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Recent Decisions
THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
I. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Misapplication of "Inextricably Intertwined" Standard Expands the
Appellate Court Standard of Review to Consider Grounds Not
Relied on by the Circuit Court When Granting
Summary Judgment
In Ross v. State Board of Elections,' the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land considered whether section 9-2092 or section 12-202' of the Elec-
tion Law Article applied to a post-election challenge seeking the
disqualification of the election winner. The Court of Appeals deter-
mined that the Circuit Court of Baltimore City erroneously relied
upon section 9-209 in granting summary judgment for the State.4
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, holding
that the challenge, filed three days after the election, was barred
under both section 12-202 and the doctrine of laches.5 The Ross court
failed to adhere to the long-standing rule requiring Maryland appel-
late courts to consider only the grounds upon which the trial court
based its judgment.6 In so acting, the Ross court effectively disre-
garded precedent and important policy considerations. 7 Further-
more, the court redefined the Election Code when it ruled that
sections 9-209 and 12-202 are inextricably intertwined and that one
could not be determined independently from the other.' The Court
of Appeals should have remanded the case for the circuit court's re-
view under section 12-202 and the doctrine of laches, which would
have protected the appellate standard of review and preserved the
separate and distinct claims under sections 9-209 and 12-202.'
1. The Case.-On June 30, 2003, Paula Johnson Branch filed a
certificate of candidacy for the Baltimore City Council seat in the
1. 387 Md. 649, 876 A.2d 692 (2005).
2. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAw § 9-209 (LexisNexis 2002).
3. Id. § 12-202.
4. Ross, 387 Md. at 667, 876 A.2d at 702.
5. Id. at 667-68, 876 A.2d at 703.
6. See infra Part 4.a.
7. See infra Part 4.b.
8. See infra Part 4.c.
9. See infra Part 4.
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Thirteenth Councilmanic District. ° After Branch won the Demo-
cratic primary, the Baltimore City Board of Elections listed Branch as
the Democratic candidate on the general election ballot." Her oppo-
nent was Green Party candidate Glenn L. Ross.
1 2
On or around October 13, 2004, the Baltimore Sun reported that
one of Branch's campaign finance entities had failed to file reports
required under section 13-3041" of the Election Law Article.14 Ross's
campaign contacted the State Board to request Branch's disqualifica-
tion under section 13-33215 during their next meeting. 6 On October
26, 2004, the State Board declined to rule on Branch's disqualifica-
tion, reasoning that the State Board should not "make any statements
that would somehow jeopardize the candidacies for [election day]
next week." 7 The State Board further suggested bringing the matter
before either the courts or the General Assembly.
18
Branch and Ross remained on the ballot. 9 In the November 2,
2004 general election, Branch defeated Ross by capturing 79.79% of
the vote.20 On December 9, 2004, Branch took the oath of office to
become a Baltimore City Councilwoman.2 1
Three days after the election, Ross challenged the election re-
sults, claiming that Branch was ineligible to be a candidate. 22 Ross
filed a petition for injunctive relief and declaratory judgment in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City.23 The circuit court denied Ross's
petition and then denied Ross's subsequent motion for a temporary
restraining order to enjoin Branch from assuming office. 2 4
10. Ross, 387 Md. at 654, 876 A.2d at 694.
11. Id. at 655-56, 876 A.2d at 695-96.
12. Id.
13. MD. CODE ANN., Eiyac. LAw § 13-304 (LexisNexis 2002). Section 13-304 requires
that a campaign finance entity report all contributions received and all expenditures made
by or on behalf of the campaign finance entity. Id.
14. Ross, 387 Md. at 655, 876 A.2d at 695.
15. MD. CODE ANN., Euc. LAw § 13-332 (LexisNexis 2002). Section 13-332 prohibits
an individual from becoming a candidate for any public or party office if the individual
failed to properly file any campaign finance reports. Id.
16. Ross, 387 Md. at 655, 876 A.2d at 695.
17. Id., 876 A.2d at 695-96.
18. Id. at 655-56, 876 A.2d at 696.
19. Id. at 656, 876 A.2d at 696.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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Ross also filed two sequential motions for summary judgment
against Branch and the State Board.2 5 In response, both Branch and
the State Board filed motions to dismiss or, in the alternative, for sum-
mary judgment.26  They argued that sections 9-20927 and 12-20228
barred Ross's claim because he failed to satisfy the required time limit
of either statute.29 On January 19, 2005, the circuit court granted
summary judgment in favor of Branch and the State Board because
Ross did not file a timely complaint under section 9-209.3o
Ross directly petitioned the Court of Appeals of Maryland pursu-
ant to section 12-203(a).3" The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to
decide, inter alia, whether the circuit court correctly determined that
Ross's complaint was properly brought under section 9-209, and if so,
whether his claim was untimely under section 9-209.32
2. Legal Background.-Generally, Maryland appellate courts will
only consider the grounds upon which the trial court relied in its
grant of summary judgment. 3 An appellate court may, however, af-
firm a case based on other grounds as long as those grounds are so
inextricably intertwined that they cannot be considered separate and
distinct.34 Maryland courts have strictly adhered to this rule and have
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Section 9-209 permits a registered voter to seek judicial review of the content and
arrangement of a ballot or to correct any other error on the ballot within three days after
the ballot is publicly displayed. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 9-209 (LexisNexis 2002).
28. If no other timely and adequate remedy is provided by the Election Law Article,
section 12-202 permits "a registered voter" to "seek judicial relief from any act or omission
relating to an election" either (1) within "[ten] days after the act or omission or the date
the act or omission became known to the petitioner" regardless of whether or not the
election has been held, or (2) within [seven] days after the election results are certified."
MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 12-202 (LexisNexis 2002). A registered voter may seek relief
"on the grounds that an act or omission: (1) is inconsistent with [the Election Law Article]
or other law applicable to the elections process; and (2) may change or has changed the
outcome of the election." Id.
29. Ross, 387 Md. at 656-57, 876 A.2d at 696.
30. Id. at 657, 876 A.2d at 696-97. Branch's motion for summary judgment was argued
before a new circuit courtjudge. Id. at 656, 876 A.2d at 696. During the hearing, Branch
also asserted that Ross's claim was barred under the doctrine of laches because he caused
prejudice to her by bringing his claim after the election when he could have brought his
claim prior to the election. Id. at 657, 876 A.2d at 696.
31. Ross, 387 Md. at 657, 876 A.2d at 697; MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAw § 12-203(a) (Lex-
isNexis 2002). Under section 12-203(a), "an appeal shall be taken directly to the Court of
Appeals within [five] days of the date of the decision of the circuit court." § 12-203(a).
32. Ross, 387 Md. at 657-58, 876 A.2d 697.
33. See infra Part 2.a.
34. See infra Part 2.b.
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only invoked an exception once. 5 Sections 9-209 and 12-202 of the
Election Code indicate two distinct grounds for relief from alleged
errors relating to an election.16 Although both sections allow regis-
tered voters to seek judicial relief for post-election disputes, section 9-
209 limits judicial review to the content and arrangement of the bal-
lot, while section 12-202 permits voters to seek relief from any act or
omission relating to an election when no other timely and adequate
remedy is provided by law.3 7
a. Maryland Appellate Courts Generally Restrict Their Review of
Summary Judgment Appeals to the Grounds upon Which the Trial Court Re-
lied.-Maryland appellate courts generally adhere to the long-estab-
lished principle of limiting review of summary judgment to the
grounds upon which the trial court relied.38 Maryland appellate
courts have repeatedly refused to speculate that summary judgment
might have been granted on grounds not reached by the trial court."
The principle maintains the role of appellate courts by limiting their
decisions to issues of law and ensures that trial judges are not deprived
of their "discretion to deny or defer until trial on the merits the entry
of judgment."4 ° The principle also allows trial courts to use their
unique ability to judge both the credibility of witnesses and the weight
of the evidence.4
b. The Court of Appeals Has Created an Exception to the General
Rule Where the Appellate Court May Consider New Grounds When Those
Grounds Are Inextricably Intertwined with the Grounds Relied upon by the
Trial Court.-In Eid v. Duke,42 the Court of Appeals of Maryland ap-
35. See Eid v. Duke, 373 Md. 2, 816 A.2d 844 (2003).
36. See infra Part 2.c.
37. See MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAw §§ 9-209, 12-202 (LexisNexis 2002).
38. E.g., PaineWebber Inc. v. East, 363 Md. 408, 422, 768 A.2d 1029, 1036 (2001);
T.H.E. Ins. Co. v. P.T.P. Inc., 331 Md. 406, 409 n.2, 628 A.2d 223, 224 n.2 (1993); Three
Garden Vill. Ltd. P'ship v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 318 Md. 98, 107-08, 567 A.2d 85,
89 (1989).
39. E.g., Brooks v. Euclid Sys. Corp., 151 Md. App. 487, 519, 827 A.2d 887, 905 (2003);
Gresser v. Anne Arundel County, 349 Md. 542, 552, 709 A.2d 740, 745 (1998); Geisz v.
Greater Baltimore Med. Ctr., 313 Md. 301, 314 n.5, 545 A.2d 658, 664, n.5 (1988).
40. Henley v. Prince George's County, 305 Md. 320, 333, 503 A.2d 1333, 1340 (1986);
see also Gresser, 349 Md. at 554, 709 A.2d at 746 (noting the importance of a clear record on
appeal and remanding the case to the Court of Special Appeals with instructions to re-
mand to the trial court for a full hearing).
41. Urban Site Venture II Ltd. P'ship v. Levering Assoc. Ltd. P'ship, 340 Md. 223, 229-
30, 665 A.2d 1062, 1065 (1995); see alsoJohnson v. Baltimore, 387 Md. 1, 5-6, 874 A.2d 439,
442 (2005) (asserting that the role of the appellate court is to decide if the trial court's
grant of summary judgment was correct as a matter of law).
42. 373 Md. 2, 816 A.2d 844 (2003).
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plied a limited exception to the principle requiring appellate courts
to consider only the grounds upon which the trial court relied in
granting summary judgment. After stating the general rule against
taking up new grounds on appeal, the court added that this principle
was only applicable when the trial court relied on one of two or more
separate and distinct grounds.43 The Eid court upheld summary judg-
ment on new grounds because the new grounds were inextricably in-
tertwined with the grounds on which the trial court relied.44 Two
issues are inextricably intertwined when each cannot be applied or
determined independently from the other.4" To determine that the
issue of a patient-physician relationship in a medical malpractice ac-
tion was inextricably intertwined with an ERISA preemption ques-
tion,46 the Court of Appeals cited a Supreme Court decision that had
already determined that the two issues were indeed inextricably inter-
twined, as well as the patient's argument, which had consistently used
the two issues interchangeably.47 The Court of Appeals therefore af-
firmed summary judgment under its newly created exception.4"
c. Registered Voters May Challenge Post-Election Contests Under
Section 9-209 or Section 12-202.-Sections 9-209 and 12-202 both govern
judicial review of challenges arising under the Election Code.49 While
Maryland courts have not yet considered any post-election challenges
under section 9-209, courts have applied and interpreted section 12-
202 in a few cases. 50 Section 9-209 and section 12-202 have not previ-
ously been considered together in the same case.
43. Id. at 10, 816 A.2d at 849.
44. Id. at 10-11, 816 A.2d at 849.
45. Id. at 15-16, 816 A.2d at 852.
46. The trial court had entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant holding
that the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempted
the plaintiff s state-law medical malpractice tort claim. Id. at 9, 816 A.2d at 848. The Court
of Special Appeals affirmed the ERISA preemption relying on the alternate ground that
the plaintiff failed to prove the requisite patient-physician relationship in a medical mal-
practice action. Id. The Court of Appeals upheld summary judgment, reasoning that the
United States Supreme Court in Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 236 (2000), determined
that the issue of a patient-physician relationship in a medical malpractice case was a neces-
sary and inextricably intertwined topic in the ERISA preemption analysis. Id. at 14-15, 816
A.2d at 851-52.
47. Id. at 14-15, 816 A.2d at 851-52.
48. Id. at 17, 816 A.2d at 853.
49. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW §§ 9-209, 12-202 (LexisNexis 2002).
50. The Court of Appeals reviews claims under section 12-202 without consideration of
section 9-209. E.g., Suessmann v. Lamone, 383 Md. 697, 862 A.2d 1 (2004) (rejecting a
section 12-202 post-election challenge without considering section 9-209); Pelagatti v. Bd.
of Supervisors of Elections for Calvert County, 343 Md. 425, 682 A.2d 237 (1995) (acting
similarly in applying the law that preceded section 12-202).
[VOL. 65:980
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Sections 9-209 and 12-202 are substantially and procedurally dis-
tinct. Section 9-209 allows registered voters to seek judicial review of
the content and arrangement of a ballot.51 On the other hand, sec-
tion 12-202 serves as a broad fall-back provision and permits registered
voters to seek judicial relief for any act or omission relating to an elec-
tion as long as no other timely and adequate remedy is provided in
the Election Code.5 2 Therefore, under the plain language of the stat-
ute, section 12-202 designates a remedy only when all other provisions
in the Code are unavailable.53
Section 9-209 and section 12-202 also set forth different timing
requirements. Under section 9-209, a valid challenge must be made
within three days after the ballot is publicly displayed.54 In contrast,
under section 12-202, a general election challenge must be made ei-
ther ten days after the act or omission was made or became known to
the challenger or seven days after the election results are certified.55
Finally, the two sections have different relief provisions. Under
section 9-209, the court "may require the local board to: (1) correct
an error; (2) show cause why an error should not be corrected; or (3)
take any other action required to provide appropriate relief."56
Under section 12-202, "a registered voter may seek judicial relief
from" an unlawful act or omission "relating to an election."57 The
courts have interpreted judicial relief to include "the voidance of an
already-held election as well as a judicially instituted new election."5
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Ross v. State Board of Elections, the
Court of Appeals upheld the circuit court's entry of summary judg-
ment in favor of the State Board of Elections and Paula Johnson
Branch.59 The Ross court found that the circuit court erroneously re-
lied on section 9-209 to grant summary judgment.6" The court none-
theless upheld the decision under section 12-202 and the common-law
doctrine of laches, a ground also raised at trial by the election
challenger.6'
51. § 9-209(a).
52. § 12-202 (a).
53. Id.
54. § 9-209(a).
55. § 12-202(b)(1)-(2).
56. § 9-209(b) (1)-(3).
57. § 12-202(a).
58. Suessmann v. Lamone, 383 Md. 697, 709-10, 862 A.2d 1, 8 (2004).
59. 387 Md. at 673, 876 A.2d at 706.
60. Id. at 667, 876 A.2d at 702.
61. Id. at 667-68, 876 A.2d at 702-03.
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The court began its analysis by exploring the scope and meaning
of section 9-209.62 Upon reviewing the legislative history of that sec-
tion, the court recognized the ability of registered voters to seek judi-
cial redress for errors on a ballot.63 The court interpreted the plain
language of section 9-209 to permit judicial review of the content and
arrangement of a ballot.64 The court found that this review was lim-
ited to general facial aspects of the ballot and did not include candi-
date qualifications. Because Ross was challenging a substantive
aspect of Branch's qualification as the Democratic candidate, the
Court of Appeals held that the circuit court erroneously granted sum-
mary judgment based on the timing provision of section 9-209(a).66
After determining that the circuit court incorrectly granted sum-
mary judgment under section 9-209, the Court of Appeals concluded
that Ross failed to file a timely petition because section 12-202(b) was
intertwined with section 9-209.67 The court reasoned that because
Ross attached the October 13, 2004 Baltimore Sun article to his Novem-
ber 5 petition, Ross was aware, on October 13, of Branch's failure to
file campaign finance reports.68 Under section 12-202(b), the court
found that Ross filed his petition more than ten days after October 13
and thereby failed to file a timely petition under section 12-202.69
The court further found that even if "the ten-day time period
under section 12-202 began to run on October 26th," Ross's action
remained barred by the doctrine of laches.7 0 The court reasoned that
Ross's delay in bringing his claim three days after the election
prejudiced Branch, the State Board, and the residents of the Thir-
teenth Councilmanic District.71 Relying on Eid v. Duke, the court then
concluded that because sections 9-209 and 12-202 were "similar and
intertwined," 72 the court would affirm summary judgment under sec-
62. Id. at 661-65, 876 A.2d at 699-701.
63. Id. at 662-63, 876 A.2d at 700.
64. Id. at 665, 876 A.2d at 701.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 666-67, 876 A.2d at 702.
67. Id. at 667-68, 876 A.2d at 702-03.
68. Id. at 668, 876 A.2d at 703.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 668 n.8, 876 A.2d at 703 n.8. Ross filed his claim on November 5, 2004. Id. at
668, 876 A.2d at 703. Under section 12-202, Ross would have met the requisite ten-day
time period if the time began to run on October 26, 2004, when the State Board refused to
rule on Branch's disqualification. Id. at 668 n.8, 876 A.2d at 703 n.8.
71. Id. at 672-73, 876 A.2d at 706.
72. Id. at 667-68, 876 A.2d at 703.
986 [VOL. 65:980
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tion 12-202 and the doctrine of laches, new grounds not considered
by the circuit court.
73
In his dissent, Chief Judge Bell disagreed with the majority's
grounds for reviewing Ross's claim under section 12-202 and the doc-
trine of laches.74 Chief Judge Bell rejected the court's application of
Eid, reasoning that the majority failed to demonstrate the similarity
between sections 9-209 and 12-202 or the doctrine of laches.75 In par-
ticular, Chief Judge Bell was concerned with the court's usurpation of
the trial court's role.76 He feared that the court's broad application of
the Eid exception would swallow the rule requiring appellate courts to
limit review only to grounds considered by the trial court. 77
4. Analysis.-In Ross v. Board of Elections, the Court of Appeals
upheld summary judgment on grounds not relied on by the circuit
court.78 In so holding, the court failed to adhere to the well-settled
rule limiting appellate review of summary judgment only to those
grounds relied on by the circuit court.79 The court also disregarded
precedent and important policy considerations.8 ° Furthermore, the
majority's decision to consider sections 9-209 and 12-202 as inextrica-
bly intertwined redefined the Election Code, which treats the two sec-
tions as separate and distinct.81 The Court of Appeals should have
remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions to reconsider
the case under section 12-202, which would have protected the appel-
late standard of review and preserved the separate and distinct claims
for judicial review under sections 9-209 and 12-202 of the Election
Code.82
a. The Court of Appeals Failed to Adhere to the General Rule Limit-
ing Appellate Court Review Only to the Grounds on Which the Trial Court
Relied in Granting Summary Judgment.-In Ross v. Board of Elections, the
court failed to follow clear precedent when it affirmed summary judg-
ment on grounds not relied on by the circuit court.83 Maryland appel-
73. Id. at 673, 876 A.2d at 706.
74. Id. at 679-80, 876 A.2d at 709-10 (Bell, C.J., dissenting). Judge Raker joined the
dissent. Id at 673, 876 A.2d at 706.
75. Id. at 680, 876 A.2d at 710.
76. Id. at 674, 876 A.2d at 706-07.
77. Id. at 680-81, 876 A.2d at 711.
78. Id. at 673, 876 A.2d at 706 (majority opinion).
79. See supra Part 4.a.
80. See supra Part 4.b.
81. See supra Part 4.c.
82. See supra Part 4.
83. Ross, 387 Md. at 667, 876 A.2d at 702-03.
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late courts generally follow the principle that they will review a grant
of summary judgment only on the grounds relied upon by the trial
court.8 4 But the Ross court diverged from this precedent," thereby
disturbing a settled rule of law.
The principle limiting appellate review only to the grounds on
which the trial court relied maintains the roles of the circuit court to
determine the record of fact and the appellate court to review only
the law as applied to the record of fact.8 6 These distinct roles permit
trial courts to determine facts and appellate courts to limit their re-
view based on the trial court's findings.8 7 In addition, the separate
roles ensure that the trial court retains its discretion "to deny or to
defer until trial on the merits the entry of judgment."88
In Ross, remand would have not only protected the appellate stan-
dard of review, but also would have preserved the separate and dis-
tinct claims under sections 9-209 and 12-202 of the Election Code."
Instead, the Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment under the
new grounds of section 12-202.9o In so doing, the Court of Appeals
blurred the roles of appellate and trial courts, undermined the princi-
ple of stare decisis, and deprived the circuit court of the discretion to
apply the merits of section 12-202 to Ross.9
b. The Court of Appeals's Broad Application of the Exception Per-
mitting Appellate Courts to Consider Grounds Not Relied on by the Circuit
Court Violates Precedent and Important Policy Considerations.-When the
Ross court failed to demonstrate that sections 9-209 and 12-202 were
inextricably intertwined, the court expanded an exception to the gen-
eral rule that limits appellate courts to review grounds relied upon by
trial courts.9 2 The narrow exception had previously been applied by
the court in Eid because the new grounds and the grounds relied on
by the trial court were inextricably intertwined. 3 Two issues are inex-
tricably intertwined when one issue cannot be determined indepen-
84. Id. at 667, 876 A.2d at 702.
85. Id., 876 A.2d at 702-03.
86. Johnson v. Baltimore, 387 Md. 1, 5-6, 874 A.2d 439, 442 (2005) (noting that the
role of the appellate court is to decide if the trial court properly granted summary judg-
ment according to the law).
87. Urban Site Venture II Ltd. P'ship v. Levering Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 340 Md. 223, 229-
30, 665 A.2d 1062, 1065 (1995).
88. Henley v. Prince George's County, 305 Md. 320, 333, 503 A.2d 1333, 1340 (1986).
89. See supra Part 2.c.
90. Ross, 387 Md. at 672-73, 876 A.2d at 705-06.
91. See supra Part 2.a.
92. Ross, 387 Md. at 680-81, 876 A.2d at 711 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
93. Eid. v. Duke, 373 Md. 2, 10-11, 816 A.2d 844, 849 (2003).
988 [VOL. 65:980
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dently from the other.9 4 The Ross court applied Eid's narrow
exception, finding that sections 9-209 and 12-202 are inextricably in-
tertwined, despite the plain language of the sections indicating that
they are two separate and distinct provisions for judicial review.95 In
so doing, the court broadened the exception and defied precedent at
the expense of the policy preferences that preserve the separate roles
of trial courts, which determine the facts, and appellate courts, which
apply law to facts.9 6
In Ross, the court concluded that the circuit court erroneously
applied section 9-209 in granting summary judgment.9" Upon recog-
nizing the error, the appeals court could have adhered to precedent
and remanded the case to the circuit court.98 In so doing, the court
would have followed stare decisis and maintained the separate and
distinct claims of sections 9-209 and 12-202 of the Election Code.9 9
In contrast to Eid, which relied upon a Supreme Court ruling that
the disputed issues were inextricably intertwined, ° ° the Ross court did
not cite any precedent or demonstrate how sections 9-209 and 12-202
are inextricably intertwined.' 0 1 In applying the Eid exception without
finding such entwinement, the court expanded a rare and narrow ex-
ception to the general rule. 10 2 This broader exception will deprive
trial judges of their discretion to deny or defer many judgments until
trial. 103 Furthermore, because appellate court review is limited to the
record of facts determined by the trial court, appellate courts are not
in the best position to make the factual determinations underlying
separate and distinct claims. Thus, the application of the Eid excep-
tion in Ross dangerously departs from precedent that requires narrow
exception and protects the separate roles of trial courts to determine
facts and appellate courts to apply the law.
c. The Court's Application of the Eid Exception Despite the Failure
to Prove the Entwinement of Sections 9-209 and 12-202 Frustrates the Intent of
the Election Code.-In upholding summary judgment on grounds not
relied upon by the trial court, the Ross court improperly concluded
94. Id. at 15-16, 816 A.2d at 852.
95. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAw §§ 9-209, 12-202 (LexisNexis 2002).
96. See supra Part 2.a.
97. 387 Md. at 667, 876 A.2d at 702 (majority opinion).
98. See, e.g., Henley v. Prince George's County, 305 Md. 320, 333, 503 A.2d 1333, 1340
(1986).
99. See supra Part 2.c.
100. 373 Md. 2, 13-15, 816 A.2d 844, 850-52 (2003).
101. See Ross, 387 Md. at 667-68, 876 A.2d at 703.
102. Id. at 680-81, 876 A.2d at 711 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 674, 876 A.2d at 707.
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that sections 9-209 and 12-202 were inextricably intertwined.' °4 Two
issues are inextricably intertwined when one issue cannot be deter-
mined independently of the other.10 5 In contrast to Eid, where the
court determined that two issues were inextricably intertwined based
on a Supreme Court holding and the petitioner's interchangeable use
of the two issues, the Court of Appeals in Ross neither cited nor ex-
plained their reasoning for concluding that sections 9-209 and 12-202
were entwined. 10 6 In fact, sections 9-209 and 12-202 cannot be inextri-
cably intertwined because section 12-202 (a) requires that a registered
voter may only seek relief under section 12-202 when "no other timely
and adequate remedy is provided by [the Election Law article]. ' O7
Because the scope of section 12-202 is defined in terms of the absence
of other remedies, section 12-202 must be mutually exclusive from sec-
tion 9-209.108 Therefore, section 12-202 cannot be inextricably inter-
twined with section 9-209 or any other section in the Election Code.
Indeed, prior to considering Ross, Maryland courts had upheld or dis-
missed election challenges based on the provisions of section 12-202,
without considering any other Election Code sections providing judi-
cial relief.' 9 Both statutory language and Maryland jurisprudence in-
dicate that section 12-202 is not inextricably intertwined with section
9_209.110
The court in Ross also failed to recognize that sections 12-202 and
9-209 are distinct in their time requirement, scope of review, and rem-
edies."' Registered voters therefore have two separate and distinct
means to seek judicial relief from any act or omission relating to an
election.1 2 Courts should base their decisions on one section or the
other, not both. Therefore, to conclude sections 9-209 and 12-202 are
inextricably intertwined not only departs from precedent, but frus-
trates the intent of the Election Code." 3
5. Conclusion.-The Ross court upheld summary judgment
under section 12-202 of the Election Law Article and the doctrine of
104. See supra Part 2.c.
105. Eid, 373 Md. at 15-16, 816 A.2d at 852.
106. Ross, 387 Md. at 667-68, 876 A.2d at 703.
107. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 12-202(a) (LexisNexis 2002).
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Suessmann v. Larnone, 383 Md. 697, 862 A.2d 1 (2004); Pelagatti v. Bd. of
Supervisors of Elections for Calvert County, 343 Md. 425, 682 A.2d 237 (1995).
110. See supra Part 2.c.
111. Compare MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAw § 9-209 (LexisNexis 2002), with § 12-202.
112. Id.
113. See supra Part 2.c.
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laches, grounds not relied upon by the trial court.114 In so doing, the
court failed to adhere to the long-standing rule requiring Maryland
appellate courts to consider only the grounds on which the trial court
relied when granting summary judgment.1 5 It also effectively disre-
garded precedent and important policy considerations. 1 6 Further-
more, the court redefined the Election Code when it found that
sections 9-209 and 12-202 could not be determined independently
from one or the other." 7 The Court of Appeals should have re-
manded the case for the circuit court's review under section 12-202
and the doctrine of laches, thereby protecting the appellate standard
of review and preserving the separate and distinct claims under sec-
tions 9-209 and 12-202 of the Election Code. 18
AMw SANDRA LEE
114. Ross, 387 Md. at 673, 876 A.2d at 706.
115. See supra Part 4.a.
116. See supra Part 4.b.
117. See supra Part 4.c.
118. See supra Part 4.
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II. CRIMINAL LAW
A. An Inappropriate and Unnecessary Expansion of
Felony Murder in Maryland
In Roary v. State,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered
for the first time whether the common-law second-degree felony-mur-
der rule applies in cases where felonious assault is the underlying fel-
ony.2 In a 4-3 decision, the court held that first-degree assault is a
proper predicate felony for second-degree felony murder.3 The effec-
tive result of the court's broad holding is that any participant in an
assault, regardless of whether she struck the fatal blow or foresaw a
deadly result, can be convicted of second-degree murder.4 Thus, the
court's decision unwisely and unnecessarily extends the scope of sec-
ond-degree common-law felony murder in Maryland.5
In reaching its decision, the court rejected the merger doctrine,
which precludes felonious assault as a predicate for felony murder.6
Instead, the court mistakenly relied on a deterrence rationale that em-
phasized conduct rather than intent.7 The court's deterrence justifi-
cation was flawed, however, because it incorrectly presumed that
rejecting the merger doctrine would deter dangerous assaults.8 More-
over, by focusing on conduct rather than intent, the court failed to
consider individual culpability and proportionality, two cornerstones
of modern criminal law.9 This misguided approach renders the statu-
tory punishment scheme for homicide largely ineffective and will, as it
did in Roary, lead to illogical, disproportionate punishments.10 Fi-
nally, the court's decision to allow assault as a predicate to felony mur-
der permits prosecutors to circumvent the requirement to prove
1. 385 Md. 217, 867 A.2d 1095 (2005).
2. In Maryland, only first-degree assault is a felony. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-
302 (LexisNexis 2005).
3. Roary, 385 Md. at 222, 867 A.2d at 1098.
4. See id. at 255, 867 A.2d at 1117 (Raker, J., dissenting) (questioning the application
of the felony-murder rule to an accomplice who did not intend to kill, did not inflict the
fatal blow, and was unaware that the actual killer had a deadly weapon).
5. See infra Part 4.c.
6. The merger doctrine limits the underlying felonies in felony murder to those that
are independent of the resulting homicide. See infra notes 75-102 and accompanying text.
The merger doctrine in the felony-murder context is different from the merger principle
that applies in sentencing. Roary, 385 Md. at 232 n.14, 867 A.2d at 1103 n.14.
7. Roary, 385 Md. at 235-36, 867 A.2d at 1105-06.
8. See infra Part 4.a.
9. See infra notes 181-188 and accompanying text.
10. See infta notes 176-199 and accompanying text.
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intent to kill and subsumes much of Maryland's second-degree mur-
der and manslaughter law into felony murder.'
The court should have instead followed the lead of a number of
other states and adopted the merger doctrine to preclude assault as a
predicate for felony murder.12 In doing so, the court would have im-
posed a reasonable limitation on the felony-murder doctrine while
preserving an appropriate punishment scheme for homicide in
Maryland."
1. The Case.--On December 27, 2001, while Michael Roary, his
cousin Charles Peters, and a friend, Charles Lucas, were standing on a
street corner in Baltimore, Lucas mistakenly identified Charles Banks,
III, as someone who had previously robbed Lucas.14 Upon seeing
Banks leave a nearby house, Peters chased Banks and fired several
shots at him.' 5 Banks fled with Roary, Peters, and Lucas in pursuit.'6
Randolph Sheppard, who was standing on a nearby street, heard cries
to stop Banks. 7 Sheppard tripped Banks and began kicking and
punching him.'" When Roary, Peters, and Lucas arrived, they joined
Sheppard in beating Banks. 9
At some point during the beating, two of the assailants dropped a
large, heavy boulder20 on Banks's head.21 Although the record did
not clearly indicate which two of the four attackers dropped the boul-
der, Roary was undisputably not one of them.22 Roary's role in the
beating was limited to kicking Banks's leg.2" When the attack ended,
11. See infra Part 4.c.
12. See infra notes 75-102 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 199, 202-204 and accompanying text.
14. 385 Md. at 222-23, 867 A.2d at 1098.
15. Id. at 223, 867 A.2d at 1098.
16. Id.
17. Id. Roary claimed that Peters called out to Sheppard to stop Banks; however, at
trial, another witness testified that Roary was the one who yelled to Sheppard. Id. at 223
n.2, 867 A.2d at 1098 n.2.
18. Id. at 223, 867 A.2d at 1098.
19. Id.
20. Id. The trial record referred to the object as a brick; however, because the object in
question was 2.5 feet wide and weighed twenty to thirty pounds, the Court of Appeals felt
that the term "boulder" more accurately characterized the object. Id. at 223 n.3, 867 A.2d
at 1098 n.3.
21. Id. at 223, 867 A.2d at 1098. The boulder was dropped twice-one time each by
two different assailants. Id.
22. Id. According to Roary, Peters dropped the boulder first, then Lucas picked up the
boulder and dropped it a second time. Id. According to another witness, however, it was
Sheppard, not Lucas, who dropped the boulder the second time. Id. The State adopted
the latter account as its view of the facts. Id.
23. Id.
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Roary and Lucas recovered the gun.2 4 Sheppard and Peters arrived in
a car, picked up Roary and Lucas, and attempted to flee.25 The police
chased and subsequently apprehended the four men.
26
Banks died ten months later from injuries sustained during the
beating.27 Roary was tried in Baltimore City and convicted of involun-
tary manslaughter, first- and second-degree assault, conspiracy, trans-
porting a handgun in a vehicle, and second-degree felony murder
with first-degree assault as the predicate felony.28 The jury acquitted
him of first-degree murder,29 second-degree "intent to kill" murder,
and transporting a handgun on his person."0 The judge sentenced
Roary to thirty years for felony murder, five years consecutive for con-
spiracy, and three years concurrent for the handgun charge."1
Roary filed a timely appeal in the Maryland Court of Special Ap-
peals; however, before the court could consider his case, the Maryland
Court of Appeals, on its own motion, granted certiorari 2 to consider
whether the trial court erred in ruling that first-degree assault is a
proper underlying felony for common-law second-degree felony
murder.3 3
2. Legal Background.-The felony-murder doctrine has its roots
in the common law of England. 4 Although England abolished the
24. Id.
25. Id. at 224, 867 A.2d at 1098-99.
26. Id., 867 A.2d at 1099.
27. Id. at 222, 867 A.2d at 1097-98.
28. Id., 867 A.2d at 1097.
29. The trial court granted a motion for judgment of acquittal for the first-degree mur-
der count before the case went to the jury. Id. at 224 n.5, 867 A.2d at 1099 n.5.
30. Id. at 224, 867 A.2d at 1099.
31. Id. The State sought a sentence of thirty years for felony murder, twenty-five years
consecutive for conspiracy, and three years consecutive for the handgun charge-a total
sentence of fifty-eight years. Id. at 245 n.20, 867 A.2d at 1111 n.20. The Maryland sentenc-
ing guidelines prescribed twenty to thirty years for second-degree felony murder, eight to
fifteen years for conspiracy, and one to five years for transporting a handgun in a vehicle.
Id. Two of the other assailants, Sheppard and Peters, pled guilty to second-degree murder
and conspiracy to commit first-degree assault and were each sentenced to twenty-five years
with all but fifteen years suspended. Id. at 224, 867 A.2d at 1099. Because Lucas's trial was
scheduled after Roary's, the outcome of Lucas's trial was not indicated in the record of
Roary's trial. Id.
32. Roary v. State, 381 Md. 674, 851 A.2d 593 (2004).
33. Roary, 385 Md. at 222, 867 A.2d at 1098. The court also considered two other is-
sues: whether the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury regarding second-degree
felony murder and whether the trial court impermissibly considered Roary's refusal to tes-
tify against his co-conspirators in determining his sentence. Id. at 222, 867 A.2d at 1098.
34. People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 307 (Mich. 1980).
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felony-murder rule in 1957," 5 most states, including Maryland, still re-
tain it in some form.3 6 Under the felony-murder rule, if a homicide
occurs during the commission of or attempt to commit a felony, the
actor may be punished for murder, whether or not she intended to
kill her victim. 7 To prove felony murder, the prosecution must first
establish the elements of the underlying felony and then show that
death occurred during the commission of that felony.38 There is no
requirement to prove intent to kill because proving every element of
the felony establishes, by operation of law, the malice that elevates the
offense to murder. 39 Therefore, the felony-murder rule is an excep-
tion to the modern criminal law principle that a crime requires an
actus reus coupled with a specific mens rea for every element of the
crime.4 ° Because the prosecution does not have to prove the intent
element of murder, felony murder is a strict liability offense with re-
spect to the homicide. 4'
a. Maryland Homicide Law.-In Maryland, criminal homi-
cide that is not excused or justified is either murder or manslaugh-
ter.42 Murder and manslaughter are two distinct crimes, not merely
different degrees of felonious homicide.43 Murder is the unjustified,
unexcused killing of a human being with malice aforethought."4 The
35. See Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, § 1 (providing that a killing that occurs
during the commission of a felony is not murder unless the malice aforethought otherwise
required for murder exists).
36. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 314. Only Hawaii and Kentucky have expressly abolished the
rule. Id.
37. Fisher v. State, 367 Md. 218, 248, 786 A.2d 706, 724 (2001).
38. Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260, 269, 373 A.2d 262, 267 (1977).
39. Id. at 268-69, 373 A.2d at 267. There are two views of how the felony-murder rule
operates. The first is a variation on transferred intent, sometimes referred to as construc-
tive malice, in which the intent to commit the felony is transferred to the homicide. E.g.,
Commonwealth v. Scott, 564 N.E.2d 370, 377 (Mass. 1990). The second view, which ap-
pears to be the one accepted by the Maryland courts, is that the felony-murder rule makes
the commission of a felony a distinct form of implied malice. See, e.g.,Jackson v. State, 286
Md. 430, 435, 408 A.2d 711, 715 (1979) (stating that the fact that a person was engaged in
perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate a felony is sufficient to supply the element of
malice).
40. See Brooks v. State, 104 Md. App. 203, 217, 655 A.2d 1311, 1317 (1995) (stating that
in Maryland, a person convicted of felony murder may receive a death sentence without a
specific finding of mens rea that accompanied the homicide); People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d
304, 317 (Mich. 1980) (observing that in felony murder, there is no need to prove a rela-
tionship between the defendant's mental state and the homicide).
41. State v. Williams, 24 S.W.3d 101, 110 (Mo. App. 2000).
42. Hook v. State, 315 Md. 25, 27-28, 553 A.2d 233, 234-35 (1989).
43. Id. at 28 n.2, 553 A.2d at 234 n.2.
44. Jackson v. State, 286 Md. 430, 435, 408 A.2d 711, 714 (1979).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
malice requirement for murder is satisfied by either express malice 45
or one of three types of implied malice: (1) intent to cause grievous
bodily harm, (2) depraved heart (willful and wanton disregard for the
value of human life), and (3) felony murder.46 The first two types of
implied malice permit a jury to infer the malice necessary to elevate a
homicide to murder.47 In felony murder, the malice required for
murder is imputed upon proof of commission of the underlying fel-
ony and the resultant homicide.4" Therefore, when felony murder is
the basis for implied malice, the jury decides the issue of intent with
respect to the underlying felony but not with respect to the intent to
commit murder.4"
In 1809, Maryland adopted a statute that defined degrees of mur-
der.5" The purpose of this statute was not to alter the common-law
definition of murder but rather to allocate appropriate punishments
according to the severity of the crime.51 In the 1809 Act, first-degree
murder was defined as murder that was willful, deliberate, or premedi-
tated; murder committed by means of poison or lying in wait; and
murder that occurred during the commission of or attempt to commit
certain enumerated felonies. 2 All other murders were classified as
second-degree murder.53 The present statute retains the same defini-
tions of murder, although the list of enumerated felonies qualifying as
first-degree murder has expanded to include statutory felonies such as
escape and kidnapping.54
Manslaughter is the unjustified, unexcused killing of a human be-
ing without malice aforethought.55 There are two forms of man-
45. Express malice is actual intent to kill. Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 696, 349
A.2d 300, 335 (1975).
46. Id. at 696, 349 A.2d at 335.
47. Lindsay v. State, 8 Md. App. 100, 104-05, 258 A.2d 760, 764 (1969).
48. Evans, 28 Md. App. at 699, 349 A.2d at 337. In Evans, Judge Moylan stated in dicta
that implied malice is a misnomer-it does not imply malice; rather, implied malice consti-
tutes malice by definition. Id. at 700, 349 A.2d at 337.
49. See Ross v. State, 308 Md. 337, 341, 519 A.2d 735, 737 (1985) (stating that it is not
necessary to prove intent to kill under Maryland's first-degree felony-murder statute).
50. Act of 1809, ch. 138, § 3, 1809 Md. Laws 458, 459.
51. Davis v. State, 39 Md. 355, 375 (1874).
52. Act of 1809, ch. 138, § 3.
53. Id.
54. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAw § 2-201 (a) (LexisNexis 2005) (first-degree murder);
§ 2-204(a) (second-degree murder). The enumerated felonies for first-degree felony mur-
der are arson in the first degree; burning a barn, stable, tobacco house, warehouse, or
other outbuilding; burglary in the first, second, or third degree; carjacking or armed
carjacking; escape in the first degree; kidnapping; mayhem; rape; robbery; sexual offense
in the first or second degree; sodomy; and illegal use of destructive devices. § 2-201 (a).
55. Selby v. State, 361 Md. 319, 332, 761 A.2d 335, 342 (2000).
[VOL. 65:992
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
slaughter: voluntary and involuntary.56 Voluntary manslaughter is an
intentional killing committed in the heat of passion with adequate
provocation and before a reasonable opportunity for a "cooling off"
period.57 Although voluntary manslaughter, like murder, is inten-
tional killing, the mitigating circumstances-heat of passion, ade-
quate provocation, and no "cooling off' period-cancel out the
malice that would otherwise make the killing murder.5" In contrast,
involuntary manslaughter is an unintentional killing without malice
that results from an unlawful act that endangers life, a negligent but
lawful act, or a negligent omission to perform a legal duty.5 9
b. Development of First- and Second-Degree Felony Murder in Mary-
land.-At common law, there were only a few felonies, nearly all of
which were punishable by death, and the felony-murder rule applied
to all of them.6" When Maryland adopted a statutory scheme defining
degrees of murder, the legislature classified homicides occurring dur-
ing certain enumerated felonies as first-degree murder.6" Unlike the
clear statutory basis for first-degree felony murder, the origins of sec-
ond-degree felony murder are more obscure. Because Maryland ad-
heres to the common-law definition of murder and the felony-murder
rule, second-degree murder based on a felony other than those enu-
merated in the first-degree murder statute has always existed, at least
implicitly, in Maryland law.6 2 It was not until 2001, however, that the
Maryland Court of Appeals, in Fisher v. State, unequivocally recognized
second-degree felony murder as a criminal offense in Maryland.6" In
Fisher, a nine-year-old girl died of malnutrition and dehydration result-
56. Id.
57. Id. The doctrine of imperfect self-defense is another mitigating factor that negates
malice and reduces murder to voluntary manslaughter. Roach v. State, 358 Md. 418, 430-
31, 749 A.2d 787, 794-95 (2000).
58. Selby, 361 Md. at 332 n.14, 761 A.2d at 342 n.14.
59. Id. at 332, 761 A.2d at 342.
60. People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 310 (Mich. 1980); see State v. Anderson, 666
N.W.2d 696, 698-99 (Minn. 2003) (noting that despite its apparent breadth, the common-
law felony-murder rule was inevitably limited in scope because there were so few felonies
recognized at the time).
61. Act of 1809, ch. 138, § 3, 1809 Md. Laws 458, 459. In 1809, the felonies that served
as predicates for felony murder were arson, rape, robbery, burglary, sodomy, and mayhem.
Id.
62. See Fisher v. State, 367 Md. 218, 238 n.4, 786 A.2d 706, 718 n.4 (2001) (suggesting
that, except for manslaughter, other inherenfly dangerous felonies not listed in the first-
degree murder statute could serve as predicates for felony murder, and if so, the offense
would be second-degree murder).
63. Id. at 251, 786 A.2d at 726. In Fisher, the trial judge, on his own initiative, intro-
duced the possibility of ajury instruction on second-degree felony murder. Id. at 237, 786
A.2d at 717. Before Fisher, the Court of Special Appeals had been the only Maryland court
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ing from severe and continuous child abuse.64 The child's mother
and older sister, along with the older sister's boyfriend, were con-
victed of felony murder with felony child abuse as the underlying fel-
ony.65 The mother and sister appealed, claiming that felony child
abuse was not a proper underlying felony for felony murder.66 In up-
holding the conviction, the Court of Appeals concluded that Mary-
land recognizes common-law second-degree felony murder in cases
where the underlying felony is not one of those enumerated in the
first-degree murder statutes.6 7 The court also held that the predicate
felonies for felony murder are not limited to felonies that existed at
common law and implied that any inherently dangerous felony would
suffice.6 s Moreover, in another decision filed the same day as Fisher,
the court expressly stated that its holding in Fisher applied not just to
felony child abuse but to other inherently dangerous felonies not
listed in the first-degree murder statute.69
c. The Merger Doctrine as a Limitation on Felony Murder. -The
felony-murder doctrine has been widely criticized as a harsh, anachro-
nistic, and unnecessary rule.70  Courts and legislatures have re-
sponded to the expansion of the felony-murder doctrine by imposing
limitations on its operation. The most common limitations require
that the felonious act must (1) be one that is inherently dangerous to
human life,7 ' (2) proximately cause the death,72 (3) have a temporal
to refer to second-degree felony murder, and its references were limited to brief mentions
in dicta. E.g., Harvey v. State, 111 Md. App. 401, 408, 681 A.2d 628, 631 (1996).
64. 318 Md. at 230, 786 A.2d at 714-715.
65. Id. at 226, 786 A.2d at 711. The three defendants resided in the same household
with the victim and a third sister, who was also abused but survived. Id. The boyfriend was
convicted of second-degree murder based on both intent to kill and felony murder. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 251, 786 A.2d at 726. At the time that the events of Fisher transpired, the
felony-murder provisions of the first-degree murder statute were codified at MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, §§ 407-410 (1996). Id. at 247 n.9, 786 A.2d at 723 n.9. During the time
period relevant to Roary's case, and at present, those provisions are found at MD. CODE
ANN., CRiM. LAw § 2-201 (a) (4) (LexisNexis 2005).
68. Fisher, 367 Md. at 253-54, 263, 786 A.2d at 727, 733.
69. Deese v. State, 367 Md. 293, 296, 786 A.2d 751, 752 (2001). Deese, like Fisher, in-
volved a conviction for second-degree felony murder based on felony child abuse. Id. at
295.
70. E.g., People v. Burroughs, 678 P.2d 894, 902 (Cal. 1984) (Bird, C.J., concurring);
People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 307 (Mich. 1980).
71. E.g., Barnett v. State, 783 So. 2d 927, 929 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000); Lawson v. State,
64 S.W.3d 396, 399 (Tex. 2001). Many states require that the felony be inherently danger-
ous under the particular circumstances of the case. E.g., Lawson, 64 S.W.3d at 399. A
minority of states, however, require that the felony must be inherently dangerous in the
abstract. E.g., People v. Hansen, 885 P.2d 1022, 1026 (Cal. 1994). Under the abstract
analysis, the defendant's conduct under the particular facts of the case is not considered.
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connection to the resulting death (res gestae requirement), and (4)
be independent of the homicide.7 4 The last of these limitations is
known as the merger doctrine. 7' The merger doctrine is a judicially
created limitation that precludes assault from serving as the basis for a
felony-murder charge when the victim of the assault is also the victim
of the homicide.7 6 Assault was not a felony at common law,77 but most
states now have at least some form of felonious assault in their stat-
utes. 78 In Maryland, first-degree assault is a statutory felony defined as
intentionally causing or attempting to cause serious physical injury, or
committing an assault with a firearm.79
The merger doctrine was first enunciated and applied in 1878 in
State v. Shock.8" In Shock, a young boy died several days after receiving
a severe beating from the defendant.8" The trial court convicted the
Id. Finally, some states view the felony both in the abstract and under the particular cir-
cumstances of the crime to determine its inherent danger. E.g., State v. Cole, 542 N.W.2d
43, 53 (Minn. 1996). Maryland appears to have adopted this dual approach. See Fisher, 367
Md. at 263, 786 A.2d at 733 (holding that the nature of the crime or the particular circum-
stances of its commission determine whether a felony is inherently dangerous).
72. E.g., Jenkins v. State, 230 A.2d 262, 269 (Del. 1967); see Commonwealth v. Wade,
697 N.E.2d 541, 544 n.3 (Mass. 1998) (stating that death must be the natural and probable
consequence of the felony).
73. E.g., Haskell v. Commonwealth, 243 S.E.2d 477, 483 (Va. 1978); see Aaron, 299
N.W.2d at 313 (stating that the time period of commission of the felony should be nar-
rowly construed).
74. E.g., Barnett, 783 So. 2d at 930; State v. Essman, 403 P.2d 540, 545 (Ariz. 1965);
Commonwealth v. Wade, 697 N.E.2d 541, 544 n.3 (Mass. 1998).
75. The merger doctrine precludes felonies that are integral to the homicide from
serving as predicates to felony murder. See infra notes 81-102 and accompanying text.
76. State v. Burkhart, 103 P.3d 1037, 1050 (Mont. 2004) (Leaphart, J., dissenting).
77. Fisher v. State, 367 Md. 218, 251, 786 A.2d 706, 726 (2001). The common-law
felonies are rape, sodomy, robbery, burglary, arson, mayhem, and larceny. Id.
78. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 240 (West 2005), WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.011 (2005).
79. MD. CODE ANN., CruM. LAW § 3-202(a) (1)-(2) (LexisNexis 2005). A serious physical
injury is one that creates a substantial risk of death or that results in a permanent or long-
term disfigurement or loss of function or impairment of a bodily member or organ. Id.
§ 3-201 (c). The term "assault" encompasses the crimes of assault, assault and battery, and
battery, which retain their judicially defined meanings. Id. § 3-201 (b). Additionally, all
assaults in Maryland qualify as second-degree assault, which is a misdemeanor. Id. § 3-203.
The present two-tiered assault statute was instituted in 1996 after the General Assem-
bly replaced the entire statutory scheme dealing with assault, mayhem, and statutory maim-
ing. Act of May 23, 1996, ch. 633, 1996 Md. Laws 3616, 3629. The former assault statutes
differentiated among several types of felonious aggravated assaults, such as assault with
intent to murder, assault with intent to maim, assault with intent to rape, and assault with
intent to rob. See MD. CODE ANN., CRaM. LAw § 12A (LexisNexis 1995). The General As-
sembly also repealed the crimes of mayhem and statutory maiming, id. §§ 384-386, al-
though, curiously, mayhem remains a predicate felony for first-degree felony murder in
the new statutory scheme. MD. CODE ANN., CRAM. LAw § 2-201 (a) (LexisNexis 2005).
80. 68 Mo. 552 (1878).
81. Id. at 557.
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defendant of first-degree murder based on felony murder with assault
as the underlying felony.8 2 The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed
the conviction, holding that the defendant's acts of violence against
the boy were necessary elements of the homicide that merged into
it.8" Thus, the beating did not constitute a distinct offense and could
not serve as a predicate felony for a first-degree felony-murder
conviction.84
After Shock, most of the development of the merger doctrine oc-
curred in New York, where the rule was first enunciated in People v.
Huter.85 In Huter, the New York Court of Appeals reversed a convic-
tion for felony murder based on assault with a handgun. 6 The court
held that "the [assault] may constitute a part of the homicide, yet the
other elements constituting the felony ... must be so distinct from
that of the homicide as not to be an ingredient of the homicide." 8
Thus, if the act that caused death was an assault that resulted in the
death of the victim, the assault "merged" with the homicide.88
The Huter court distinguished assault from acts committed with a
"collateral and independent felonious design," such as rape and rob-
bery, that result in death.89 In crimes such as rape, robbery, and kid-
82. Id. at 556. The jury was instructed that if it found that the defendant intended to
inflict great bodily harm and death resulted, then those findings were sufficient to establish
first-degree murder. Id. at 558. This instruction was based on a similar instruction from an
earlier case, which had been approved under Missouri's felony-murder statute. Id. The
felony-murder statute at that time provided that "[h]omicide, committed in the attempt to
perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary or other felony, shall be deemed murder in
the first degree." Id. at 559. Another statute made acts inflicting great bodily harm on
another person a felony. Id. Therefore, assault could serve as a predicate to felony murder
under the Missouri statutes at that time.
83. Id. at 561.
84. Id. at 561-62.
85. 77 N.E. 6 (N.Y. 1906). When Huter was decided, New York, like Missouri at the
time of Shock, had a statute that classified as first-degree murder a killing that occurred
during the attempt or commission of any felony. Id. at 7. After Huter, the New York Court
of Appeals continued to develop and apply the merger doctrine in subsequent cases. See,
e.g., People v. Moran, 158 N.E. 35 (N.Y. 1927) (reversing a first-degree murder conviction
that was based solely on felony murder, where the felony was shooting a police officer);
People v. Wagner, 156 N.E. 644, 646 (N.Y. 1927) (stating that the law requires that the
predicate felony must be independent of and not included within the resulting homicide).
86. Under the New York murder statute in effect at the time, any felony could serve as
the underlying felony for felony murder. Huter, 77 N.E. at 7.
87. Id. at 8.
88. Id. at 8-9.
89. Id. at 9. While an assaultive act often occurs during a rape or robbery, and arguably
must occur for those offenses to result in death, the assault is not an essential ingredient
that defines the entire crime. People v. La Marca, 144 N.E.2d 420, 428 (N.Y. 1957); Buel v.
People, 78 N.Y. 492, 497 (1879).
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napping, an element other than assault forms the basis of the crime.9"
When a felony-murder charge is based on the underlying felony of
rape, the intent to commit rape substitutes for the intent to kill.91
The intent to commit rape, which forms the basis for the felony-mur-
der charge, is distinct from the accompanying intent to commit the
assaultive behavior that causes death, such as choking or beating.92 In
contrast, when a single assaultive act results in homicide, the only in-
tent is the intent to commit the assault.93 Thus, there is no intent
based on a separate, collateral felony, in addition to the assaultive in-
tent, to supply the necessary intent to kill. 4
While New York developed and applied the merger doctrine in
the context of first-degree felony murder, other states, notably Califor-
nia, have applied the doctrine to preclude assault as a predicate felony
for second-degree felony murder.95 In People v. Ireland, the California
Supreme Court decided that assault with a deadly weapon could not
serve as the predicate felony for second-degree felony murder.96 In
Ireland, the defendant, who was suffering from depression and marital
troubles, fatally shot his wife.97 The court held that second-degree
felony murder could not be predicated upon a felony that was an inte-
gral part of the homicide and that was an included offense within the
homicide.9" In later decisions, the California Supreme Court modi-
90. See, e.g., Bue4 78 N.Y. at 497 (stating that carnal knowledge is the essence of rape);
La Marca, 144 N.E.2d at 428 (stating that the essence of child kidnapping is the intent to
conceal the child from her parent or to extort or obtain money or a reward for the child's
return).
91. Commonwealth v. Wade, 697 N.E.2d 541, 546 (Mass. 1998).
92. Bue4 78 N.Y. at 497.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. In addition to Maryland, states that recognize common-law second-degree felony
murder include California, Massachusetts, and Nevada. People v. Robertson, 95 P.3d 872,
878 (Cal. 2004); Commonwealth v. Matchett, 436 N.E.2d 400, 407 (Mass. 1982); Sheriff of
Clark County v. Morris, 659 P.2d 852, 859 (Nev. 1983). Other states have expressly de-
clined to recognize second-degree felony murder absent legislative action. See, e.g., Sawyer
v. People, 478 P.2d 672, 674 (Colo. 1970) (concluding that statutory scheme foreclosed
existence of second-degree felony murder in Colorado); State v. Randolph, 676 S.W.2d
943, 946 (Tenn. 1984) (declining to adopt a judicially created second-degree felony-mur-
der rule). In 1980, the Michigan Supreme Court judicially abrogated common-law felony
murder, declaring that the mental element of murder may not be satisfied by proof of the
underlying felony. People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 329 (Mich. 1980).
96. 450 P.2d 580, 590 (Cal. 1969). Thejudicially created second-degree felony murder
has existed in California since 1872. People v. Burroughs, 678 P.2d 894, 903 (Cal. 1984)
(Bird, C.J., concurring).
97. 450 P.2d at 582.
98. Id. at 590.
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fled its version of the merger doctrine to require an independent felo-
nious purpose, bringing it closer to the New York approach.99
A number of other states have adopted the merger doctrine,
often citing the reasoning in New York or California cases as their
basis for doing so.'00 As a result, there is no single expression of the
merger doctrine.' 1 However, although courts applying the merger
doctrine have expressed the rule in different ways, the net result is
always that assaultive conduct merges with the homicide. 10 2
d. Rationales for Limiting the Felony-Murder Doctrine.-The ori-
gin and original purpose of the felony-murder doctrine are un-
clear.10 3 The original common-law justification for felony murder
apparently hinged on general moral blameworthiness: because a felon
was generally viewed as a "bad person with a bad state of mind," when
she committed an act with a bad result, it was unimportant whether
she actually intended that result.'0 4 With time, the concept of mens
99. People v. Hansen, 885 P.2d 1022, 1029 (Cal. 1994).
100. E.g., Barnett v. State, 783 So.2d 927, 930 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000); State v. Essman,
403 P.2d 540, 545 (Ariz. 1965). In 1967, New York effectively incorporated the merger
doctrine into its revised felony-murder statute by limiting allowable predicate felonies to
eight specific crimes, of which assault was not one. People v. Lozano, 434 N.Y.S.2d 588,
590 (1980).
101. See, e.g., Ireland, 450 P.2d at 590 (holding that felony murder cannot be based on
acts which are an integral part of the homicide and which are included in fact in the
homicide); People v. Morgan, 758 N.E.2d 813, 838 (Ill. 2001) (stating that acts that arise
from and are inherent in the act of murder itself cannot serve as predicates to felony
murder); Commonwealth v. Wade, 697 N.E.2d 541,545 (Mass. 1998) (requiring the under-
lying felony to be separate from the homicide).
102. Ireland, 450 P.2d at 590.
103. People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 309 (Mich. 1980). The court in Aaron concluded
that the doctrine appears to derive from a misinterpretation of early common-law cases.
Id. at 308-09. Lord Dacres's Case and Mansell & Herbert's Case, two cases often cited as early
expositions of the felony-murder rule, actually dealt with different concepts. Id. at 307-08
(citing Lord Dacres's Case, (1535) 72 Eng. Rep. 458 (KB.), and Mansell & Herbert's Case,
(1558) 73 Eng. Rep. 279 (KB.)). It appears that when English commentators first stated
the rule, their basis for doing so was doubtful. Burroughs, 678 P.2d at 905 (Bird, C.J., con-
curring). For example, modern scholars have concluded that Sir Edward Coke's version of
the felony-murder rule in his Third Institute of the Laws of England, which stated that an
unlawful act that resulted in killing was murder, had no foundation in law or reason. Id. at
906. Sir Michael Foster's subsequent statement of the rule limiting its application to un-
lawful acts done with felonious intent was based on dictum in one case, Rex v. Plummer,
(1701) 84 Eng. Rep. 1103 (KB.), which itself cited only Coke as its authority. Aaron, 299
N.W.2d at 311. Later statements of the rule by eighteenth century English commentators,
such as Sir William Blackstone and Sir William Hawkins, repeated Foster's version of the
rule. Id.
104. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d. at 317 (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AuSTIN W. SCOTT, CRIMI-
NAL LAw 560 (1972)). One commentator suggests that the primary purpose was to deal
with homicides that resulted from attempted felonies because at common law, an at-
tempted felony was only a misdemeanor. Id. at 309 n.24. The felony-murder rule would
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rea evolved from a vague notion of criminal disposition to a specific
mental state requirement. 10 5 As a result, the justification for the fel-
ony-murder doctrine shifted to deterrence. The more common deter-
rent rationale suggests that the purpose of the felony-murder rule is to
prevent accidental or negligent killings during felonies.10 6 Another
rationale is to deter the underlying felonies themselves.'0 7
At early common law, virtually all felonies were punishable by
death.1"8 Thus, application of the felony-murder doctrine made no
practical difference and caused no injustice because the punishment
was the same whether a person was convicted of the felony itself or of
felony murder. 09 Over time, however, states began to enact statutory
felonies, many of which were not as severe as the common-law felo-
nies.1"0 As a result, courts began to view the felony-murder rule as an
unacceptably harsh doctrine that unfairly broadened the scope of
murder."11 Courts also noted the apparent harshness of the felony-
murder doctrine's conflict with modem notions of liability in propor-
tion to moral culpability.' 12
In People v. Moran, in an opinion written by Judge (later Justice)
Cardozo, the New York Court of Appeals articulated one of the most
cited reasons for applying the merger doctrine. 1 3 In Moran, the de-
fendant was convicted of first-degree felony murder for shooting a po-
lice officer.114 The appellate court reversed, holding that the element
then operate to punish the would-be felon as if she had successfully carried out her crime.
Id.
105. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) (stating that the require-
ment that an injury be intentional to be considered a crime is a "universal and persistent
notion in mature systems of law"); Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 318 (stating that at early common
law, mens rea was a vague concept encompassing any intentional wrongdoing); Regina v.
Cunningham, (1957) 2 Q.B. 396 (Crim. App.) (indicating that general wicked nature no
longer sufficed to provide requisite mental element of murder).
106. E.g., People v. Hansen, 885 P.2d 1022, 1027 (Cal. 1994); State v. Williams, 24
S.W.3d 101, 110 (Mo. App. 2000); People v. Miller, 297 N.E.2d 85, 87-88 (N.Y. 1973).
107. E.g., Lawson v. State, 64 S.W.3d 396, 398 (Tex. Cim. App. 2001).
108. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 310.
109. Id. at 310-11.
110. SeeJenkins v. State, 230 A-2d 262, 268 n.7 (Del. 1967) (noting that an unqualified
felony-murder rule would be incongruous with statutory felonies such as forgery, counter-
feiting, embezzlement, pandering, and pimping).
111. E.g., In re Personal Restraint of Andress, 56 P.3d 981, 983 (Wash. 2002).
112. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983) (stating that the principle of propor-
tionality is "deeply rooted" in the common law); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 697-98
(1975) (stating that degree of culpability, not just guilt or innocence, is a concern in crimi-
nal law). Furthermore, in Enmund v. Florida, the Supreme Court emphasized the impor-
tance of individual culpability in the context of felony murder. 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982).
113. 158 N.E. 35, 36 (N.Y. 1927).
114. Id.
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of intent should not be eliminated simply because a felony was com-
mitted or because a homicide occurred during its commission. 115 Be-
cause nearly every homicide originates in an assault, the court
reasoned that without the merger doctrine there would never be a
need to prove intent to kill, deliberation, and premeditation." 6 Many
courts have echoed Judge Cardozo's view, explaining that the merger
limitation was necessary to prevent the extinction of second-degree
murder and manslaughter.' 1 7
Courts have advanced similar arguments in second-degree felony-
murder cases. For example, in People v. Ireland, the California Su-
preme Court stated that if the merger doctrine did not apply, juries
would not be able to consider the issue of malice whenever a homi-
cide occurs as a result of a felonious assault-the vast majority of
cases. i s Subsequently, the California Supreme Court explained that
to elevate all felonious assaults resulting in death to second-degree
murder would usurp much of the law of homicide and would frustrate
the legislature's intent to create punishments proportional to culpa-
bility. " The California Supreme Court has also justified its applica-
tion of the merger doctrine based on its view that the purpose of the
felony-murder rule-to deter accidental or negligent killing during
felonies-is not realized when the felony-murder rule is applied to
assault cases. 120
Finally, although some state courts have refused to apply the
merger doctrine, they have usually done so to comply with legislative
intent or specific statutory language that expressly includes assault as a
predicate felony for felony murder.12  Moreover, in several states
where statutory language precludes adoption of the merger doctrine,
courts have nonetheless approved of it as an appropriate limitation on
felony murder.' 22
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. E.g., Barnett v. State, 783 So. 2d 927, 930 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000); State v. Branch,
415 P.2d 766, 767 (Ore. 1966).
118. 450 P.2d 580, 590 (Cal. 1969).
119. People v. Hansen, 885 P.2d 1022, 1028 (Cal. 1994).
120. People v. Mattison, 481 P.2d 193, 198 (Cal. 1971). In Mattison, the court suggested
that the felony-murder rule will not deter an assailant from carrying out an assault, nor will
it deter negligent or accidental killing in the case of an assault. Id. at 198-99. The court
explained that only when a felony has a separate purpose other than assault can a deter-
rent effect be realized. See id. at 198.
121. E.g., State v. Williams, 24 S.W.3d 101, 117 (Mo. App. 2000); Lawson v. State, 64
S.W.3d 396 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); State v. Thompson, 558 P.2d 202, 205 (Wash. 1977).
122. See, e.g., Lawson, 64 S.W.3d at 401 (Cochran, J., concurring) (recognizing that the
common-law felony-murder rule was overbroad and that the merger doctrine was a reason-
able means of limiting it); Williams, 24 S.W.3d at 117 (approving the state appellate courts'
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3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Roary v. State, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland held that first-degree assault committed in a manner that
is inherently dangerous to human life may serve as the predicate fel-
ony for second-degree felony murder in Maryland. t23 After first ad-
dressing a procedural matter, 24 Judge Greene, writing for the
majority, began by discussing the doctrine of felony murder and its
application in Maryland. 12 5 After defining the common-law felony-
murder rule, Judge Greene stated that the purpose of the modern
felony-murder rule is to deter violent conduct by punishing homicide
resulting from dangerous felonies such as murder, recognizing that
society views a felony that results in death as more serious than one
that does not.126 Then, quoting language from an earlier case, Judge
Greene explained that in felony murder, participation in the felony
supplies the element of malice necessary to elevate the offense to
murder. 1
27
prior endorsement of the doctrine as a means of keeping the felony-murder rule within its
logical bounds, while noting its present duty to enforce the felony-murder statute as writ-
ten); State v. Wanrow, 588 P.2d 1320, 1320-21 (Wash. 1978) (recognizing the harshness of
the felony-murder rule but stating that it could not adopt the merger doctrine without
invading the legislature's province of defining crimes).
123. Roary, 385 Md. at 236, 867 A.2d at 1106. The court also found no error in the two
additional questions Roary raised on appeal regarding the jury instructions and the criteria
used in sentencing. Id. at 222, 867 A.2d at 1098. With respect to the jury instructions, the
court's holding that first-degree assault was a proper underlying felony for second-degree
felony murder negated Roary's argument that the judge's felony-murder instruction was
improper. Id. The court also held Roary's additional arguments that the jury instructions
were prejudicial to be without merit. Id. at 237-38, 867 A.2d at 1106-07. Finally, the court
held that the trial court did not use impermissible criteria in determining Roary's sentence
and rejected his contention that the judge penalized him for refusing to testify against his
co-conspirators. Id. at 242, 248, 867 A.2d at 1109, 1113.
124. The court first addressed whether Roary had properly preserved the issue of
whether first-degree assault could serve as the underlying felony for second-degree felony
murder. Id. at 225, 867 A.2d at 1099. Under Rule 8-131(a), the appellate court will not
ordinarily decide issues other than subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction un-
less the trial record shows that the issue was clearly raised in or decided by the trial court.
Id., 867 A.2d at 1100 (citing MD. R. 8-131(a) (LexisNexis 2005)). However, the court may
decide an issue that was not clearly raised to provide guidance for the trial court or in the
interest of economy and efficiency. Id. at 225-26, 867 A.2d at 1100. Although the court
concluded that Roary had not properly preserved the issue, the court nevertheless exer-
cised its discretion under Rule 8-131 (a) to consider the issue on the merits. Id. at 225, 867
A.2d at 1099-1100.
125. Id. at 226-27, 867 A.2d at 1100-01. Judges Cathell, Harrell, and Battagliajoined in
the majority opinion. Id.
126. Id. at 227, 867 A.2d at 1100.
127. Id., 867 A.2d at 1100-01 (citingJackson v. State, 286 Md. 430, 408 A.2d 711 (1979)).
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The majority then restated the three conclusions pertaining to
second-degree felony murder that the court had reached in Fisher.'
2 8
First, predicate felonies for felony murder are not limited to those
enumerated in the first-degree murder statute. 129 Second, underlying
felonies for felony murder are not restricted to those offenses which
were felonies at common law. 3 ' Finally, a felony must be dangerous
to life, either by its nature or by the manner and circumstances in
which it was committed, to serve as an underlying offense to felony
murder.' 3 ' The majority also explained the accomplice liability rule
as it applies to felony murder in Maryland: if a felon commits homi-
cide during a felony, all participating co-felons are guilty of
murder. 13
2
After reviewing the statutory definition of first-degree assault, the
majority applied the Fisher standard to Roary's case and concluded
that first-degree assault qualifies as a felony that is dangerous to life.' 33
Based on this conclusion, the majority held that first-degree assault is
a proper underlying felony for second-degree felony murder.1
34
The majority then considered and ultimately rejected Roary's
proposal that it adopt the merger doctrine, which would preclude as-
sault as a predicate to felony murder.'35 First, the majority noted a
distinction between the common-law evolution of Maryland's felony-
murder law and that of other states that have adopted codes in lieu of
common-law crimes."l 6 The court stated that Maryland has amelio-
rated the harshness of the felony-murder rule by limiting the underly-
ing felonies to those that are dangerous to human life, but otherwise
the rule still operates to supply the element of malice to elevate the
128. Id. at 227-29, 867 A.2d at 1101-02 (citing Fisher v. State, 367 Md. 218, 786 A.2d 706
(2001)). The Roary court referred to Fisher, the case in which the Court of Appeals first
recognized common-law second-degree felony murder as an offense in Maryland, as the
"seminal case in Maryland regarding common law second-degree felony murder." Id. at
227, 867 A.2d at 1101.
129. Id. at 228, 867 A.2d at 1101.
130. Id. at 228-29, 867 A.2d at 1101.
131. Id. at 229, 867 A.2d at 1101.
132. Id., 867 A.2d at 1102.
133. Id. at 230, 867 A.2d at 1102. The court found first-degree assault to be dangerous
both by its nature, as a crime that "creates a substantial risk of death," and under the
particular circumstances of this case, an assault by four men in which a twenty- to thirty-
pound boulder was dropped on the victim's head. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 232-36, 867 A.2d at 1103-06.
136. Id. at 231, 867 A.2d at 1102-1103. The majority noted that the delineation of mur-
der into degrees in the Acts of 1809 was intended to create different punishments, but "did
not alter the common law felony murder doctrine." Id. at 231 n.12, 867 A.2d at 1103 n.12.
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homicide to murder.1 7 The court then reviewed several cases from
other jurisdictions that discuss the merger doctrine and considered
the arguments in favor of the merger doctrine. The court then reiter-
ated its position that the felony-murder doctrine is justified if the felo-
nious acts are sufficiently dangerous to human life and stated that its
focus in applying the felony-murder doctrine was on the participants'
conduct in committing or attempting to commit the felony." 8 The
majority asserted that rejecting the merger doctrine would deter
would-be felons whose acts create a foreseeable risk of death, either
inherently or under the particular circumstances of their actions.1 39
In rejecting the merger doctrine, the court recognized that its posi-
tion is contrary to that of a number of other states who have adopted
merger. 14
0
Judge Raker dissented, joined by ChiefJudge Bell and Judge Wil-
ner.14 1 In Judge Raker's view, the predicate felony for felony-murder
must be independent of the homicide and therefore must be inde-
pendent of the assault that merges into the homicide.' 42 Although
Judge Raker agreed with the majority that Maryland jurisprudence in-
cludes the felony-murder doctrine in both common-law and statutory
form, she objected that the majority's holding extended the felony-
murder rule in contrast with the trend around the country. 143 Judge
Raker noted that such an extension is unwarranted in light of the his-
tory of the felony-murder rule and modern trends in criminal law."4
The dissent made three arguments against the majority's position
that assault is a proper underlying felony for felony murder. First,
Judge Raker contended that the merger doctrine is necessary because
if assault is a proper underlying felony, the different grades of homi-
cide would be obliterated.1 45 She then asserted that adopting the
merger doctrine would not preclude second-degree murder prosecu-
tions when warranted because Maryland homicide law provides three
other modalities for establishing second-degree murder aside from
felony murder.146 Thus, Judge Raker concluded, in many cases, a
137. Id. at 231-32, 867 A.2d at 1103.
138. Id. at 235-36, 867 A.2d at 1105-06.
139. Id. at 236, 867 A.2d at 1106. The court reaffirmed the principle that one who
participates in a felony is responsible for the "natural and probable consequences" of his
actions. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 249, 867 A.2d at 1113 (Raker, J., dissenting).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 250, 867 A.2d at 1114.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 252, 867 A.2d at 1115.
146. Id. at 253, 867 A.2d at 1116.
2006] 1007
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
"dangerous to life" assault that results in death will implicate the de-
fendant under one of the other theories of second-degree murder.
147
In such cases, she argued, felony murder is unnecessary to establish
intent. 118
Finally, the dissent suggested that allowing first-degree assault to
serve as the predicate felony does not advance the purpose of the fel-
ony-murder doctrine.' 49 Judge Raker stressed that in Fisher, the court
made clear that the primary purpose of the modern felony-murder
rule is to deter dangerous conduct. 5 ' She argued that the purpose of
deterring accidental or negligent killings is not served by finding mur-
der when the defendant intentionally commits a dangerous, life-
threatening assault.' 51 Judge Raker also questioned the deterrent ef-
fect when the rule is applied to an accomplice who did not intend to
commit murder and did not know that the ultimate killer had a
deadly weapon. t5 2
4. Analysis.-In Roary v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
held that first-degree assault is a proper predicate felony for second-
degree felony murder.15 In so holding, the court declined to adopt
the merger doctrine, which would have precluded crimes such as as-
sault, that are inherently part of the resulting homicide, from serving
as the underlying felony. 15 4 The court's refusal to adopt the merger
doctrine inappropriately broadens the scope of felony murder in
Maryland. 15
5
In reaching its decision, the Roary court failed to consider several
negative consequences that flow from its rejection of the merger doc-
trine. First, the court's decision will not serve the majority's pur-
ported deterrent goals because allowing assault to serve as a predicate
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 254, 867 A.2d at 1116.
150. Id. Judge Raker elaborated further, quoting a commentator's description of several
deterrent purposes of felony murder: to deter accidental or negligent killing, to reduce
the risk that homicide will occur during commission of a felony, and to deter intentional
killing. Id. at 254-55, 867 A.2d at 1116 (citing James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the
Felony-Murder Rule: A Study of the Forces That Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH & LEE L. REV.
1429, 1448-49 (1994)).
151. Id. at 255, 867 A.2d at 1117.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 222, 867 A.2d at 1098 (majority opinion).
154. See supra notes 80-94 and accompanying text.
155. See infra Part 4.c.
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felony will not deter would-be assailants from committing assaults. 156
Second, in choosing to adhere to an outdated view of criminal law in
which the focus is on a defendant's conduct instead of her culpability,
the court has adopted a rule that will result in unfair, illogical, and
disproportionate punishments. 15 7 Finally, the court's decision allows
prosecutors to circumvent the intent requirement for second-degree
murder, thus effectively eliminating the entire scheme of second-de-
gree intent-to-kill murder from Maryland law.15 1
The Roary court should have followed the lead of a number of
other states and adopted the merger doctrine to limit the scope of
second-degree felony murder.159  Adopting the merger doctrine
would also have been a better policy decision in terms of modern
criminal justice principles that emphasize individual culpability and
proportionality of punishment.' Moreover, such a decision would
have maintained control over prosecutorial discretion in charging fel-
ony murder and protected the statutory scheme of homicide grada-
tions adopted by the General Assembly.161
a. Allowing Assault as a Predicate Felony Will Not Deter Danger-
ous Assaults.-In Roary, the court justified its rejection of the merger
doctrine by citing the goal of deterring dangerous felonies.1 62 How-
ever, the majority's conclusion that allowing assault to serve as a predi-
cate offense for felony murder will deter potential criminals from
committing dangerous felonies is misguided in several respects. First,
the court failed to realize that a punishment intended as a deterrent
will be more effective when it is directed at the intended harm rather
than at an unintended, greater result.163 Second, the court neglected
the fact that Maryland law already provides a significant penalty, up to
twenty-five years in prison, for first-degree assault.164 The penalty for
156. See infra Part 4.a. According to the majority, the purpose of the felony-murder rule
is to deter dangerous conduct, and it does so by punishing such conduct as murder when it
occurs during a felony. Roary, 385 Md. at 226-27, 867 A.2d at 1100.
157. See infra notes 176-199 and accompanying text.
158. See infra Part 4.c.
159. See supra notes 75-102 and accompanying text.
160. See infra notes 176-199 and accompanying text.
161. See Davis v. State, 39 Md. 355, 375 (1874) (recognizing that murder includes of-
fenses that differ in degree of atrocity and stating the intent of the Maryland homicide
statute to differentiate punishments for murder according the specific circumstances of
commission).
162. 385 Md. at 236, 867 A.2d at 1106.
163. Norval Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA. L. REv.
50, 67 (1956); Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at
Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. Rv. 446, 452 (1985).
164. MD. CODE ANN., CRiM. LAW § 2-302(b) (LexisNexis 2005).
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second-degree murder, including felony murder, is thirty years.165 If
the threat of twenty-five years in prison does not by itself deter assaults
that are dangerous to life, it is unlikely that the threat of an additional
five years will do so either.166
Finally, the deterrent effect of felony murder on the commission
of felonies lacks empirical support. 167 The deterrence rationale de-
pends on the premise that a disproportionate number of deaths occur
during felonies, 168 but statistics reveal that it is highly unlikely that
commission of a felony will result in death. 169 For instance, in En-
mund v. Florida, the Supreme Court considered whether an accom-
plice whose role in a robbery that resulted in homicide was limited to
driving the getaway car could be sentenced to death after being con-
victed of felony murder."7 ' The Court concluded that imposing the
death penalty for felony murder was not a justifiable deterrent for the
felony itself.'7 1 The Court based its conclusion on an examination of
national crime statistics from 1980 which indicated that the rates of
homicides occurring during robberies, rapes, and burglaries were ex-
tremely lOW. 17 2 Recent data from 2004 show similarly low rates, reaf-
firming the Court's conclusion that a significantly harsher penalty will
not deter dangerous felonies.' Although these data did not include
165. Id. § 2-204(b).
166. See Russell R. Barton, Comment, Application of the Merger Doctrine to the Felony Murder
Rule in Texas: The Merger Muddle, 42 BAYLOR L. REV. 535, 544 (1990) (arguing that assault
statutes already provide adequate deterrence for dangerous acts causing death). One au-
thor has even suggested that if the penalty for the underlying felony is nearly as severe as
the penalty for felony murder, a felon may be encouraged to kill in order to prevent a
victim from later identifying him. Jeanne Siebold, Comment, The Felony-Murder Rule: In
Search of a Viable Doctrine, 23 CATH. LAw. 133, 152 (1978).
167. See Tomkovicz, supra note 150, at 1460.
168. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 59 (Little, Brown & Co. 1923)
(1881).
169. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800 n.24 (1982) (citing statistics which indicated
that only 0.43% of robberies resulted in homicide); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. n.96
(1959) (citing statistics from Philadelphia in 1948-1952 indicating that the rates of homi-
cides occurring during dangerous felonies were 0.50% for robbery, 0.35% for rape, and
0.0036% for burglary).
170. 458 U.S. at 799.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. U.S. DEPT. OFJUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES
2004: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 18, 22 (2004) (presenting data on the circumstances of
14,121 of the estimated 16,137 murders that occurred in United States. Of the 2089 homi-
cides that occurred during felonies, 36 occurred during rapes, 988 occurred during rob-
beries, and 71 occurred during burglaries. Id. at 22, tbl.2.12. In 2004, there were 94,635
rapes, 401,376 robberies, and 2,143,546 burglaries in the United States. Id. at 22, 37, 45.
Thus, the rates of homicides occurring during these felonies were 0.038% for rape (36 of
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assaults, there is no reason to believe that the deterrent effect on as-
saults would be any different.174
In summary, the Roary court's rejection of the merger doctrine
under a deterrence rationale is not justified. It is much more likely
that the deterrent goal would be realized through the certainty and
severity of punishment for first-degree assault, which in Maryland may
be up to twenty-five years in prison. 7
b. The Court's Refusal to Adopt the Merger Doctrine Promotes Illog-
ical Results and Punishments Disproportionate to Culpability.-As Roaiy il-
lustrates, the Court of Appeals's refusal to apply the merger doctrine
is likely to lead to illogical results. In Roary, the jury acquitted the
defendant of second-degree murder based on intent to kill and intent
to cause grievous bodily harm.' 76 Therefore, the jury must have
found that Roary lacked the intent to kill and the intent to commit
serious bodily harm. However, the jury found Roary guilty of second-
degree felony murder with first-degree assault as the underlying fel-
ony. 177 To convict Roary on this charge, the jury had to find that he
met the intent requirement for first-degree assault, which is the intent
to commit serious bodily harm. 17 Therefore, in the same case, on the
same facts, the jury findings led to two incongruous results: Roary did
not commit second-degree murder under a traditional second-degree
murder theory because he did not intend to cause serious bodily
harm, yet Roary did commit second-degree murder under the theory
of felony murder based on assault because he intended to cause seri-
ous bodily harm. This illogical outcome in Roary follows directly from
the court's application of the felony-murder doctrine to a predicate
felony of assault.
1 79
94,635 rapes resulted in homicide), 0.246% for robbery (988 of 401,376), and 0.004% for
burglary (71 of 2,143,456).
174. This is especially true because there are already significant deterrents to assault,
including the possibility of being charged with murder if the victim dies. See infra notes
202-204 and accompanying text.
175. See Tomkovicz, supra note 150, at 1456 (arguing that very few of the already small
number of deaths that occur during felonies are not already subject to a significant crimi-
nal sanction, making it even less likely that the additional risk of a murder conviction will
influence prospective felons).
176. 385 Md. at 224, 867 A.2d at 1099. Intent to commit serious bodily harm is also one
of the types of implied malice that can be used to elevate homicide to murder. Evans v.
State, 28 Md. App. 640, 696, 349 A.2d 300, 335 (1975).
177. Roary, 385 Md. at 224, 867 A.2d at 1099.
178. MD. CODE ANN., CRiM. LAW § 2-302 (LexisNexis 2005).
179. In an assault case, unlike rape or robbery, there is no separate felonious conduct,
in addition to the assaultive act causing death, that elevates the crime to murder. See supra
notes 89-94 and accompanying text. Because the assault is the only felonious conduct,
2006] 1011
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
In rejecting the merger doctrine, the Roay court mistakenly fo-
cused on the result of the participants' conduct without considering
each person's individual culpability.1 80 This misplaced emphasis on
conduct will likely lead to disproportionate punishments, as it did in
Roary's case.' While conduct is a consideration in determining cul-
pability, the court appears to have completely ignored the more im-
portant factor of the defendants' individual states of mind.' 82 In
doing so, the court reverted to the outdated view of culpability that
prevailed when the felony-murder rule was first developed and mens
rea was a nebulous and general concept. 83 Thus, the majority's ap-
proach in Roary contrasts sharply with the modern understanding of
criminal law that emphasizes individual culpability and proportional
punishment. 18 4 Even those who have argued for the felony-murder
doctrine acknowledge that proportionality is a critical consideration
and that the merger doctrine supports the objective of proportional
punishment.
185
The Roary majority also failed to recognize that the felony-murder
rule, which holds a defendant strictly liable for a homicide without
considering his state of mind, violates proportionality principles that
require assessment of individual culpability.' 86 Applying strict liability
in the context of murder conflicts with the modern notion that strict
liability is acceptable only for offenses that carry minor moral stigmas
and punishments.1 87 Unlike public welfare and regulatory offenses
applying the felony-murder rule when assault is the predicate felony results in inappropri-
ate and illogical bootstrapping. People v. Ireland, 450 P.2d 580, 590 (Cal. 1969).
180. 385 Md. at 236, 867 A.2d at 1106.
181. See id. at 224, 867 A.2d at 1099 (imposing a sentence of thirty-five years where more
culpable accomplices received sentences of fifteen years).
182. See Tamu Sudduth, Note, The Dillon Dilemma: Finding Proportionate Felony-Murder
Punishments, 72 CAL. L. REv. 1299, 1314 (1984) (stating that the predominant factors in
determining criminal culpability are the offender's mental state and the magnitude of the
harm). In homicides, the magnitude of harm-loss of life-does not vary from case to
case. Therefore, a defendant's mental state is the major factor in assessing culpability. Id.
183. Roth & Sundby, supra note 163, at 458. The theory that a felon's evil mind justified
severe punishment originated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Id This the-
ory focuses on the harm resulting from an unlawful act rather than the felon's intent. Id.
184. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
185. David Crump & Susan Waite Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine, 8 HARv.
J. L. & PUB. POL'v 359, 379, 381 (1985).
186. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. (1980) (stating that the homicide in fel-
ony murder is a strict liability offense because liability for murder is based on culpability
for the underlying felony without proof of culpability for the resulting death); see also Peo-
ple v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 134 (Cal. 1965) (stating that the felony-murder rule "er-
odes the relation between criminal liability and moral culpability").
187. See Tomkovicz, supra note 150, at 1452-53.
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for which strict liability is considered appropriate, murder carries one
of the worst stigmas and the highest penalties. 8 '
Likewise, the Roary court did not account for the far-reaching im-
plications when felony murder is combined with accomplice liabil-
ity.' 89 When the killer is one of a group of co-felons, the felony-
murder rule ignores the extent of an individual's particular miscon-
duct when determining culpability.'9 ° The result is a double applica-
tion of strict liability that can lead to unfair and disproportionate
outcomes such as the result in Roary.'91 Roary's individual bad con-
duct during the assault was limited to kicking the victim in the leg,'92
while two of the other assailants dropped a twenty-five- to thirty-pound
boulder on the victim's head, directly causing his death. 193 During
Roary's sentencing, the trial judge recognized that Roary was not the
killer 94 and that the two killers had received sentences of only fifteen
years each.' 95 Nevertheless, Roary was held responsible for the acts of
his co-felons and sentenced to thirty-five years in prison.196 This out-
come, in which the least culpable actor received the most severe pun-
ishment, defies modern criminal law concepts of individual culpability
and proportionality of punishment."'
The court could have avoided this result if it had adopted the
merger doctrine. Although Roary's conviction for felony murder
would have been overturned, his conviction for involuntary man-
slaughter would not have been affected.198 Thus, he would have been
188. Id. at 1454.
189. It is well-established under Maryland law that an accomplice is responsible for the
natural and probable results of her acts and the acts of her co-felons in furtherance of a
common scheme. Campbell v. State, 293 Md. 438, 443-44, 444 A.2d 1034, 1038 (1982).
190. People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 317 (Mich. 1980); see People v. Burroughs, 678
P.2d 894, 909 (Cal. 1984) (Bird, C.J., concurring) (suggesting that applying vicarious liabil-
ity to an accomplice who did not commit the act causing death is the most objectionable
aspect of the felony-murder doctrine).
191. See Siebold, supra note 166, at 153 (arguing that all felons involved in an intentional
or reckless killing can be found criminally responsible without the need to implicate mens
rea through agency).
192. Roary, 385 Md. at 223, 867 A.2d at 1098.
193. See Brief of Appellee at 20, Roary, 385 Md. 217, 867 A.2d 1095 (No. 25) (stating that
blunt force injury to the head was the cause of death).
194. Roary, 385 Md. at 246, 867 A.2d at 1112 (stating that "the truth in this case is that
this Defendant, Roary, is not the killer").
195. Id. at 224, 867 A.2d at 1099.
196. Id.
197. See infra notes 181-188 and accompanying text.
198. See Roamy, 385 Md. at 255, 867 A.2d at 1117 (Raker, J., dissenting) (noting that the
jury found Roary guilty of second-degree felony-murder and two counts of involuntary
manslaughter).
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held responsible for his actions, but under a sentence much more in
line with his culpability. 199
Finally, the result in Roary conflicts with the General Assembly's
desire to punish different crimes according to both their severity and
the culpability of each defendant. 2 0 This desire is reflected in the
homicide statute, which assigns punishments for the crimes of first-
degree murder, second-degree murder, first-degree assault, and invol-
untary manslaughter according to the severity and seriousness of the
crimes. 20 1 Moreover, in designating a twenty-five-year maximum sen-
tence for first-degree assault, the legislature recognized the potential
severity of that offense.20 2 Because the difference in maximum
sentences for first-degree assault and second-degree murder is only
five years, even if the merger doctrine precludes a felony-murder pros-
ecution, ajudge can assign a nearly identical penalty for a first-degree
assault conviction. Therefore, had the Roary court adopted the
merger doctrine, a first-degree assault resulting in death could still be
severely punished. Additionally, the merger doctrine will not pre-
clude murder liability in homicide cases where an assailant truly in-
tends to kill or to cause serious bodily harm. As the dissent in Roary
emphasized, there is no need to broaden the scope of felony murder
because the other types of implied malice allow a prosecutor to bring
charges of second-degree murder under appropriate circum-
stances. 20 3 Therefore, felony murder with assault as a predicate felony
is a redundancy in Maryland's well-established second-degree murder
jurisprudence. 20 4
c. The Roary Court's Decision Inappropriately Permits Prosecutors
to Circumvent the Intent Requirement and Subsumes Second-Degree Murder.-
The Roary court's decision inappropriately gives prosecutors over-
199. The maximum penalty for involuntary manslaughter is ten years. MD. CODE ANN.,
CRM. LAw § 2-207(a) (1) (LexisNexis 2005). Since the more culpable co-conspirators re-
ceived fifteen years in prison, a ten-year sentence for Roary would have been more appro-
priate than the grossly disproportionate thirty-five-year sentence that he actually received.
200. See generally MD. CODE ANN., C~iM. LAw § 2 (LexisNexis 2005).
201. See id. First-degree murder is punishable by life in prison, id. § 2-201, while second-
degree murder carries a maximum sentence of thirty years. Id. § 2-204. Manslaughter is
punishable by up to ten years in prison. Id. § 2-207.
202. MD. CODE ANN., CRiM. LAw § 2-302 (LexisNexis 2005).
203. 385 Md. at 253, 867 A.2d at 1116 (Raker, J., dissenting); see MODEL PENAL CODE
COMMENTARY § 210.2 cmt. (1980) (stating that in the vast majority of cases, killings that
occur during felonies probably amount to murder independent of the felony-murder
rule); Frederick J. Ludwig, Foreseeable Death in Felony Murder, 18 U. Prr. L. REv. 51, 61
(1956) (stating that in many felony-murder cases the evidence would support conviction
under depraved heart or other implied malice theories).
204. Roary, 385 Md. at 253, 867 A.2d at 1116 (Raker, J., dissenting).
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broad discretion to charge second-degree felony murder for any felo-
nious assault that results in death.2 °5 Because virtually every homicide
involves an assaultive act, the practical effect of the court's decision is
to subsume all second-degree murder, along with voluntary man-
slaughter and, in some cases, involuntary manslaughter, 20 6 into felony
murder.2 0 7 To prove felony murder, a prosecutor must establish only
that the defendant committed the underlying felony and that death
occurred during its commission.2 8 There exists no requirement to
prove intent to commit murder under a traditional theory of actual
intent to kill, intent to cause grievous bodily harm, or a depraved
heart.2 9 Therefore, under the majority's holding in Roary, when a
felonious assault results in death, a prosecutor can circumvent the re-
quirement to prove intent to commit murder by charging a defendant
with second-degree felony murder.2 0  The court's decision invites
prosecutors to follow the easier path of a felony-murder prosecution
to obtain a conviction rather than undertaking the more difficult task
of proving specific intent to kill.211 Because prosecutors are often vul-
205. See People v. Ireland, 450 P.2d 580, 590 (Cal. 1969) (concluding that applying the
felony-murder rule to a felonious assault would preclude the jury from considering intent
in the vast majority of homicides); cf Commonwealth v. Wade, 697 N.E.2d 541, 545 (Mass.
1998) (drawing the analogous conclusion, in the context of first-degree murder, that with-
out merger, all second-degree murder and manslaughter could be charged as first-degree
murder with assault as the predicate felony).
206. In Maryland, a defendant may be charged with involuntary manslaughter if a homi-
cide results from her unlawful act or her lawful but grossly negligent act. Selby v. State, 361
Md. 319, 332, 761 A.2d 335, 342 (2000). An assault would be an expected precedent to
unlawful-act involuntary manslaughter.
207. See supra notes 117-119 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
210. See People v. Robertson, 95 P.3d 872, 885 (Cal. 2004) (Moreno, J., concurring)
(questioning whether prosecutors should be allowed to use felony murder as a "backdoor
route" to a second-degree murder conviction). One can also argue that first-degree felony
murder allows prosecutors to circumvent the requirement to prove that a homicide was
willful, deliberate, and premeditated. However, in Maryland, first-degree felony murder
cannot subsume the entire realm of first-degree murder because first-degree felony mur-
der is limited to a handful of enumerated felonies which are independent of the homicide.
See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAw § 2-201 (LexisNexis 2005) (defining the felonies that com-
prise first-degree murder in Maryland). There will still be homicides that qualify as first-
degree murder which do not occur during armed robbery, rape, arson, burglary, and the
other predicate felonies listed in the first-degree murder statute.
211. See State v. Wanrow, 588 P.2d 1320, 1327 (Wash. 1978) (Utter, J., dissenting) (con-
tending that prosecutors will abandon the statutory provision requiring intent to kill when
they can instead simply prove assault and resulting death). State v. Thompson, a Washington
case decided a year before Wanrow, illustrates the potential injustice that could result from
overbroad prosecutorial discretion in light of the Roary court's failure to adopt the merger
doctrine. 558 P.2d 202 (Wash. 1977). In Thompson, the defendant shot her husband, who
had been drinking heavily and taking drugs, after he drove recklessly with the defendant
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nerable to political and societal pressure to be tough on crime, they
are likely to accept this invitation, especially in the midst of the public
outcry that often accompanies a tragic death.212 Moreover, the over-
broad discretion that the Roary decision grants to prosecutors creates
a real danger of unequal treatment because prosecutors could charge
second-degree felony murder in cases where they would have other-
wise charged manslaughter.213
In addition to allowing the prosecutor a greater opportunity to
charge a defendant with murder, the Roary court's decision also in-
creases the likelihood of an unjustified conviction for murder. In a
traditional second-degree murder prosecution, if the prosecution fails
to prove intent to kill, or if the defendant shows mitigating circum-
stances, the jury can find the defendant guilty of the less severe of-
fense of manslaughter.21 4 In contrast, there is no such option in a
felony-murder prosecution: because felony murder has no element of
intent for the jury to decide, there is no opportunity for the jury to
consider a lesser offense or mitigating circumstances.215 Instead, fel-
ony murder is an "all-or-nothing" charge in which the defendant is
either convicted of murder or acquitted. 21 6 Thus, under the Roary
court's holding, the same set of facts could conceivably lead to two
different outcomes, with significantly different punishments and sig-
nificantly different social stigmas, depending on whether the charge is
second-degree felony murder or traditional second-degree murder. 217
and two passengers in the car, and then hit and threatened to kill the defendant in front of
the passengers. Id. at 203-04. The prosecutor charged the defendant with second-degree
felony murder with assault as the predicate felony, and the jury convicted her. Id. at 203.
Although the language of the homicide statute required it to uphold the verdict, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court acknowledged that the felony-murder rule in this case led to overly
harsh results, id. at 205, and a strong dissent emphasized the injustice of the felony-murder
rule under the circumstances. Id. at 206 (Utter, J., dissenting).
212. See Tomkovicz, supra note 150, at 1463-64 (arguing that the life of an innocent
crime victim has political power that outweighs the interest in fair and proportional treat-
ment of felons).
213. See Thompson, 558 P.2d at 210 (Utter, J., dissenting) (arguing that failure to apply
the merger doctrine creates the possibility of unequal treatment if prosecutors have broad
discretion to bring either felony murder or intentional murder charges).
214. See Roach v. State, 358 Md. 418, 429, 749 A.2d 787, 793 (2000).
215. People v. Ireland, 450 P.2d 580, 590 (Cal. 1969); Siebold, supra note 166, at 157.
216. In re Personal Restraint of Andress, 56 P.3d 981, 987 (Wash. 2003). In Hook v. State,
the Court of Appeals reversed a first-degree murder conviction on fairness grounds when
the jury was presented with an "all-or-nothing" choice either to convict of first-degree mur-
der or to acquit. 315 Md. 25, 40, 553 A.2d 233, 241 (1989).
217. Id. Murder has a greater social stigma than manslaughter, and a more severe pun-
ishment as well. In Maryland, the maximum sentence for second-degree murder is thirty
years. MD. CODE. ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-204 (LexisNexis 2005). In contrast, the maximum
sentence for manslaughter is only ten years. Id. § 2-207.
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5. Conclusion.-In Roary v. State, the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land unwisely expanded the scope of felony murder in Maryland when
it refused to adopt the merger doctrine and allowed first-degree as-
sault to serve as a predicate felony for second-degree felony mur-
der.218 The court's decision is troubling for several reasons. First, the
court's stated policy goal of deterring dangerous assaults is unlikely to
occur.
2 1 9 Second, the court's refusal to adopt the merger doctrine is
likely to yield unfair and illogical results. 220 Moreover, the court's de-
cision in Roary defies modern criminal law principles of individual cul-
pability and proportionality of punishment 221 and undermines the
proportional gradation of homicide punishments adopted by the Ma-
ryland General Assembly. 222 Finally, the court's decision permits pros-
ecutors to circumvent the requirement to prove intent as an element
of murder.223 This loophole increases the likelihood that second-de-
gree felony murder will subsume second-degree intent-to-kill murder
and voluntary manslaughter.
2 24
The court should instead have followed the lead of a number of
other states and adopted the merger doctrine as a means of limiting
the felony-murder rule. 2 5 The severe statutory penalties for first-de-
gree assault ensure that, even with the merger doctrine, there would
be adequate deterrence and sufficient punishment for dangerous as-
saults that result in death but which do not reach the level of inten-
tional murder.22 6  Furthermore, in most cases, the express and
implied malice theories of intentional murder provide ample founda-
tion for second-degree murder convictions without the felony-murder
rule.22 7 Therefore, had the court adopted the merger doctrine, it
would have imposed a reasonable limitation on the felony-murder
doctrine while preserving an appropriate punishment scheme for
criminal homicide in Maryland.
MARCIA J. SIMON
218. 385 Md. at 223, 867 A.2d at 1098.
219. See supra notes 162-175 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 176-199 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 181-199 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 200-204 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 205-213 and accompanying text.
224. See sup-a notes 205-217 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 75-102 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 164-202 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 203-204 and accompanying text.
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III. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Permitting Unsubstantiated Own-Race Bias Arguments in Summation
Invites Juror Confusion and Irrelevant Racial Considerations
into Criminal Trials
In Smith v. State,1 the Court of Appeals considered for the first
time whether a defense counsel may attack a white victim's identifica-
tion of two black defendants with unsupported own-race bias (ORB)'
arguments during summation. The court held that the criminal de-
fendant's right to effective advocacy entitled him to attack the credi-
bility of the cross-racial identification.3 The court stated that
adversarial summations promote the objectives of the criminal justice
system by aiding the jury in ascertaining the guilt or innocence of the
accused.4 The implications of the court's decision, however, contra-
dict this goal. By failing to require an evidentiary basis for ORB argu-
ments, the court mistakenly treats ORB as a matter of common
knowledge, thereby increasing the risk of juror confusion.5 Until sci-
ence can provide a means to differentiate between affected and non-
affected cross-racial identifications, the Smith court invites jurors, at-
torneys, and trial courts to focus on potentially irrelevant racial con-
siderations at all stages of trial.6 To mitigate the problematic
consequences of the Smith decision, the Court of Appeals should
adopt a factor-based test and evidentiary threshold that would ensure
that when ORB arguments are relevant, they are effective.7
1. The Case.-On the evening of May 8, 2002, two black men
approached Christine Crandall, a white woman, as she parked her car
near her Baltimore City residence.' One of the men held her at gun-
point while the other attempted to pry the car keys from her fist.9
1. 388 Md. 468, 880 A.2d 288 (2005).
2. Social science research suggests that some eyewitnesses have difficulty identifying
someone of another race, a phenomenon described as own-race bias (ORB). SeeJohn P.
Rutledge, They All Look Alike: The Inaccuracy of Cross-Racial Identifications, 28 Am. J. CrM. L.
207, 211 (2001).
3. Smith, 388 Md. at 488-89, 880 A.2d at 300. A cross-racial identification occurs when
an eyewitness of one race must identify a person of a different race. Rutledge, supra note
2, at 211.
4. Smith, 388 Md. at 486, 800 A.2d at 298-99.
5. See infra Part 4.a.
6. See infra Part 4.b.
7. See infra Part 4.c.
8. Smith, 388 Md. at 470, 880 A.2d at 289.
9. Id.
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Crandall tried to reason with her attackers before yelling for a neigh-
bor to call the police. 10 The gunman turned to point his weapon at
Crandall one last time before both men fled.1
Crandall gave a description of her attackers to law enforcement
officials as they arrived at the scene.' 2 Two days after the attack,
detectives provided Crandall with six photographs based on her
description, but she did not make an identification.13 Two weeks
later, detectives produced two additional photo arrays from which
Crandall identified James Smith and Jason Mack.14 Soon after Cran-
dall's identification, both men were arrested.1 5
At trial, Crandall testified that she was certain that Smith and
Mack were her attackers because her background in art and painting
enhanced her ability to remember faces and physical characteristics. 6
She consistently articulated specific characteristics about both of the
defendants and noted that Mack had altered his hairstyle between the
time of the photo identification and their confrontation at trial.1
7
Crandall did not indicate that she had difficulty discerning the fea-
tures of other races.' 8 On cross-examination, the defense questioned
Crandall on her ability to view the perpetrators, but never questioned
her about the cross-racial nature of the identification.19
Before closing argument, the defense counsel requested permis-
sion to argue that ORB affected Crandall's identification.20 The court
denied their request, citing a lack of evidentiary support.2 The court
did, however, give the defense permission to state that the defendants
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 470-71, 880 A.2d at 289.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 475, 880 A.2d at 292. Specifically, Crandall credited herself as "extremely
good with faces," elaborating that she was obsessed with studying people and that she was
fascinated with postures and distinct features. Id. The court overruled the defense coun-
sel's objections to this testimony. Brief of Petitioner at 6 n.3, Smith, 388 Md. 468, 880 A.2d
288 (No. 116). The defense, however, called on a Baltimore City Police Officer to testify
that, when he arrived at the scene, Crandall admitted that she could not sketch the un-
armed suspect. Smith, 388 Md. at 476, 880 A.2d at 292.
17. Smith v. State, 158 Md. App. 673, 704, 857 A.2d 1198, 1216 (2004).
18. Id.
19. Smith, 388 Md. at 475, 880 A.2d at 292.
20. Id. Before trial, the defense requested an ORB jury instruction, which would have
allowed the defense to raise the issue in opening statements. Id. at 473, 880 A.2d at 291.
The judge denied their request after the defense was unable to produce any scientific data
to support the instruction. Brief of Respondent at 5, 18 n.4, Smith, 388 Md. 468, 880 A.2d
288 (No. 116).
21. Smith, 388 Md. at 475, 880 A.2d at 292.
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are black and the witness is white, but the defense counsel declined to
do so. 2 2 The jury found both defendants guilty of assault, attempted
robbery, and attempted theft.23 Smith and Mack filed a joint appeal
to the Court of Special Appeals.24
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision
to prohibit the defense from referencing ORB during closing argu-
ment,2 5 reasoning that defense was given ample opportunity to dis-
credit Crandall's identification with legitimate arguments.2 6  The
court noted that studies of eyewitness identification are inherently
general in their applicability, making them potentially irrelevant in
any individual case. 2 7 Accordingly, the court approved of the trial
court's efforts to prevent an express appeal to racial biases in this case,
as there was no evidence that Crandall experienced difficulty discern-
ing the features of other races. 28 Nevertheless, the court realized that
courts might have difficulty determining the propriety of ORB argu-
ments in other cross-racial identification cases. 29 The court suggested
that the Court of Appeals provide guidance for future cases and of-
fered a list of factors for consideration. 0
Smith and Mack petitioned the Court of Appeals, which granted
certiorari to consider whether the trial judge erred in preventing the
defense from discussing ORB during closing argument.
31
22. Id. at 476, 880 A.2d at 293.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 477, 880 A.2d at 293.
25. Id. The court also upheld the trial court's decision to deny the defense counsel's
request for an ORB jury instruction. Smith v. State, 158 Md. App. 673, 702, 857 A.2d 1198,
1214-15 (2004).
26. The defense argued that Crandall's identification of the defendants was unreliable
for the following reasons: (1) the brevity of Crandall's encounter with the assailants, (2)
Crandall's unfamiliarity with the assailants, (3) the lighting on the street, (4) Crandall's
stress level, (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification, and (6) the
skin complexion and hair style of the individuals in the photo arrays. Smith, 158 Md. App.
at 705-06, 857 A.2d at 1217. As for the final factor, Smith's counsel argued that his client
had the darkest complexion in his array, as well as a receding hairline, suggesting that this
combination made Smith's picture conspicuous. Id. Mack's counsel also argued that his
client's photo was significantly darker than the other four photos in his array. Id.
27. Id. at 702, 857 A.2d at 1215.
28. Id. at 707-08 & n.l1, 857 A.2d at 1217-18 & n.1l.
29. Id. at 703, 857 A.2d at 1215.
30. Id. at 703, 708, 857 A.2d at 1215, 1218. The factors included whether the identifica-
tion was equivocal or recanted, whether the witness had no exposure to people outside of
her race, and whether the witness was unable or had very little time to see the perpetrator.
Id. at 708, 857 A.2d at 1218.
31. Smith, 388 Md. at 477, 880 A.2d at 293. The court also granted certiorari to con-
sider whether the trial judge erred in refusing to give a special jury instruction on cross-
racial identification. Id.
1020
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
2. Legal Background.-The criminal defendant's constitutional
right to counsel 32 incorporates the opportunity for closing argu-
ment.3" Closing argument plays a critical part in the adversarial crimi-
nal justice system by aiding the jury in ascertaining the guilt or
innocence of the accused.34 While advocating for their client, attor-
neys are free to comment on the facts in evidence and to reference
matters of common knowledge.35 To prevent attorneys from dis-
torting the issues of the case, trial courts retain the discretion to pro-
hibit arguments that are irrelevant, unsubstantiated, or racially
inflammatory.36
a. Closing Argument Precedent Balances the Criminal Defendant's
Right to Effective Advocacy with the Trial Court's Discretion to Limit the Scope
of Closing Arguments.-In Herring v. New York, the Supreme Court of
the United States considered the constitutionality of a state statute
granting trial judges the discretion to fully deny counsel the opportu-
nity of closing arguments in bench trials.3 The Court stated that the
criminal defendant's constitutional right to counsel requires a full op-
portunity to participate in the adversarial fact-finding process, includ-
ing closing argument.3" The Court elaborated that closing argument
serves to clarify the facts and issues of the case for the jury before
deliberation.39 According to the Court, effective advocacy by both the
state and the accused supports the primary objective of the criminal
justice system: that "the guilty be convicted and the innocent go
free."4o
Notwithstanding the important function served by summation,
the Court articulated the role of the trial judge in controlling exces-
sive closing arguments:
[t]he presiding judge must be and is given great latitude in
controlling the duration and limiting the scope of closing
summations. He may limit counsel to a reasonable time and
may terminate argument when continuation would be repeti-
tive or redundant. He may ensure that argument does not
stray unduly from the mark, or otherwise impede the fair
32. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 21.
33. See infra Part 2.a.
34. See infra Part 2.a.
35. See infra Part 2.b.
36. See infra Part 2.c.
37. 422 U.S. 853, 865 (1975).
38. Id. at 858.
39. Id. at 862.
40. Id.
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and orderly conduct of the trial. In all these respects he
must have broad discretion.41
Turning back to the facts of the case, the Court concluded that the
interest in expedient criminal adjudication was no justification for a
statute providing the trial judge the discretion to deprive the defen-
dant of any opportunity for closing argument.4 2
In Maryland, the right to closing argument had already been de-
fined in Yopps v. State,"3 a decision cited by the Herring majority.44 In
Yopps, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court's refusal to allow
defense counsel the opportunity to present closing argument on the
facts and evidence of the case resulted in a denial of the defendant's
right to counsel.45 The court rejected the argument that a defendant
loses this right in non-jury trials or in cases with overwhelming evi-
dence of guilt and concluded that the right to counsel applies equally
in all cases.4 6 The court expressed, however, that trial courts have the
discretion to restrain redundant and irrelevant arguments.47
Accordingly, appellate courts review the trial judge's restrictions
on closing argument on an abuse of discretion standard.4" The trial
court's decision will be upheld unless the argument results in
prejudice to the accused, thereby denying the defendant of his consti-
tutional right to a fair trial.4 9 Although this constitutional right is
most frequently implicated by prosecutorial comments, the Court of
Appeals has also acknowledged the need to prevent prejudicial com-
ments by the defense.5 °
b. In Constructing Closing Arguments, Advocates Are Permitted to
Draw Inferences from the Facts in Evidence and Comment on Matters of Com-
mon Knowledge.-Attorneys are generally given great leeway in advocat-
ing for their client during closing argument.51 Counsel may draw
inferences from the facts in evidence, highlight the testimony more
favorable to their client's side of the story, criticize the parties' alleged
41. Id.
42. Id. at 863-65.
43. 228 Md. 204, 178 A.2d 879 (1962).
44. 422 U.S. at 859-60.
45. 228 Md. at 208, 178 A.2d at 882.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 207, 178 A.2d at 881. The court also noted that trial courts may place reason-
able time limits on closing argument. Id.
48. See, e.g., Wilhelm v. State, 272 Md. 404, 413, 326 A.2d 707, 714-15 (1974) (describ-
ing the traditional deference afforded to trial judges in establishing the scope of trial).
49. E.g., Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 638 (1974).
50. Wilhelm, 272 Md. at 438, 326 A.2d at 728.
51. E.g., Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 429-30, 722 A.2d 887, 901 (1999).
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actions, and attack witnesses' character.5 2 In addition to arguments
on the evidence, counsel may comment on facts that are not in evi-
dence, yet are of such general notoriety that they are considered to be
within the jury's common knowledge."
The Court of Appeals established the boundaries of common
knowledge arguments in Wilhelm v. State, holding that an attorney's
reference to murder statistics not in evidence was permissible during
closing arguments. 4 In his summation, the prosecutor commented
that 330 murders were committed in Baltimore City during the previ-
ous year, information that was widely publicized in newspaper head-
lines nineteen days before.55 For this reason, the statistical argument
was not a comment on facts not in evidence, but rather a mere re-
minder of a fact that the jury already knew.56 As such, the court con-
cluded that these facts could be referenced in closing argument
without evidentiary support.57
The Wilhelm court noted, however, that the murder statistics
would not have been common knowledge if they had not been the
subject of newspaper headlines during the previous weeks.58 Thus,
arguments are not common knowledge if there is no data to support
the statement or if the subject matter is not of such public notoriety as
to be within the jury's cognizance. 9
c. Trial Courts Prevent Irrelevant Racial Considerations and Ap-
peals to Racial Prejudice from Influencing the Jury.-Trial courts must bal-
ance the defendant's right to closing argument with the courts' duty
to insulate all stages of trial from racial biases.60 Accordingly, attor-
52. Wilhelm, 272 Md. at 412-13, 326 A.2d at 714.
53. Id. at 438, 326 A.2d at 728-29. Along these lines, basic jury instructions provide that
the jury should "use their own common sense, their own experiences in life and their own
knowledge of the ways and affairs of the world." Id. at 439, 326 A.2d at 729.
54. Id. at 445, 326 A.2d at 732.
55. Id. at 439, 326 A.2d at 729.
56. Id. at 440, 326 A.2d at 729.
57. Id. at 438, 326 A.2d at 728-29. As another example, the court suggested that it
would be an appropriate common knowledge argument for an attorney to state that Balti-
more is "a big crime area." Id. at 442, 326 A.2d at 730. Similarly, counsel is permitted to
argue on matters that are clear to the jury from observation. Id. at 445, 326 A.2d at 731.
For example, the court found the prosecutor's reference to the defendants as "young
toughs"-an allusion to the defendants' testimony on homicide and robbery-was appro-
priate, as the comment was referencing information that was generally observable to the
jury during the course of the trial. Id. at 442, 326 A.2d at 730.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 440-41, 326 A.2d at 729.
60. Cf Jackson v. State, 364 Md. 192, 201-02, 772 A.2d 273, 278-79 (2001) (finding that
a sentencing judge's use of phrases such as "ghetto," "jungle," and people "from [Balti-
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neys may not use closing arguments to make improper comments de-
signed to inflame racial prejudices in the jury." For example, in
Contee v. State, the Court of Appeals criticized a prosecutor's use of
racial comments in the trial of a black man charged with raping a
white woman. 62 During cross-examination, Contee admitted having
extramarital affairs with numerous women, to which the prosecutor
questioned, "Other white girls?"'63 After Contee replied that he had
only one previous affair with a white woman, the prosecutor further
interrogated the defendant on the issue, asking, "How many other
white girls do you have intercourse with? ' 64 The judge denied the
defense's request for a mistrial, yet did not reprimand the prosecutor
for his race-based line of questioning.65 As the trial continued, the
court similarly turned a blind eye to the prosecutor's additional refer-
ence to the victim as a "white girl," and again, the court denied de-
66fense counsel's objections. The prosecutor, apparently encouraged
by the court's failure to correct him, continued his irrelevant racial
remarks for the remainder of the trial.6" The jury returned a guilty
verdict.6" The Court of Appeals found the prosecutor's irrelevant line
of questioning prejudicial and criticized the trial court's failure to cor-
rect the prosecutor's conduct.6 9 The court reiterated the trial court's
responsibility to prevent unwarranted appeals to racial prejudices.7 "
Most recently, the Court of Appeals addressed improper racial
comments in the civil context. In Tierco Maryland, Inc. v. Williams, the
court held that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant a
new trial after the plaintiffs' attorney's overt attempts at exploiting
racial prejudice caused the jury to reach a verdict based on irrelevant
considerations.71 Although the parties' races appeared nowhere in
the complaint, race was mentioned sixty-three times over the three-
day trial.7 2 The racial overtones began when the plaintiffs' counsel
more] city" in a case with a black defendant gave the appearance that race was improperly
considered in sentencing).
61. See infra notes 62-80 and accompanying text.
62. 223 Md. 575, 165 A.2d 889 (1960).
63. Id. at 582, 165 A.2d at 894.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 583, 165 A.2d at 894.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 577-78, 165 A.2d at 891.
69. Id. at 584, 165 A.2d at 895. The Court of Appeals reversed on other grounds. Id.,
165 A.2d at 894-95.
70. Id.
71. 381 Md. 378, 849 A.2d 504 (2004).
72. Id. at 384, 849 A.2d at 508.
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and witnesses referred to the parties' races twenty-five times in the
plaintiffs' case-in-chief.73 Realizing these tactics, the defense attorneys
asked thirteen race-related cross-examination questions." Plaintiffs'
counsel continued his race-based arguments in summation.75
By the end of the trial, racial issues had overwhelmed the mate-
rial issues of the case.7 6 The jury awarded the plaintiffs $1,000,000 in
compensatory damages and $1,500,000 in punitive damages.77 The
court subsequently found that the damage awards were excessive, con-
sidering the plaintiffs' failure to provide any evidence of permanent
injury.78 In holding that the trial court abused its discretion by deny-
ing the defendant's request for a new trial, the Court of Appeals ex-
pressed its disapproval of the attorney's overt tactic of using race to
prejudice an opponent.7" Once again, the court cautioned against
unsubstantiated appeals to racial prejudice, noting their potential to
undermine the integrity of the judicial system.8"
Despite the general impropriety of race-based arguments, some
jurisdictions have created an exception in cross-racial identification
cases. In these jurisdictions, attorneys are permitted to reference
ORB as a matter of common knowledge.8" Additionally, some courts
permit ORB jury instructions.8 2 Most of these jurisdictions, however,
permit trial courts to use their discretion in limiting the use of ORB
73. Id. at 404, 849 A.2d at 520.
74. Id.
75. Id at 408, 849 A.2d at 522.
76. Id. at 406-07, 849 A.2d at 521.
77. Id. at 384, 849 A.2d at 508.
78. Id. at 408, 849 A.2d at 522.
79. Id. at 414, 849 A.2d at 526.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Lenoir v. State, 72 S.W.3d 899, 904 (Ark. App. 2002) (upholding a trial
court's prohibition of both ORB jury instruction and expert testimony because jurors can
apply their own experience to judge the accuracy of an identification); People v. Carrieri,
777 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (permitting reference to ORB as a matter of
common knowledge); Commonwealth v. Simmons, 622 A.2d 621, 630-31 (Pa. 1998) (re-
jecting expert testimony on ORB because the phenomenon is within the jury's cogni-
zance). But see Garden v. State, 815 A.2d 327, 341 (Del. 2003) (characterizing ORB as
outside the jury's common knowledge, thus requiring expert testimony); Brodes v. State,
551 S.E.2d 757, 759 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that the topic of ORB was unlikely to be
fully understood by ajury without the aid of expert testimony); State v. Willis, 731 P.2d 287,
292 (Kan. 1987) (requiring expert testimony on ORB as it is outside the cognizance of the
jury).
82. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 31 M.J. 125, 128 (C.M.A. 1990) (permitting an
ORB jury instruction if the cross-racial identification is a critical issue in the case). But see,
e.g., State v. Hadrick, 523 A.2d 441, 444 (R.I. 1987) (determining ORB jury instructions to
be inappropriate judicial commentary on the nature and quality of the evidence). Mary-
land's pattern jury instructions do not include a cross-racial identification instruction and
no Maryland case has held that such an instruction is required. See MD. R. 4-325 (2005).
10252006]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
instructions to appropriate cases.8 3 For example, in State v. Cromedy,
the New Jersey Supreme Court considered the propriety of a cross-
racial identification jury instruction where no scientific evidence was
produced to support the instruction.s4 Cromedy, a black man, was
convicted of the rape and robbery of D.S., a white woman.8 5 There
was no forensic evidence linking Cromedy to the crime. 6 Cromedy's
defense counsel requested an ORB jury instruction in light of the se-
verity of the crimes, the cross-racial nature of the identification, D.S.'s
failure to identify Cromedy in the initial photo array five days after the
crime, and the eight-month time lapse between the crime and the
identification. 7 The trial court denied the request.88 The NewJersey
Supreme Court reversed Cromedy's conviction, holding that, based
on these facts, the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on
cross-racial identification." The court reasoned that, while ORB re-
search is elusive, it was not the basis of Cromedy's requests; rather,
Cromedy's request was based on the "widely held commonsense view"
that it is more difficult to identify someone of another race.9 ° Never-
theless, the Cromedy court minimized the potential for misuse of the
jury instruction by stressing that the unrestricted use of the ORB in-
structions would have detrimental effects on the judiciary, and that
trial courts must be cautious of "base appeals to racial prejudice."'"
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Smith v. State, the Court of Appeals
held that the defense counsel was entitled to attack a cross-racial iden-
83. For example, Massachusetts does not require trial courts to give ORB instructions
in all cross-racial identification cases. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hyatt, 647 N.E.2d 1168,
1171 (Mass. 1995) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial judge denied ORB jury
charge); Commonwealth v. Charles, 489 N.E.2d 679, 684 (Mass. 1986) (commenting that,
because the problems with cross-racial identification are not well established, the trial
court may use its discretion to deny a request for an ORB instruction); Commonwealth v.
Engram, 686 N.E.2d 1080, 1082 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997) (determining that an ORB instruc-
tion was unnecessary where the facts of the case made it unlikely that the cross-racial na-
ture of the identification affected the witness).
84. 727 A.2d 457, 458 (N.J. 1999).
85. Id. at 459.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 460.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 459.
90. Id. at 462, 466-67 (Bezeton, C.J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Telfaire,
469 F.2d 552, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). The Cromedy court also considered the New Jersey
Task Force on Minority Concerns' recent recommendation for a cross-racial identification
jury instruction. Id. at 465-66.
91. Id. at 467. The court rejected the notion that the mere scenario of a white victim
and a black defendant requires an ORB instruction. Id. Instead, the court suggested that
an appropriate jury instruction would detail the specific context in which jurors are to
consider racial issues. Id.
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tification with ORB arguments during summation without producing
evidentiary support.9 2 Judge Battaglia delivered the opinion of the
court, which began by surveying the field of developing ORB re-
search.93 The court acknowledged the scientific debate over the ori-
gins of ORB, its effect on different races, and the applicability of ORB
studies to criminal context.94 Turning to the law of closing argument,
the court expressed its uncertainty over whether ORB was a matter of
common knowledge.95 Nevertheless, the court rested its decision on
the importance of the defendant's right to effective advocacy at sum-
mation, as well as its role in promoting the ultimate purpose of our
criminal justice system: the ascertainment of the defendant's true guilt
or innocence.96 And, because Crandall's identification of Smith and
Mack was the State's primary piece of evidence, the court determined
that the defense counsel was entitled to use ORB arguments to attack
Crandall's testimony about her artistic background and ability to re-
member faces.9
7
Judge Harrell dissented,9 arguing that the trial court correctly
prohibited the defense counsel from making unsupported ORB argu-
ments.99 The dissent noted the defense counsel's failure to produce
any evidence on either the general existence of ORB or its specific
effects on Crandall's identification of Smith and Mack.' Judge Har-
rell reiterated that under Wilhelm, the scope of closing argument is
limited to the evidence admitted at trial and reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom. 0 1 Additionally, the dissent criticized the majority
opinion for implying that ORB is common knowledge."0 ' Even if it
92. 388 Md. at 470, 880 A.2d at 289. The court did not reach the question of whether
the trial court erred in denying defense counsel's request for a special ORB jury instruc-
tion. Id.
93. Id. at 469, 880 A.2d at 289. Chief Judge Bell, and Judges Cathell and Rakerjoined
Judge Battaglia.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 486, 880 A.2d at 298-99.
97. Id. at 488-89, 880 A.2d at 300.
98. Id. at 489, 880 A.2d at 300 (Harrell, J., dissenting). Judges Wilner and Greene
joined the dissent. Id.
99. Id. at 491, 880 A.2d at 301.
100. Id. at 490-91, 880 A.2d at 301.
101. Id. at 491-92, 880 A.2d at 302.
102. Id. at 492, 880 A.2d at 302. Judge Harrell did not reject ORB arguments in all
cases, but suggested that the research be subjected to a Fye-Reed type of review before
permitting its use in criminal trials. Id at 496 & n. 11, 880 A.2d at 304 & n. 11 (citing Frye v.
United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) and Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364
(1978)). Under the Fye-Reed test, before expert testimony on a novel area of science is
admitted into evidence, scientists within that field must generally accept the foundation of
the expert's opinion. Id. at 496 n.ll, 880 A.2d at 304 n.1l.
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was, Judge Harrell found no nexus between the ORB studies and
Crandall's statements about her artistic background.1" 3 Finally, the
dissent criticized the majority's apparent sanction of unnecessary race-
based inquiries whenever an eyewitness testifies about the certainty of
her cross-racial identification. °4
4. Analysis.-In Smith v. State, the Court of Appeals held that the
defendant's right to an adversarial summation entitled the defense
counsel to attack a cross-racial identification with unsupported ORB
arguments.'0 5 The court stated that adversarial summations promote
the objectives of the criminal justice system by aiding the jury in ascer-
taining the guilt or innocence of the accused.1 °6 The implications of
the court's decision, however, contradict this goal. By failing to re-
quire an evidentiary basis for ORB arguments, the court mistakenly
treats ORB as a matter of common knowledge.'0 7 Until science can
provide a means to differentiate between affected and non-affected
cross-racial identifications, Smith invites jurors, attorneys, and trial
courts to focus on potentially irrelevant racial considerations at all
stages of trial.' 08 To mitigate the problematic consequences of the
Smith decision, the Court of Appeals should have established a frame-
work that would allow trial courts to determine whether ORB is an
issue before permitting ORB arguments during summation.' 0 9
a. By Failing to Require Evidentiary Support for ORB Arguments,
Smith Improperly Treats ORB as Common Knowledge and Increases the Risk
ofJury Confusion.-The court's decision to permit unsubstantiated ar-
guments on a developing area of social science will ultimately under-
mine its goal of effective advocacy. If scientists cannot yet explain
how, why, and in what situations ORB occurs, it is unreasonable to
assume that jurors can correctly interpret its effect on a particular
case."t0 Nevertheless, while expressing its uncertainty as to whether
103. Id. at 492, 880 A.2d at 302.
104. Id. at 495, 880 A.2d at 304.
105. Id. at 488-89, 880 A.2d at 300.
106. Id. at 486, 800 A.2d at 298-99.
107. See infra Part 4.a.
108. See infra Part 4.b.
109. See infta Part 4.c.
110. See, e.g., United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 561-62 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Leventhal,
J., concurring) (expressing uncertainty as to the appropriateness of an ORB jury instruc-
tion in light of the "meager" state of research on the topic); People v. Bias, 475 N.E.2d 253,
257 (Il1. App. Ct. 1985) (concluding that the conflicting research on ORB suggests that
determining its appropriateness in jury instructions is a task for bar committees, rather
than reviewing courts); Jeremy C. Bucci, Article: Revisiting Expert Testimony on the Reliability of
Eyewitness Identification: A Call for a Determination of Whether It Offers Common Knowledge, 7
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ORB is common knowledge, the Court of Appeals treats ORB as such
by permitting attorneys to make ORB arguments without evidentiary
support.11 ' This decision may distort the facts of the case and lead
jurors to faulty conclusions.'1 2 Until science provides definite criteria
to aid jurors in evaluating the accuracy of a cross-racial identification,
ORB arguments will likely fail to aid the jury in ascertaining the guilt
or innocence of the accused.
The Smith court failed to reconcile the inconclusive state of ORB
research with its goal of effective advocacy. Despite over thirty years of
research, scientists remain divided as to the individuals and situations
affected by ORB." 3 Specifically, three unresolved issues in ORB sci-
ence will lead to jury confusion: (1) whether ORB studies are applica-
ble to actual eyewitnesses, (2) whether ORB affects all races to the
same degree, and (3) whether other variables can mitigate the effects
of ORB on an individual identification.
First, the dramatic differences between ORB studies and actual
identifications make imputing laboratory findings to witnesses of
crimes, especially the victims of violent crimes, questionable.' 1 4 For
example, study participants usually view a number of faces in a short
period of time before identifying those faces in a second sample." 5
In a criminal lineup, however, the eyewitness attempts to recognize
SUFFOLKJ. TRIAL & APP. ADvoc. 1, 4 n.12 (2002) (explaining that whether certain scientific
or technological facts is considered common knowledge depends on the state of scientists'
knowledge in the area, not how precedent describes the topic); James M. Doyle, Discount-
ing the Error Costs: Cross-Racial False Alarms in the Culture of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 7
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'v & L. 253, 260 (2001) (advocating for further research into the dis-
crepancies in ORB studies).
111. Smith, 388 Md. at 488, 880 A.2d at 300.
112. See Telfaire, 469 F.2d at 561-62 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Leventhal,J., concurring) (explain-
ing that more research into the nature of ORB is necessary to prevent ORB jury instruc-
tions from distorting the facts and promulgating erroneous verdicts).
113. E.g., Christian A. Meissner &John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating the Own-
Race Bias in Memory for Faces: A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 3, 4-5
(2001).
114. See Otto H. MacLin et al., Race, Arousal, Attention, Exposure, and Delay: An Examina-
tion of Factors Moderating Face Recognition, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 134, 149 (2001) (ad-
mitting the difficulties in generalizing laboratory findings to real-life crime victims, who
experience extreme levels of stress that are not replicable in the laboratory setting); Daniel
B. Wright et al., A Field Study of Own-Race Bias in South Africa and England, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L., 119, 120-22 (2001) (suggesting that differences in laboratory and real-life iden-
tifications may prohibit accurate statistics on ORB in criminal cases).
115. E.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 CoR-
NELL L. REv. 934, 938 (1984). In some studies, participants have only seconds to study the
faces before identifying them. See, e.g., MacLin et al., supra note 114, at 138 (measuring
participants' ability to recognize faces after a maximum exposure time of five seconds).
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only one face: the perpetrator's. 16 Moreover, eyewitnesses, especially
victims, have a personal stake in identifying the true criminal.1 1 7 Simi-
larly, the consequences of falsely identifying a criminal suspect, i.e.,
incarceration and death, may cause eyewitnesses to make prudent
identifications.1"' In contrast, study participants are typically students
who receive cash or class credit for merely participating in the experi-
ment."' If ORB studies do not accurately reflect the abilities of real
eyewitnesses, Smith permits irrelevant arguments to distort rather than
clarify the facts of the case in the minds of the jury. 1 20
Second, even if scientists conclude that ORB findings are applica-
ble to the criminal context, they have not conclusively determined
whether ORB affects all races,' 2 1 and if so, whether it affects all races
equally.122 Moreover, the degree of the bias exhibited by a racial
group may vary depending on the race of the face identified.1 23 For
instance, studies suggest that Hispanic witnesses can more accurately
identify white faces than black faces, 124 and Asian witnesses can more
accurately identify black faces than white faces. 125
Finally, scientists have not yet determined how other variables in-
fluence ORB.126 Some studies suggest that ORB can be mitigated by
factors such as the witness's interracial contacts, 27 the length of time
116. Deborah Bartolomey, Cross-Racial Identification and What Not to Do About It: A Com-
ment on the Cross-Racial Jury Charge and Cross-Racial Expert Identification Testimony, 7 PSYCHOL.
PuB. POL'v & L. 247, 249 (2001).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See Rosemary Nidiry, Note, Restraining Adversarial Excess in Closing Argument, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 1299, 1307-08 (1996) (reflecting that closing arguments have the potential
to confuse the jury when they are based on facts not in evidence and outside the jury's
common knowledge).
121. Compare Paul Barkowitz & John C. Brigham, Recognition of Faces: Own-Race Bias, In-
centive, and Time Delay, 12 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 255, 261 (1982) (suggesting that black
eyewitnesses do not exhibit ORB), with Terrence S. Luce, The Role of Experience in Inter-
Racial Recognition, 1 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 39, 40 (1974) (finding ORB in
black study participants).
122. E.g., Rutledge, supra note 2, at 211.
123. See, e.g., Siegfried Ludwig Sporer, The Cross-Race Effect, Beyond Recognition of Faces in
the Laboratory, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 170, 176 (2001) (reviewing study finding that
white participants correcdy identified 53.2% of white faces, 40.4% of black faces, and 34%
of Hispanic faces).
124. Id. But see MacLin et al., supra note 114, at 147 (reviewing a study finding that
Hispanic and white participants recognized white and black faces at the same accuracy
rate).
125. Luce, supra note 121, at 40.
126. E.g., Meissner & Brigham, supra note 113, at 7-9.
127. Id. at 8, 21-23; see Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, The Other-Race Effect in Eyewit-
ness Identification: What Do We Do About It?, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL' & L. 230, 232 (2001)
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between the crime and the identification,1 2 8 and the presence of dis-
tinct features on the suspect or defendant such as scars, tattoos, or
birthmarks.129  But the extent to which these and other variables
might reduce ORB remains unclear,' 30 and findings suggest that same
and cross-racial identifications are affected differently. '3
The Smith court further failed to acknowledge that even if scien-
tists could adequately predict the accuracy of a cross-racial identifica-
tion, the public's ignorance of ORB precludes its characterization as
common knowledge.1 32 Over fifty-five percent of jurors believe that
cross-racial identifications are just as reliable, if not more reliable,
than same-race identifications. 1 3 Among those jurors cognizant of
the phenomenon, ORB arguments are often dismissed as irrelevant
because they fail to adequately explain why the eyewitness identified
the defendant over the other fillers in the line-up. 134 In many cases,
jurors are reluctant to accept the controversial idea of racial biases
and are loathe to consider whether their own ability to remember
faces decreases in cross-racial situations.' 35 Thus, the Court of Ap-
peals failed to recognize that the ambiguous state of ORB research
(stating that a white NBA fan may be less likely to experience ORB after viewing other-race
faces).
128. See Wells & Olson, supra note 127, at 232 (noting that identifications are less likely
to be accurate as the time between the crime and the identification increases). But see
MacLin et al., supra note 114, at 141 (finding that the amount of time between viewing and
identification did not influence the accuracy of Hispanic participants).
129. E.g., Radha Natarajan, Racialized Memory and Reliability: Due Process Applied to Cross-
Racial Eyewitness Identifications, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1821, 1850 (2003).
130. See MacLin et al., supra note 114, at 135 (assessing the need for more research on
the extent to which different variables moderate facial recognition in other-race
identifications).
131. See id. at 138 (finding differences in the manner in which stress levels affect same
and other-race identifications). For example, in one study of Hispanic participants, the
presence of a gun in the photograph with the Hispanic faces decreased the accuracy of
these same-race identifications. Id. at 147-48. In contrast, the presence of the gun during
the presentation of black faces had no effect on the accuracy of the identifications. Id,
132. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 115, at 946-49 (surveying three studies on ORB com-
prehension which found that, on average, only twenty-four percent of laymen and twenty-
two percent of attorneys were able to comprehend the phenomenon).
133. Timothy P. O'Toole et al., Feature: District of Columbia Public Defender Survey: What Do
Jurors Understand About Eyewitness Reliability? Survey Says.... THE CHAMPION, Apr. 2005, at
28, 31.
134. E.g., Wells & Olson, supra note 127, at 240. The case of McKinley Cromedy illus-
trates jurors' reluctance to accept the existence of ORB. See State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d
457 (N.J. 1999). The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed Cromedy's conviction after the
trial court denied defense counsel's request for a special jury instruction on cross-racial
identification. Id. at 467. The inclusion of an ORB jury charge in Cromedy's second trial
did not change the outcome of the case; Cromedy was convicted a second time. Natarajan,
supra note 129, at 1845.
135. O'Toole et al., supra note 133, at 31.
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and the public's ignorance of the phenomenon prevent ORB from
being a topic of common knowledge that can be referenced in closing
arguments without evidentiary support. Consequently, the unsubstan-
tiated ORB arguments permitted by Smith will not aid the jury in
reaching an informed decision as to the guilt or innocence of a crimi-
nal defendant.136
b. Smith Permits Irrelevant Race-Based Arguments in Cases Where
ORB Is Not an Issue by Providing Little Guidance for Future Cross-Racial
Identification Cases.-By not requiring evidentiary support for ORB ar-
guments, the court's decision unnecessarily makes race a considera-
tion for jurors, attorneys, and trial courts in cross-racial identification
cases, even in those cases where the ORB is unlikely to be a factor.1 37
The court's decision in Smith thus departs from precedent and further
contradicts its goal of effective advocacy by inviting potentially irrele-
vant racial considerations into all aspects of trials.138
The Court of Appeals's decision in Smith increases the likelihood
that attorneys will construct arguments around race, a result inconsis-
tent with the court's precedent in Contee and Tierco. In Contee v. State,
the court criticized a trial judge for permitting the prosecutor's re-
peated statements about the black defendant's relationships with
white women.13 9 Yet after Smith, the trial court may have to tolerate
similar comments. For example, if the defense counsel makes an
ORB argument, the prosecution may chose to rebut this argument
with arguments based on mitigating factors, including the witness's
interactions with people outside of her race.14° This would require
eliciting facts about the witness's interactions with people of different
136. E.g., Doyle, supra note 110, at 259.
137. See Bartolomey, supra note 116, at 247 (describing the detrimental effects of ORB
arguments on credible witnesses).
138. For example, the voir dire process seeks to protect the defendant's ight to an
impartial jury by expunging any racially biased jurors. E.g., Aldridge v. United States, 283
U.S. 308, 314 (1931); Hernandez v. State, 357 Md. 204, 211-12, 221, 742 A.2d 952, 955-56,
961 (1999). After Smith, the same jurors screened for racial prejudices may consider race
bias when reaching a verdict. SeeJoy L. Lindo, Note, New Jersey Jurors Are No Longer Color-
Blind Regarding Eyewitness Identification, 30 SETON HALL L. REv. 1224, 1250 n.137 (2000)
(finding the NewJersey Supreme Court's decision in Cromedy to allow cross-racial identifi-
cation jury instructions surprising in light of the constitutional restrictions on using race as
a determining factor injury selection).
139. 223 Md. 575, 582-83, 165 A.2d 889, 894 (1960).
140. See United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 562 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Leventhal,J., con-
curring) (expressing concern over subjecting witnesses to an examination of their interra-
cial contacts and personal prejudices); Bartolomey, supra note 116, at 247 (criticizing the
use of ORB in criminal trials as unnecessarily demeaning to witnesses, whose only fault is
being a different race than the accused).
1032 [VOL. 65:1018
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
races for improper reasons: precisely what the court prohibited in
Contee.141
Moreover, the Court of Appeals's decision in Smith is difficult to
reconcile with its decision in Tierco v. Williams, where it held that the
trial court abused its discretion by permitting improper racial issues to
overwhelm the material facts of a personal injury action. 42 In Tierco,
the plaintiff's attorney's tactic of suggesting that racial prejudice
caused the defendant's behavior resulted in the defendant's counsel
countering with additional race-related arguments.1 43 Paradoxically,
Smith permits attorneys to employ similar tactics under the guise of
ORB arguments.
The court's sanction of unsubstantiated ORB arguments is partic-
ularly problematic because the possibility of racial issues distorting the
juror's understanding of the material issues of the case-the reason-
ing employed in Tierco-is more damaging in the criminal context."'
Frequently, trial courts are the only check on improper defense argu-
ments, as these arguments are rarely subject to appellate review."'
This is because the Constitution prohibits the retrial of acquittals,
even those based on irrelevant racial considerations.1 46 Prosecutors
facing improper defense arguments frequently respond with im-
proper rebuttals, realizing there may be no opportunity to appeal if
the defense's improper comments sway the jury's decision.1 47 Consid-
ering the jury's general rejection of the ORB phenomenon, however,
this tactic may cause both attorneys to lose credibility with the jury for
attempting to "play the race card." 4 ' Regardless of whether the jury
accepts the ORB argument or merely considers it a blatant appeal to
racial prejudice, these tactics harm both the state and the accused by
hindering the ability of the jury to ascertain guilt or innocence on
race-neutral considerations.' 49
141. 233 Md. at 582-83, 165 A.2d at 894.
142. 381 Md. 378, 414, 849 A.2d 504, 526 (2004).
143. Id. at 404, 849 A.2d at 520.
144. Nidiry, supra note 120, at 1315.
145. Id. at 1300.
146. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L. REv. 1739, 1748
n.28 (1993) (proposing that defense arguments may be more susceptible to improper ra-
cial comments because the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial after an acquittal).
147. Michael J. Ahlen, The Need for Closing Argument Guidelines inJuly Trials, 70 N.D. L.
REv. 95, 100 (1994).
148. See id. at 101 (noting that attorneys' improper arguments may unnecessarily endan-
ger their client's case if the arguments offend the jury); Johnson, supra note 146, at 1741
(proposing that using race as a factor seldom sways the jury and may even backfire, benefit-
ing the subject of race-related comments).
149. See Nidiry, supra note 120, at 1317-18 (describing the divisiveness of implicit racial
appeals in closing arguments made by defense attorneys).
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Not only does the Smith court permit attorneys to draw undue
attention to the race of the parties, it also inappropriately forces trial
courts to delve into the controversial task of racial classifications.
150
Because the Court of Appeals offered little guidance as to how to ap-
ply their decision, trial courts will have to spend time assigning racial
classifications to the witness and the accused, particularly in cases
where an individual's race is ambiguous.' 5 ' New Jersey courts faced
this problem in the aftermath of Cromedy, as trial courts attempted to
define race in cross-racial identification cases. 152 Similarly, Maryland
trial courts will have trouble applying Smith because it gave no gui-
dance as to biracial witnesses153 or cross-ethnic identifications (e.g., a
Chinese eyewitness and a Korean defendant). 154 The Court of Ap-
peals also did not explain whether attorneys will be permitted to use
ORB to bolster a same-race identification, a divisive tactic vehemently
rejected in other jurisdictions. 155 Because of these ambiguities, trial
courts are now in a conflicted position in which they face reversal for
permitting improper racial comments under Contee and Tierco or for
preventing counsel from making race-based comments on ORB under
Smith. 1
56
150. See United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 562 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Leventhal,J., con-
curring) (advising that the judiciary should carefully consider the effects of involving itself
in an area "as sensitive as race relations"); Hernandez v. State, 357 Md. 204, 230, 742 A.2d
952, 966 (1999) (expressing that the appropriate role of the court is not to assign a race to
a criminal defendant); cf. Jackson v. State, 364 Md. 192, 206-08, 772 A.2d 273, 281-82
(2001) (criticizing the statements of a trial judge during a sentencing hearing for giving
the inappropriate impression that race was a factor in the court's decision).
151. See Smith, 388 Md. at 496-97, 880 A.2d at 304-5 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (rejecting
the majority's treatment of race as a "well-defined issue").
152. Compare State v. Walton, 845 A.2d 1257, 1262 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004)
(holding that the trial court erred when it refused to give a cross-race effectjury instruction
in a case where the defendant and one identifying witness were black and another identify-
ing witness was Hispanic), with State v. Valentine, 785 A.2d 940, 944-45 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2001) (finding no reversible error in failing to give a cross-racial identification
instruction where defendant was black and identifying victim was part Hispanic and part
African American, as Hispanics are not a race).
153. See Smith, 388 Md. at 497, 880 A.2d at 305 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (questioning the
implications of the Smith decision on multi-racial witnesses).
154. Id; see alsoJohnson, supra note 115, at 941 (discussing a study of Asian participants,
which found insignificant differences in the ability of Japanese and Chinese witnesses to
identify Japanese and Chinese faces).
155. See, e.g., People v. Alexander, 727 N.E.2d 109, 110 (N.Y. 1999) (finding the prosecu-
tion's argument about the greater reliability of same-race identifications to be a prejudicial
error).
156. See Smith, 388 Md. at 496, 880 A.2d at 304 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (suggesting that
trial courts may have difficulty implementing the Smith decision); Tierco v. Williams, 381
Md. 378, 414, 849 A.2d 504, 526 (2004) (holding that the trial judge abused her discretion
by failing to grant a new trial where attorneys commented on the race of the parties sixty-
three times in a personal injury case).
1034 [VOL. 65:1018
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
c. The Court of Appeals Should Have Established a Test for Deter-
mining When ORB Arguments Are Appropriate to Limit Unnecessary Juror
Confusion and Irrelevant Racial Arguments.-To limit unnecessary juror
confusion and irrelevant racial arguments, the Court of Appeals
should have adopted a threshold standard for determining when ORB
arguments are appropriate, similar to the factor test proposed by the
Court of Special Appeals. 157 By restoring the deference traditionally
afforded to trial courts in determining the scope of closing argument,
the framework balances the trial court's interest in insulating trials
from irrelevant appeals to racial bias with the Smith court's objective of
protecting the defendant's right to effective advocacy at closing argu-
ment. 151 Similarly, the standard would alleviate the court's treatment
of ORB as common knowledge by requiring the defense to produce
evidentiary support before introducing ORB arguments in
summation.
To illustrate, if the defense counsel requests permission to make
an ORB argument, the court should then consider its relevance in
light of various factors: (1) the line-up or photo array procedure, (2)
the witness's exposure to other-race faces, (3) the witness's ability to
give a specific description of the perpetrator, (4) the amount of time
the witness viewed the perpetrator, (5) the lighting at the scene of the
crime, (6) the delay between the crime and the identification, (7) the
potential for the defense to attack the eyewitness's credibility with
race-neutral arguments, and (8) the presence of any other factors that
might mitigate the effect of ORB on the identification. 159 When some
or all of these factors are present, the court should then require coun-
157. See Smith v. State, 158 Md. App. 673, 707-08, 857 A.2d 1198, 1218 (2004) (sug-
gesting the adoption of a framework that would allow trial courts to determine whether
ORB was a legitimate factor in a particular case before permitting reference to race at
trial).
158. See id, at 707, 857 A.2d at 1218 (asserting that trial courts have the discretion to
prevent subtle appeals to prejudice); State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 467 (N.J. 1999) (in-
structing trial courts to be cautious of overt appeals to racial prejudice).
159. These factors are similar to those courts in other jurisdictions use in determining
the relevancy of cross-racial identification issues. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hyatt, 647
N.E.2d 1168, 1171 (Mass. 1995) (affirming trial court's denial of cross-racial identification
jury instruction where the witness was victimized for fifteen to twenty minutes, the crime
occurred in broad daylight, the victim was face to face with the attacker, and the defense
produced no relevant studies relating to the reliability of cross-racial identifications in
crimes with such characteristics); Commonwealth v. Engram, 686 N.E.2d 1080, 1082 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1997) (finding no error in precluding cross-racial identification jury instruction
where five identifying witnesses described the robber as having a distinctive eye problem,
the witnesses saw the robbery in good light, all were within close proximity to the robber,
four of the five witnesses identified the defendant in the initial photo array, and, at trial, all
five identifying witnesses noted that the defendant appeared to have gained weight since
the crime had occurred, which the defendant admitted was correct).
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sel to produce evidence, including experts or scientific studies, to sup-
port an ORB argument during summation. 6 ° However, if the court
concludes that ORB evidence will not aid the jury in reaching a deci-
sion on the issues in a case, it may prohibit ORB arguments to protect
the trial from unnecessary racial considerations. 6'
Where the evidence presented.allows for a reasonable inference
that ORB was an issue in the identification, the court should grant
counsel the discretion to introduce the evidence and make the argu-
ment.162 The evidentiary threshold will ameliorate the Smith court's
decision to treat ORB as common knowledge since effective ORB ar-
guments require attorneys to reference research that is typically inad-
missible without the support of expert testimony. 163 Although an
evidentiary requirement may restrict the scope of some closing argu-
ments, the restriction is necessary to ensure an appropriate balance
between the defendant's right to a fair trial and the need forjurors to
understand the potential impact of ORB before weighing ORB as a
factor in their deliberations. 164
Applying this test to the facts of the Smith case, the trial court
would have been within its discretion to prohibit ORB comment be-
cause many of the balancing factors weighed against introducing the
topic. First, Crandall rejected six photographs of black male suspects
during the first photo array. 165 In contrast, D.S., the white victim in
Cromedy, failed to identify a picture of Cromedy in the first photo array
she was shown. 166 Additionally, Crandall's identification mirrored
that of a multiple line-up procedure, in which the witness views multi-
ple line-ups, the first line-up comprised of only innocent people. 167
Studies suggest that the rate of misidentification is very low when the
multiple line-up procedure is used.161 Second, Crandall gave a spe-
160. See Smith, 158 Md. App. at 708, 857 A.2d at 1218. But cf. Wells & Olson, supra note
127, at 240-41 (discounting the effectiveness of expert testimony on eyewitness identifica-
tion issues as it lengthens trials, increases costs, and fails to help the jury differentiate
between accurate and inaccurate cross-racial identifications while providing no incentive
for the criminal justice system to prevent mistaken identifications at the time of the initial
identification).
161. See Smith, 158 Md. App. at 708, 857 A.2d at 1218.
162. Introducing the ORB argument before summation will increase the likelihood that
it will be effective, since most jurors make their decision about the guilt or innocence of
the defendant before closing arguments. E.g., Tucker Ronzetti & Janet L. Humphreys,
Avoiding Pitfalls in Closing Arguments, FLA. B.J., Dec. 2003, at 36.
163. E.g., Natarajan, supra note 129, at 1843.
164. See id.
165. Smith, 388 Md. at 470-71, 880 A.2d at 289.
166. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
167. Wells & Olson, supra note 127, at 233-34, 239.
168. Id.
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cific description of the perpetrators, including details about their
clothes and hairstyles. 169 Third, Crandall was able to view the defend-
ants at a close distance for four minutes, an exposure time much
longer than that used in many ORB studies.1 70 Fourth, Crandall iden-
tified the defendants within two weeks of the crime, distinguishing
Smith from cases like Cromedy, where the eight-month lapse between
the crime and the identification increased the potential for ORB.
171
Fifth, the defense had race-neutral arguments to impeach Crandall's
statement that her artistic background gave her enhanced memory
skills.172 Sixth, Crandall's potential for ORB may have been mitigated
by other variables, such as the fact that Crandall resided in a city with
a sixty-four percent black population, which made it unlikely that she
was unfamiliar with other-race faces. 173 If the trial court, even in light
of all the factors discussed above, found that ORB was permissible, the
trial court should still have denied the defense counsel's request be-
cause the defense did not produce any, let alone sufficient, evidence
in support of their ORB argument. 174
As illustrated above, to prevent irrelevant race-based arguments
from misleading the jury, the Court of Appeals should adopt a flexible
framework and limit Smith to those cases where the trial court deter-
mines that ORB affected the identification of the defendant. Such an
evidentiary threshold maintains the Smith court's objective of protect-
ing the defendant's right to effective advocacy by ensuring that when
ORB arguments are relevant, they are effective.
5. Conclusion.-In Smith v. State, the Court of Appeals held that
the criminal defendant's right to an adversarial summation entitled
the defense counsel to attack a cross-racial identification with ORB
arguments without producing evidentiary support. 1 5 The court's de-
cision, however, subverts effective advocacy by mistakenly treating
ORB as a matter of common knowledge' 76 and permitting potentially
169. Smith v. State, 158 Md. App. 673, 676-77, 857 A.2d 1198, 1199-1200 (2004).
170. Id. at 676, 857 A.2d at 1200.
171. Smith, 388 Md. at 471, 880 A.2d at 289; State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 459 (NJ.
1999).
172. For example, the defense counsel could have drawn inferences from the police
officer's testimony that when the officers arrived at the scene of the crime, Crandall told
them that she could only sketch one of the perpetrators. Smith, 388 Md. at 476, 880 A.2d at
292.
173. Smith, 158 Md. App. at 704 n.7, 857 A.2d at 1216 n.7.
174. Brief of Respondent, supra note 20, at 18 n.4.
175. 388 Md. at 470, 880 A.2d at 289.
176. See supra Part 4.a.
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irrelevant race-based arguments to mislead the jury.177 To mitigate
the detrimental effects of Smith, the Court of Appeals should adopt a
factor-based standard for determining the relevancy of ORB argu-
ments and should require an evidentiary basis for ORB arguments, as
they are not a matter of common knowledge. 178
MELANIE GART
177. See supra Part 4.b.
178. See supra Part 4.c.
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B. The Acceptance of Detention Without Probable Cause
In Cotton v. State,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered
whether police detention of an individual violated his right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amend-
ment.2 In a 4-3 decision, the court upheld the individual's detention
and found that narcotics seized from his person were admissible at
trial.' In reaching its decision, the majority misapplied the detention
standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Michigan v. Summers.4
The court stretched this standard beyond its intended purpose in au-
thorizing the detention of all visitors found on the property of a
household subject to a search and seizure warrant. 5
In so holding, the court improperly favored a police officer's in-
terest in executing a valid search warrant over an individual's right to
be free from unreasonable seizures.6 This decision is irreconcilable
with both the history and jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment. 7
More troubling, however, is that this ruling approves a disturbing ex-
pansion of law enforcement authority that directly undermines the
assumption that detention constitutes an exceptional practice.' As a
result, the court's decision grants law enforcement officials a broad
power to detain individuals at will.9
1. The Case.-In February 2002, Detective James Henning of the
Caroline County Drug Task Force (Task Force) secured a no-knock
warrant1° to search Don AntonioJones's residence." The warrant au-
1. 386 Md. 249, 872 A.2d 87 (2005).
2. The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment was applied to the states by the Supreme
Court in Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
3. Cotton, 386 Md. at 251, 267, 872 A.2d at 88, 98.
4. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
5. Cotton, 386 Md. at 267, 872 A.2d at 98 (Battaglia, J., dissenting).
6. See infra Part 4.a.
7. See infra Part 4.b.
8. See infra Part 4.c.
9. See infra Part 4.
10. A "no-knock" warrant empowers law enforcement officials to enter a suspect's resi-
dence without announcing their presence. Davis v. State, 383 Md. 394, 418 n.18, 859 A.2d
1112, 1126 n.18 (2004).
11. Cotton, 386 Md. at 267-68, 872 A.2d at 98 (Battaglia, J., dissenting).
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thorized the police to search individuals named in the warrant' 2 and
other persons on the premises suspected of conducting illegal drug
activities."' The warrant also sanctioned the seizure of any evidence
recovered during those searches and the arrest of individuals violating
controlled substance statutes on the premises.1 4
On February 21, 2002, twenty to twenty-five police officers exe-
cuted the warrant.' 5 When the police arrived, Steven Cotton stood in
the front yard of the house alongside Jones and several other individu-
als, including Steven Aldredge and Grace Johnson. 6 Jones fled.17
Cotton, however, remained in the yard.'8 An officer handcuffed Cot-
ton and allowed him to sit down.19
Meanwhile, Detective Henning secured the premises and re-
turned to the yard to interview all of the individuals who had been
detained but not yet arrested.20 Henning first spoke with Aldredge. 9'
Henning next approached Cotton, who remained sitting and hand-
cuffed. 2 2 Ten to twenty minutes elapsed between Cotton's initial de-
tention and Henning's interrogation.23
Henning advised Cotton of his Miranda rights and asked him if
he had any dangerous weapons or sharp objects. 2 4 In response, Cot-
ton admitted that he was in possession of a bag of marijuana. 25 Hen-
ning then frisked Cotton and recovered marijuana from him. 26 At
that point, Cotton was formally arrested.27
12. The warrant also named Calvin Edgar Bolden and Calvileen Bolden, Jones's grand-
father and mother respectively, as residents ofJones's household. Id. at 251-52, 872 A.2d at
88-89 (majority opinion).
13. Id. at 252, 872 A.2d at 89.
14. Id. After conducting a four-year investigation into Jones's drug-trafficking activi-
ties, Henning and the Task Force presented a sixty-eight page application for a search
warrant of Jones's home. Id., 872 A.2d at 88.
15. Id. at 253, 872 A.2d at 89; id. at 267, 872 A.2d at 98 (Battaglia, J., dissenting).
16. Brief for the Petitioner at 5, Cotton, 386 Md. 249, 872 A.2d 87 (No. 29).
17. Cotton, 386 Md. at 253, 872 A.2d at 89.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 254, 872 A.2d at 90.
21. Id. Henning had a brief conversation with Aldredge and received Aldredge's con-
sent to search his person and his car. Id. Henning's search of Aldredge did not reveal any
contraband, and Aldredge was released. Id.
22. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 16, at 7.
23. Cotton, 386 Md. at 267, 872 A.2d at 97; id. at 268, 872 A.2d at 98 (Battaglia, J.,
dissenting).
24. Id. at 268, 872 A.2d at 98 (Battaglia, J., dissenting).
25. Id.
26. Id. Henning found no weapons on Cotton during the pat-down. Id.
27. Id.
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The State charged Cotton with marijuana possession in the Cir-
cuit Court for Caroline County.28 Cotton moved to suppress the mari-
juana evidence, alleging that his detention was illegal and
contravened the Fourth Amendment.2 Cotton argued that there was
no reasonable articulable basis for his detention and frisk by the po-
lice and that no exception to the Fourth Amendment's protections
pertained to uphold the search and seizure.3 0
On August 28, 2002, the circuit court held a suppression hear-
ing.3" The court denied Cotton's motion, finding that the search and
seizure warrant authorized his detention. 2 Alternatively, the court
observed that a legal pat-down search of Cotton would have inevitably
resulted in the seizure of marijuana from his person. 3
Cotton was subsequently convicted of marijuana possession and
sentenced to two years in prison.34 The Court of Special Appeals af-
firmed the circuit court's decision. 5 The intermediate appellate
court stressed the dangers faced by police in executing a narcotics
search warrant and observed that Cotton stood close to one of the
individuals named in the warrant as officers arrived." The court also
noted that at least one of those named individuals had previously
threatened the officers.3 7 The court held that under the totality of
the circumstances, the police had the authority to detain Cotton for a
limited duration while they secured the premises.3 8
Cotton petitioned the Court of Appeals, which granted certio-
rari 9 to determine whether the police, while executing a no-knock
search and seizure warrant, can lawfully detain and then search an
individual standing in the front yard of a residence that is the subject
of the search when the individual is not named in the warrant.
40
28. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 16, at 1.
29. Brief for the Respondent at app. 49, Cotton, 386 Md. 249, 872 A.2d 87 (No. 29).
30. Id. at app. 48-49.
31. Id. at app. 1, 5.
32. Id. at app. 70.
33. Id. at app. 70-71.
34. Cotton, 386 Md. at 251, 872 A.2d at 88. Cotton received an enhanced sentence
because he was a repeat offender. Id.
35. Cotton v. State, No. 2210, slip op. at 9-10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Feb. 2, 2004).
36. Id. at 6.
37. Id. at 6-7. The court also pointed to Jones's flight as an additional basis for Cot-
ton's detention. Id. at 8.
38. Id. at 7.
39. Cotton v. State, 381 Md. 673, 851 A.2d 593 (2004).
40. Cotton, 386 Md. at 251-55, 872 A.2d at 88-90.
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2. Legal Background.-The Fourth Amendment protects individ-
uals from unreasonable searches and seizures." Indeed, the Supreme
Court has stressed that the reasonableness of the police action is the
proper inquiry in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.42 Although the
Court typically requires probable cause to legally seize an individual
under the Fourth Amendment, several cases following Terry v. Ohio
have authorized detentions under a less exacting standard. 43 None-
theless, the Supreme Court has emphasized that Terry-based excep-
tions must be narrowly drawn and ought not impede on the liberty
guarantees of the Fourth Amendment.44 In identifying the scope of
reasonableness, the Court has stressed that such an analysis must
place equal importance on the interests of law enforcement officials
and an individual's right to personal liberty.4" Maryland's jurispru-
dence, consonant with the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 has followed
suit, extending Teny to interactions between police and citizens.47 In
following this approach, the Court of Appeals has balanced the needs
of law enforcement personnel with individual liberty.48
a. United States Supreme Court Jurisprudence Regarding the
Fourth Amendment.-The Supreme Court has considered the probable
cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment central to its analysis of
any search and seizure. In several isolated instances, however, the
Court has approved narrowly drawn exceptions to this requirement.
(1) The Probable Cause Requirement of the Fourth Amendment
and the Development of the Exclusionary Rule.-In Johnson v. United
States,49 the Court reversed an individual's narcotics conviction be-
cause law enforcement officials failed to obtain a warrant before exe-
cuting the search. The majority deemed the search unconstitutional,
resting its conclusion on an interpretation of the Fourth Amend-
ment's warrant requirement."° The Court explained that although
the warrant requirement was not designed to deny officers the use of
41. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
42. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
43. See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
44. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion).
45. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21.
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
47. Maryland courts recognized the applicability of the exclusionary rule immediately
following the Supreme Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio. Belton v. State, 228 Md. 17, 23,
178 A.2d 409, 412 (1962).
48. Stanford v. State, 353 Md. 527, 538-43, 727 A.2d 938, 944-46 (1999).
49. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
50. Id. at 13-14.
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their reasoned judgment and experience, it nonetheless requires
them to present their judgments to a neutral magistrate who has the
decisionmaking authority to find probable cause." The Court ob-
served that the desire to prevent crime must be reconciled with soci-
ety's right to security in their own homes and that the warrant
requirement provided an objective basis for doing so.52 The Court
also rejected the government's additional argument that the search
was lawful as incident to a valid arrest.53 In doing so, the Court
stressed that an officer seeking entry into a private dwelling must have
a sound legal basis for the intrusion. 4
The Court developed the probable cause requirement more ex-
tensively in Henry v. United States." In Henry, the majority reversed a
defendant's conviction for possession of stolen goods because law en-
forcement officials lacked probable cause to search him. 6 In explain-
ing its rationale, the Court focused on the historical and doctrinal
importance of probable cause to the enactment of the Fourth Amend-
ment. 7 The Court explained that this historical background placed
probable cause, not mere suspicion or rumor, at the forefront of
Fourth Amendment analysis.58 Relying on Johnson, the Court firmly
rejected the idea that probable cause can derive from evidence found
in a warrantless search.59 The Court thus concluded that mere suspi-
cion is insufficient to invade the personal security of a citizen.6 °
While the Court heightened the probable cause requirement in
its Fourth Amendment analysis, it also employed the exclusionary rule
to provide a practical remedy for Fourth Amendment violations. In
51. Id. The Court's focus on the magistrate's neutrality stems from its finding that
officers are "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Id. at 14.
52. Id. at 14.
53. Id. at 15-17.
54. Id. at 17; accord Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968).
55. 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
56. Id. at 104.
57. Id. at 100-01. The majority opinion referred to the Maryland Declaration of Rights
as an example of the colonial reaction to general warrants, i.e., warrants based on suspi-
cion. Id. at 101. Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights states:
That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected places, or to
seize any person or property, are grievous and oppressive; and all general war-
rants to search suspected places, or to apprehend suspected persons, without
naming or describing the place, or the person in special, are illegal, and ought
not to be granted.
MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 26.
58. Henry, 361 U.S. at 101.
59. Id. at 104.
60. Id. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, observed that "[i]t is better, so the
Fourth Amendment teaches, that the guilty sometimes go free than that citizens be subject
to easy arrest." Id.
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Boyd v. United States,61 the Court suggested that evidence seized pursu-
ant to an unconstitutional search could not be admitted at trial to
establish guilt. The Court relied on an influential English common-
law decision6 2 condemning the use of general warrants to discover evi-
dence for a libel conviction.6 3 In the Court's view, the decision stood
for the principle that evidence improperly seized for use at trial
amounted to self-incrimination and constituted an impermissible in-
vasion into an individual's personal security and property." Although
the Court found the circumstances of the case innocuous,6 5 it stressed
that upholding the defendants' convictions would effectively endorse
the depreciation of the defendants' constitutional rights.6 6 Unwilling
to take this step, the Court reversed the convictions, holding that the
search for evidence and its use at trial was unconstitutional.6 7
In Weeks v. United States,6 8 the Court formally announced that it
would employ the exclusionary rule to protect Fourth Amendment
rights. The defendant's conviction in that case was based on a war-
rantless search of his home, which uncovered incriminating papers
and envelopes.6 9 Relying on the Boyd decision, the Court deemed evi-
dence seized as a result of an unconstitutional search inadmissible to
sustain the defendant's conviction.7"
In Mapp v. Ohio,7 the Court formally recognized that its Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule was applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court felt that the disparate constitu-
tional protections afforded defendants in state and federal courts de-
fied common sense and encouraged law enforcement officials to flout
constitutional rights. 72 To support its argument, the Court pointed to
its interpretation of other constitutional protections, such as freedom
of speech and the press, where it had held the states to the same stan-
dards as the federal government. 73 Consequently, the Court rectified
this discrepancy by holding state law-enforcement officials to the same
61. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
62. Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).
63. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626-29.
64. Id. at 630.
65. The Boyd defendants were convicted of illegally importing thirty-five cases of plate
glass. Id. at 617-18.
66. Id. at 635.
67. Id. at 638.
68. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
69. Id. at 387-88.
70. Id. at 398.
71. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
72. Id. at 657.
73. Id. at 656.
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exclusionary rule as their federal counterparts.74 After Mapp, both the
probable cause protections guaranteed in the written text of the
Fourth Amendment and the practical remedy of the exclusionary rule
shielded citizens from unwarranted police intrusion into their per-
sonal liberty.
(2) Exceptions to Probable Cause.-In Terry v. Ohio,75 the
Court recognized that in some circumstances, searches and seizures
based on less than probable cause were still constitutionally permissi-
ble. There, a police officer observed Terry and several others en-
gaged in a repeated pattern of walking by a store window, peering in,
and conferring with each other.76 This behavior aroused the suspi-
cion of the officer, who then approached the men and asked them to
identify themselves.77 After the men mumbled incoherent responses,
the officer grabbed Terry and patted down the outer layer of his cloth-
ing.78 The officer discovered a gun in Terry's jacket pocket and ar-
rested him.79 Terry was later convicted of carrying a concealed
weapon. 80
The Terry Court affirmed the conviction, recognizing a narrow
exception to the probable cause requirement in encounters between
citizens and police officers. 81 The Court expressed the usefulness of
the exclusionary rule in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence both as
a deterrent to inappropriate police conduct and as a method for up-
holding judicial integrity.82 The Court recognized that the Fourth
Amendment inquiry primarily assesses the reasonableness of the gov-
ernment's invasion of an individual's personal security.83 The major-
ity explained that this inquiry focuses on whether the governmental
interest asserted by the officer is reasonable to justify the intrusive ac-
tion.84 Although the Court concluded that the officer did not need
probable cause to frisk Terry,85 the Court nevertheless stressed that
the underpinnings of the probable cause requirement still applied to
74. Id. at 657.
75. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
76. Id. at 6.
77. Id. at 6-7.
78. Id. at 7.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 7-8.
81. Id. at 30.
82. Id. at 12.
83. Id. at 19.
84. Id. at 20-21.
85. Id. at 27.
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the seizure.86 The Court reasoned that an inquiry unmoored from
this standard invites constitutional intrusions based on mere suspi-
cion, a result that it had long rejected as unconstitutional.8" Instead,
this lower standard is based on an officer's reasonable articulable sus-
picion of criminal activity." In the Court's view, requiring officers to
draw on their law enforcement experience, rather than hunches, si-
multaneously protected officers from harm and individuals from un-
constitutional intrusions into their personal liberty.8 " The majority
stressed that since the sole purpose of the search in this situation was
to protect the officer and bystanders from harm, the scope of the
search must be limited to ascertaining whether the suspect is armed
and dangerous. 90
Relying on Terry, the Court recognized an additional exception to
the probable cause requirement in Michigan v. Summers.91 In Summers,
the Court upheld the detention and search of the owner of a resi-
dence where he was found on the front steps of the home during the
execution of a valid search warrant.92 The majority examined Terry
and its progeny and concluded that certain seizures are reasonable
even without probable cause.93 The Court reasoned from these cases
that an officer's reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity
could suffice to detain an individual.94 In the Court's view, such suspi-
cion served as the basis for its reasonableness inquiry under the
Fourth Amendment.
9 5
86. Id. at 20-21.
87. Id. at 21-22.
88. Id. at 21.
89. Id. at 27.
90. Id. at 29. In concurrence, Justice Harlan explained that the proper inquiry for on-
the-street encounters is the reasonableness of the frisk under the circumstances. Id. at 31
(Harlan, J., concurring). For Justice Harlan, an officer's right to frisk a suspect is directly
related to the reasonableness of that officer's articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Id.
at 33. If the suspicion is reasonable, the officer is automatically authorized to stop and
frisk the suspect. Id.
91. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
92. Id. at 705.
93. Id. at 698-99; see, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (author-
izing customs officials on the U.S.-Mexico border to stop vehicles briefly if they have a
reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicles contain illegal aliens); Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143 (1972) (finding informant's tip to police officer reliable indicia to search and
seize an individual in his car).
94. Summers, 452 U.S. at 699. The Court also observed that considerable law enforce-
ment interests outweighed the minimal intrusiveness of the detentions in these cases. Id.
95. Id. at 699-700. Justice Stevens's majority opinion stressed that reasonableness was
the key basis to understanding the Fourth Amendment. Id.; accord Dunaway v. New York,
442 U.S. 200, 219 (1979) (White, J., concurring).
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The Court then addressed the factual background of the deten-
tion.96 Just as officers were about to execute a search warrant for
drugs on a residence, Summers descended from the front steps.
97
The officers identified themselves and asked Summers to let them in
the house.9 8 Summers replied that he had left his keys inside, so the
officers forced open the door and executed the warrant.9 9 The of-
ficers detained Summers and led him back inside the residence dur-
ing the search.' 0 0 Officers found narcotics in the basement and
formally arrested Summers once they learned that he lived there.''
The Supreme Court in Summers held that the defendant's deten-
tion did not violate the Fourth Amendment.10 2 The Court stressed
that the search warrant authorized the police to search Summers's res-
idence. °3 The majority then noted the law enforcement interests that
supported the detention: the desire to prevent the defendant's flight,
the minimization of harm to officers, and the orderly execution of the
search.10 4 The Court upheld the detention, balancing these law en-
forcement interests with the intrusion on Summers's liberty.' The
Court also observed that police officers can minimize the risk of harm
to both themselves and bystanders if they exercise absolute control of
the situation. 06 The majority stressed that the public stigma associ-
ated with Summers's detention was de minimis because the detention
occurred in the defendant's residence.
1 0 7
Moreover, the Court observed that officers would not prolong or
abuse the detention because the recovery of contraband would result
from a search of the residence, not from the defendant's detention.
l0 8
Alternatively, the Court noted that the connection between Summers
and the residence specified in the search warrant gave the officers a
justifiable basis for his detention.'0 9 That is, the Court held that the
search warrant contained the implicit authority to detain Summers be-
96. Summers, 452 U.S. at 701.
97. Id. at 693.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 693 n.I.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 705.
103. Id. at 701.
104. Id. at 702-03.
105. Id. at 701-03, 705.
106. Id. at 702-03.
107. Id. at 702.
108. Id. at 701.
109. Id. at 703-04.
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cause he was an "occupant" and "resident" of the home subject to a
lawful search. 10
Recently, the Court applied the Summers rationale in Muehler v.
Mena."' In that case, police investigating a gang shooting uncovered
information linking a residence to a gang member.' 12 Based on this
knowledge, Officer Muehler obtained a search warrant for the resi-
dence for weapons and gang-related paraphernalia.113 Muehler and
other officers executed the warrant at 7:00 a.m., rousing Iris Mena, a
resident unconnected with the criminal activity specified in the war-
rant, from sleep in her bedroom." 4 Officers handcuffed Mena and
transported her to a garage on the premises, where she was guarded
for two to three hours." 5 Mena brought a civil rights claim against
Muehler and other officers,1 16 arguing that the scope and duration of
her detention was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.1 1 7
The Supreme Court found that Summers authorized Mena's de-
tention."11 For the Court, the warrant legitimized the search of the
residence, sweeping Mena, who was physically present at the time of
the warrant's execution, within its reach.' 19 Under the Court's view of
Summers, Mena's occupation of the residence covered by a search war-
rant explicitly authorized her detention. 120 Ultimately, although the
Court has drawn several exceptions to the probable cause require-
ment of the Fourth Amendment, it has applied them narrowly and
only in rare circumstances warranting immediate police action.
b. Court of Appeals Jurisprudence Regarding Illegal Detentions.-
In Maryland, the Court of Appeals has complied with the Supreme
Court's careful consideration of detention based on less than proba-
110. Id. at 705 & n.21.
111. 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2005).
112. Id. at 1468.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1468, 1471. The length of detention, although generally not dispositive of
whether the search and seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, may provide
reliable indicia that the detention is in fact illegal. See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470
U.S. 675, 693 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring) (asserting that an initially valid Teny stop
becomes illegal if it lasts too long); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality
opinion) (noting that investigative seizures must be temporary and restricted in duration
to the amount of time necessary to complete the search).
116. Mena sued Muehler under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Muehler, 125 S. Ct. at 1469.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1470.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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ble cause. In Stanford v. State,12 1 the court directly addressed the im-
plications of the Summers Court's "resident" and "occupant" language
to Maryland detainees but found that the defendant's detention was
unreasonable under any definition. In Stanford, a confidential inform-
ant told police that individuals in an apartment were selling drugs.
1 22
Officers arranged for the informant to purchase cocaine from the in-
dividuals, during which time the informant learned the names of the
men living in the apartment. 123 Based on this information, officers
then obtained a no-knock search and seizure warrant for the apart-
ment. 12 4 The warrant named three individuals: the two individuals
whose identities were known to police at the time of the execution of
the warrant, and another man believed to be the supplier.' 2 ' Before
executing the warrant, Detective Keith Williams recognized one of the
men named in the warrant and saw him exit the common stairwell to
the apartment building and get into an automobile. 126 Williams
radioed other officers to stop the car and detain the individuals.'
27
One of the men, Richard Stanford, was unknown to Williams and did
not match the informant's description of the supplier. 128 The officers
frisked the men for weapons, handcuffed them, and returned to the
apartment. 129 Once inside, officers recovered cocaine from Stanford
after a search of his person.1
30
The Court of Appeals recognized that Stanford's Fourth Amend-
ment claim rested on Summers."' The court noted that the Summers
majority referred to searched individuals as both residents and occu-
pants without defining either term. 132 As a result, state and federal
121. 353 Md. 527, 727 A.2d 938 (1999).
122. Id. at 529, 727 A.2d at 939-40.
123. Id. at 530, 727 A.2d at 940.
124. Id. at 529, 727 A.2d at 939. The issuance of a no-knock search and seizure warrant
itself is insufficient to supply the reasonable articulable suspicion necessary for a Terry stop.
Dashiell v. State, 374 Md. 85, 90, 821 A.2d 372, 375 (2003). But if the affidavit provided by
officers to obtain this warrant includes information suggesting that violent individuals will
be present when the warrant is executed, officers may frisk individuals found inside the
residence for weapons to protect themselves. Id.
125. Stanford, 353 Md. at 530, 727 A.2d at 940. Based on the informant's description,
the warrant described the other individual as an African-American man standing five feet,
eight inches tall and weighing 175 pounds. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 530-31, 727 A.2d at 940. Stanford is six feet tall and 210 pounds. Id. at 531,
727 A.2d at 940.
129. Id. at 530, 727 A.2d at 940.
130. Id. at 531, 727 A.2d at 940-41.
131. Id. at 535, 727 A.2d at 942.
132. Id.
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courts created their own definitions, and the Stanford court grouped
these decisions into three categories.133
For the court, the first category of cases limited Summers to actual
residents of the searched location.33 The court noted that language
in Summers supported this interpretation given the Supreme Court's
emphasis on the link between the detention of a resident and the
search of the resident's possessions.13 Next, the court explained that
the second line of cases recognized that visitors fell outside the scope
of Summers, unless officers executing the warrant had reasonable ar-
ticulable suspicions linking the visitors to the home or the criminal
activity contained in the warrant.1 3 6 Finally, the third group of deci-
sions upheld the detention of visitors found at a residence, so long as
law enforcement interests outweighed the intrusion on the visitors'
Fourth Amendment rights.1
3 7
The Court of Appeals declined to adopt any of these definitions
because it found Stanford's detention unreasonable under all of
them. 13 8 The court found no significant law enforcement interests in
Stanford's case as Stanford could not assist the officers in the search
of the apartment since he did not live there.139 Moreover, the court
stressed that officers could not detain a nonoccupant of the residence
for a search when that individual is not named in the warrant and has
no known association with the residence. 4 ° Additionally, the court
observed that Stanford's detention was impermissible in duration.141
Consequently, the court vacated Stanford's conviction as evidence
seized from him was the result of an illegal detention.' 42 Stanford illus-
trates the court's due regard for a detainee's personal liberty interest
in light of the authority afforded law enforcement officials to exercise
valid search and seizure warrants.
c. Examination of the "Occupant" and "Resident" Terminology of
Summers.-
(1) Only Actual Residents May Be Detained.-As explained
by the Stanford court, federal and state courts have interpreted the
133. Id. at 535-38, 727 A.2d at 942-44.
134. Id. at 535, 727 A.2d at 942.
135. Id. at 535-36, 727 A.2d at 942-43.
136. Id. at 536, 727 A.2d at 943.
137. Id. at 537-38, 727 A.2d at 943-44.
138. Id. at 538, 727 A.2d at 944.
139. Id. at 539, 727 A.2d at 944.
140. Id. at 542, 727 A.2d at 946.
141. Id. at 543, 727 A.2d at 946.
142. Id.
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"occupant" and "resident" language in Summers both narrowly and
broadly. In United States v. Reid,143 the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit found that Summers did not apply
to the detention of a visitor seen leaving an apartment on which po-
lice were about to execute a search warrant. As officers ascended the
stairwell of the apartment, Carlton Reid, the visitor, exited its front
door and proceeded down the stairs.14 4 This activity aroused the sus-
picion of one officer, who detained Reid, frisked him, and recovered a
large bag of cocaine from his front pocket.1 45 The government ar-
gued that Reid's case fell under the scope of Summers, urging the
court to extend its holding to authorize searches of anyone found on
the premises at the time the warrant is executed. 146 The court re-
jected this idea, noting that Reid never lived at the apartment and was
not inside the premises to be searched. 147 The court viewed Reid's
detention as being more analogous to the Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence concerning searches in public places than
to the circumstances in Summers.'4 8 Notwithstanding its interpretation
of Summers, the court upheld Reid's detention because the officer
voiced articulable concerns for his safety in the confined hallway. 149
(2) Visitors with an Articulable Connection to the Residence or
the Activity Contained in the Search Warrant May Be Detained.-In Baker v.
Monroe Township,1"' the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit upheld under Summers the detention of a mother and her fam-
ily who were headed to visit her son at the same time officers executed
a warrant on her son's home. When Inez Baker and her family ar-
rived at the steps to the residence, they were surprised by armed of-
ficers running past and ordering them to get down on the ground. 5'
The officers handcuffed the Bakers and emptied the contents of Inez
Baker's purse onto the ground.'52 The officers detained the Bakers
for twenty-five minutes, releasing them only once it was established
143. 997 F.2d 1576 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
144. Id. at 1577.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1579.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1578-79; see Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) (finding the search and
seizure of all bar patrons unreasonable where warrant was specifically issued for the
bartender).
149. Reid, 997 F.2d at 1579.
150. 50 F.3d 1186 (3d Cir. 1995).
151. Id. at 1188-89.
152. id. at 1189.
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that they were relatives of the apartment's occupant. 153 The Bakers
sued the officers and the township, claiming that their seizure violated
the Fourth Amendment and that the officers used excessive force.
154
The court first addressed the Bakers' complaint that the officers'
order to drop to the ground violated their Fourth Amendment
rights. 155 The court held that Summers authorized officers to detain
occupants of a residence to be searched.1 56 Although the majority
observed that Summers only applied to residents, it noted that Summers
implicitly authorized officers to question people entering or leaving
the house to establish if they lived there.1 57 Because the Bakers were
ascending the steps to enter the residence at the time officers exe-
cuted the warrant, the officers' order was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.
158
The court subsequently addressed the search of Inez Baker's
purse. 159 The court observed that although Ms. Baker's detention was
valid under both Summers and Terry, neither case authorized the of-
ficers' search of her personal effects.16° The court stated that searches
authorized under these cases were limited to weapons, and in Ms.
Baker's case, the police had overstepped these boundaries by looking
for other evidence.161 The majority found the searches overbroad in
scope and lacking in probable cause and therefore unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.' 62
(3) Visitors to the Residence May Be Detained.-In Burchett v.
Kiefer,163 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit up-
held under Summers the detention of an individual for three hours
while officers executed a search warrant on a neighboring home. In
that case, officers wearing black clothes arrived in unmarked vehicles
to execute a search warrant on a residence in mid-afternoon.
1 64
Charles Burchett, whose brother owned the residence, lived next door
and was concerned about the unidentified officers' behavior.
65
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1191.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1192.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1194-95.
160. Id. at 1194.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. 310 F.3d 937 (6th Cir. 2002).
164. Id. at 939-40.
165. Id. at 939.
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Burchett approached the property line between the homes and of-
ficers ordered him to drop to the ground. 16 6 Fearing for his family's
safety, Burchett ran back to his house. 16 7 Officers pursued and caught
Burchett and handcuffed him. 16' Burchett was then placed in one of
the unmarked vehicles for three hours while officers executed the
warrant.169 During Burchett's detention, officers turned off the vehi-
cle and rolled up the windows, even though the temperature outside
was ninety degrees.'
70
Burchett sued the officers, alleging that his detention violated the
search and seizure protections of the Fourth Amendment. 171 The
Sixth Circuit held that Burchett's detention was authorized under
Summers.1 72 The court first noted that the occupants as discussed in
Summers included any nonresident present during the execution of a
search warrant on the home.173 In the court's view, this was justified
because such a detention prevents flight and enhances officer
safety.' 7
4
Second, the court observed that its reading of Summers authorized
officers to detain any individual who arrives at a residence during the
execution of a search warrant. 175 The court conceded that while
Burchett's detention failed to fall under either of these categories, it
nonetheless fell under the Summers rule because of Burchett's evasive
actions.1 76 The officers therefore never violated Burchett's Fourth
Amendment rights by detaining him.177 In sum, a court's view of the
scope of "occupant" or "resident" has a determinative impact on
whether a detainee was impermissibly held in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Cotton, the Court of Appeals af-
firmed the lower court's decision that Cotton was not unlawfully de-
tained and arrested during the execution of the Caroline County
Sheriff Office's warrant. 17 Judge Wilner, writing for the majority,'79
166. Id. at 940.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 941.
172. Id. at 944.
173. Id. at 943.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 943-44.
177. Id. at 944.
178. 386 Md. at 251, 872 A.2d at 88.
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determined that the police legally seized marijuana from Cotton dur-
ing a proper investigative seizure that did not require probable
cause. 1
80
The court began by observing that the Fourth Amendment only
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures."" In the court's view,
reasonableness in Cotton's case hinged on whether his initial deten-
tion constituted an arrest that requires probable cause or an investiga-
tive seizure that does not.18 2
Relying on Michigan v. Summers at the outset of its analysis, 18 3 the
court observed that Summers refuted the notion that police executing
warrants were limited to the type of stops upheld in Terry v. Ohio and
its progeny.1 8 4 The court interpreted Summers to mean that when as-
sessing the legality of searches and seizures during the execution of a
search warrant, the court should balance the acknowledged restraint
on the individual detainee's personal liberty with legitimate law en-
forcement interests. 8 ' The majority noted that the Summers Court re-
ferred to legitimate detainees as either occupants or residents.' 86 The
court explained that this loose terminology created debates over the
proper scope of the exception. 8 7 The court noted, however, that the
Supreme Court in Muehler v. Mena viewed Summers as dealing with
occupants.' 88
The court explained that, in Stanford v. State, it had grouped the
decisions interpreting Summers into three categories.1 89 The catego-
ries ranged from (1) a narrow view of a residence's occupants, includ-
ing only actual inhabitants of the premises, (2) a broader approach
that included visitors who had a reasonable connection to the resi-
dence or the activity contained in the search warrant, and (3) an all-
encompassing view authorizing the detention of all visitors.190 The
court surveyed decisions interpreting Summers since its Stanford deci-
179. Id. Judge Wilner's opinion was joined by Judges Raker, Cathell, and Harrell. Id. at
251, 267, 872 A.2d at 88, 98.
180. Id. at 267, 872 A.2d at 97.
181. Id. at 255, 872 A.2d at 90.
182. Id., 872 A.2d at 90-91.
183. Id. at 255, 872 A.2d at 90.
184. Id. at 255-56, 872 A.2d at 91.
185. Id. at 256, 872 A.2d at 91.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 257, 872 A.2d at 91.
190. Id., 872 A.2d at 91-92.
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sion and found that courts had generally tended toward the broader
interpretation of legal detainees to include nonresidents or visitors.' 9 '
The majority adopted that broad approach, reasoning that its
view accorded with recent jurisprudence and focused on the basis for
the warrant and its execution. 19 2 The court held that employing this
approach protected police and private citizens during the execution
of a search warrant.1 93 Furthermore, the court observed that the resi-
dence constituted an open-air drug market known to harbor danger-
ous and potentially violent individuals.194 The court explained that it
would be unreasonable to force officers in that environment to dis-
cern which individuals on the premises posed threats.'95 For the ma-
jority, the reputation of the residence and Cotton's presence there
during the authorized search satisfied Summers.196 Thus, the court
found Cotton's initial detention legal.' 97
After upholding the legality of Cotton's initial detention, the
court then assessed whether the length of his detention violated the
Fourth Amendment. 98 The court observed that although the dura-
tion of an individual's detention is significant, it is not dispositive 99
In the court's view, the judiciary should not second-guess police ac-
tions in rapidly developing situations like drug raids.200 The majority
explained that courts must instead determine whether the police rea-
sonably failed to pursue a method of investigation other than deten-
tion.2" 1 The court noted that given the increasing acts of violence
against police, officers need to protect themselves as they execute
their duties.20 2 Based on these views, the court held that the length of
Cotton's detention was not unreasonable because it served to protect
the police officers and the community. 20 3
Finally, the court addressed Cotton's alternative argument that
the reading of his Miranda rights evinced that his detention consti-
tuted an arrest requiring probable cause.204 The court noted that the
191. Id., 872 A.2d at 92.
192. Id. at 257-58, 872 A.2d at 92.
193. Id. at 258, 872 A.2d at 92.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 258-59, 872 A.2d at 92-93.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 259, 872 A.2d at 93.
199. Id. at 260, 872 A.2d at 93-94.
200. Id. at 259, 872 A.2d at 93.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 265, 872 A.2d at 96.
203. Id.
204. Id., 872 A.2d at 96-97.
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warnings themselves do not transform a temporary detention into an
arrest.205 The court explained that this result is necessary because
without Miranda warnings, any incriminating evidence recovered dur-
ing an investigation could be deemed inadmissible.206 Consequently,
the court found that reading Cotton his Miranda warnings did not
indicate he was under arrest.20 7
In dissent, Judge Battaglia argued that the majority had misinter-
preted Summers by finding that persons present anywhere on the
premises where a valid search warrant is being executed may be de-
tained without probable cause or reasonable articulable suspicion.2 0 8
Judge Battaglia observed that the Supreme Court has created excep-
tions to the probable cause requirement necessary for a lawful search
and seizure.20 9 She explained that although Summers was part of this
line of cases, in her view, the majority's reasoning had taken the ex-
ception too far.2 10 Judge Battaglia argued that the majority set forth a
standard that presumed the guilt of persons present on the prem-
ises.211 She asserted that this standard forced those individuals to
prove their innocence to avoid detention.2 12 Judge Battaglia con-
tended that the majority failed to adhere to Summers' directive to bal-
ance the threat to police with the individual's liberty interest against
warrantless seizures. 211 Judge Battaglia concluded that it was apparent
in Cotton's case that he posed little threat to the police and, there-
fore, was impermissibly detained. 21 4
After finding Cotton's detention illegal, Judge Battaglia ex-
plained that Cotton was subject to a de facto arrest.2 15 In so conclud-
ing, she pointed to the large number of police in the operation, the
small size of the premises, and the fact that Cotton had aroused no
205. Id. at 265-66, 872 A.2d at 97.
206. Id. at 266-67, 872 A.2d at 97.
207. Id. at 267, 872 A.2d at 97.
208. Id., 872 A.2d at 98 (Battaglia, J., dissenting). Judge Battaglia's dissenting opinion
was joined by Chief Judge Bell and Judge Greene. Id.
209. Id. at 268-69, 872 A.2d at 98-99.
210. Id. at 271, 872 A.2d at 100.
211. Id. at 272, 872 A.2d at 101.
212. Id. Judge Battaglia was also concerned that the majority did not limit the bounda-
ries of its interpretation of Summers. Id. at 273, 872 A.2d at 101. She observed that while
the Supreme Court had upheld detentions of residents when the potential for violence was
high, Cotton, a visitor to the residence, displayed no outward signs of carrying weapons or
contraband. Id. at 274-75, 872 A.2d at 102. Judge Battaglia insisted that Cotton's mere
presence at the residence was insufficient to uphold his detention. Id. at 275, 872 A.2d at
102.
213. Id. at 273, 872 A.2d at 101.
214. Id. at 275, 872 A.2d at 102.
215. Id. at 279, 872 A.2d at 105.
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suspicion as a basis for his detention2 6 Judge Battaglia reasoned that
the length of the detention and the fact that Cotton was read his Mi-
randa rights also were indicative of his arrest.217 Judge Battaglia noted
that the police did not know Cotton was carrying any contraband until
after he was arrested and lacked probable cause to justify the arrest.2 18
Warrantless arrests must be based on probable cause, and in Cotton's
case, Judge Battaglia concluded that this prerequisite to arrest was ab-
sent.219 Consequently, she found that Cotton's motion to suppress
the evidence should have been granted.22 °
4. Analysis.-In Cotton, the Court of Appeals held that Cotton's
detention did not violate his right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. 22 ' To arrive at this result, the majority misap-
plied the Summers balancing test at the expense of Cotton's free-
dom.222 The court's expansive ruling contravenes the history of the
Fourth Amendment and its own jurisprudence. 22' This weakens indi-
vidual personal liberty interests and creates an exception to probable
cause that threatens to swallow the rule. 224
a. The Cotton Court Misapplied the Summers Balancing Test.-
In upholding Cotton's detention, the Cotton majority failed to prop-
erly apply the balancing test established in Summers.2 25 This misappli-
cation effectively undermined a court's central inquiry regarding
detentions: weighing valid law enforcement interests against an indi-
vidual's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 226
The law enforcement interests of preventing flight, minimizing harm
to officers, and methodically completing the search were notably lack-
ing in Cotton's case227 and, if properly examined, weighed in favor of
his release, not his detention.
In Cotton, the court failed to explain why a nonresident displaying
no outward signs of fleeing the scene ought to be detained.228 The
216. Id.
217. Id. at 280-82, 872 A.2d at 105-07.
218. Id. at 283, 872 A.2d at 107.
219. Id. at 287, 872 A.2d at 109-10.
220. Id., 872 A.2d at 110.
221. Id. at 258-59, 872 A.2d at 92-93 (majority opinion).
222. See infra Part 4.a.
223. See infta Part 4.b.
224. See infra Part 4.c.
225. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702-03 (1981).
226. Id.
227. Cotton, 386 Md. at 257-59, 872 A.2d at 92-93.
228. Id. at 272-73, 872 A.2d at 101 (Battaglia,J., dissenting).
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Summers Court designed its exception to probable cause to meet the
exigencies of a narcotics search, where suspects threaten flight or the
destruction of evidence.22 Thus, in Cotton, this law enforcement in-
terest authorized officers to detain Jones, the known owner of the
home and an individual who fled the premises as police arrived
there.23 ° Cotton, on the other hand, remained in the yard and calmly
obeyed the officers' commands.2"' The Cotton majority, however, in-
ferred that because Summers authorized officers to exert unquestioned
control of the situation, officers could legally detain Cotton.23 2 The
majority overextended Summers, as officers should be confined to en-
forcing control through limited means, rather than detaining all indi-
viduals acting calmly and without any known connection to the
premises being searched.233
The Cotton majority similarly failed to explain how Cotton's de-
tention served to protect officer safety. 21 4 Detective Henning arrived
with at least twenty officers to secure a location that he described as
being rather small, making the danger that officers would be
ambushed by any individuals found at Jones's residence minimal.23 5
Henning also conceded that in four years of surveillance on the prop-
erty, he had never seen Cotton,236 thereby making Cotton's detention
even more unreasonable. The Cotton majority pointed out that of-
ficers executing a warrant cannot forecast who will be on the scene
when they arrive.237 Although this is undoubtedly true, the majority's
categorical extension of detention to any visitors found on the prem-
ises was far more expansive than was needed to address the court's
concern for officer safety.238
Moreover, the Cotton court's sweeping application of the Summers
test forces individuals to instantly prove their innocence, rather than
requiring officers to ascertain whether the individuals have a connec-
229. 452 U.S. at 702.
230. 386 Md. at 253, 872 A.2d at 89.
231. Id. Cotton did not act evasively so as to arouse officer suspicion. See Burchett v.
Keifer, 310 F.3d 937 (6th Cir. 2002) (upholding an individual's detention under Summers
because he sprinted away from officers upon their arrival at a neighboring home).
232. 386 Md. at 258, 872 A.2d at 92.
233. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (plurality opinion) (holding that law en-
forcement officials may detain individuals for no longer than is necessary to effectuate an
investigative detention).
234. Cotton, 386 Md. at 273, 872 A.2d at 101 (Battaglia, J., dissenting).
235. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 29, at app. 35. Henning described the prem-
ises as "not that very big." Id.
236. Id. at app. 33.
237. 386 Md. at 258-59, 872 A.2d at 92-93.
238. Id. at 272-73, 872 A.2d at 101 (Battaglia, J., dissenting).
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tion to the property. 239 Because Cotton displayed no erratic behavior,
had no known association with the residence, and officers outnum-
bered individuals present on the premises by at least five to one, the
Cotton majority erred in finding that officer safety would have been
compromised by inquiring whether Cotton had a connection to the
premises. 2
40
The Cotton majority simply failed to address whether Cotton's de-
tention could help law enforcement officials complete their search in
an orderly fashion.241 Since Cotton was not a resident of the prop-
erty,2 42 officers did not, and could not, claim that his detention was
necessary to complete the search. The Cotton majority instead con-
cluded that courts should not second-guess police decisions.243
The Cotton court's overly deferential approach further departs
from Summers because it weakens the protections afforded to individu-
als. Indeed, under Cotton, officers may effectively ignore a defendant's
liberty interests under the guise of a "balancing" approach.244 The
Cotton majority failed to consider the restraint on Cotton's liberty in
light of his status as a nonresident of the premises to be searched.245
This approach removes any weight given to Cotton's visitor status and
impermissibly tilts the scales in favor of law enforcement interests in
contravention of the Summers balancing test.246 Cotton's detention oc-
curred outside the home that was the subject of the warrant, and he
had no ownership interest in that home.247 This action elevated the
public stigma and the restraint on his liberty associated with the inci-
dent.24s Furthermore, since Cotton's detention cannot be linked to
his association with the residence, the potential for law enforcement
to exploit this rule exceeds the risk associated with a Terry search
239. See id. (explaining the burden on detainees to prove their lack of wrongdoing).
Judge Battaglia asserted that this burden shift was impermissible in light of the balancing
test central to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry. Id.
240. Id. at 258-59, 872 A.2d at 92-93 (majority opinion).
241. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 703 (1981) (explaining that the detention
of occupants of a residence aids the efficiency of a search).
242. Cotton, 386 Md. at 252 n.1, 872 A.2d at 89 n.1.
243. Id. at 259, 872 A.2d at 93.
244. Judge Battaglia described the majority's approach as paying "lip service" to the
Summers balancing test. Id. at 272, 872 A.2d at 101 (Battaglia, J., dissenting).
245. The majority acknowledged that Cotton was not a resident and was never seen in
several years of surveillance ofJones's residence. Id at 252 n.1, 872 A.2d at 89 n.1 (major-
ity opinion); Brief for Respondent, supra note 29, at app. 36.
246. 452 U.S. at 702-03.
247. Cotton, 386 Md. at 275, 872 A-2d at 102 (Battaglia, J., dissenting).
248. See Summers, 452 U.S. at 702 (noting the minimal public stigma of a search or
seizure within one's own home).
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where the individual himself has raised the officer's suspicion. 24 9 In
contrast to the limited Terry exception, the Cotton rule allows officers
to draw into a web of suspicion anyone near a house that is the subject
of a search warrant.25 ° Thus, the risk for a mistake is much higher
than a search of the defendant's person. 25 1 The weak law enforce-
ment interests supporting Cotton's detention, coupled with the im-
permissible character of the intrusion, should have tilted the scales in
Cotton's favor and resulted in the invalidation of his detention.252
b. A Historical and Jurisprudential View of the Fourth Amendment
Reveals That Cotton's Visitor Status Required His Release.-In Cotton, the
majority acknowledged that the Summers Court's description of legal
detainees as either occupants or residents created confusion among
the lower state and federal courts.2 5 3 Despite this confusion, the court
concluded that Summers covered all individuals, including visitors, sub-
ject to detention during the execution of a search warrant on a resi-
dence.254 In so finding, the majority failed to consider the context of
the Summers decision, thus misrepresenting the meaning of the terms
"occupants" and "residents." '255 The historical underpinnings of the
Fourth Amendment and the court's own jurisprudence support the
view that Cotton's visitor status necessitated his release.256
The Framers adopted the Fourth Amendment in reaction to the
overreaching writs of assistance employed by British customs offi-
249. See 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968) (analyzing the reasonableness of an investigative search in
light of an officer's impression of the suspect's activity).
250. 386 Md. at 272-74, 872 A.2d at 101 (Battaglia, J., dissenting).
251. The majority noted that the probable cause to arrest Cotton stemmed from the
frisk during his detention, not from any contraband found in the residence that was linked
to Cotton. Id. at 254, 872 A.2d at 90 (majority opinion).
252. See id. at 273, 872 A.2d at 101 (Battaglia, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 256-57, 872 A.2d at 91-92 (majority opinion).
254. Id. at 257-58, 872 A.2d at 92.
255. Cf RobertJ. Condlin, "Defendant Veto" or "Totality of the Circumstances"? It's Time for
the Supreme Court to Straighten Out the Personal Jurisdiction Standard Once Again, 54 CATH. U. L.
REv. 53, 66-72 (2004) (explaining that when courts analyzing general jurisdiction casually
apply the phrase "continuous and systematic" instead of "substantial" to the contacts at
issue, they are mistakenly employing the specific jurisdiction test and consequently are
eviscerating the distinction between the two terms).
256. Past scholarship, however, has stressed the Supreme Court's aversion to employing
historical context in analyzing the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 395 (1974) ("Its language is no
help and neither is its history."). Nevertheless, recent research has focused on the histori-
cal intent of the Framers. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107
HARv. L. REV. 757, 775-77 (1994) (exploring the historical linkage between the Fourth and
Seventh Amendments); David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100
COLUM. L. REv. 1739, 1780-84 (2000) (critiquing Justice Scalia's application of text and
history in his Fourth Amendment decisions).
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cials.2 57 These writs authorized nearly limitless searches and seizures
by officials on any premises deemed suspicious, and the Framers re-
jected them in enacting the Fourth Amendment. 25 During the Con-
stitutional Convention, many of the delegates argued that the
Constitution as written did not afford individuals sufficient protec-
tions from discretionary sovereign power.25 '9 The Fourth Amendment
was enacted along with the rest of the Bill of Rights to assuage these
concerns.
260
These historical findings suggest that the Cotton court erroneously
assumed that visitors to a residence subject to a search warrant should
be detained. 261 A search is reasonable where there is a strong connec-
tion between a residence's visitors and the criminal activity or individ-
uals named in a warrant; but where there is no known link between
the visitor and the residence or crime, an ensuing search is decidedly
unconstitutional.2 6 2 An inquiry by officers of visitors found on the
searched premises can quickly dispel or confirm the officers' suspi-
cions of any connection to the residence and activity in the warrant.
26 3
257. NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 53-54 (1937).
258. Id. at 54, 120.
259. Id. at 94. Patrick Henry of Virginia urged:
I feel myself distressed, because the necessity of securing our personal rights seems
not to have pervaded the minds of men; for many other valuable things are omit-
ted: -for instance, general warrants, by which an officer may search suspected
places, without evidence of the commission of a fact, or seize any person without
evidence of his crime, ought to be prohibited. As these are admitted, any man
may be seized, any property may be taken in the most arbitrary manner without
any evidence or reason. Everything the most secret may be searched and ran-
sacked by the strong arm of power.
Id.
260. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 96-97 (1980) (ascribing the Fourth
Amendment's purpose as a means to limit the discretionary authority of law enforcement
officials).
261. See Sklansky, supra note 256, at 1784 (discussing Justice Scalia's expressed doubt
regarding whether the Framers would have even subjected themselves to a frisk for weap-
ons on less than probable cause).
262. Compare Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186 (3d Cir. 1995) (invalidating the
search of a mother and her three children on the way to dinner at a family member's
apartment), with United States v. Reid, 997 F.2d 1576 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (upholding the
detention and frisk of an individual seen exiting an apartment as police approached up a
narrow stairwell to execute a search warrant).
263. See Baker, 50 F.3d at 1192 (finding that although Summers only applied to actual
residents of the house to be searched, officers could ascertain whether individuals exiting
from and arriving to the residence actually lived there).
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But a categorical rule that all visitors may be detained incident to a
warranted search crosses the outer boundaries of reasonableness. 264
The Cotton court's decision skirts the edges of reasonableness
given that Cotton was neither a resident nor an occupant of the prem-
ises to be searched.265 Cotton simply stood in the front yard of the
house as officers arrived.266 Cotton was not observed exiting, as in
Summers,2 6 7 or approaching the residence, as in Baker,268 and he was
certainly not inside the residence, as in Muehler.2 6 ' The strongest po-
lice evidence indicating that Cotton was not associated with Jones's
residence is that the police had never observed Cotton in several years
of surveillance of the residence. 27' Although the police could have
reasonably asked Cotton whether he had any connection to the resi-
dence,27' they were decidedly unreasonable in detaining him for ten
to twenty minutes without making any attempt to determine his
status.
2 7 2
The Cotton court erroneously employed Summers as controlling
precedent even though Cotton was a mere visitor. 273 The Summers
Court stressed that the warrant issued on the home was an objective
justification for detaining the occupants found inside. 274 This objec-
tive factor, however, was tied to the fact that Summers actually lived in
the residence to be searched.2 75 The facts in Cotton preclude the ap-
plication of this objective standard. Although a warrant was issued for
the residence, Cotton could not be linked to the home in any way at
264. As Justice White observed, "the key principle of the Fourth Amendment is reasona-
bleness-the balancing of competing interests." Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 219
(1979) (WhiteJ., concurring).
265. 386 Md. at 252 n.1, 872 A.2d at 89 n.1.
266. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 29, at app. 32.
267. See 452 U.S. 692, 693 (1981) (detainee seen descending the front steps); accord
Reid, 997 F.2d at 1577.
268. 50 F.3d at 1188-89 (detainees approaching the front door).
269. 125 S. Ct. 1465, 1468 (2005) (detainee asleep in her bedroom when police
arrived).
270. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 29, at app. 33.
271. See Baker, 50 F.3d at 1192.
272. Cotton did not act erratically or flee the scene so as to arouse the suspicion of
officers and authorize a prolonged detention. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,
699-700 (1985) (Marshall,J., concurring) (concluding that a lengthy detention was author-
ized when an individual driving an automobile sought to evade officers after they asked
him to pull over); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983) (plurality opinion) (finding
that the detained individual's demeanor, appearance, and behavior were reliable indicia of
suspicious criminal activity).
273. See Stanford v. State, 353 Md. 527, 535-36, 727 A.2d 938, 942-43 (1999) (noting that
language in Summers supports the view that only actual residents may be detained).
274. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 703-04 (1981).
275. Id. at 705 & n.21.
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the time the warrant was executed.2 7 6 This removes the objectivejusti-
fication offered by the Summers Court and exempts Cotton from its
purview. 77
Alternatively, the Cotton court might have applied the Terry rule
rather than the Summers balancing test.278 But Terry's scope is limited
to frisks of individuals thought to be armed and dangerous. 2 79 Here,
the officers had no reason to suspect that Cotton was dangerous sim-
ply because he stood next to Jones when they arrived.28" The circum-
stances in Cotton are more akin to Fourth Amendment cases
addressing overbroad search warrants in public places. 28 ' Although
those cases dealt with searches rather than seizures, 28 2 they apply here
where Cotton's only connection to the residence was the person
standing next to him. 28 3 As a result, Cotton's detention was illegal.284
The Cotton court also failed to draw a proper analogy between
Cotton's case and Stanford v. State. Like Stanford, who the court
found had been improperly detained, 85 Cotton did not live at the
residence to be searched and was not named in the warrant, and of-
ficers had no evidence that Cotton had ever been inside the residence
prior to his detention.286 Unlike the officers in Stanford who immedi-
276. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 29, at app. 33.
277. The Summers Court focused on the magistrate's neutral belief that criminal activity
took place inside the home. 452 U.S. at 703.
278. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 690 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(noting that a reviewing court must determine that an investigative stop is not overly intru-
sive before the Summers balancing test even applies).
279. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see also 2 WAWE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 4.9(e), at 729-30 (4th ed. 2004) (arguing that Terry
presents a different set of factual circumstances than Summers-type detentions).
280. Cotton, 386 Md. at 273, 872 A.2d at 101 (Battaglia, J., dissenting) (asserting that
there was no justification for Cotton's detention other than his presence on the property).
281. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) ("[A] person's mere propinquity
to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to
probable cause to search that person.").
282. See Summers, 452 U.S. at 695 n.4 (observing that while Ybarra-type "search" issues
concern the scope of police action, "seizure" issues address the legitimacy of an individ-
ual's detention). The Cotton court referred to search cases in its decision. Cotton, 386 Md.
at 258, 263, 872 A.2d at 92, 95 (citing Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) (protective
sweep); United States v. Maddox, 388 F.3d 1356 (10th Cir. 2004) (same)).
283. Cotton, 386 Md. at 273-74, 872 A.2d at 101-02 (Battaglia, J., dissenting).
284. See Amsterdam, supra note 256, at 411 (asserting that a fundamental principle of
the Fourth Amendment is that individuals are entitled to security of their persons unless
an adequate justification for disturbing that security is shown).
285. Stanford v. State, 353 Md. 527, 538, 727 A.2d 938, 944 (1999).
286. Cotton, 386 Md. at 252-53, 872 A.2d at 89-90; Brief for Respondent, supra note 29, at
app. 33.
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ately ascertained Stanford's identity,287 Detective Henning and the
Task Force made no attempt whatsoever to inquire as to Cotton's con-
nection with the residence until after the residence was secured. 28 A
careful precedential analysis by the majority should have led the court
to determine that Cotton's detention was illegal under the court's rea-
soning in Stanford.
If the court had properly found that Cotton was illegally de-
tained, law enforcement officials would still have authority to detain
suspected criminals during the execution of search and seizure war-
rants. There should be a tight fit between the officers' reasonable
articulable suspicion of inhabitants arriving on the scene and the indi-
viduals and criminal activity named in the warrant. 289 This refutes the
notion that "unquestioned command of the situation"290 should mean
detaining everyone, including bystanders, while executing a search
warrant.291 Law enforcement officials may inquire into the names and
addresses of individuals found at the scene to use them as witnesses at
trial.292 Twenty to twenty-five officers converged on Jones's residence
to execute the warrant. 293 It would be a small imposition on officer
safety to have one of the officers briefly question individuals at the
scene about their link to the residence.294 This type of assessment is
both reasonable and necessary to enforce the Fourth Amendment.
295
c. The Cotton Court's Detention Presumption Unreasonably
Broadens the Reach of Terry.-The Cotton courtjustified Cotton's deten-
tion by noting that it occurred during the execution of a narcotics
search warrant and was not overly lengthy.296 If no additional facts
had been before the court, the detention would not be controver-
287. The Stanford majority stressed that once officers discovered that Stanford was not
one of the individuals named in the warrant, he should have been released. 353 Md. at
541-42, 727 A.2d at 945-46.
288. Cotton, 386 Md. at 254, 872 A.2d at 90.
289. See Muehler v. Mena, 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2005) (upholding the detention of a resident
of a household where the warrant authorized a search for weapons and a gang member
suspected in a shooting actually lived there).
290. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 703 (1981).
291. Cotton, 386 Md. at 272-73, 872 A.2d at 101 (Battaglia, J., dissenting).
292. See 2 LAFAvE, supra note 279, § 4.9(e), at 719-20.
293. Cotton, 386 Md. at 253, 872 A.2d at 89.
294. Detective Henning appears to have had this role but delegated the actual detention
of individuals found on the premises to other officers. Brief for the Respondent, supra
note 29, at app. 15-16.
295. Professor Amsterdam asserted: "[T]he authors of the Bill of Rights had known op-
pressive government. I believe they meant to erect every safeguard against it. I believe
they meant to guarantee to their survivors the right to live as free from every interference
of government agents as our condition would permit." Amsterdam, supra note 256, at 400.
296. 386 Md. at 263, 872 A.2d at 95.
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sial.29 7 But the Cotton rule unreasonably extends Fourth Amendment
exceptions to all detentions of visitors outside a home subject to a
warrant without any additional indicia to support the detention.2 98 In
its decision, the Cotton court did not heed the Terry Court's concern
for expanded law enforcement authority at the expense of individual
rights. 299 As the Supreme Court has continued to extend the Terry
exception to border patrols,3 0 0 informant communications,3 0 1 and
search warrants, 30 2 something has been lost-an individual's right to
be truly free from unreasonable searches and seizures. This trend,
which the court categorically accepts in upholding Cotton's deten-
tion, threatens to become the rule rather than the exception.30 3
An analogy to the investigation of a bank robbery further reveals
the danger in the Cotton court's ruling. 3 4 Unless the culprits have
already fled the scene, police may hold bank customers until they de-
termine who committed the crime. 0 5 But these customers would not
be handcuffed, guarded under watch of gun, and read their Miranda
rights as befell Cotton. 0 6 As officers arrived, he stood in the front
yard of the residence with Jones, an individual named in the war-
rant.3 0  Cotton did not subsequently try to flee the scene but calmly
297. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) (upholding a resident's detention
under this justification).
298. See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 958, 963 (2002) (comparing the
"war on terrorism" to the "war on drugs" and discussing governmental support for deten-
tions based on less than probable cause).
299. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968) (stressing that the decision does not detract
from the judiciary's role to protect citizens against unconstitutional police activity); id. at
21-22 (observing that its decision is rooted in principles of probable cause); id. at 30 (nar-
rowing the scope and applicability of the exception); see also id. at 38-39 (Douglas, J., dis-
senting) (analogizing Fourth Amendment decisions to the balancing of hydraulic
pressures and asserting that the majority's decision "water[ed] down" constitutional
guarantees).
300. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
301. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
302. Summers, 452 U.S. at 705.
303. See Gus G. Sentementes, O'Malley Backs Use of Stop and Frisk, BALT. SUN, Nov. 17,
2005, at IB, 7B (explaining that although Baltimore police officers are required by Mary-
land law to file a report for each frisk, official police records of frisk activity are vastly
underreported).
304. This example comes from an anecdote told by the presiding judge at Cotton's sup-
pression hearing. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 29, at app. 62-63.
305. Id.; see MD. STATE POLICE, PATROL MANUAL, ch. 33, § XIII, subsecs. 2-1 to -6, at 33-43
to -44.1 (2d ed., rev. vol. 2000) (establishing the guidelines for law enforcement investiga-
tion of bank robberies at the scene).
306. Cotton, 386 Md. at 253-54, 872 A.2d at 89-90; see MD. STATE POLICE, supra note 305,
at ch. 27, § II, subsec. A(f) (6) (2d ed., rev. vol. 2005) (explaining that in circumstances
with a large number of witnesses, speed and accuracy are paramount); id. at ch. 28, § V,
subsec. H (describing situations when a stop-and-frisk is appropriate).
307. Cotton, 386 Md. at 253, 872 A.2d at 89.
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remained and obeyed the officers' commands.3 °8 Like many of the
bank customers, Cotton was simply in the wrong place at the wrong
time.30 9 Cotton and the banking customers are both deemed auto-
matically suspicious by their presence on the property. 1 ° But the Cot-
ton majority's decision to favor detention rather than to weigh the
competing interests of police and individuals produces disparate re-
sults: while the banking customers are released after brief police in-
quiries, Cotton is still searched and detained. t t
The Cotton court's failure to limit its detention presumption mag-
nifies the impact of its decision. In dissent, Judge Battaglia decries the
absence of any spatial boundaries in the majority's overextension of
Summers.112 More importantly, she emphasizes that it is virtually im-
possible for a visitor to rebut the detention presumption because it
shifts the inquiry of reasonable detentions from the judiciary to the
police.313 As the Terry majority clarified, a vital role of the judiciary is
to protect citizens from oppressive police conduct.31 4 In contraven-
tion of the Terry holding, the Cotton court's decision inappropriately
elevates the detention presumption while sublimating individual
rights.
As the ongoing concern over military detainees at Abu Ghraib
and Guantanamo Bay attests, 315 the Cotton court's grant of significant
leeway to officials without effective supervision may produce less than
desirable results.3 16 It is not enough to casually assert that judges can-
308. Id.
309. Police investigating a bank robbery could often find customers with drugs or other
contraband if all customers are seized and searched for evidence. Butjust because officers
may uncover evidence that permits a customer to be charged does not mean that they had
probable cause to search in the first place. Similarly, officers were not authorized to con-
clude that they had probable cause to search Cotton because marijuana was found on his
person. SeeJohnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16-17 (1948) (explaining that police
cannot justify an unconstitutional search by what it uncovers); United States v. Barrios-
Moriera, 872 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1989) ("'[T]he proof of the pudding is in the eating' has
no application to Fourth Amendment law.").
310. See Cotton, 386 Md. at 272, 872 A.2d at 101 (Battaglia, J., dissenting); Brief for the
Respondent, supra note 29, at app. 62-63.
311. 386 Md. at 267, 872 A.2d at 97 (majority opinion).
312. Id. at 273, 872 A.2d at 101 (Battaglia, J., dissenting).
313. Id. at 272, 872 A.2d at 101.
314. 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968).
315. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Rule on a Challenge to U.S. Tribunals, N.Y. TiMES,
Nov. 8, 2005, at Al (listing a chronology of the detention issues concerning enemy
combatants).
316. See David A. Super, Are Rights Efficient? Challenging the Managerial Critique of Individ-
ual Rights, 93 CAL. L. REv. 1051, 1137 (2005) (positing that the abuses at the Abu Ghraib
prison facility in Iraq stemmed from the sublimation of the stated goal of humane treat-
ment to the practical need to extract reliable intelligence).
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not second-guess police officers. 1 7 The Supreme Court has made
clear that it is the role of the judiciary to protect constitutional
rights.3"' Cotton's detention is symptomatic of a larger problem, the
acceptance of detention without probable cause.319
5. Conclusion.-The Cotton court broadened the scope of law en-
forcement interests at the expense of individual liberty. 20 As a result,
persons found anywhere on the premises to be searched may be
viewed with a suspicious gaze, regardless of their demeanor or connec-
tion to the criminal activity detailed in the search warrant. 2 ' This
contradicts the historical underpinnings of the Fourth Amendment
and imperils individual freedom.322 Such an expansive ruling tilts the
scales away from the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment
and threatens to make categorical detentions the norm rather than
the exception.323 Indeed, the Cotton court's misapplication of the
Summers balancing test severely weakened Fourth Amendment protec-
tions in Maryland.
MICHAEL A. LAMSON
317. Cotton, 386 Md. at 259, 872 A.2d at 93.
318. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) ("When the right of privacy must
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by ajudicial officer, not by
a policeman or government enforcement agent.").
319. See Thomas K. Clancy, What Constitutes an "Arrest" Within the Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, 48 VILL. L. REv. 129, 178 (2003) (arguing that seizures, i.e., detentions, must
be tied to an officer's belief of probable cause to arrest or at least some reasonable articul-
able suspicion of criminal activity).
320. See supra Part 4.
321. See supra Part 4.a.
322. See supra Part 4.b.
323. See supra Part 4.c.
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C. A Missed Opportunity to Protect the Individual's Right to Privacy in
His Home Under the Maryland Declaration of Rights
In Fitzgerald v. State,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland consid-
ered for the first time whether a canine sniff of the exterior of an
apartment constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights. The court held that a dog sniff of the exterior of a resi-
dence is not a search under the Fourth Amendment, provided that
law enforcement officers conduct it from a location where they have a
right to be.2 The court declined to decide the issue under the Mary-
land Declaration of Rights and held that, even if the sniff was a search,
it was justified under the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard
employed by a majority of state courts holding a sniff to be a search
under their constitutions.'
While Supreme Court precedent may have compelled the court's
conclusion on the Fourth Amendment issue, the Court of Appeals
missed a chance to rule differently under Article 26 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights.4 The Court of Appeals should have taken this
opportunity to hold that a canine sniff of a residence requires reason-
able, articulable suspicion under Article 26 because such a holding
would have resolved an open question of law.5 Furthermore, requir-
ing reasonable, articulable suspicion is a better standard for canine
sniffs of residences because it protects the privacy of the home without
significantly impeding law enforcement.
6
1. The Case.-In February 2002, an anonymous source informed
Detective Leeza Grim of the Howard County Police Department Crim-
inal Investigation Bureau that Matthew Thomas Fitzgerald and his
girlfriend Allison Mancini shared an apartment at 3131 Normandy
Woods Drive, drove a white pick-up truck, and frequently sold mari-
juana.7 Grim confirmed that the couple lived at that location and that
the truck was registered to a relative of Mancini.' Grim also discov-
ered that Fitzgerald had a juvenile record of separate arrests in 1998
1. 384 Md. 484, 864 A.2d 1006 (2004) [hereinafter Fitzgerald I].
2. Id. at 503, 864 A.2d at 1017.
3. Id. at 509, 864 A.2d at 1020.
4. See infra Part 4.
5. See infra Part 4.a.
6. See infra Part 4.b.
7. Fitzgerald II, 384 Md. at 487, 864 A.2d at 1008.
8. Id.
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for distribution of marijuana near a school and for three first-degree
burglaries.9
Based on her findings, Grim then requested the aid of Officer
Larry Brian of the Howard County Police Department's K-9 unit on
March 19, 2002.10 Brian visited the apartment at 3131 Normandy
Woods Drive with his certified drug-detecting dog, Alex." Brian and
Alex entered the building through unlocked glass doors leading to
the stairwell and mailboxes.' 2 Brian then prompted Alex to scan
apartment doors A, B, C, and D. 13 After sniffing all four apartments,
Alex alerted to the presence of narcotics only at apartment A, Fitzger-
ald and Mancini's apartment. 14 On March 20, the anonymous source
informed Grim that Fitzgerald and Mancini continued to sell
marijuana. 15
The next day, March 21, District Court Judge JoAnn Ellinghaus-
Jones issued a search and seizure warrant for apartment A at 3131
Normandy Woods Drive pursuant to Grim's affidavit. 6 On April 2,
Grim executed the warrant and seized a considerable amount of mari-
juana as well as evidence of use and distribution. 7 Fitzgerald and
Mancini were then arrested and charged with possession of marijuana
with intent to distribute and other related offenses.' 8
The case proceeded to the Circuit Court for Howard County,
where Fitzgerald moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the
search and seizure warrant.' 9 In two hearings on September 18 and
October 3, 2002, he argued that a canine sniff constituted a warrant-
less search of his apartment and that without the sniff, the police
would not have had probable cause for a search warrant.20 On Octo-
ber 21, 2002, Judge Lenore Gelfman denied the motion, holding first
that the apartment hallway was open to the public and second that
precedent establishes that dog sniffs are not searches.2'
9. Id. at 487-88, 864 A.2d at 1008.
10. Id. at 488, 864 A.2d at 1008.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. In describing Alex's method of alerting, Brian noted that he first presents an
area to Alex. Id. at 488 n.2, 864 A.2d at 1008 n.2. Alex then sits in that area and he looks at
Brian. Id. The look is Alex's indication that he smells a narcotic. Id.
15. Id. at 488, 864 A.2d at 1008.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 488-89, 864 A.2d at 1008.
21. Id. at 489, 864 A.2d at 1008.
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The case went before the circuit court, where Fitzgerald entered
a plea of not guilty.22 In a bench trial before Judge Dennis M. Swee-
ney, Fitzgerald was found guilty of possession of marijuana with intent
to distribute.23 He was sentenced to two years incarceration and a
$1000 fine, but the entire sentence was suspended except for a $250
fine and two years probation.24
Fitzgerald appealed Judge Gelfman's denial of his motion to sup-
press to the Court of Special Appeals.25 The Court of Special Appeals
affirmed the decision, holding that a canine alert establishes probable
cause for a search.26 The Court of Special Appeals further held that
the common area of the apartment building was not entitled to
Fourth Amendment protection and was thus a legitimate place for the
police to conduct their investigation.27 The Court of Special Appeals
then held that a canine sniff of any protected place, including a resi-
dence, conducted from an area where law enforcement have the right
to be, is not a "search" under the Fourth Amendment.
28
The Court of Special Appeals concluded that a canine alert sup-
ported the issuance of a warrant. 29 The court held that the common
area of Fitzgerald's building, which was open to the public, was not
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection and that the police were
not required to justify their presence there.30 The court reasoned
that because sniffs detect only the presence or absence of contraband,
in which there is no legitimate privacy interest, a sniff does not invade
society's reasonable expectation of privacy guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment.3" The court found the location of the sniff irrelevant to
the application of this rule.
3 2
Fitzgerald petitioned the Court of Appeals on April 8, 2004. 33
The Court granted certiorari to address, inter alia, whether a dog sniff
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment of the United
22. Id.
23. Fitzgerald v. State, 153 Md. App. 601, 614, 837 A.2d 989, 996 (2003) [hereinafter
Fitzgerald I].
24. Fitzgerald II, 384 Md. at 489, 864 A.2d at 1008-09.
25. Id., 864 A.2d at 1009.
26. Fitzgerald 1, 153 Md. App. at 619, 837 A.2d at 998.
27. Id. at 666-67, 837 A.2d at 1025-26. The court explained that the Fourth Amend-
ment only applies within the property line of the apartment itself. Id.
28. Id. at 682, 837 A.2d at 1035.
29. Id. at 619, 837 A.2d at 998.
30. Id. at 664-67, 837 A.2d at 1024-26.
31. Id. at 668, 674, 679, 837 A.2d at 1026, 1030, 1033.
32. Id. at 674, 837 A.2d at 1030.
33. Fitzgerald II, 384 Md. 484, 489, 864 A.2d 1006, 1009 (2004).
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States Constitution or Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights. 4
2. Legal Background.-The Supreme Court has extensively adju-
dicated the issue of what constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment."5 Only those investigations that qualify as searches re-
ceive the protection of the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures.3 6 This guarantee historically pro-
tected the individual's right to "personal security, personal liberty,
and private property," regardless of guilt or innocence, from all gov-
ernment invasions into the "sanctity of a man's home and the priva-
cies of life.""7 In Katz v. United States, the Court simplified the
definition of a search by deciding that a search occurred whenever an
investigation invaded the individual and society's legitimate, reasona-
ble expectations of privacy.38 The Court has since stressed that the
individual's expectation of privacy in his home is reasonable, 9 and it
has preserved the legitimacy of this privacy interest when confronted
with unconventional search methods.4" In United States v. Place, how-
ever, the Court created an exception to the traditional definition of a
search for limited-scope investigatory methods, finding that a search
does not occur unless the investigation risks uncovering something in
which the individual had a right to privacy.41 The Supreme Court has
since applied the Place exception to canine sniffs in various factual
scenarios,42 although the Court has not considered whether the ex-
ception applies to sniffs of residences.
In considering Maryland's protection against unlawful searches
and seizures, the Court of Appeals has held that Article 26 of the Ma-
ryland Declaration of Rights is interpreted in pari materia with the
Fourth Amendment.43 The Court of Appeals has not yet decided,
34. Id. The court also considered whether the sniff in question was an unlawful search.
Id. Moreover, if the sniff was unlawful and its results struck from the record, the court
considered whether the remaining information would establish the requisite probable
cause for the warrant. Id.
35. See Part 2.a-b.
36. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
37. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391 (1914) (quoting Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)); see also Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927) (stressing
that a search "is not made lawful by what it brings to light"); accord McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948).
38. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
39. E.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980).
40. See infra Part 2.a.
41. 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
42. See infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
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however, whether a canine sniff of a residence constitutes a search
under the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and other state courts have
split over the issue."
a. Katz v. United States Establishes That a Search Occurs Any-
time an Investigation Invades an Individual's Reasonable Expectation of Pri-
vacy.-In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court relied on significant
historical precedent to determine that the Fourth Amendment's pro-
tections do not turn upon a physical intrusion into an area.4 5 Rather,
the Court established that the Amendment's protections often de-
pend on the defendant's objectively reasonable and subjectively ex-
pressed expectation of privacy in the subject of the investigation.4 6
The Court emphasized that the Amendment applies to persons,
rather than to specific constitutionally protected places.4 7
In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan articulated a two-part
test for constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment: first, the indi-
vidual expressed a subjective expectation of privacy in the subject of
the investigation; and second, society recognizes that expectation as
reasonable. 48 Although not included in the majority opinion, this test
has become representative of the Katz decision.4 9
The Supreme Court went on to apply Katz's reasoning to various
investigatory contexts, including less invasive methods applied to the
residence. In United States v. Karo, the Supreme Court expanded the
holding in Katz to establish that an individual's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in his residence transforms less invasive investigations
into searches.5 ° The Court determined that the individual's privacy
interest outweighs the government's indiscriminate monitoring of the
interior of the home even if the method used is less invasive than a
44. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
45. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). The Court held that monitoring the person's conversa-
tion in a public phone booth constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
46. See id. at 352.
47. Id. at 351. "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Id. at
351-52 (internal citations omitted).
48. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
49. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (applying Justice Harlan's two-
part inquiry in Katz to find that a homeowner's expectation that his garden was protected
from aerial observation was unreasonable; therefore, a warrantless observation of it did not
violate the Fourth Amendment).
50. 468 U.S. 705, 714-16 (1984). In Karo, the Court held that the monitoring of a
beeper inside an individual's home constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.
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full search.5 ' The Court found that less invasive methods still revealed
crucial information about the interior of the premises that the govern-
ment could not have otherwise obtained without a warrant.
52
The Court continued to find that less invasive methods consti-
tuted searches in Kyllo v. United States.5 3 In Kyllo, the Court found that
the use of sense-enhancing technology to gain information about the
interior of the home constituted a search, even if the methods were
designed to disclose limited information about the residence.5 4 The
Court established that the use of technology not in general public use
to obtain information about the interior of a residence, which would
otherwise be unobtainable without physical intrusion, constituted a
search and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.5 5 The
Court stressed that the individual's expectation of privacy in the home
has never been determined by the quality or quantity of information
obtained because in the home, "all details are intimate details."
56
b. The Supreme Court Created an Exception to the Definition of a
Search for Limited-Scope Methods by Focusing on Whether an Individual Pos-
sessed a Legitimate Expectation of Privacy in the Item Searched for.-In
United States v. Place,5 7 the Supreme Court contemplated whether a
canine sniff of luggage located in a public place was a search under
the Fourth Amendment. The Court recognized that an individual has
a protected privacy interest in the contents of his luggage, but ulti-
mately held that a canine sniff did not violate that privacy interest.
5
In so holding, the Court emphasized that a sniff does not require
opening the luggage and thus reveals only the presence or absence of
contraband. 59 The limited manner and scope of a sniff, therefore,
make it sui generis as an investigatory technique and not a search
within the Fourth Amendment.
60
Less than a year later, the Supreme Court continued to develop
this exception in United States v. Jacobsen.6 1 In Jacobsen, the Court
found that limited investigations designed to reveal only the presence
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
54. Id. at 40. In Kyllo, the sense-enhancing technology was a thermal-imaging device
used to measure the interior temperature of the residence. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 37.
57. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
58. Id. at 707.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
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or absence of contraband did not invade a legitimate privacy interest
under the Fourth Amendment.62 As in Place, the Jacobsen Court found
that the chance that the investigation would invade any legitimate in-
terest of privacy was too low to treat the investigation as a search
under the Fourth Amendment.63
Place and Jacobsen together establish that limited-scope investiga-
tions are not searches under the Fourth Amendment if they do not
disclose any information in which an individual has a legitimate pri-
vacy interest. 64 Nonetheless, many lower courts have been reluctant
to apply this rule to the home. 65 A small number of courts have found
the cases emphasizing the protections of the home, like Kyllo, control-
ling and said that the limited-scope investigation exception in Place
does not apply to the residence.66 Many courts have recognized that
sniffs are not Fourth Amendment searches under Place, but have
found that sniffs constitute searches under their state constitutions.
6 7
c. The Court of Appeals Has Yet to Decide Whether a Sniff of a
Residence Is a Search Under the Maryland Declaration of Rights.-The
Court of Appeals has yet to address the specific issue of whether a
canine sniff of a residence constitutes a search under Article 26 of the
Declaration of Rights. Having generally interpreted Article 26 in pari
materia with the Fourth Amendment, the court has said that the provi-
sions have similar but not necessarily identical purposes and effects
62. Id. at 123-24. In this case, the Court considered whether testing the contents of a
package to determine whether powder found inside was cocaine was a search under the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 122.
63. Id. at 124.
64. Subsequent application of this rule has expanded it beyond the facts of Place and
Jacobsen. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408-09 (2005) (holding that Place and Jacobsen
dictate that dog sniffs of vehicles are not constitutionally protected searches under the
Fourth Amendment); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000) (noting that
walking a drug-detecting dog around a vehicle stopped at a checkpoint does not constitute
a search).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding unani-
mously that a canine sniff was a Fourth Amendment search), affd, 731 F.2d 590 (9th Cir.
1983) (upholding the decision that a sniff is a Fourth Amendment search despite the rul-
ing in Place), rev'd en banc, 736 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding, in accordance with
Place, that a sniff is not a Fourth Amendment search).
66. See United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985) (applying Kyllo to hold
that a canine sniff of an apartment is a Fourth Amendment search based on the height-
ened expectation of privacy in the home); accord State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2006); State v. Ortiz, 600 N.W.2d 805 (Neb. 1999).
67. E.g., State v. Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710 (N.H. 1990); People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054
(N.Y. 1990); Commonwealth v. Johnston, 530 A.2d 74 (Pa. 1987). But see Rodriguez v.
State, 106 S.W.3d 224 (Tex. 2003) (holding that a canine sniff of the exterior of a resi-
dence does not violate the Fourth Amendment or the Texas Constitution).
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and has subjected Article 26 to similar but not identical interpreta-
tions.6" Thus, although Supreme Court decisions on the Fourth
Amendment are not binding on the Court of Appeals, they are highly
persuasive.69 This respect does not mean, however, that the Court of
Appeals cannot rule differently on state constitutional issues; although
persuasive, the provisions remain independent and subject to individ-
ual interpretations.70
d. Terry v. Ohio Created a Balancing Test to Determine Whether
the Circumstances of a Search Require Compliance with the Usual Warrant
Requirements.-The Fourth Amendment does not protect citizens from
all searches and seizures, only those that are unreasonable.71 In Terry
v. Ohio, the Supreme Court determined that certain types of limited
searches are reasonable and thus legitimate under the Fourth Amend-
ment absent a warrant if they are based on reasonable, articulable sus-
picion.72 To determine whether reasonable, articulable suspicion is
present, the Court set up a balancing inquiry, weighing the govern-
ment's interest in the investigation against the individual's privacy in-
terest.73 For the search to be reasonable, the Court required that the
government justify its interest by pointing to specific and articulable
facts in the investigation that would alert a reasonable person to the
possibility of the crime suspected. 74 Requiring anything less than rea-
sonable, articulable suspicion, the Court said, would invite searches
based on "inarticulate hunches" and weaken the protections of the
amendment.7
5
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Fitzgerald v. State, the Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the Court of Special Appeals, holding that: (1) a canine
68. Davis v. State, 383 Md. 394, 408, 859 A.2d 1112, 1120 (2004).
69. Gahan v. State, 290 Md. 310, 320, 430 A.2d 49, 54 (1981).
70. Id. at 322, 430 A.2d at 55.
71. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
72. 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968). The Maryland Court of Appeals has embraced the Terry
reasonable suspicion standard for stop-and-frisks. E.g., In re David S., 367 Md. 523, 789
A.2d 607 (2002); Stokes v. State, 362 Md. 407, 765 A.2d 612 (2001); Quince v. State, 319
Md. 430, 572 A.2d 1086 (1990).
73. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. The Court determined in Terry that an officer had the right to
frisk the defendant for weapons without a warrant because the alleged government interest
in the investigation outweighed the intrusion on the individual's constitutionally protected
interests. Id. at 27.
74. Id. at 21.
75. Id. at 22. A Terry inquiry is appropriate to determine whether a specific kind of
search, under particular circumstances, required a warrant under state law, but not to de-
termine whether a search occurred. Commonwealth v. Johnston, 530 A.2d 74, 79 (Pa.
1987).
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sniff of the exterior of an apartment does not constitute a search
under the Fourth Amendment; and (2) even if a sniff constituted a
search under Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, the
officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct the sniff.76
The court supported its canine-sniff ruling by emphasizing Supreme
Court precedent, specifically Place and its progeny's emphasis on the
limited nature of the sniff.7 7
The court next ruled that investigations that expose only contra-
band items and are conducted from a place where government offi-
cials are permitted to be are not searches because no legitimate
privacy interest exists in contraband. 78 The court thus affirmed the
Supreme Court's emphasis on the content of the sniff, rather than its
context, to determine whether a Fourth Amendment search
occurred.79
In considering whether a sniff remained a nonsearch when per-
formed on the exterior of an apartment, a question of first impression
in Maryland, the court applied the Place exception to determine that
an individual had no reasonable expectation of privacy in contraband
in any location, including the home.8" The court distinguished Karo
because that case revealed information obtainable only from the in-
side of the residence, while canine sniffs reveal information obtained
outside of the residence.8 1 Had Alex crossed the property line into
the residence, the court reasoned, the officer would have conducted a
search and violated the reasonable expectation of privacy in one's
home. 2 Furthermore, .the investigatory method in Karo was not
meant to detect contraband, as was the sniff in Place.83 The court also
noted that the search method present in Karo was an electronic device
rather than a dog.84
Further distinguishing the case from Karo and Kyllo, the court
ruled that the concern with the advancement of sense-enhancing
technology did not pertain to sniffs.85 "A dog," the court wrote, "is
76. Fitzgerald II, 384 Md. at 503, 864 A.2d at 1017.
77. Id. at 512, 864 A.2d at 1022-23.
78. Id. at 493, 503, 864 A.2d at 1011, 1017.
79. Id. at 493-94, 864 A.2d at 1011.
80. Id. at 495, 864 A.2d at 1012.
81. Id. at 498, 864 A.2d at 1014 (citing United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)).
82. Id.
83. Id. (citing Karo, 468 U.S. at 705; United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 499-500, 864 A.2d at 1014-15.
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not technology-he or she is a dog."86 Technology, the court rea-
soned, does not have the limited scope and nature of a dog sniff.8
7
Having determined that canine sniffs of residences were subject
to the Place exception, the court rejected the defendant's attempts to
distinguish Place by emphasizing the increased privacy in the home.88
The court emphasized that the Place exception focuses on the limited
nature of the sniff, rather than its location, dictating that a canine
sniff of the exterior of a residence is not a Fourth Amendment
search.89 The court declined, however, to decide whether a canine
sniff is a search under Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
based on its decision that even if it was a search, it would have been
valid under the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard of Teny v.
Ohio.90
In his dissent, Judge Greene argued that a canine sniff is a search
under the Fourth Amendment and Article 26 of the Maryland Decla-
ration of Rights and requires a warrant supported by probable
cause. He argued that holding that a sniff is not a search weakens
the protections of the Fourth Amendment and Article 26 and leads to
selective law enforcement. 92
Judge Greene maintained that the higher expectation of privacy
in the home dictates that the search of a home should be provided the
highest level of protection under the Fourth Amendment.9" He ar-
gued that sniffs should only be conducted when probable cause suffi-
cient to issue a warrant exists. 94
Judge Greene also argued that the majority's holding could lead
to the random scanning of residences with sniffs, which prejudices
persons who cannot afford to live in homes with no surrounding com-
mon space.95 This ruling, he wrote, will lead to selective law enforce-
86. Id. at 500, 864 A.2d at 1015.
87. Id. at 501, 864 A.2d at 1016.
88. Id. at 502, 864 A.2d at 1016 (citing Place, 462 U.S. at 696).
89. Id. at 502-03, 864 A.2d at 1016-17.
90. Id. at 506-09, 864 A.2d at 1019-21 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). The
court found that reasonable suspicion would justify a warrantless sniff based on the sniff's
minimal intrusiveness, and a majority of state holdings apply that standard. Id. at 510-11,
864 A.2d at 1021-22. The court also declined to consider the argument that Alex's sniff
was made a search because of his ability to detect non-contraband medications, finding
that the issue was not properly preserved for appeal. Id. at 504-05, 864 A.2d at 1018.
91. Id. at 514-15, 864 A.2d at 1024 (Greene, J., dissenting). Chief Judge Bell joined in
the dissent. Id. at 512, 864 A.2d at 1023.
92. Id. at 513, 864 A.2d at 1023.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 514-15, 864 A.2d at 1024.
95. Id. at 515, 864 A.2d at 1024.
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ment at the expense of the poor and will infringe traditional notions
of freedom.96 He maintained that traditional notions of privacy be-
come meaningless when the government is free to conduct wholesale
random drug detection, so long as they do so from a place where they
have a right to be.1
7
Judge Greene argued that the majority should have instead ruled
that the Fourth Amendment requires probable cause and a warrant
for sniffs.9" If the majority was unable to rule on the Fourth Amend-
ment, however, he noted that they could have done so under Article
26 to ensure Maryland residents greater protections surrounding the
home.99
4. Analysis.-In Fitzgerald v. State, the Court of Appeals missed
an opportunity when it ruled in accordance with Supreme Court pre-
cedent that a canine sniff of the exterior of a residence was not a
Fourth Amendment search so long as the police conduct the sniff
from a place where they have a legal right to be.100 Instead of declin-
ing to rule on whether such an investigation was a search under the
Declaration of Rights, the Court of Appeals could have settled an un-
decided area of state law and held that canine sniffs were searches
requiring reasonable, articulable suspicion under Article 26.1"1 Fur-
thermore, requiring reasonable, articulable suspicion for sniffs of resi-
dences is a better reasoned standard to protect the traditional right to
privacy in the home and prevent selective law enforcement, while still
preserving the ability of law enforcement officers to conduct sniffs
where reasonable suspicion is present. 1°2
a. The Court of Appeals Should Have Taken This Opportunity to
Hold That a Canine Sniff of a Residence Requires Reasonable, Articulable
Suspicion Under Article 26 Because Such a Holding Would Provide Guidance
for Maryland Courts on an Unresolved Issue.-The Court of Appeals is the
authority on questions of state law and, as such, should have decided
in Fitzgerald whether a canine sniff of a residence is a search under
Article 26. The court had the opportunity to hold that a sniff was a
search requiring reasonable, articulable suspicion under the Declara-
tion of Rights because the parties identified the conflicting federal
96. Id.
97. Id. at 515-16, 864 A.2d at 1025.
98. Id. at 519, 864 A.2d at 1027.
99. Id. at 518, 519-20, 864 A.2d at 1026-27.
100. Id. at 503, 864 A.2d at 1017.
101. See infra Part 4.a.
102. See infra Part 4.b.
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precedents of Place and Kyllo as central to the issue of whether a ca-
nine sniff constituted a search.' 3 Because this issue is one of first
impression in Maryland, lower courts will look to Fitzgerald for gui-
dance and, in its absence, will refer to conflicting federal precedent,
as well as the split of authority in other states, to resolve this issue.10 4
The conflicting federal precedent over whether a canine sniff of a
residence constitutes a search provides little guidance to Maryland
courts.1 °5 Courts that apply Place's exception for limited-scope investi-
gatory methods to Article 26 would find that sniffs do not invade legit-
imate privacy interests, are never searches, and never require
reasonable suspicion, regardless of their location, so long as law en-
forcement conducts the investigation from a location where they were
legally permitted to be.1 °6 Courts that apply Kyllo, however, would
likely find that the exception for limited-scope investigatory methods
does not apply to residences because of the increased expectation of
privacy in the home. 107 Rather than forcing courts to choose between
these two conflicting lines of precedent, the Court of Appeals should
have settled the issue and provided guidance for lower courts by find-
ing that warrantless canine sniffs of residences are only permissible
under Article 26 when reasonable, articulable suspicion is present.'0 8
103. Petitioner's Brief and Appendix at 2, Fitzgerald II, 384 Md. 484 (No. 8); Brief of
Respondent at 2, Fitzgerald II, 384 Md. 484 (No. 8). Fitzgerald argued that Place's exception
for limited investigational procedures was not applicable to investigations of the home.
Petitioner's Brief, supra, at 8-9. In contrast, the State argued for application of Place's ex-
ception for limited investigational methods to canine sniffs of residences. Brief of Respon-
dent, supra, at 15-17. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals has adopted the Terry reasonable
suspicion standard in the context of stop-and-frisks. See, e.g., Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430,
434, 572 A.2d 1086, 1088 (1990) (applying Teny's "established principles of law").
104. The Court of Appeals is not confined by Fourth Amendment precedent because
Article 26, although in pari materia with the Fourth Amendment, is not identical to it and
does not require identical interpretation. Davis v. State, 383 Md. 394, 408, 859 A.2d 1112,
1120 (2004).
105. See, e.g., State v. Ortiz, 600 N.W.2d 805, 814-17 (Neb. 1999) (looking to various
states' constitutional precedent as well as conflicting federal precedent to determine the
appropriate standard for canine sniffs under the Nebraska constitution).
106. E.g., Rodriguez v. State, 106 S.W.3d 224 (Tex. 2003) (applying Place to hold that a
canine sniff of the exterior of a residence does not violate the Fourth Amendment or the
Texas Constitution).
107. E.g., State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that a sniff of
a residence is a search despite Place and Caballes because of the protections of the home
expressed in Kyllo).
108. Should a lower court rule that a canine sniff of a residence is a search, the court
could then follow the Fitzgerald court's determination that if a sniff was a search under
Article 26, it would require only reasonable suspicion. Fitzgerald II, 384 Md. at 512, 864
A.2d at 1022-23.
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b. Requiring Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion Is a Better Stan-
dard for Canine Sniffs of Residences Because It Protects the Privacy of the
Home While Not Significantly Impeding Law Enforcement.-The Fitzgerald
court should have protected civil rights and found that Article 26 dic-
tated that canine sniffs of residences are searches requiring reasona-
ble, articulable suspicion absent a warrant. This standard would
protect citizens where their privacy interests are highest without com-
promising the government's interest in conducting searches."°9 Find-
ing that a canine sniff of a residence is not a search under the
exception articulated in Place sacrifices the legitimate privacy interests
of citizens and creates the possibility of subjective law enforcement." 0
Contrary to the Fitzgerald court's holding, the Place exception for
limited-scope investigations should not apply to canine sniffs. The
Place exception dictates that limited-scope investigations designed to
detect only the presence or absence of contraband can be justified on
less than reasonable, articulable suspicion because such investigations
run no risk of invading a legitimate privacy interest.11" ' Canine sniffs,
however, should not fall into this limited category." 2 Although in-
tended to detect only the presence or absence of contraband, canine
sniffs often detect noncontraband items in which the individual has
an expectation of privacy.' 3 Dog sniffs regularly return false posi-
tives; one study found that a dog considered "generally reliable"
alerted falsely anywhere from 12.5% to 60% of the time.' 14 A trained
dog can also accurately alert to a variety of things in which the individ-
ual has a legitimate privacy interest. 15 For example, a large amount
of circulating currency contains enough drug residue to cause a nar-
cotics dog to alert, but an individual certainly has a privacy interest in
the money she keeps in her home.1 6 Trained narcotics dogs are falli-
ble; sniffs always run a risk of invading a legitimate privacy interest
109. See infra notes 126-136 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 126-136 and accompanying text.
111. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123-24 (1984); United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
112. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 411-13 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) (assert-
ing that sniffs cannot be justified as sui generis as claimed in Place). But see Place, 462 U.S.
at 707.
113. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 411 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that "the infallible
dog ... is a creature of legal fiction"); see also Fitzgerald Hl, 384 Md. at 517, 864 A.2d at 1026
(Greene, J., dissenting) (noting that errors made by drug dogs can significantly encroach
on legitimate expectations of privacy). Contra Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
114. K. GARNER ET AL., DUTY CYCLE OF TIE DETECTOR DOG: A BASELINE STUDY 12 (2001).
115. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 412-13.
116. Id. at 412; see, e.g., United States v. $242,484.00, 351 F.3d 499, 511 (11th Cir. 2003)
(noting that as much as eighty percent of currency is tainted with drug residue, making a
dog alert of minimal value).
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and cannot fit into an exception for limited-scope investigational
methods. 17
Because the likelihood of false alerts by trained narcotics dogs
implicates legitimate privacy interests anytime the government con-
ducts a canine sniff, the question of whether a sniff of a residence is a
search must be considered under a traditional expectation-of-privacy
inquiry and not the Place exception." 8 The proper inquiry considers
first whether the individual had a subjective expectation of privacy in
the object of the canine sniff, and second, whether society considers
the individual's expectation reasonable.1 19 When evaluated under
this expectation-of-privacy inquiry, a dog sniff of a residence must be
classified a search. 2 Individuals manifest an expectation of privacy
when they place items out of sight in their residences. Furthermore,
society has long considered this expectation of privacy in the home
reasonable and also essential to our liberty.1 2 1
After establishing that a canine sniff is a search under Article 26,
the Fitzgerald Court should have determined whether this type of
search is legitimate by applying the balancing inquiry in Teny v.
Ohio.t 22 Terry's balancing inquiry demands that the government justify
its interest in conducting the sniff by demonstrating reasonable, ar-
ticulable suspicion-that is, by pointing to specific, articulable facts
117. See Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 412-13 (Souter,J., dissenting) (arguing that recognition
of a dog's fallibility destroys the justification for applying the Place exception to canine
sniffs).
118. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 142 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(arguing for an investigation emphasizing whether the context in which an item is con-
cealed supports a reasonable expectation of privacy, rather than the content-based inquiry
used by the majority). Contra Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
119. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan,J., concurring); accord Cali-
fornia v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). Without the Place exception, this inquiry is required
by precedent; however, as Justice Brennan notes in his dissent in Jacobsen, this inquiry also
correctly considers the context in which the item is concealed, not the identity of the item
or whether it is contraband, in determining whether a legitimate privacy interest exists.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The inquiry presented in Place and
Jacobsen reverses the proper inquiry by focusing on whether the individual has a legitimate
privacy interest in what the search might reveal. Id. at 140.
120. Many state courts have applied this reasoning to hold that without the Place excep-
tion, a canine sniff of a residence is a search under their state constitution. See, e.g., State v.
Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710 (N.H. 1990); People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054 (N.Y. 1990); Com-
monwealth v. Johnston, 530 A.2d 74 (Pa. 1987). But see Rodriguez v. State, 106 S.W.3d 224
(Tex. 2003).
121. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) ("At the very core [of
the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there
be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.").
122. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 723 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(suggesting that a dog sniff may be a minimally intrusive search that could be justified
under Tery upon reasonable suspicion).
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that would alert a reasonable person to the possibility of illegality.' 2
The requirement of reasonable, articulable suspicion is essential be-
cause, like the police stops in Terry, warrantless canine sniffs of resi-
dences may invade an individual's legitimate expectation of privacy,
but sometimes the government's interest in conducting these sniffs
outweighs this risk. 1 24 A reasonable, articulable suspicion require-
ment ensures that the individual's right to privacy will not be jeopard-
ized unless the government need substantially outweighs her privacy
interest. 125
A reasonable, articulable suspicion requirement, like that consid-
ered by the Fitzgerald court, represents the most logical standard for
canine sniffs of residences because it affords a degree of protection to
citizens' privacy interests without impairing the ability of law enforce-
ment to employ sniffs where the government's interest is substan-
tial.1 26 The government's interest in conducting a canine sniff is
highest where the demonstrated risk of the suspected activity is sub-
stantial or immediate. 127 When law enforcement employs a drug-de-
tection dog to sniff for narcotics, the demonstrated risk is often
significant, but not always substantial or immediate, depending on the
additional facts known by law enforcement. 128 In contrast, when law
enforcement employs bomb-sniffing dogs to investigate threats, the
demonstrated risk clearly is both substantial and immediate and re-
quires only a minimal showing of articulable facts to be deemed rea-
sonable.' 29 This flexibility ensures that law enforcement can act when
the perceived risk is great. 130
123. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968).
124. See, e.g., State v. Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710, 717 (N.H. 1990) (recognizing that officers
may conduct investigative stops on reasonable, articulable suspicion provided that the in-
trusion on the individual's rights is small and the legitimate state interest is great).
125. See supra Part 2.b. A reasonable suspicion requirement would not entirely remove
the risk of a canine sniff invading an individual's legitimate privacy interests because a law
enforcement officer's reasonable suspicion sometimes will prove incorrect. By preventing
sniffs from occurring in the absence of independent reasonable suspicion, however, the
opportunity for false alerts will be greatly reduced. LAFAvE, supra note 64, § 2.2(g).
126. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 419-21 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (not-
ing that the Tery test provides a situation-sensitive balancing test to assess Fourth Amend-
ment interests).
127. Id. at 417 n.7 (Souter, J., dissenting).
128. See id. at 423-25 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the Court distinguish
between the general interest in crime control and more immediate threats to public
safety).
129. See id. at 417 n.7 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that "unreasonable sniff searches
for marijuana are not necessarily unreasonable sniff searches for destructive or deadly ma-
terial"); id. at 423 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (finding that a dog sniff for explosives would
be an entirely different matter from a dog sniff for narcotics).
130. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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A reasonable, articulable suspicion requirement is also a better
standard for canine sniffs of residences because it prevents wholesale,
random sniffing and selective law enforcement."3 ' If a sniff of a home
is not a search requiring reasonable, articulable suspicion, law en-
forcement may conduct sniffs from any place they have a right to
be.132 These places include sidewalks, parking lots, and apartment
buildings, so long as the corridors are open to the public or the land-
lord has granted permission."' This lack of restraint grants law en-
forcement officers nearly absolute discretion in who and what they
choose to subject to canine sniffs, which inevitably invites intrusions
into individual privacy interests based upon nothing more than inar-
ticulate hunches and personal prejudices.1 3 4 Such unmonitored dis-
cretion jeopardizes the rights of often marginalized people, such as
members of minority groups and those who reside in less affluent
neighborhoods.1 3 ' The risk of selective law enforcement is height-
ened by the fact that sniffs must be conducted from a place where law
enforcement have a right to be; thus, those who cannot afford a home
with a surrounding private area or an apartment in a locked or gated
community lack the protections of those who can. 136
5. Conclusion.-In Fitzgerald v. State, the Court of Appeals consid-
ered for the first time whether a canine sniff of the exterior of a resi-
dence was a search under the Fourth Amendment and Article 26 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights. l3 7 Applying the Place exception
for limited-scope investigational methods, the court held that a canine
sniff of the exterior of a residence was not a Fourth Amendment
131. See Fitzgerald II, 384 Md. at 516, 864 A.2d at 1025 (Greene, J., dissenting) (noting
that the majority's decision not to rule on the Maryland constitutional issue makes possible
wholesale random drug detection in almost any public gathering place, which will subject
lower income groups to selective law enforcement); see also Caballes, 543 U.S. at 422 (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting) (finding that the majority's decision to allow the police to conduct
sniffs of vehicles without reason to suspect contraband opens the door for random, suspi-
cionless sniffs of parking lots and sidewalks); Commonwealth v. Johnston, 530 A.2d 74, 79
(Pa. 1987) (noting the necessity of a reasonable suspicion requirement because "a free
society will not remain free if police may use this, or any other crime detection device, at
random and without reason").
132. Fitzgerald II, 384 Md. at 516, 864 A.2d at 1025 (Greene, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 515-16, 864 A.2d at 1024-25; see also Caballes, 543 U.S. at 422 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
134. Fitzgerald II, 384 Md. at 517-18, 864 A.2d at 1026 (Greene, J., dissenting); see also
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) (stressing that a requirement less than reasonable
suspicion "invite[s] intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing
more substantial than inarticulate hunches").
135. Fitzgerald II, 384 Md. at 517-18, 864 A.2d at 1026 (Greene, J., dissenting).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 484, 864 A.2d at 1006.
2006] 1083
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
search.1 38 The court declined to determine whether a canine sniff of
a residence was a search under Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights, finding it not necessary to rule on the issue because reason-
able, articulable suspicion was present to justify the sniff regardless of
their decision.139 In declining to decide the issue, the court missed
the opportunity to settle an undecided area of Maryland law. The
court should have held that a canine sniff is a search under Article 26
requiring reasonable, articulable suspicion because this decision
would have provided guidance to lower courts. 4 ° Furthermore, re-
quiring reasonable, articulable suspicion is a better reasoned standard
for protecting the right of citizens to be secure in their homes and
preventing selective law enforcement. 4' At the same time, this re-
quirement does not impede the ability of law enforcement to conduct
sniffs where the government's interest is legitimate, since in those
cases reasonable, articulable suspicion will be present.'42
EMILY L. LEVENSON
138. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
140. See supra Part 4.a.
141. See supra Part 4.b.
142. See supra Part 4.b.
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IV. EVIDENCE
A. In Changing How Experts May Present DNA Match Evidence at
Criminal Trials, the Court of Appeals Burdens Prosecutors and
Leaves Key Issues Unresolved
In Young v. State,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered
whether an expert may testify that a DNA sample matches a defen-
dant's profile, and that the defendant was the source of the sample,
without providing random match statistics. The court answered in the
affirmative, holding that where the probability of a random DNA
match is infinitesimal, an expert may testify that there was a DNA
match without offering random match statistics.2 The court further
held that the expert may explain the meaning of that match to the
jury by identifying the defendant as the source of the DNA sample.3
In reaching this holding, the court neglected to supply a
probability standard explaining when an expert may omit random
match statistics, and this failure will unduly impair prosecutors and
could eliminate incentives to pursue advances in DNA forensics.4 The
court should have followed the example of other courts in setting
forth an explicit standard for when experts may forego providing ran-
dom match statistics.5 The Young court also failed to clarify whether
DNA experts may still provide random match statistics if they identify
a defendant as the source of a DNA sample.6 Finally, the court failed
to address whether DNA expert opinion testimony might encroach on
the factfinding role of the jury.7
1. The Case.-On September 27, 2001, Anthony Eugene Young
used a computer to access an Internet chat room entitled "Gay Twen-
ties."8 Young, then thirty-seven years old, contacted a thirteen-year-
old boy who was also participating in this chat room and set up a
meeting at the boy's apartment.' Young came to the boy's house the
next day and the two had oral and anal sex.1°
1. 388 Md. 99, 879 A.2d 44 (2005).
2. Id. at 100, 879 A.2d at 44-45.
3. Id. at 119-20, 879 A.2d at 56.
4. See infra Part 4.a.
5. See infra Part 4.b.
6. See infra Part 4.c.
7. See infra Part 4.d.
8. Young, 388 Md. at 101, 879 A.2d at 45.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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On October 2, Young allegedly returned to the boy's home, and
the two engaged in anal intercourse.11 While Young was still at the
boy's home, the boy's mother came home from work. 12 After Young
left, the boy eventually related to his mother what had transpired.13
That same night, the two called the police. 4
The boy was brought to a hospital, and a forensic nurse obtained
a DNA sample from him by taking a swab of his rectal area.1 5 An
officer of the Prince George's County Police Department subse-
quently procured a DNA sample from Young, with his consent, by tak-
ing two swabs of his mouth. 6 A forensic DNA analyst, Rupert Page,
examined and tested these DNA samples on behalf of the State.' 7
Page compared the DNA profile obtained from the nurse's anal swab
to Young's profile from the oral swabs.'" Examining DNA markers
along thirteen short tandem repeat (STR) loci and a gender identifi-
cation locus, Page concluded that the two DNA samples matched.' 9
A grand jury for Prince George's County charged Young with
three counts of second-degree sexual offense and other related
charges.2' The primary issue at Young's trial was whether he could be
identified as the perpetrator of the offenses.2 ' The State presented
three forms of evidence to establish that Young was the culprit.
22
First, the State submitted testimony from the boy and his mother.23
Young challenged this evidence by noting that the boy and his mother
could not pick Young's picture out of a police photo array and by
attacking the boy's credibility.24 Second, the State offered evidence
that Young participated in the "Gay Twenties" chat room.25
Third, Page testified on behalf of the State that the DNA sample
recovered from the boy matched the sample taken from Young.26
Page did not explain his conclusion beyond stating that he reached it
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 102, 879 A.2d at 45.
16. Id.
17. Id. The circuit court "received Page as an expert in profiling and forensic serol-
ogy." Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 123, 879 A.2d at 58.
20. Id. at 101, 879 A.2d at 45.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 101-02, 879 A.2d at 45-46.
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after comparing the two samples. 27 The State did not ask Page about
the likelihood that a random person's DNA profile could have
matched the profile taken from the boy nor did Page mention any
statistics when he presented the results of his analysis.28 Young's
counsel objected to this evidence, arguing that under Armstead v. State,
Page had to accompany his testimony with random match probability
statistics.
29
The court allowed Page to testify that Young's DNA profile
matched the one recovered from the victim, but declined to permit
Page to say that the DNA obtained from the anal swab came from
Young.3 ° The court did, however, allow the State to enter into evi-
dence Page's DNA report despite defense counsel's objection.3' The
report's conclusion was that, to a reasonable degree of scientific cer-
tainty, Young was the source of the DNA obtained from the sperm
fraction of the anal swab, assuming Young had no identical twin.3 2
This conclusion was not supported by any statistical data." On cross-
examination, counsel for Young failed to elicit any testimony about
statistics from Page.34
Throughout Young's trial, the State repeatedly asserted that the
DNA sample taken from the child matched the sample taken from
Young. In its opening statement, the State claimed that the DNA
evidence showed a "perfect match" and would prove that Young was
the source of the semen recovered from the victim, conclusively prov-
ing Young's guilt.3 6 In his summation, the prosecutor argued that the
DNA comparison produced "an exact match." 7 On rebuttal, the
State declared that the defense counsel's attacks on the reliability of
the State's non-DNA identification evidence were immaterial to the
27. Id. at 102, 879 A.2d at 46. Page "did not identify which DNA sequences he re-
viewed, and only on cross-examination did he note that he employed the polymerase chain
reaction ('PCR') method" to examine the DNA samples. Id.
28. Petitioner's Brief at 6-13, Young, 388 Md. 99, 879 A.2d 44 (No. 99).
29. Young, 388 Md. at 102, 879 A.2d at 46 (citing Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 673
A.2d 221 (1996)).
30. Id. at 103, 879 A.2d at 46.
31. Id. Page's report noted that he used the PCR-STR method to examine DNA mark-
ers along a combined thirteen loci and a gender identification locus. Id.
32. Id. Young conceded that he had no identical twin. Id. at 103 n.4, 879 A.2d at 46
n.4.
33. Id. at 103, 879 A.2d at 46.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 103-04, 879 A.2d at 46-47.
36. Id. at 103, 879 A.2d at 46.
37. Id. at 103-04, 879 A.2d at 46.
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question of Young's guilt or innocence because the DNA match testi-
mony alone was sufficient to identify Young as the culprit."
The jury reached a guilty verdict on one count of second-degree
sexual offense, and the court imposed a twenty-year sentence on
Young.39 Young appealed his conviction to the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals, which affirmed his conviction.40 In an unreported
opinion, the Court of Special Appeals distinguished Armstead v. State,
where the Court of Appeals had declared that statistics must accom-
pany DNA evidence.41 The Court of Special Appeals explained that a
DNA match based on a comparison of one locus, like the one at issue
in Armstead, is basically meaningless without accompanying statistical
testimony.42 By contrast, the court reasoned, a match at thirteen dif-
ferent loci is so unlikely to produce a random match that accompany-
ing statistical data is unnecessary.43 The court also stated that even if
statistical evidence was required, declaring the match was harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt.44
The Court of Appeals granted Young's petition for a writ of certi-
orari to consider whether the trial court erred in admitting the State's
expert testimony that there was a match between Young's DNA sample
and that of the boy.
45
2. Legal Background.-A forensic scientist can use DNA analysis
to determine whether a tissue sample recovered from a crime scene
came from a particular individual, as scientists have developed ever
more precise DNA analysis methods, the probability of a DNA com-
parison producing a "random match"-that is, incorrectly identifying
a defendant as the source of a DNA sample-has become extremely
low. 46 Maryland courts have considered whether statistics indicating
this random match probability must accompany DNA match evidence
on several occasions since 1989. 47 Federal and state courts outside
Maryland have examined this same issue and have reached divergent
conclusions.48 Where an expert does not provide random match sta-
38. Id. at 104, 879 A.2d at 46-47.
39. Id., 879 A.2d at 47.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 104, 879 A.2d at 47 (highlighting the Court of Special Appeals's
distinction).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See infra Part 2.a.
47. See infra Part 2.b.
48. See infra Part 2.c.
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tistics, but simply identifies a defendant as the source of a DNA sam-
ple, she could usurp the factfinding role of the jury, which Maryland
courts have held to be improper under certain circumstances.4 9
a. DNA Evidence.-Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)5° can be
used for forensic identification because it does not vary within an indi-
vidual, and no two individuals, save identical twins, have the same total
DNA configuration. 5' DNA contains around three billion base pairs
of amino acids bound together.52 Large strings of these base pairs
form genes, which are located at specific sites-loci-on the DNA
molecule."3 About ninety-nine percent of these genes have the same
form in every individual.54 The remaining one percent are known as
polymorphic genes because they are different in each individual.55
DNA identification is based on comparisons of these variations be-
tween two DNA molecules.56 An analyst compares two DNA samples
at a certain number of loci, and if they have the same base pair se-
quences at each locus, then it is possible that the samples could have
come from the same individual.57
The most common method of DNA comparison employed in
criminal trials during the mid-1990s was restriction fragment length
polymorphism (RFLP) analysis. 51 In recent years, however, the major-
ity of forensic scientists have adopted polymerase chain reaction-short
tandem repeat (PCR-STR) for DNA typing as it is more accurate and
less time-consuming than RFLP analysis. 59 A DNA analyst could not
conclude with absolute certainty that a DNA sample comes from a
49. See infra Part 2.d.
50. DNA contains the genetic code that defines all individual hereditary characteristics.
Keirsey v. State, 106 Md. App. 551, 561, 665 A.2d 700, 705 (1995).
51. Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 52, 53 n.8, 673 A.2d 221, 227, 228 n.8 (1996).
52. Keirsey, 106 Md. App. at 561, 665 A.2d at 705.
53. Id.
54. Id
55. Id.
56. Commonwealth v. Curnin, 565 N.E.2d 440, 441 n.1 (Mass. 1991).
57. State v. Tankersley, 956 P.2d 486, 490 (Ariz. 1998).
58. Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 53, 673 A.2d 221, 228 (1996). RFLP involves treat-
ing both DNA molecules with restriction enzymes, which cut into smaller fragments at
specific sites that are present in all DNA molecules. Keirsey, 106 Md. App. at 562-63, 665
A.2d at 705. An analyst then compares the lengths of the resulting fragments because
these lengths would be equal if the two DNA molecules came from the same individual. Id.
at 564-65, 665 A.2d at 706. If the analyst finds that the lengths of all the fragments are
equal, she concludes that the suspect is a potential source of the DNA evidence. Tankersley,
956 P.2d at 490.
59. See State v. Belken, 633 N.W.2d 786, 798 (Iowa 2001) (describing the advantages of
PCR testing).
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particular individual unless she compared the two DNA molecules
along their entire length.6 °
Since both RFLP and PCR-STR analysis examine only part of the
DNA molecule, when an analyst finds that a suspect's DNA sample
matches a crime scene DNA sample at a certain number of loci, she
declares that the suspect is merely a possible source of the DNA mate-
rial.61 It may be that two individuals could be unrelated but neverthe-
less share the same DNA patterns at the loci examined, which would
manifest itself as a DNA match.62 Consequently, for a DNA match to
have any meaning, an expert must calculate the probability that a ran-
domly suspected individual would match the suspect's DNA at the loci
examined, generally known as the random match probability.6"
Random match probability is calculated using a two-step pro-
cess.64 First, an initial calculation is made regarding the random
match probability of each polymorphic locus (the "individual allele
frequency"). 65  Second, the individual allele frequencies are com-
bined to determine the overall probability of an individual possessing
the entire matched DNA segment. 66 Analysts have employed various
statistical methodologies to combine individual allele frequencies.67
Today, probability calculations are often made using the "product
rule. '68 The use of the product rule, and the calculation of random
match probability generally, have been the subjects of some recent
scientific dispute.69
b. Maryland's Approach to the Presentation of DNA Evidence.-
Maryland's legislature and judiciary have both played roles in deter-
mining how DNA evidence may be presented at criminal trials. In
60. Nelson v. State, 628 A.2d 69, 75 (Del. 1993).
61. Tankersley, 956 P.2d at 490.
62. Nelson, 628 A.2d at 75-76.
63. Id.
64. Watts v. State, 733 So. 2d 214, 224-25 (Miss. 1999).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 225.
67. See Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 70-72, 673 A.2d 221, 236-37 (1996) (describing
alternative methods of aggregating allele frequencies).
68. Id. at 69-70, 683 A.2d at 236. The product rule states that the likelihood of a match
occurring for an entire DNA segment can be determined by calculating the match
probability for each polymorphic allele and then multiplying those probabilities together.
Id. For example, if a matching DNA sample contains two independent alleles, and there is
a ten-percent chance of a random match of the first allele and a twenty-percent chance of a
random match of the second, the product rule would suggest that there was a two-percent
chance that a random person in the population shared the same DNA profile (.10 x .20 =
.02). Id.
69. Id. at 69-74, 683 A.2d at 236-39.
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1989, the Maryland legislature enacted a statute, now codified at sec-
tion 10-915 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, permitting
the admission of DNA evidence in any criminal proceeding, provided
certain requirements are met.7" The original version of this statute
neither required nor prohibited the presentation of population genet-
ics statistics in conjunction with DNA evidence. 71 A 1991 amendment
to the statute 72 referred to population statistics, which suggests that
the legislature intended for them to be admissible, yet the statute re-
mained silent on which specific methods of DNA analysis that expert
witnesses should employ.73
In 1991, the Court of Special Appeals examined the role of
probability statistics in DNA evidence in Jackson v. State.74 In Jackson,
the defendant appealed from convictions that resulted from two sepa-
rate trials.75 In the first trial, defendant was convicted of first- and
second-degree sexual offenses, burglary, and assault with intent to
rape. 76 The convictions arose out of an incident in 1988 in which
Jackson allegedly forced his way into the home of his former wife's
sister, kicked and beat her, and forced her to perform oral sex upon
him.77 Jackson was arrested over a year later, and at trial, an expert
testified that his DNA matched two samples taken from semen found
on the victim's clothing and person.78 At his second, separate trial,
Jackson was convicted of assault and battery and breaking and enter-
ing,79 charges stemming from an attack on a different victim in
1990.80 The victim was opening her door when a man forced his way
through and punched her.8" The victim managed to reach a pair of
scissors, which she used to stab the attacker in the face.82 The attacker
fled, and three days later, Jackson visited a police station to discuss an
unrelated matter with officers, one of whom observed puncture
70. Act of May 19, 1989, ch. 430, 1989 Md. Laws 2892 (codified as amended at MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 10-915 (West 2005)).
71. Id.; Armstead, 342 Md. at 77, 673 A.2d at 240.
72. Act of May 24, 1991, ch. 631, 1991 Md. Laws ch. 3447 (codified as amended at MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 10-915 (West 2005)).
73. Armstead, 342 Md. at 81, 673 A.2d at 242.
74. 92 Md. App. 304, 608 A.2d 782 (1992).
75. Id. at 307, 608 A.2d at 783.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 308, 608 A.2d at 784.
78. Id. at 308-09, 608 A.2d at 784.
79. Id. at 307-08, 608 A.2d at 783.
80. Id. at 309, 608 A.2d at 784.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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wounds on his face.83 Jackson's DNA matched DNA samples recov-
ered from blood found in the victim's home. 84
On appeal from his convictions, Jackson challenged the trial
court's admission of an expert witness's testimony that his DNA
matched samples lifted from the crime scene.85 The expert witness
had also testified that, in her opinion, the defendant was the source of
both DNA samples.86 The defendant argued on appeal that the de-
clared match had no relevance because the expert did not present
probability calculations.87 The Court of Special Appeals held that the
defendant waived this argument.8 However, the court nevertheless
declared that the State was not required to offer additional evidence,
such as probability statistics, to establish the reliability of its DNA test-
ing method.89
Five years later, the Court of Appeals examined the role of
probability statistics in DNA evidence in Armstead v. State.9" Armstead
was convicted of first- and second-degree rape and twenty-three other
offenses, stemming from his attack on a female victim.91 Armstead
broke into the victim's home, demanded money from her, and then
raped her.92 The State offered evidence showing that the DNA con-
tained in a semen sample taken from the victim matched DNA from
the defendant's blood 9 3 and accompanied this testimony with the
probability of a random DNA match.94 Armstead challenged the ad-
missibility of the DNA evidence, through an in limine motion, on a
variety of constitutional and statutory grounds.95
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 321, 608 A.2d at 790.
86. Id. at 324, 608 A.2d at 791.
87. Id.
88. Id. The court stated that although defense counsel timely objected to the testi-
mony of the State's first DNA expert, he failed to object when a second expert offered the
same opinion as the first. Id., 608 A.2d at 791-92. Because the arguments raised on appeal
were not raised at trial, they were waived pursuant to MD. R. 4-323(a) (1992). Id., 608 A.2d
at 792.
89. Id. at 324-25, 608 A.2d at 792. The court made this statement, possibly to provide
guidance to lower courts in determining the admissibility of DNA evidence, despite the fact
that defense counsel failed to preserve the issue at trial, and the issue was not properly
before the court. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
90. 342 Md. 38, 673 A.2d 221 (1996).
91. Id. at 44-45, 673 A.2d at 223-24.
92. Id. at 44, 673 A.2d at 223.
93. Id., 673 A.2d at 224.
94. Id. at 46, 673 A.2d at 224.
95. Id at 45, 673 A.2d at 224.
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On appeal, Armstead reiterated these challenges and also argued
that the trial court erred by admitting expert testimony of random
match statistics.96 The Court of Appeals held that the trial court prop-
erly admitted the testimony. 7 According to the court, by permitting
the admission of DNA evidence," the legislature intended to make
random match statistics admissible to support the evidence.99 The
court reasoned that DNA match evidence presented without accompa-
nying statistics would be meaningless,' 0 0 and the legislature could not
have meant for juries to receive DNA evidence that they could not
evaluate in a logical manner.'Ot The court declared that the DNA
match and the statistics should be treated "as inseparable components
of DNA evidence."
10 2
The Armstead court also approved the use of the product rule for
calculating random match statistics."0 ' The court noted that section
10-915 did not explicitly approve this method. 104 It declared that the
legislature refrained from prescribing any specific statistical method-
ologies because it did not want to have to rewrite the law every time
there was an advance in DNA technology.1 0 5 The court explicitly re-
96. Id. at 48-49, 673 A.2d at 225-26.
97. Id. at 83, 673 A.2d at 243.
98. MD. CODE. ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 10-915 (West 1991).
99. Armstead, 342 Md. at 81, 673 A.2d at 242.
100. Id. at 78-79, 673 A.2d at 240-41. If an expert testified that two DNA samples
matched, the court reasoned, but did not provide the random match probability, jurors
would not know whether such matches are "as common as pictures with two eyes, or as
unique as the Mona Lisa." Id. at 78, 673 A.2d at 241 (quoting United States v. Yee, 134
F.R.D. 161, 181 (N.D. Ohio 1991)).
101. Id. at 79, 673 A.2d at 241. The court added that if the legislature had specified the
precise method to be used for each critical step in DNA analysis, laboratories would not
have been able to utilize the most effective tests without legislative change, thereby inhib-
iting the development of forensic science. Id at 81-82, 673 A.2d at 242-43.
102. Id. at 79, 673 A.2d at 241. The court declared that it disapproved of Jackson to the
extent it was inconsistent with Armstead. Id. at 79 n.32, 673 A.2d at 241 n.32. Maryland
Rule 8-131 (b) provides that when the Court of Appeals reviews a decision rendered by the
Court of Special Appeals, the Court of Appeals ordinarily will consider only an issue that
has been raised in the petition for certiorari or any cross-petition and that has been pre-
served for review. MD. R. 4-323 (a) (2004). The Armstead court was presented with the issue
of whether random match statistics were admissible, not whether the statistics were re-
quired, but it nevertheless reached a holding on the latter issue. 342 Md. at 43, 79, 673
A.2d at 223, 241. The court appears to have determined that the case was one that war-
ranted searching beyond the matters before the court, perhaps to provide additional gui-
dance to lower courts with respect to the complicated and relatively novel area of DNA
evidence. See, e.g., State v. Parker, 334 Md. 576, 597, 640 A.2d 1104, 1114 (1994) ("This
Court possesses the discretion to consider issues that were not necessarily raised in the
petition or order for a Writ of Certiorari.").
103. 342 Md. at 82-83, 673 A.2d at 243.
104. Id. at 81, 673 A.2d at 242.
105. Id. at 81-82, 673 A.2d at 242-43.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 65:1085
jected the defendant's challenge to the scientific validity of the prod-
uct rule. 10 6 The court noted that some scientists had previously
disputed the method's validity, but declared that it was now widely
accepted. 0 7
c. DNA Match Evidence in Other Jurisdictions.-Other states
have taken a variety of approaches to the role of statistics in DNA evi-
dence. The overwhelming majority of courts hold that random match
statistics are admissible under the proper circumstances.'0 8 In fact, at
the time Armstead was decided in 1996, most states required statistical
evidence with the admission of DNA evidence. 10 9
Defense challenges to the admission of random match statistics in
other jurisdictions have focused primarily on the potential prejudicial
effects of such statistics.110 Minnesota courts, in particular, have ex-
amined the prejudicial harm that presenting random match probabili-
ties to juries could cause.11 ' In State v. Boyd, for instance, Boyd was
charged with criminal sexual conduct for having intercourse with a
fourteen-year-old girl, and the prosecution sought to offer blood test
results indicating that Boyd was the father of a child born to the vic-
tim." 2 The State's expert planned to express these results in terms of
a statistical probability that the defendant was the child's father.1 1 3
106. Id at 82-83, 673 A.2d at 243.
107. Id. at 72, 673 A.2d at 238.
108. E.g., Lindsey v. People, 892 P.2d 281, 291 (Colo. 1995); State v. Montalbo, 828 P.2d
1274, 1282 (Haw. 1992); State v. Faught, 908 P.2d 566, 569 (Idaho 1995); People v. Miller,
670 N.E.2d 721, 731-32 (Ill. 1996); People v. Chandler, 536 N.W.2d 799, 802-03 (Mich.
App. 1995); State v. Weeks, 891 P.2d 477, 489 (Mont. 1995); State v. Marcus, 683 A.2d 221,
232 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1996); State v. Furtell, 436 S.E.2d 884, 889 (N.C. Ct. App.
1993); State v. Anderson, 881 P.2d 29, 45 (N.M. 1994); Taylor v. State, 889 P.2d 319, 333
(Okla. Crim. App. 1995); State v. Morel, 676 A.2d 1347, 1355-56 (R.I. 1996); State v.
Dinkins, 462 S.E.2d 59, 60 (S.C. 1995); State v. Schweitzer, 533 N.W.2d 156, 160 (S.D.
1995); State v. Copeland, 922 P.2d 1304, 1316-17 (Wash. 1996).
109. E.g., People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 742 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Nelson v.
State, 628 A.2d 69, 76 (Del. 1993); State v. Brown, 470 N.W.2d 30, 33 (Iowa 1991); State v.
Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 483, 494 (N.H. 1992); Springfield v. State, 860 P.2d 435, 448 (Wyo.
1993). Since 1996, however, some courts have concluded that experts need not accom-
pany DNA match evidence with random match statistics. E.g., Sholler v. Commonwealth,
969 S.W.2d 706, 709-10 (Ky. 1998); State v. Buckner, 941 P.2d 667, 668 (Wash. 1997).
110. E.g., State v. Pennell, 584 A.2d 513, 519-20 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989); Commonwealth
v. Cumin, 565 N.E.2d 440, 441 (Mass. 1991).
111. See, e.g., State v.Joon Kyu Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544, 548 (Minn. 1987) (holding that the
danger of population frequency statistics misleading a jury outweighed any probative value
of the statistics).
112. 331 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1983).
113. Id. at 481. The expert compared their blood types with respect to fifteen different
gene systems and concluded that 1121 unrelated men would have to be randomly selected
from the general population of men before another man would be found with all the
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The court held that although the expert could describe the analysis
he performed and state that it showed that Boyd could not be ex-
cluded as the father, he could not offer a statistical probability of the
child being Boyd's. 114 The court based this conclusion on its concern
that testimony expressing opinions or conclusions in terms of statisti-
cal probabilities could make uncertain facts seem all but proven and
suggest, by quantification, satisfaction of the requirement that guilt be
established beyond a reasonable doubt.1 5
Minnesota courts subsequendy applied the Boyd rule to a variety
of different forensic identification methods, holding that expert testi-
mony about the results of a forensic comparison could not be accom-
panied with statistics showing the likelihood of a positive match. 116
Minnesota's Supreme Court created an exception to the Boyd
rule in State v. Bloom." 7 The Bloom court held that DNA statistical
probability evidence in criminal prosecutions could be used to estab-
lish identity if calculated using the "ceiling method" of calculating the
statistics." 11 The court, however, reaffirmed that courts should ensure
that DNA identification evidence is not presented in a misleading or
unfairly prejudicial way." 9
Accordingly, in State v. Roman Nose,120 the Supreme Court of Min-
nesota held that the State did not present a random match probability
statistic in a "prejudicial or misleading manner" and that the trial
court properly admitted the statistics. The court observed that the
jury could mistake the random match probability for the likelihood of
the defendant's guilt or innocence, thereby detracting from the pre-
sumption of innocence,12 ' especially because the probability was very
appropriate genes to have fathered the child in question, which meant that the likelihood
that the defendant was the father of the child was 99.911%. Id.
114. Id at 483.
115. Id
116. See, e.g., Joon Kyu Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544 (holding that a prosecution expert would
not be permitted to express his opinion as to the probability that semen found on an
alleged rape victim's bed sheet was the defendant's, but could testify about the basic theory
underlying the blood type comparison he performed, that none of his tests excluded the
defendant as a source of the semen, and that the scientific evidence was consistent with the
defendant having been the source of the semen).
117. 516 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1994).
118. Id at 160. The ceiling method is a modified application of the product rule that
results in more conservative random match statistics than the standard product rule. State
v. Johnson, 922 P.2d 294, 298 (Ariz. 1996).
119. Bloom, 516 N.W.2d at 168-69.
120. 667 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 2003).
121. Id. at 397. If a juror believes that innocence was highly improbable, given the low
random DNA match probability, he might discount as unreasonable any doubts he has
about the defendant's guilt. Id.
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small: 1 in 63 trillion. 122 Yet, since the State did not highlight this
statistic at trial, but offered the number as part of its overall presenta-
tion of DNA results, the court admitted the probability. 12 1
Two federal courts have examined concerns with respect to the
presentation of DNA statistics, ultimately concluding that the poten-
tial probative value of random match statistics outweighs the possible
prejudice they pose to criminal defendants. 124 In United States v. Shea,
the government charged Shea with robbery and proposed to intro-
duce into evidence expert testimony of a match between Shea's DNA
and DNA extracted from bloodstains left by one of the robbers inside
the bank and a vehicle believed to have been used by the robber.12
5
The government's expert would also testify that the likelihood of a
random DNA match was I in 200,000.126 Shea moved to exclude the
random match probability, arguing that it would mislead the jury,
which would fail to distinguish the probability of a random match
from the potentially different probability that Shea did not leave DNA
at the crime scene. 127 The court acknowledged the possibility ofjury
confusion,1 2' but concluded that the risk would be tolerable if the
concept was properly explained.1 29 The court stated that the estimate
could help the jury understand the potential meaning of a DNA
match and that the estimate should be admitted even if it required
explanation. 1 0
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also examined the potential
prejudicial harm of random match statistics in United States v. Chis-
chilly."' Chischilly was convicted of aggravated sexual abuse and mur-
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Shea, 957
F. Supp. 331 (D.N.H. 1997); see also FED. R. EVID. 403 (2005) ("Although relevant, evidence
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.").
125. Shea, 957 F. Supp. at 332.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 345. This mistake is known as "the prosecutor's fallacy." Id
128. Id. The random match probability does not take into account possibilities such as
the planting of evidence, mishandling of samples at the lab, and other scenarios. Id. For
example, if the random match probability were one in one million, it would remain un-
changed even if undisputed evidence established that a defendant did not commit the
crime, which would make the probability that someone other than the defendant contrib-
uted the evidence sample one in one. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. 30 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 1994).
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der 132 following a trial during which the jury heard expert testimony
of a DNA match between a sample of Chischilly's blood and sperm
found on the victim.' 3 3 The government's expert witness further testi-
fied that 1 in 2563 would be a "conservative" estimate of the
probability of a similar match between the DNA of a randomly se-
lected American Indian and either the evidentiary sample or the de-
fendant's DNA.'34 Chischilly argued on appeal that the district court
erred by admitting this random match probability testimony. 13 5 The
Ninth Circuit noted that a jury could confuse random match statistics
with both the probability that the defendant left the sample at the
crime scene and with the likelihood of guilt or innocence. 3 6 But, the
court also declared that the statistics are probative of a defendant's
guilt or innocence. 13 7 The court concluded that so long as a district
court provides careful oversight, the potential prejudice of random
match statistics can be reduced to the point where it is outweighed by
its probative value. 3 8
d. Maryland Case Law on Expert Witness and Opinion Testi-
mony.-Maryland courts have generally permitted expert and lay wit-
nesses to offer opinion testimony only if their conclusions do not
encroach upon the factfinding role of the jury. In Turner v. State
Roads Commission, the Court of Appeals articulated its standard for de-
termining when trial courts should admit expert opinion testimony.13 9
The Court of Appeals applied this standard in the criminal context in
Yudkin v. State.140 Yudkin was charged with selling an obscene
book. 14' The trial court refused to allow him to offer testimony from
expert witnesses, who would have testified that the book in question
would not arouse the prurient interests of the average person or meet
other required elements for being considered an obscene work. 14 2
The trial court concluded that it was the jury's responsibility to deter-
mine whether the book would stimulate the prurient interests of the
132. Id. at 1146.
133. Id. at 1152.
134. Id. at 1158.
135. Id. at 1146.
136. Id. at 1156.
137. Id. at 1158.
138. Id. In Chischilly, the Ninth Circuit noted that the Government had portrayed its
expert's DNA profiling statistics as the probability of a random DNA match, not of Chis-
chilly's innocence. Id.
139. 213 Md. 428, 431-35, 132 A.2d 455, 456-58 (1957).
140. 229 Md. 223, 182 A.2d 798 (1962).
141. Id. at 224, 182 A.2d at 799.
142. Id. at 228, 182 A.2d at 801.
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average individual.14 The Court of Appeals reversed, declaring that
the test as to the admissibility of expert opinion is not whether the
jury can decide the particular issue without expert help, but whether
the jury can receive appreciable help from the particular witness on
the subject.' 44
In Bohnert v. State,14 5 the Court of Appeals held that expert opin-
ion testimony was not admissible where it required the expert to re-
solve contested facts. The court examined whether the trial court
erred in permitting a social worker to offer her opinion that a child
who had accused the defendant of sexually abusing her was telling the
truth. 146 The court answered in the affirmative. 147 Because the opin-
ion was tantamount to a declaration by the expert that the child was
telling the truth and that the defendant was lying, it usurped the jury's
tasks of weighing the credibility of the witnesses and resolving con-
tested facts.
148
In Braxton v. State, the Court of Special Appeals applied the
Yudkin standard for admitting expert testimony to the question of
whether the admission of a firearms expert's testimony that a weapon
recovered from the defendant's house constituted a handgun under
Maryland law invaded the province of the jury.14 9 The court upheld
the admission of the expert's testimony, noting that the definition of a
handgun under Maryland law is complex, and the distinction between
fact and opinion is hard to discern. 15 ° The court concluded that this
was surely the kind of subject matter that an expert could help the
jury understand.151
The Court of Special Appeals reached a similar conclusion in
Cook v. State.1 52 The State charged Cook with possession of cocaine
with intent to distribute and an array of related offenses.15 3 At trial, a
police officer testified that, in his opinion, Cook was the head of the
143. Id. at 226-27, 182 A.2d at 800.
144. Id
145. 312 Md. 266, 539 A.2d 657 (1988).
146. Id. at 276-77, 539 A.2d at 662.
147. Id. at 279, 539 A.2d at 663.
148. Id. at 278-79, 539 A.2d at 663.
149. 123 Md. App. 599, 649-50, 720 A.2d 27, 51-52 (1998). Thejury convicted appellant
of, inter alia, unlawful use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime of violence
and unlawful wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun. Id. at 609 n.2, 720 A.2d at 32
n.2.
150. Id. at 652, 720 A.2d at 53.
151. Id. at 653, 720 A.2d at 53.
152. 84 Md. App. 122, 578 A.2d 283 (1990).
153. Id. at 126, 578 A.2d at 285.
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cocaine distribution organization located at that dwelling.154 He
based this conclusion on his experience and training, stating that
when a person at a drug distribution area carries a weapon, as Cook
did, he is the head of that area. 155 Cook denied that he was involved
in drug distribution and claimed he was merely an invited guest at the
dwelling in question. 15 6 The trial court permitted this testimony and
convicted Cook.
157
The Court of Special Appeals reversed on appeal.15 The court
noted that the expert testimony is admissible if the factfinder can re-
ceive appreciable help from the expert on the subject matter.' 59 The
court observed that the jury had to determine whether Cook partici-
pated in the drug organization, and the officer's opinion was not of
appreciable help in making that judgment.1 60 The court reasoned
that the jury would have been just as capable of concluding that Cook
was the head of the conspiracy had the officer merely described how
drug operations typically are conducted and in that case, would not
have had its role in deciding guilt or innocence clouded by an expert
witness, which was highly prejudicial to Cook.' 6 '
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Young v. State, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland upheld unanimously the circuit court's admission of evi-
dence that the defendant was the source of a DNA sample and that
the sample matched his DNA profile, even though the evidence was
not accompanied by statistics showing the probability that the DNA
match was random.1 62
Judge Raker, writing for a unanimous Court of Appeals, acknowl-
edged that under Armstead v. State, evidence of a DNA match is inad-
missible unless that evidence includes statistics that indicate the
probability of the match being random.163 According to the court, it
reached this holding in Armstead because without these statistics, a
statement that two DNA profiles matched would be scientifically
meaningless.'
154. Id. at 135-36, 578 A.2d at 290.
155. Id. at 136, 578 A.2d at 290.
156. Id. at 139, 578 A.2d at 291.
157. Id. at 126, 135, 578 A.2d at 285, 290.
158. Id. at 144, 578 A.2d at 294.
159. Id at 138, 578 A.2d at 291.
160. Id. at 139, 578 A.2d at 291.
161. Id at 139-40, 578 A.2d at 291-92.
162. Young, 388 Md. at 100, 879 A.2d at 44-45.
163. Id. at 113 n.8, 879 A.2d at 52 n.8 (citing Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 673 A.2d
221 (1996)).
164. Id.
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The court observed, however, that at the time of Armstead, experts
could not explain to a jury the meaning of a DNA match by testifying
that the sample came from a specific individual. 16 5 Such a conclusion,
the court observed, could only be stated with certainty if the DNA
molecules were compared along their entire lengths. 6 6 The DNA
methods in use at the time of Armstead examined only a relatively
small number of sites on the molecule, thus experts could not offer
this evidence for the purpose of identifying the source of the DNA.16 7
The court then observed that DNA analysis technology has ad-
vanced in the nine years since Armstead and that DNA examiners can
now use the PCR-STR method, which is more precise and examines
DNA molecules at more loci than previous methods. 6 s The court
noted that a DNA match still cannot identify the source of the DNA
sample with absolute certainty unless the expert examines the entire
DNA molecule. 69 The court, however, declared negligible the possi-
bility that a thirteen-loci PCR-STR analysis could indicate that a DNA
sample matched an individual's profile when the sample did not in
fact come from that individual (a random match)., 7 °
In deciding whether to revisit Armstead, the court examined re-
ports from the National Research Council (NRC) regarding source
attribution and statistics.'7 1 The court observed that the NRC's 1992
report cautioned its experts to avoid stating that a DNA sample is
unique. 1 72 The court noted that in 1996, the NRC revised its position,
concluding that a DNA profile "might be said to be unique if it is so
rare that it becomes unreasonable to suppose that a second person in
the population might have the same profile.' 7 ' This conclusion
made it clear, according to the court, that once the probability of ran-
dom DNA matches becomes infinitesimal, no scientific basis exists for
165. Id
166. Id. at 110, 879 A.2d at 50.
167. Id at 115, 879 A.2d at 53.
168. Id. at 113-14, 879 A.2d at 52.
169. Id. at 113, 879 A.2d at 52.
170. Id. ("Under certain circumstances, however, new technologies result in infinitesi-
mal random match probabilities that would be deemed conclusive by all but mathemati-
cians and philosophers.").
171. Id. at 114-17, 879 A.2d at 53-55. The NRC is an association of leading scientists, the
members of which are drawn from the National Academy of Sciences, the National Acad-
emy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. Commonwealth v. Fowler, 685 N.E.2d
746, 748 n.6 (Mass. 1997).
172. Young, 388 Md. at 115, 879 A.2d at 53. According to the court, the NRC reached
this conclusion because the then-prevailing methods of DNA analysis examined only a
small number of loci. Id.
173. Id. at 115-16, 879 A.2d at 53-54 (quoting COMM. ON DNA FORENSIC SCIENCE, NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 136 (1996)).
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requiring an expert to mention that probability when testifying as to a
DNA match.
17 4
The court observed that the NRC's shift of position prompted the
Washington Supreme Court to revise its treatment of DNA match tes-
timony.'75 The Young court discussed State v. Cauthron, where the
Washington Supreme Court held that experts could not testify to the
uniqueness of a DNA sample and had to accompany their match testi-
mony with statistics. 17  The Court of Appeals noted that while the
Washington court upheld the rule of Cauthron in State v. Buckner, it
reconsidered its decision after the release of the 1996 NRC report and
repudiated its earlier opinion.
177
The court then concluded that DNA comparisons can now be
performed with such precision that they result in extremely low
probabilities of random matches. 17 The court stated that a PCR-STR
test that examines thirteen loci has such a low probability of produc-
ing a random match, even for related individuals, that the DNA may
be characterized as unique. 179 In this case, the court held, an expert
may testify that a DNA match exists without contextual statistics.'
Instead of offering these statistics, the expert can explain to the jury
that the match is one of a kind by declaring that the individual whose
DNA matched the sample recovered at the crime scene was the source
of that evidence.' 8 1 Because this is what the State's witness did at
Young's trial, the court concluded that the circuit court properly ad-
mitted his testimony and report.1 1 2
The court also explained that the new standard does not render
the defendant incapable of challenging an expert witness's source at-tribution testimony183 The court declared that a defendant retains
the right and opportunity to cross-examine the expert and attack her
174. Id. at 116, 879 A.2d at 54. The court recognized that courts or legislatures can
determine the point at which the random match probability accompanying a DNA match
becomes so low that the match may be deemed "unique." Id at 117, 879 A.2d at 55.
175. Id. at 117, 879 A.2d at 55.
176. Id. at 117-18, 879 A.2d at 55 (citing State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 515-16 (Wash.
1993) (en banc)).
177. Id. at 118, 879 A.2d at 55 (citing State v. Buckner, 941 P.2d 667 (Wash. 1997) (en
banc)). The Young court noted that the FBI also changed its policy in the wake of the NRC
report, permitting its experts to "testify to a match without citing statistics, when the
probability of a match is less than one in 260 billion." Id. at 119, 879 A.2d at 56.
178. Id. at 119, 879 A.2d at 56.
179. Id. This type of comparison yields an average match probability of one in 180 tril-
lion. Id. at 122, 879 A.2d at 57.
180. Id. at 119, 879 A.2d at 56.
181. Id. at 119-20, 879 A.2d at 56.
182. Id. at 123, 879 A.2d at 58.
183. Id. at 121, 879 A.2d at 57.
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conclusion."8 4 The court also noted that a party seeking to introduce
DNA evidence is required to provide data to the other party upon
request."8 5 Finally, the court noted that a defendant may challenge
the weight of DNA evidence by asking the expert about contamination
and errors.'
8 6
4. Analysis.-In Young v. State, the Court of Appeals held that
where an expert uses a DNA analysis method that produces infinitesi-
mal random match probabilities, the expert may testify to a match
between a defendant's DNA profile and a DNA sample without ad-
dressing the random match probability.1 8 7 Under these circum-
stances, the Young court held, the expert may also identify the
defendant as the source of the DNA sample.18 In so holding, the
court failed to provide a probability standard governing when random
match statistics may be omitted, and this failure will unduly burden
prosecutors and could impede future advances in DNA forensics.'
The court should have emulated other courts in setting forth a bright-
line standard for when experts may forego providing random match
statistics.190 The Young court also failed to state whether DNA experts
may still provide random match statistics if they identify a defendant
as the source of a DNA sample. 9' Finally, the court failed to address
whether DNA expert opinion testimony might encroach on the jury's
role as facffinder.'92
a. The Court Failed to Provide a Probability Standard Governing
When Random Match Statistics May Be Omitted, and This Failure Will Un-
duly Burden Prosecutors and Could Impede Future Advances in DNA Foren-
sics.-In Young v. State, the Court of Appeals did not expressly state
how low a random match probability must be before experts may tes-
tify to a DNA match without addressing that probability. The court
held that the expert in Young, Page, was not required to support his
testimony with statistics, based largely on his use of a PCR-STR analysis
along thirteen loci. 9 ' The court observed that this method results in
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 100, 879 A.2d at 44-45.
188. Id.
189. See infra Part 4.a.
190. See infra Part 4.b.
191. See infra Part 4.c.
192. See infta Part 4.d.
193. Young, 388 Md. at 100, 879 A.2d at 44-45.
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infinitesimal random match probabilities, yet did not state explicitly
what it considered to be an "infinitesimal" probability.' 94
The court's omission would pose fewer problems if it were clear
from the circumstances of the case how low the probability of random
match must be before an expert can omit this information from her
DNA match testimony, but this information cannot be discerned from
the opinion.1"5 The random match probability resulting from the spe-
cific test Page performed in Young's case might have answered that
question, but this statistic was not available to the court. 96 The court
could have implied an answer to this question by mentioning an esti-
mate of the random probability that a PCR-STR match generally pro-
duces. However, the court referred to two widely divergent estimates
of the random match probability that a PCR-STR comparison examin-
ing thirteen loci could produce.1" 7 Because the court did not define
"infinitesimal," and the meaning cannot be discerned from the case,
courts in the future will not know when to insist that experts provide
random match probability statistics testimony."9 '
Young could be interpreted to stand for the proposition that a
particular method of DNA analysis-a PCR-STR comparison along
thirteen loci-will result in infinitesimal random match probabili-
ties.' 9 However, this guidance will not apply whenever a DNA expert
employs an alternative method of DNA comparison, which the Young
court acknowledged was a possibility.2 ° ° Additionally, by endorsing
one particular means of DNA analysis, the Young court risks impeding
194. Id.
195. The court pronounced the random match probability in Young's case to be infini-
tesimal despite not even knowing what that probability was. It appears to have simply as-
sumed that the probability was so low as to be infinitesimal.
196. See id. at 102, 879 A.2d at 46 ("Page did not testify to the probability that a random
person's profile would have matched the profile taken from the boy."); see also id. at 103,
879 A.2d at 46 ("Page's report contained no statistical data to support his conclusion ....
Young did not ask Page any questions about statistics.").
197. See i&t at 122, 879 A.2d at 57-58 (noting that the thirteen STR loci selected by the
FBI yield an average random match probability of one in 180 trillion, but also citing an-
other source for the proposition that thirteen loci produce a one in one trillion random
match probability).
198. The court declared that not all DNA analysis techniques produce infinitesimal ran-
dom match probabilities, which means that matches produced by those methods would
have to be accompanied by random match statistics. Id. at 112, 879 A.2d at 52. However,
the court did not elaborate as to the circumstances under which the statistics would be
required.
199. Id, at 122-23, 879 A.2d at 58.
200. Id. at 112, 879 A.2d at 52. Such a situation could arise where a DNA sample is so
old or degraded that a PCR-STR comparison must be made at a number of loci fewer than
thirteen, or where, as with State v. Bailey, 677 N.W.2d 380, 411 (Minn. 2004), some of the
loci examined cannot be interpreted with the required level of precision.
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scientific development. The Armstead court held that the statute per-
mitting the admission of DNA evidence at criminal trials does not re-
quire any specific means of comparison, allowing experts to use the
most advanced scientific methods available without the legislature
having to change the law. 20 1 To the extent that Young is read to imply
that a particular method will always result in sufficiently infinitesimal
random match probabilities, the State's experts will have little incen-
tive to adopt newer, more accurate DNA testing procedures.
The Young court's assertion that a thirteen-loci PCR-STR compar-
ison results in infinitesimal random match probabilities also fails to
account for cases where the test produces an abnormally high random
match probability. In a situation where a close relative of the defen-
dant could have left the DNA sample, the likelihood of a random
match can increase to 1 in 40,000.202 Additionally, in a case where
there is other non-DNA evidence indicating that a defendant could
not have left the DNA sample, a reasonable expert would adjust up-
ward the probability that the DNA comparison produced a random
match. 2 3 Despite the Young court's silence, defendants can argue
forcefully that in such cases a thirteen-loci PCR-STR comparison does
not produce infinitesimal random match probabilities within the
meaning of Young.
20 4
The Young court's failure to define fully what it considered to be
an infinitesimal random match probability will create uncertainty for
prosecutors who must decide when to provide random match statistics
along with DNA evidence. A prosecutor could offer expert testimony
that two DNA samples matched following a thirteen-loci PCR-STR
analysis, without providing statistics, presuming that this satisfies the
Young standard. 20 5 However, the defendant could then insist that, in
her case, the DNA comparison resulted in an abnormally high ran-
dom match probability that the Young court would not have consid-
ered infinitesimal. Prosecutors could err on the side of caution by
providing statistics in every case, following the Armstead holding.206
However, that policy could unnecessarily expose the State to a variety
of evidentiary challenges. The most common recent challenges to
201. Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 81-82, 673 A.2d 221, 242-43 (1996).
202. Young, 388 Md. at 122, 879 A.2d at 58.
203. DJ Balding, When Can a DNA Profile Be Regarded as Unique?, 39 SCIENCE & JUSTICE
257, 260 (1999).
204. See Young, 388 Md. at 112, 879 A.2d at 52 (rejecting the State's argument that all
DNA comparisons result in infinitesimal random match probabilities).
205. See id. at 122, 879 A.2d at 58 (holding that when thirteen STR loci are used, the
random match probability is generally low enough as to be designated unique).
206. See supra notes 90-102 and accompanying text.
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DNA evidence are attacks on random match statistics.2 ° v Defendants
have asserted that the presentation of infinitesimally small probabili-
ties is prejudicial 2 8 and insisted that the experts can confuse juries
into believing that random match statistics reflect the probability of
guilt or innocence. 2 9  The Young decision forces prosecutors to
choose between providing random match statistics, thereby exposing
their DNA evidence to one of these challenges, and omitting the sta-
tistics, which could run afoul of the court's new standard.
b. The Court of Appeals Should Have Followed Other Courts in
Adopting a Bright-Line Standard for When Experts May Omit Random Match
Statistics.-The Court of Appeals could have mitigated the confusion
surrounding DNA evidence by creating a bright-line rule regarding
when an expert may omit random match statistics. The court recog-
nized that this was an option, as it noted that determining under what
circumstances and with less than what probability a DNA profile could
be deemed unique was a task for courts and legislatures, not scien-
tists. 2 1 0 Furthermore, the court noted that the FBI has a policy of per-
mitting its experts to testify to a DNA match without offering statistics
when the random match probability is less than 1 in 260 billion.
211
Finally, the Young court cited Buckner, where the Washington Supreme
Court suggested that wherever a random match probability was one in
a number greater than the earth's population, the DNA profile at is-
sue could be deemed unique, and the defendant identified as the
source of the relevant sample.212 This standard could apply regardless
of how many loci are tested in a PCR-STR comparison and in situa-
tions where the PCR-STR method is not used.
There are three possible objections to setting forth a numerical
standard, but they do not justify the court's failure to provide a clear
standard. First, the court's task was complicated by the fact that the
probability at issue in Young was not in evidence. 2 1' However, that
lack of information did not stop the court from asserting that the
207. Garret E. Land, Judicial Assessment or Judicial Notice? An Evaluation of the Admissibility
Standards for DNA Evidence and Proposed Solutions to Repress the Current Efforts to Expand Foren-
sic DNA Capabilities, 9J. MED. & LAw 95, 126 (2005).
208. E.g., State v. Joon Kyu Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544, 547 (Minn. 1987).
209. E.g., United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1156 (9th Cir. 1994).
210. Young, 388 Md. at 114-17, 879 A.2d at 54-55.
211. Id. at 119, 879 A.2d at 56.
212. State v. Buckner, 941 P.2d 667, 668 (Wash. 1997).
213. See 388 Md. at 102, 879 A.2d at 46 ("Page did not testify to the probability that a
random person's profile would have matched the profile taken from the boy."); see also id.
at 103, 879 A.2d at 46 ("Page's report contained no statistical data to support his conclu-
sion .... Young did not ask Page any questions about statistics.").
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probability was "exceedingly small."" 4 The court could have simply
adopted one of its estimates of the average random match probability
produced by the PCR-STR method as its definition of "infinitesimal."
Second, one could argue that if the court explicitly specified a ran-
dom match probability, above which experts could present match tes-
timony without statistics, then the court would be subject to criticism
for endorsing a particular method of presenting that probability. 215
The disputes over how to calculate random match statistics, however,
have been resolved in favor of the product rule, which could be used
to determine whether the random match probability in a given case
satisfies the requisite standard.216
Thirdly, Maryland appellate courts adhere to the doctrine of
avoidance and will not decide any issue unless it plainly appears on
the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court.2 7 The
Young court's failure to set a bright-line standard could be interpreted
as adherence to avoidance principles, but Maryland courts have not
followed these principles in their previous DNA evidence cases. For
example, in Jackson v. State, the Court of Special Appeals held that
Jackson waived his argument that DNA evidence had to be accompa-
nied by random match statistics. 218 However, the court nevertheless
reached the substantive issue, declaring that the State could establish
the reliability of its DNA testing method without presenting random
match statistics. 2" The Court of Appeals followed a similar course in
Armstead, as the question before the court in that case was whether the
trial court improperly admitted random match statistics. 220 The court
held that the statistics were admissible, but also went further by declar-
ing that they would henceforth be a necessary component of DNA
match evidence. 221 Maryland's appellate courts, perhaps due to the
complex and technical nature of DNA evidence, have fashioned rules
for presenting DNA evidence that range beyond the issues raised in
the particular cases, and the Court of Appeals should have followed
this pattern in Young. Given the rapidly changing and highly techni-
214. Id. at 122, 879 A.2d at 57.
215. See Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 68-70, 673 A.2d 221, 236 (1996) (detailing the
potential problems in calculating random match probabilities).
216. See id. at 72, 673 A.2d at 238 ("[IT]he debate over the product rule essentially ended
in 1993, with the announcement in the scientific journal Nature that the 'DNA fingerprint-
ing wars are over.'").
217. MD. R. 8-131(a).
218. 92 Md. App. 304, 324, 608 A.2d 782, 791-92 (1991).
219. Id., 608 A.2d at 792-93.
220. 342 Md. 38, 48-49, 673 A.2d 221, 225-26 (1996).
221. Id. at 79, 673 A.2d at 241.
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cal nature of DNA match evidence, Young should have followed Jack-
son and Armstead and offered trial courts more guidance even at the
risk of resolving issues not presented to them.
c. The Young Court Inappropriately Neglected to State Whether
DNA Experts May Still Provide Random Match Statistics If They Identify a
Defendant as the Source of a DNA Sample.-The Young court also de-
clined to state whether the State may attribute a DNA sample to a
defendant and still provide random match statistics. In Armstead, the
Court of Appeals rejected a defendant's challenge to the admission of
random match statistics.222 But that holding was based on the as-
sumption that a DNA match would be meaningless without the statis-
tics.223 Most jurisdictions have held that the vital role played by
random match statistics-providing the meaning of a DNA match-
warrant their inclusion despite the prejudice they could cause
defendants.224
Under Young, source attribution testimony fills the role previously
held by random match statistics; an expert may provide the meaning
of a DNA match by identifying a defendant as the source of a DNA
sample, sharply reducing the relevance of the statistics.225 When this
reduced relevance is weighed against the random match statistics' un-
diminished potential to prejudice defendants, it is unclear whether
courts should permit prosecutors to present both source attribution
testimony and random match statistics or force them to choose be-
tween one or the other.
d. The Court of Appeals Failed to Address Whether DNA Expert
Opinion Testimony Might Encroach on the jury's Role as Factfinder.-The
Young court modified how experts may present DNA evidence at crim-
inal trials without examining how this new standard affects the jury's
role as factfinder. The court declared that an expert witness may offer
her opinion that a DNA sample recovered from a crime scene came
from a particular defendant, provided she finds a match between the
two DNA profiles after employing a method that results in infinitesi-
mal random match probabilities.226 At trial, Young's counsel objected
to this form of testimony on the basis that permitting the State's ex-
pert to opine that the crime scene DNA sample came from Young
222. Id.
223. Id. at 78, 673 A.2d at 241.
224. See, e.g., United States v. Shea, 957 F. Supp. 331, 345 (D.N.H. 1997) (noting the
potential for prejudice).
225. Young, 388 Md. at 119-20, 879 A.2d at 56.
226. Id. at 100, 879 A.2d at 44-45.
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would invade the province of the jury.22 7 Young's counsel argued that
the jury should have the chance to discern the significance of the
DNA match from the statistical information, yet the Court of Appeals
did not address this argument.22 Maryland case law provides a basis
for this argument, as under the standard set forth in Yudkin, expert
opinion testimony may be inadmissible where it invades the province
of the factfinder to resolve contested issues.229 However, the Young
court did not refer to these precedents. The court's failure to address
Young's concerns over the role of expert opinion testimony leaves de-
fendants free to raise these concerns, and the court provided scant
guidance as to how to resolve them.
In assessing whether expert opinion testimony encroaches on the
factfinder's role, cases since Yudkin have placed great weight on the
consideration of whether the jury could reach the expert's conclusion
on its own, based on the facts offered by the expert, or whether the
testimony concerns technical expertise so complicated that the jury
needs the expert's opinion to render a judgment on the issue in ques-
tion.2 "° The Court of Special Appeals's decision in Braxton suggests
that courts in the future will permit source attribution testimony; the
Braxton court permitted an expert to offer his conclusion relating to
the definition of a handgun because it involved a complicated
topic. 2 1 DNA comparisons, especially random match statistics, are
similarly difficult for jurors to understand.2"2
However, that an expert testifies about a complex subject does
not automatically render his opinions admissible. The Court of Spe-
cial Appeals in Cook v. State held that it was error to admit an expert's
conclusions with respect to how a cocaine distribution organization
was conducted.233 The Cook court found that the State's expert could
have conveyed the same information to the jury in a less prejudicial
and suggestive manner.23 4 Similarly, under Armstead, experts can ex-
plain the meaning of a DNA match by testifying to the match and
227. Petitioner's Brief at 11, Young, 388 Md. 99, 879 A.2d 44 (No. 99).
228. Id. at 10.
229. See, e.g., Bohnert v. State, 312 Md. 266, 279, 539 A.2d 657, 663 (1988); Braxton v.
State, 123 Md. App. 599, 651, 720 A.2d 27, 52 (1998).
230. See, e.g., Harper v. Higgs, 225 Md. 24, 38, 168 A.2d 661, 667 (1961). But see LYNN
McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 702.1 (1987) (noting that for expert opinion to be admissi-
ble in Maryland, ajuror need not find an expert witness's area of expertise so difficult that
he cannot comprehend the particular issue without the expert's assistance).
231. Braxton, 123 Md. App. at 652, 720 A.2d at 53.
232. Richard Lempert, Some Caveats Concerning DNA as Criminal Identification Evidence:
With Thanks to the Reverend Bayes, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 303, 330-31 (1991).
233. 84 Md. App. 122, 139-40, 578 A.2d 283, 291-92 (1990).
234. Id. at 139-40, 578 A.2d at 291-92.
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offering random match statistics, 23 5 a method that allows the jury to
conclude for itself whether the DNA sample in question came from
the individual whose profile it matched.23 6 Cook thereby suggests that
to be held admissible, source attribution testimony must not merely
be of appreciable help, but must provide more help to the jury than
the Armstead method of presenting DNA evidence.
The Young court hinted that source attribution testimony is the
superior method, by referring to an NRC report that endorsed source
attribution testimony as a simpler means of presenting DNA evidence
than providing random match statistics. 23 '7 However, the Young court
did not explicitly agree with the NRC's judgment or otherwise state a
preference for one method of presenting DNA evidence over the
other. In fact, by declaring that DNA testing now produces random
match probabilities that would be considered "conclusive" by every-
one except mathematicians and philosophers, the court suggested
that lay jurors can decide on their own that a DNA sample came from
an individual based on testimony of a DNA match and an extremely
low random match probability.2"'
A prosecutor could argue that the Young court meant to exclude
all subsequent defense challenges to source attribution testimony, in-
cluding claims that it intrudes on the jury's role as factfinder, by en-
dorsing the use of source attribution testimony in Young's case.
However, a defendant could respond that under Bohnert v. State,
source attribution is inadmissible wherever it requires the DNA expert
to resolve contested facts.239 In Bohnert, the court held that an expert
invaded the province of the jury by declaring that the State's witness
was credible and the defendant was not.240 Young, unlike Bohnert,
did not attempt to refute the conclusion of the State's expert in his
case; although Young's counsel argued that the State's expert could
not present testimony of a DNA match without statistics, Young's
counsel did not attack the reliability of the PCR-STR test or otherwise
challenge the conclusion that Young was the source of the DNA sam-
235. 342 Md. 38, 79, 673 A.2d 221, 241 (1996).
236. See Petitioner's Brief at 11-12, Young, 388 Md. 99, 879 A.2d 44 (including the objec-
tion of Young's counsel at trial that it is the jury's province to make conclusions with re-
spect to a DNA match).
237. Young, 388 Md. at 116, 879 A.2d at 54; see COMM. ON DNA FORENSIC SCIENCE, NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 194-95 (1992) ("Opinion testi-
mony about uniqueness would simplify the presentation of evidence by dispensing with
specific estimates of population frequencies or probabilities.").
238. Young, 388 Md. at 113, 879 A.2d at 52.
239. 312 Md. 266, 279, 539 A.2d 657, 663 (1988).
240. Id. at 278-79, 539 A.2d at 663.
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ple. 41' However, where a defendant does present evidence that she
did not leave her DNA at a crime scene, the State's DNA expert can
conclude that she was the source of the DNA only by resolving con-
tested facts, which is impermissible under Bohnert.242 The Young court
could have preempted disputes over this question by the simple expe-
dient of declaring that source attribution does not intrude on the
factfinding role of the jury.
5. Conclusion.-The Court of Appeals left unresolved three key
issues in reaching its holding. First, by failing to specify a numerical
benchmark for when a random match probability can be considered
infinitesimal,243 the court left the door open for defendants to chal-
lenge an expert witness's omission of the random match
probability.244 This uncertainty forces prosecutors to choose between
omitting the statistics, and taking the risk that the defense will chal-
lenge this omission, and offering the statistics and confronting the
possibility of defense challenges to their admission.245 Second, the
court failed to state whether experts may attribute a DNA sample to a
defendant and also provide random match statistics. 246 Finally, the
court did not explain whether an expert who testifies that a defendant
was the source of a DNA sample impermissibly encroaches on the
jury's role as factfinder, permitting defendants to challenge source at-
tribution testimony on this basis.247
JOHN J. LoVEJOY
241. Young v. State, No. 2284 at 12 (Md. App. filed Aug. 18, 2004).
242. Bohnert, 312 Md. at 279, 539 A.2d at 663. The defendant could attack the expert's
conclusion either by criticizing the DNA comparison procedures used by the expert, or by
presenting non-DNA evidence that suggests he was not the culprit.
243. See supra notes 193-204 and accompanying text.
244. See supra Part 4.a.
245. See supra Part 4.b.
246. See supra Part 4.c.
247. See supra Part 4.d.
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B. An Unexplained Exception to the Admissibility of Pre-Arrest Silence
In Weitzel v. State,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered
whether pre-arrest silence in the presence of a police officer could be
offered in evidence as a tacit admission of guilt.2 The court held that
such evidence was inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt.3 The
court failed to explain or justify the necessity of an exception to the
tacit admission rule,4 left little guidance for future application of the
prerequisite analysis,5 and missed an opportunity to eliminate all tacit
admissions as substantive evidence of guilt.6
1. The Case.-On March 17, 2002, Baltimore County police re-
sponded to a 911 call at the Holabird East Apartments, where they
found Darla Effland laying at the bottom of a stairwell unconscious
and injured.7 At the scene were Thomas Crabtree and Mark Weitzel.'
Officer Frederick Johnson arrested Weitzel after an on-scene
investigation. 9
Weitzel was indicted for attempted murder and first-degree as-
sault.1" The State intended to present evidence at trial of a "tacit ad-
mission" when Weitzel remained silent after hearing Crabtree tell
Officer Johnson that Weitzel pushed Effland down the stairs.'" Weit-
zel filed a motion in limine to prohibit the State from offering such
evidence. 12
At the hearing on the motion, Crabtree testified that he punched
Weitzel repeatedly in the face ten minutes before Officer Johnson ar-
rived on the scene."3 Crabtree also testified that Weitzel had been
smoking cocaine and drinking vodka earlier that day.14 Crabtree went
1. 384 Md. 451, 863 A.2d 999 (2004).
2. A tacit admission occurs when one faces an accusation that, if untrue, would natu-
rally call for a denial. See id. at 453, 863 A.2d at 1000.
3. Id. at 461, 863 A.2d at 1005. Pre-arrest silence is the common term for when an
individual does not speak before being arrested or read his Miranda rights. Id. at 455, 862
A.2d at 1001.
4. See infra Part 4.a.
5. See infra Part 4.b.
6. See infra Part 4.c.
7. Weitze4 384 Md. at 453, 863 A.2d at 1000.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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on to state that during questioning by Officer Johnson, Crabtree
pointed at Weitzel-who stood four feet away and appeared con-
scious-and told Officer Johnson that Weitzel pushed Effland down
the stairs.
1 5
OfficerJohnson corroborated Crabtree's story thatJohnson ques-
tioned Crabtree in the presence of Weitzel and that Weitzel appeared
conscious, cognizant, and not intoxicated.' 6 When Officer Johnson
told Weitzel that he was being arrested for assaulting Effland, Weitzel
remained silent but followed Officer Johnson's command to stand up,
turn around, and be handcuffed. 7 At the police station, Weitzel an-
swered some general questions but remained silent when Officer
Johnson asked if he comprehended the Miranda warning.' 8
The Circuit Court for Baltimore County denied Weitzel's motion
in limine, finding him to be alert and aware at the time of the inci-
dent.19 At trial, the State presented Weitzel's pre-arrest silence as a
tacit admission, to which Weitzel objected.2" Weitzel was subsequently
convicted of second-degree assault and sentenced to ten years in
prison.2 ' The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment in an
unreported opinion.22
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted Weitzel's petition for
certiorari to consider, inter alia, (1) whether police presence-to-
gether with a defendant who has recently engaged in an illegal activity
separate from the subject of the police investigation-renders the pre-
arrest silence too ambiguous to be admissible, and (2) whether police
presence-together with a defendant who is possibly mentally im-
paired-renders pre-arrest silence too ambiguous to be admissible.25
2. Legal Background.-There is no national consensus concern-
ing the admissibility of pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence of
guilt. Although the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on evidence of
silence has evolved, it has not addressed whether pre-arrest evidence
offered as substantive evidence of guilt is a constitutional violation. 24
15. Id.
16. Id. at 453-54, 863 A.2d at 1000.
17. Id. at 454, 863 A.2d at 1000.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id., 863 A.2d at 1000-01.
23. Id. at 454-55, 862 A.2d at 1001. The court also considered whether the circuit court
abused its discretion in allowing evidence of Weitzel's pre-arrest silence as a tacit admission
when there were other explanations for the silence. Id.
24. See infra Part 2.a.
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Maryland has a long history of admitting evidence of pre-arrest silence
as a tacit admission, if there was an accusation that was heard, under-
stood, and if untrue, would naturally call for a reply.25 The rules for
admissibility of pre-arrest silence significantly vary across the federal
courts26 and from state to state. 2 7
a. The Admissibility of Silence at the Supreme Court.-The Su-
preme Court has yet to rule on the constitutionality of pre-arrest si-
lence offered as substantive evidence of guilt. The Court's
jurisprudence dealing with evidence of silence has evolved over the
last century and has overwhelmingly involved post-arrest silence.
More recently the Court has ruled that the admission of silence after
an arrest and a Miranda warning is unconstitutional, regardless of
whether the evidence of silence is offered for impeachment or as sub-
stantive evidence of guilt.2" The Court has also held that silence oc-
curring post-arrest but prior to a Miranda warning can be used for
impeachment and does not violate due process. 29 The Court has only
addressed pre-arrest silence as it relates to credibility and has allowed
such evidence for the limited purpose of impeachment.
30
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees that
"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself."3 ' The Supreme Court narrowly interpreted this
right in Raffel v. United States," holding that the right against self-in-
crimination can be waived by voluntarily taking the stand. The Court
upheld the prosecutor's cross-examination of Raffel on his decision
not to testify in an earlier trial, as it related to his credibility.33 The
Court noted that the waiver of immunity is not partial, and that once a
defendant offers himself as a witness, he is subject to cross-examina-
tion and impeachment of credibility through his prior silence.3 4
In Griffin v. California,3 5 the Supreme Court extended to the
states the prohibition against commenting on a defendant's decision
to remain silent and not testify. After a jury trial in which Griffin did
not take the stand, the prosecutor highlighted his failure to deny or
25. See infra Part 2.b.
26. See infra Part 2.c.
27. See infra Part 2.d.
28. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 611 (1976).
29. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982) (per curiam).
30. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
32. 271 U.S. 494 (1926).
33. Id. at 496-97.
34. Id. at 497.
35. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
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explain the circumstances surrounding his involvement with the vic-
tim.36 The jury was instructed that it may consider Griffin's failure to
deny or explain facts within his knowledge when evaluating the truth-
fulness of such facts. 7 The Supreme Court reversed the murder con-
viction, holding that a prosecutor could not comment on a
defendant's decision not to testify and that the jury could not be in-
structed that silence evinced guilt.38 The Court reasoned that the
standards of the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause should
extend to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and any
comment at federal or state court regarding a defendant's silence
should be unconstitutional.9
One year later in the landmark decision of Miranda v. Arizona,4 °
the Supreme Court expanded the application of the Fifth Amend-
ment outside of the courtroom. Miranda consisted of four separate
cases where each defendant was taken into police custody and interro-
gated without being advised of his constitutional rights.4 All of the
defendants made admissions that were used at trial, and all were ulti-
mately convicted.42 The Court held that a defendant must be fully
informed to properly exercise his constitutional rights and established
that law enforcement officials prior to an interrogation must advise
the person in custody of the right to remain silent.43 The Court clari-
fied that its ruling did not apply to general fact-finding or to on-scene
questioning related to a criminal investigation because the person
questioned is not in custody or under arrest and therefore not subject
to these inherent compelling pressures found in an interrogation."
In an expansion of Raffel and consistent with Miranda, the Su-
preme Court in United States v. Hale45 held that a defendant who exer-
cises the right to remain silent during an interrogation cannot be
cross-examined about his silence despite later taking the stand in his
own defense. The Court found inadmissible evidence of the defen-
dant's silence at the time of his arrest because it lacked significant
probative value and was substantially prejudicial.46 The Court noted
36. Id. at 610-11.
37. Id. at 609-10.
38. Id. at 615.
39. Id.
40. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
41. Id. at 445.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 467-68.
44. Id. at 477-78.
45. 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
46. Id. at 180. Because the Court ruled on evidentiary grounds, it did not reach the
constitutional claims. Id. at 175 n.4.
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that a court must first determine if the two statements being used for
impeachment purposes are actually inconsistent.47 Because a defen-
dant in custody has been informed of the right to remain silent, his
motivation for remaining silent is not necessarily inconsistent with his
later reason for testifying.4" The Court distinguished Raffel by com-
paring the possible inconsistency in Hale of remaining silent in cus-
tody and then later testifying at trial, with the clear inconsistency in
Raffel of remaining silent at an initial trial and then later testifying at
the subsequent trial.49 The Court also noted the potential probative
value of silence specifically in the face of an accusation because "it is
assumed in such circumstances that the accused would be more likely
than not to dispute an untrue accusation."5
One year later in Doyle v. Ohio,"' the Court expanded Hale and
held that admitting post-arrest silence following the Miranda warning
for any purpose violates due process. The prosecutor in Doyle at-
tempted to impeach the credibility of Doyle, who offered an explana-
tion for his actions while on the stand but had remained silent at the
time of his arrest.52 The Court explained that allowing evidence of
silence that occurred after the Miranda warning was a violation of due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment, even if the prosecutor's
questions were meant to impeach the credibility of a witness and not
to imply that the silence was substantive evidence of guilt.5
However, the Supreme Court's rationale from Doyle has been
qualified. In Fletcher v. Weir,5 4 the Court held that silence occurring
post-arrest but prior to the Miranda warning can be used for impeach-
ment and does not violate due process. The Court in Fletcher reasoned
that because the police had not yet given Fletcher the Miranda warn-
ing, Fletcher's silence was not induced by the government and such
evidence would not invoke the fundamental unfairness present in
Doyle. 55
The Supreme Court also found no violation of due process when
pre-arrest silence was used to impeach a defendant who took the
stand. In Jenkins v. Anderson,56 the Court reasoned thatJenkins's deci-
47. Id. at 176.
48. Id. at 177.
49. Id. at 176.
50. Id.
51. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
52. Id. at 613-14.
53. See id. at 611.
54. 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per curiam).
55. Id. at 605-06.
56. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
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sion to testify constituted a waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent. The Court distinguished Doyle because the defendant's
silence in Jenkins occurred before being taken into custody and in-
formed of his Miranda rights.57 The fundamental unfairness and am-
biguity discussed in Doyle was not present when the silence occurred
prior to an arrest.58 The Court also noted that any lack of probative
value of pre-arrest silence was a question of state evidentiary law59 and
that " [e] ach jurisdiction remains free to formulate evidentiary rules
defining the situations in which silence is viewed as more probative
than prejudicial."60
b. The Admissibility of Pre-Arrest Silence in Maryland.-The
Court of Appeals of Maryland has generally prohibited the use of pre-
arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt because such evidence is
too ambiguous to be probative.6 1 One narrow exception where pre-
arrest silence may be deemed probative and admissible as substantive
evidence of guilt is in the limited circumstances of a tacit admission.62
A tacit admission arises when a person makes a statement in the pres-
ence of a party that, if untrue, the party would naturally be expected
to explain or deny but remains silent.63 The failure to explain or deny
the statement can be offered as evidence of the party's belief in the
statement.
64
Maryland has a long history of allowing tacit admissions by a de-
fendant as an exception to the hearsay rule under Maryland Rule 5-
803(a) (2).65 In Kelly v. State,6 6 the Court of Appeals in a bastardy pro-
ceeding against Watson Kelly allowed evidence that Kelly's father
promised the baby's mother, in Kelly's presence, to do everything to
help the mother's family, including making weekly child support pay-
ments. The court reasoned that Kelly would have protested his fa-
57. Id. at 240.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 239 n.5.
60. Id. at 240. Justice Stevens's concurring opinion made explicit that a decision to
remain silent does not implicate the Fifth Amendment when there is no official compul-
sion to speak. Id. at 241 (Stevens, J., concurring).
61. Grier v. State, 351 Md. 241, 252, 718 A.2d 211, 217 (1998).
62. Id. at 254, 718 A.2d at 217.
63. Ewell v. State, 228 Md. 615, 618, 180 A.2d 857, 859 (1962).
64. Id.
65. See Key-El v. State, 349 Md. 811, 816, 709 A.2d 1305, 1307 (1998) (outlining the
history of tacit admissions in Maryland). Maryland Rule 5-803 (a) (2) creates an exception
to the hearsay rule by making admissible "[a] statement that is offered against a party and
is... [a] statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth."
MD. R. 5-803.
66. 151 Md. 87, 133 A. 899 (1926).
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ther's promises if he was not the baby's father, citing the maxim qui
tacet consentire videtur.67 a party that is silent appears to consent.68 In
Zink v. Zink,69 the Court of Appeals restricted the admissibility of pre-
arrest silence and held that remaining silent can signify the adoption
of another person's statement only when there is no other equally
consistent explanation for the silence. Evidence was presented that
Zink had been accused by his wife, in his niece's presence, of not liv-
ing together as man and wife. 70 The court ruled that such evidence
was not sufficient to infer that Zink adopted the statement as true
because a husband and wife do not normally discuss their intimate
relationship in the presence of a third party.
71
However, the presence of a third party does not automatically
render pre-arrest silence inadmissible. In Ewell v. State,72 evidence was
offered at trial that someone with Ewell stated "we just yoked a man,"
and Ewell did not deny the assertion. 7' The Court of Appeals upheld
Ewell's conviction for robbery and first degree murder, stating that
when one is accused of a crime that he did not commit, it is more
natural to deny it, even in the presence of friends and the commission
of crime is a common occurrence. 4 Consistent with the rationale in
Zink, the court explained that because there was no reason for Ewell
to remain silent-such as fear, intoxication, or the presence of a stran-
ger-it would have been natural to reply under the circumstances.75
In Williams v. State,76 the Court of Special Appeals expanded the
limits of admissibility to allow evidence of pre-arrest silence occurring
in the presence of a third party who is a police officer. Evidence was
admitted at trial that Williams had stood silent while a woman told a
police officer that she was on the street buying a skirt from Williams.
77
The court upheld Williams's conviction for peddling without a li-
cense, reasoning that the admissibility of the evidence depended on
whether the statement was one that the defendant would naturally be
expected to deny. 78 The court noted that the defendant was not in
67. Id. at 97, 133 A. at 903.
68. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY app. B (8th ed. 2004).
69. 215 Md. 197, 137 A.2d 139 (1957).
70. Id. at 202, 137 A.2d at 142.
71. Id. at 203, 137 A.2d at 143.
72. 228 Md. 615, 180 A.2d 857 (1962).
73. Id. at 617, 180 A.2d at 859.
74. Id. at 620-21, 180 A.2d at 861.
75. Id.
76. 4 Md. App. 342, 242 A.2d 813 (1968).
77. Id. at 347, 242 A.2d at 816.
78. Id. at 348 & n.6, 242 A.2d at 816-17 & n.6.
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custody at the time the statement was made and found nothing excep-
tional about the police officer's mere presence.79
In Henry v. State,"° the Court of Appeals outlined a series of pre-
requisites necessary to qualify silence as a tacit admission:
(1) the party heard and understood the other person's state-
ment; (2) at the time, the party had an opportunity to re-
spond; (3) under the circumstances, a reasonable person in
the party's position, who disagreed with the statement, would
have voiced that disagreement. The party must have had
first-hand knowledge of the matter addressed in the
statement.
8 1
This analysis for admitting evidence of pre-arrest silence was ap-
plied in Key-El v. State,12 where the presence of a police officer was
considered as part of the court's evaluation of the prerequisites, but
did not automatically render the evidence of silence inadmissible as a
violation of the Fifth Amendment. 3 Key-El had been accused of as-
sault by his wife in the presence of a police officer prior to being ar-
rested.8 4 In upholding the admission of the pre-arrest silence, the
court noted that Key-El was not in custody or being interrogated, had
not been given the Miranda warning, and had every opportunity to
reply to his wife's accusation. 5 Because Key-El was under no official
compulsion to remain silent or to speak, the evidence had some pro-
bative value and did not violate his constitutional rights.8 6
Less than a year later, in Grier v. State, 7 the Court of Appeals
declined to expand the admissibility of pre-arrest silence absent an
accusation. The prosecution offered evidence of Grier's guilt when
he left the scene of a robbery while being followed by a police of-
ficer.8 The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, reasoning that
79. Id.
80. 342 Md. 204, 596 A.2d 1024 (1991).
81. Id. at 241-42, 596 A.2d at 1043 (quoting 6 L. McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 801 (4)
(1987)). In Henry, the Court of Appeals affirmed the murder conviction of Ian Henry, who
had laughed and cheered as his co-conspirators recalled how the victim pleaded for his
life. Id. at 240-42, 596 A.2d at 1042-43. The court reasoned that Henry went beyond a tacit
admission and had adopted the statements through his clear approval. Id. at 242, 596 A.2d
at 1043.
82. 349 Md. 811, 709 A.2d 1305 (1998).
83. Id. at 824-25, 709 A.2d at 1311.
84. Id. at 813-14, 709 A.2d at 1306.
85. Id. at 818, 709 A.2d at 1308.
86. Id. at 824-25, 709 A.2d at 1311.
87. 351 Md. 241, 718 A.2d 211 (1998).
88. Id. at 253 n.2, 718 A.2d at 217 n.2.
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there is no affirmative duty to approach the police and that without an
accusation, evidence of silence would lack probative value.89
c. The Admissibility of Pre-Arrest Silence in Federal Court.-Fed-
eral courts are split on the admissibility of pre-arrest silence as sub-
stantive evidence of guilt. The First, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth
Circuits have all held that a defendant's pre-arrest, pre-Miranda si-
lence is inadmissible as evidence of guilt.9 ° However, the Fifth, Ninth,
and Eleventh Circuits have found admissible the same evidence. 91
In Coppola v. Powell,92 the First Circuit overturned Coppola's con-
viction for rape, reasoning that he had relied on the Miranda rights
guaranteed to a defendant despite not being arrested or Mirandized.
Coppola was questioned by police as part of a rape investigation.93
When asked if he would answer questions, Coppola stated that he was
no country boy but grew up on the streets, that the police were crazy if
they thought he was going to confess, and that he wanted to speak
with a lawyer.94 Because Coppola had relied on the Miranda rights,
the First Circuit held that it was unconstitutional for the prosecution
to comment on his pre-arrest silence.95
In Combs v. Coyle,96 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rea-
soned that the potential for incriminating evidence existed in both
the pre- and post-arrest setting, necessitating the availability of the
privilege against self-incrimination in either circumstance. A police
officer approached Combs after a shooting and asked him what hap-
pened, to which Combs replied that the officer could talk to Combs's
lawyer.97 In overturning Combs's murder conviction, the court rea-
soned that it would eviscerate the privilege against self-incrimination
if a distinction could be drawn between silence occurring before and
after an arrest. 98
The Seventh Circuit in United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane9 found
that the right to remain silent exists prior to formal charges and at-
taches during a preliminary investigation. The police wanted to inter-
view Lane during a murder investigation, but Lane stated that he did
89. Id. at 254, 718 A.2d at 218.
90. See infra notes 92-106 and accompanying text.
91. See infra notes 107-119 and accompanying text.
92. 878 F.2d 1562 (1st Cir. 1989).
93. Id at 1563.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 205 F.3d 269 (6th Cir. 2000).
97. Id. at 278-79.
98. Id. at 285.
99. 832 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1987).
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not want to talk or make any statements. 10 0 The Seventh Circuit ex-
plained that Griffin, and not Jenkins, applied because Lane did not
take the stand.10 ' The court reasoned that comment by the prosecu-
tion on Lane's pre-arrest silence would be analogous to the comment
prohibited by Griffin on a defendant's decision not to testify. 10 2
In United States v. Burson,10 3 the Tenth Circuit found it impermis-
sible to comment on a defendant's decision to remain silent. In Bur-
son, Internal Revenue Service agents tried to interview Burson about
financial dealings with a business associate.1 0 4 Burson refused to co-
operate with their investigation or answer any questions, instead re-
cording the conversation and asking the agents about their
authority. 0 5 The Tenth Circuit found that it was irrelevant that Bur-
son was not in custody or given the Miranda warning, reasoning that
Burson invoked the privilege because he was aware that the questions
were part of a criminal investigation and refused to give any
answers. 1
06
In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United
States v. Zanabria'0 7 held that the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit
a prosecutor from commenting on any circumstances of a defendant's
incriminating pre-arrest silence. Zanabria had been arrested for hav-
ing cocaine in his luggage. 0 8 While the defense presented a duress
defense and Zanabria did not take the stand, Zanabria's wife testified
that he had smuggled the drugs to raise money to pay off a loan shark
who was threatening his daughter."0 9 The prosecution presented a
customs agent who testified that Zanabria never mentioned the
threats against his daughter.1 0 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the
Fifth Amendment was not violated because the silence had not been
induced by any action of a government agent."'
Similarly, in United States v. Oplinger,"2 the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that the privilege against self-incrimination
does not apply to a citizen who remains silent and is not under any
100. Id. at 1015.
101. Id. at 1017.
102. Id.
103. 952 F.2d 1196 (10th Cir. 1991).
104. Id. at 1200.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1200-01.
107. 74 F.3d 590 (5th Cir. 1996).
108. Id. at 592.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 593.
111. Id.
112. 150 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1998).
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official compulsion to speak. Oplinger was the supply coordinator at
a bank and was accused by his supervisor of over-purchasing supplies
and then keeping the cash refunds."' 3 Oplinger did not respond after
being informed that the FBI would be notified about the fraudulent
activity." 4 The Ninth Circuit upheld Oplinger's conviction for bank
fraud, reasoning that Oplinger's silence was not protected by the Fifth
Amendment because he was under no official compulsion to remain
silent." '
In United States v. Rivera,116 the Eleventh Circuit found no error
when a prosecutor commented on the defendant's silence before the
defendant was arrested or received a Miranda warning.' 1 7 Customs
agents testified at trial about Rivera's failure to respond to interview
questions at Miami International Airport and his lack of a reaction
after cocaine was found in his suitcase.18 The Eleventh Circuit cited
Jenkins in finding that the government may comment on a defendant's
silence if the silence occurs prior to an arrest and the Miranda
warning." 9
d. The Admissibility of Pre-Arrest Silence in State Court.-State
courts are also split on the admissibility of pre-arrest silence as sub-
stantive evidence of guilt. Some have found pre-arrest silence inad-
missible because the probative value, if any, is outweighed by
prejudice to the defendant. In People v. DeGeorge,'2 ° the Court of Ap-
peals of New York noted that silence is not necessarily consistent with
guilt because of the many explanations for not speaking, including an
awareness of one's Miranda rights or a distrust of the police. 2' Some
courts, such as the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Marek,122 have
abolished the tacit admission rule because there are many reasons
that one might remain silent in response to an accusation.'
23
Alternatively, other state courts have ruled that pre-arrest silence
can be admissible and does not implicate the Fifth Amendment. The
113. Id. at 1063-64.
114. Id. at 1064.
115. Id. at 1067.
116. 944 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1991).
117. Id. at 1565.
118. Id. at 1568.
119. Id.
120. 541 N.E.2d 11 (N.Y. 1989).
121. Id. at 13.
122. 556 So. 2d 375 (Ala. 1989); see also People v. Rogers, 68 P.3d 486, 492 (Colo. Ct.
App. 2002) (acknowledging the impossibility of avoiding self-incrimination if both pre-
arrest silence and speech can be used against a defendant at trial).
123. Ex parte Marek, 556 So. 2d at 382.
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Supreme Court of Missouri in State v. Kinder124 noted that evidence of
silence is generally admissible as long as the silence occurred before
the defendant was in custody.1 2
5
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Weitzel v. State, the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland overruled the recent decision in Key-El v. State and
held that pre-arrest silence of a defendant in the presence of a police
officer is too ambiguous to be probative and therefore is inadmissible
as evidence of guilt.126 Because the court could not conclude beyond
a reasonable doubt that admitting evidence of Weitzel's silence was
harmless, it reversed the decision and remanded for a new trial. 127
Writing for the majority, Judge Raker 28 noted the split in author-
ity in both federal and state courts as to whether pre-arrest silence of a
defendant in the presence of a police officer can be used as an admis-
sion of guilt.129 The court observed that a majority of the federal
courts have held that such evidence is inadmissible as part of the gov-
ernment's case-in-chief.13 ° The court also noted that since the 1998
decision in Key-El, more courts across the country have found evi-
dence of pre-arrest silence inadmissible, either as a violation of the
Fifth Amendment or because such evidence is too ambiguous to be
probative. 1
3 1
The majority noted the Supreme Court's recognition of the ambi-
guity and lack of probative value of a defendant's post-Miranda silence
during a police interrogation, as the silence could be the result of
reliance on the right to remain silent, intimidation, confusion, incom-
prehension, or fear.'3 2 The court also acknowledged Supreme Court
precedent finding some probative value in silence as a response to an
accusation because the accused will likely deny a false accusation.1 33
Judge Raker concluded by mentioning the influence of the media on
the public, including the familiarity of the Miranda warning and the
124. 942 S.W.2d 313 (Mo. 1996).
125. Id. at 326; accord State v. Leecan, 504 A.2d 480 (Conn. 1986); State v. Helgeson, 303
N.W.2d 342 (N.D. 1981).
126. Weitzel, 384 Md. at 461, 863 A.2d at 1005. The court did not reach the issue of
whether admitting evidence of pre-arrest silence would violate the privilege against self-
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 456-57 n.2, 863 A.2d at 1002 n.2.
127. Id. at 462, 863 A.2d at 1005.
128. Judge Raker was joined by Chief Judge Bell and Judges Wilner, Harrell, and
Greene. See id. at 452, 463, 863 A.2d at 1000, 1006.
129. Id. at 456, 863 A.2d at 1001-02.
130. Id.
131. Id., 863 A.2d at 1002.
132. Id. at 457-58, 863 A.2d at 1002-03.
133. Id.
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notion that any statement made in police presence can and will be
used against an arrestee in a court of law. 34
Judge Battaglia, in a dissent joined by Judge Cathell, reasoned
that the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals should be affirmed
and the recent decision in Key-El should not be overruled. 13 5 The dis-
sent noted that while the majority relied on United States v. Hale as
establishing that a defendant's silence was ambiguous and lacked pro-
bative value, Hale-unlike Weitzel-involved in-custody interrogation
of a defendant who had been informed of his Miranda rights.136 Fur-
ther, the dissent pointed out that Hale was already considered when
Key-Elwas decided in 1998.137 The dissent also noted that many courts
have found probative value in evidence of pre-arrest silence and that
such evidence is only one piece of all evidence presented in a trial.13
Judge Battaglia concluded by indicating that the majority ignored
the probative value of pre-arrest silence recognized by the Key-El court
only six years earlier and failed to decide whether Weitzel's silence was
properly admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule as a tacit admis-
sion.'39 The dissent observed that adequate safeguards exist to regu-
late the admission of pre-arrest silence even if it occurs in police
presence. 40
134. Id. at 461, 863 A.2d at 1004-05. The majority also decided whether the error by the
Court of Special Appeals was harmless, stating that the court must believe beyond a reason-
able doubt that the evidence did not influence the decision. Id., 863 A.2d at 1005. The
only direct evidence of Weitzel's guilt was the eyewitness testimony of Crabtree, and the
only significant evidence corroborating Crabtree's testimony was the silence of Weitzel. Id.
at 461-62, 863 A.2d at 1005. Without the evidence of Weitzel's silence, and because Crab-
tree had a clear motivation to lie if he was the person who actually committed the crime,
the jury easily could have questioned the credibility of Crabtree and found that Weitzel's
guilt was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 462, 863 A.2d at 1005.
135. Id. at 463, 863 A.2d at 1006 (Battaglia, J., dissenting). The dissent cited to justice
Stevens's concurring opinion in Jenkins v. Anderson, which implies some probative value of
pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence by noting the difference between the constitutional right to
remain silent during a police interrogation and silence before contact with the police. Id.
at 464 n.1, 863 A.2d 1006 n.1 (citingJenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 243 (1980) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring)).
136. Id. at 463-64, 863 A.2d at 1006 (citing United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 177
(1975)).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 464, 863 A.2d at 1006. The dissent also noted that some courts that find pre-
arrest silence inadmissible have ruled that the admission of such evidence is harmless error
when viewed in totality with the other evidence. Id. at 464 n.2, 863 A.2d at 1007 n.2.
139. Id. at 465, 863 A.2d at 1007.
140. Id. Judge Battaglia also remarked that there are serious consequences anytime re-
cent precedent is overruled, including a loss of stability, efficiency, predictability, and con-
fidence in the legal system. Id. at 466, 863 A.2d at 1007.
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4. Analysis.-In Weitzel v. State, the Court of Appeals held that
evidence of pre-arrest silence in the presence of a police officer is
inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt. 141 In creating an excep-
tion to the tacit admission rule, the court gave no explanation for its
necessity,142 left little guidance for future application and exceptions
to the prerequisite analysis,1 4 ' and missed an opportunity to eliminate
all tacit admissions. 1
4 4
a. A Tacit Admission Exception Specifically for Police Presence is
Unjustified and Unnecessay.-In creating an exception to the tacit ad-
mission rule specifically for police presence, the Court of Appeals fails
to explain how the motivations for silence in police presence are
unique to police, ignores that the prerequisite analysis for a tacit ad-
mission allows for consideration of any reason for remaining silent,
and creates an exception that has been specifically considered and
rejected in recent jurisprudence.
The Court of Appeals in Weitzel failed to explain how the motiva-
tions for silence in police presence are unique to the police when
compared to any other third party. 4 ' The court has suggested several
instances that might exclude any inference of guilt, including shock,
injury, deafness, intoxication, fear, advice of counsel to remain silent,
or a desire to exercise a perceived right against self-incrimination.' 46
All of these factors that the court envisions inducing a person to re-
main silent in police presence could motivate silence in the presence
of almost any third party. As evidenced in Zink v. Zink, the assertion
that a husband and wife do not normally discuss their intimate rela-
tionship in the presence of a third party has nothing to do with the
presence of law enforcement, but reflects the assumption that Zink's
silence was an emotional response to the presence of his niece. 14 7
The reasons that the Court of Appeals has offered as motivating si-
lence in the presence of the police 4 8 are not unique to police pres-
ence as opposed to any other third party. Yet the court in Weitzel
made no attempt to explain why the same factors inducing silence in
141. Id. at 461, 863 A.2d at 1005 (majority opinion).
142. See infra Part 4.a.
143. See infra Part 4.b.
144. See infra Part 4.c.
145. See 384 Md. at 456, 863 A.2d at 1001-02.
146. Ewell v. State, 228 Md. 615, 620, 180 A.2d 857, 860-61 (1961).
147. 215 Md. 197, 203, 137 A.2d 139, 143 (1957).
148. Ewel4 228 Md. at 620, 180 A.2d at 860-61.
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front of the police are not too ambiguous when applied in other third-
party situations.149
The court in Weitzel also failed to recognize that the prerequisites
for a tacit admission in Maryland account for the many reasons that a
person might remain silent when accused in the presence of police.
Consideration for a defendant's shock, injury, deafness, or intoxica-
tion is reflected in the first prerequisite for a tacit admission, which
requires that an accused party both hear and understand an accusa-
tion. 5 ° A defendant's fear, advice of counsel to remain silent, or a
desire to exercise the right against self-incrimination is considered
under the third prerequisite for a tacit admission, which requires that
"under the circumstances, a reasonable person in the party's position"
would have disagreed with the statement."'
The court in Weitzel downplayed the fact that an exception specifi-
cally for police presence has been previously considered and rejected
by both the Court of Special Appeals and the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Special Appeals in Williams v. State found that although a
police officer was present, evidence of silence was admissible as a tacit
admission because the defendant was not in custody.152 Further, the
Court of Appeals in Key-El v. State found that pre-arrest silence in the
presence of a police officer was properly admitted at trial. 53 The
court made clear that "the admissibility of such silence should depend
on an evaluation of the required prerequisites for the use of a tacit
admission that have been established over the years by this Court. 1 54
The court went on to say that if "such an evaluation by the court dis-
closes that the police officer's presence together with the other cir-
cumstances demonstrate that a reasonable person in the defendant's
position would not be expected to deny or explain the accusation,
then the defendant's silence would be excluded from evidence.1 55
The Court of Appeals noted that the circumstances in Key-El-where
the accused had an opportunity to respond; was in the presence of a
police officer; and was not in custody, interrogated, arrested, or given
the Miranda warning-was a "text-book example of the wisdom of
judging the effect of pre-arrest silence on a case by case basis."' 56 Yet
149. See 384 Md. at 456, 863 A.2d at 1001-02.
150. Henry v. State, 324 Md. 204, 242, 596 A.2d 1024, 1043 (1991).
151. Id. (emphasis added).
152. 4 Md. App. 342, 348 & n.6, 242 A.2d 813, 816-17 & n.6 (1968).
153. 349 Md. 811, 813, 709 A.2d 1305, 1305 (1998).
154. Id. at 819, 709 A.2d at 1308.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 818, 709 A.2d at 1308.
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the Weitzel court made no attempt to explain why the reasoning in Key-
El is faulty six years later.
The Weitzel court attempted to justify its decision on the ground
that other jurisdictions have invoked a similar rule.' 57 This reasoning
overlooked the fact that the determination for admissibility of pre-
arrest silence in other courts might be predicated on different consid-
erations and not based on the same prerequisite analysis found in Ma-
ryland jurisprudence. The court cited the Alabama Supreme Court's
decision in Ex parte Marek, where the tacit admission rule was abol-
ished because the underlying assumption that an accused always ob-
jects to an untrue accusation is incorrect, as there are numerous
reasons that an accused might remain silent. 5 ' These numerous rea-
sons are addressed through the prerequisites required for a tacit ad-
mission in Maryland.' 59 The court also noted the decision in People v.
DeGeorge, which reasoned that "silence is the natural reaction of many
people," and that an innocent person might have a multitude of rea-
sons for not speaking. 60 While New York employs a very general and
objective reasonable person test, Maryland evaluates the behavior of
"a reasonable person in the party's position" and "under the circum-
stances," adding a subjective element to the test, or at the least using a
more narrow objective standard than New York."' The Court of Ap-
peals has also previously established that a tacit admission only occurs
if the statement is something that the accused would naturally be ex-
pected to deny and that remaining silent can signify the adoption of
another person's statement only when there is no other equally consis-
tent explanation for the silence. 62 The Weitzel court failed to note
that the prerequisite analysis and other safeguards in Maryland case
law are not necessarily present in other jurisdictions that allow tacit
admissions.
The Weitzel court's reliance on the Miranda rights as ajustification
for a tacit admission exception ignores an important distinction be-
tween an investigation and an interrogation due to the inherent pres-
sures and compelling atmosphere unique to an in-custody setting. 163
157. 384 Md. at 456, 863 A.2d at 1002.
158. Id. at 458-59, 863 A.2d at 1003-04 (citing Ex parte Marek, 556 So. 2d 375, 382 (Ala.
1989)).
159. See Henry v. State, 324 Md. 204, 242, 596 A.2d 1024, 1043 (1991) (outlining the
prerequisites for a tacit admission).
160. Weitze/ 384 Md. at 460, 863 A.2d at 1004 (emphasis added) (citing People v. DeGe-
orge, 541 N.E.2d 11 (N.Y. 1989)).
161. Henry, 324 Md. at 242, 596 A.2d at 1043 (emphasis added).
162. Zink v. Zink, 215 Md. 197, 202, 137 A.2d 139, 142 (1957).
163. See 384 Md. at 461, 863 A.2d at 1004-05.
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The court in Weitzel cited the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte
Marek for the premise that one motivation for remaining silent could
be that the accused believes he has the right to remain silent because
that right has been extensively publicized by the news media. 164 The
court also noted the New York Court of Appeals's decision in People v.
DeGeorge, which recognized that one of the reasons a person would
remain silent is the knowledge that a statement can and will be used
against him at trial. 165 The court looked further to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit in Combs v. Coyle, which held that admitting
evidence of pre-arrest silence as a tacit admission violates the privilege
against self-incrimination. 166 The court in Weitzel concluded by imply-
ing that knowledge of the Miranda rights might cause a person to re-
main silent.
167
The Supreme Court in Miranda, however, began by noting the
importance of the nature and setting of an in-custody interroga-
tion.168 Miranda makes clear that "the accused must be adequately
and effectively apprised of his rights... to permit a full opportunity to
exercise the privilege against self-incrimination." 169  The Miranda
Court also explicitly stated that its decision did not apply to general
fact-finding or on-scene investigations because, in those situations, the
compelling atmosphere of an in-custody interrogation is not pre-
sent.1 70 The Supreme Court even noted that "it is an act of responsi-
ble citizenship" to give information to the police during an
investigation. 171 Yet the Weitzel court's concerns for Miranda rights ex-
tended the compelling pressures of an interrogation to an investiga-
tion, ignoring the atmospheric distinction stressed in Miranda.
b. The Court Missed an Opportunity to Clarify the Rules of Admis-
sibility.-In giving little explanation for straying from the prerequisite
analysis approach and creating a bright-line exception for police pres-
ence, 172 the court in Weitzel left little guidance for future application
of the prerequisite analysis.17 ' The nature of the prerequisite analysis
164. Id. at 459, 863 A.2d at 1003-04 (citing Ex parte Marek, 556 So. 2d 375, 382 (Ala.
1989)).
165. Id. at 460, 863 A.2d at 1004 (citing DeGeorge, 541 N.E.2d at 13).
166. Id. at 460-61, 863 A.2d at 1004 (citing Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283 (6th Cir.
2000)).
167. Id. at 461, 863 A.2d at 1004-05.
168. 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966).
169. Id. at 467.
170. Id. at 477-78.
171. Id.
172. See supra Part 4.a.
173. 384 Md. at 456, 863 A.2d at 1002.
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as "essentially ad hoc, factual inquir[y]" will continue to present the
same difficulty in application as seen in takings jurisprudence.' 74 The
root of this problem may be the ambiguity of the third prerequisite
for a tacit admission, where a court must determine that "under the
circumstances, a reasonable person in the party's position, who dis-
agreed with the statement, would have voiced that disagreement. "175
In each case, the court must haphazardly decide what constitutes an
accusation and under what circumstances a reasonable person would
respond with a denial.
The flaw in this approach was illustrated in Zink v. Zink, where
the dissent noted that the majority "finds it unlikely that a husband
would feel called upon to deny the charge for adultery. I think that is
an unwarranted assumption."' 76 Similarly, in Ewell v. State, the court
reasoned that Ewell would have naturally denied an exclamation by
his friend about a specific crime that they had committed, even if
committing crime was a regular occurrence.' 77 The three-member
dissent in Ewell noted that the assertion was more likely a teenage
boast than an accusation that Ewell committed a crime. 17  Without
clarifying what constitutes an allegation and which circumstances de-
mand a response, the court risks future decisions like Ewell, where up-
holding or reversing a murder conviction may hinge on one judge's
interpretation of the difference between boasting and blaming.' 79
If the Weitzel court believed that silence in police presence is too
ambiguous to be probative, and if the motivations for remaining silent
in police presence also induce silence in other third-party situations,
then there seems to be little justification for allowing any tacit admis-
sions in the State of Maryland. i80 But the court carved a bright-line
exception only for pre-arrest silence in the presence of police, leaving
all other tacit admissions to be evaluated through prerequisite analy-
sis. ls ' The Supreme Court in Miranda, however, specifically refused
to evaluate whether a defendant was already aware of his constitu-
tional rights."8 2 The Court remarked that "[a]ssessments of the
knowledge the defendant possessed, based on information as to his
174. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
175. Henry v. State, 324 Md. 204, 242, 596 A.2d 1024, 1043 (1991).
176. Zink v. Zink, 215 Md. 197, 204, 137 A.2d 139, 144 (1957) (Henderson, J.,
dissenting).
177. Ewell v. State, 228 Md. 615, 620, 180 A.2d 857, 860 (1962).
178. Id. at 623, 180 A.2d at 862 (Horney, J., dissenting).
179. See id.
180. 384 Md. at 456, 863 A.2d at 1002.
181. Id.
182. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 (1966).
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age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with authorities, can
never be more than speculation."18' 3 Yet instead of eliminating all
tacit admissions, the court in Weitzel only created an exception to the
rule and failed to provide any explanation or criteria for when an ac-
cusation should be denied.
18 4
c. Tacit Admissions Should Not Be Admissible in Maryland.-
The Weitzel court missed an opportunity to eliminate all tacit admis-
sions as substantive evidence of guilt. Such a holding is prudent be-
cause Supreme Court jurisprudence has been misconstrued as
supporting the admission of pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence
of guilt,'85 many other jurisdictions have held that there is a right to
remain silent prior to an arrest,'86 and recent Confrontation Clause
interpretations raise doubts as to the admissibility of tacit
admissions. 187
The court in Weitzel ignored a significant factual distinction be-
tween cases such as Weitzel and Supreme Court jurisprudence evaluat-
ing evidence of silence: the evidence of pre-arrest silence in Weitzel was
offered in the prosecution's case-in-chief as substantive evidence of
guilt. 8 " Jurisdictions such as the Eleventh Circuit, which allow evi-
dence of pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt, cite Jenkins
v. Anderson for support.'89 However, the Supreme Court limited its
holding in Jenkins to the use of a defendant's pre-arrest silence to im-
peach credibility on cross-examination. 9 ° Relying on Jenkins as prece-
dent for admitting tacit admissions ignores this explicit limitation. "'9 1
There is support from other circuit courts that Jenkins is limited to
instances where a defendant takes the stand and is subject to cross-
examination. As noted by the Seventh Circuit in United States ex rel.
Savory v. Lane,192 Griffin-and notJenkins-is the applicable precedent
when the prosecution offers silence as evidence of guilt and not for
impeachment purposes.' 93 The court distinguished cases such as Jen-
183. Id. at 468-69.
184. See 384 Md. at 456, 863 A.2d at 1002.
185. See infra notes 188-198 and accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 199-223 and accompanying text.
187. See infra notes 224-243 and accompanying text.
188. See 384 Md. at 454, 863 A.2d at 1000.
189. United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 1991).
190. 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980).
191. See id.
192. 832 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1987).
193. Id. at 1017.
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kins and Fletcher v. Weir because unlike the defendants in those cases,
Lane did not testify on his own behalf." 4
The Court of Appeals disregarded the fact that the statement in
Jenkins, leaving jurisdictions free to define rules where evidence of si-
lence is more prejudicial than probative, was discussed in the context
of impeachment and not in relation to the prosecution's case-in-
chief.19 5 This limitation is consistent with the Supreme Court's analy-
sis in United States v. Hale,'9 6 where the Court reasoned that silence at
the time of arrest was not probative of credibility and had significant
prejudicial effect.'9 7 Further, allowing jurisdictions to cite Jenkins in
an attempt to extend the use of pre-arrest silence to the prosecution's
case-in-chief would essentially permit evidentiary rules to supersede
constitutional guarantees in violation of the Supremacy Clause.'
9 8
The court in Weitzel also ignores recent case law that supports the
existence of a right to remain silent prior to an arrest or custodial
interrogation. While courts finding pre-arrest silence admissible in
the prosecution's case-in-chief have reasoned that there is no constitu-
tional right to remain silent when the silence occurs without govern-
ment compulsion,'9 9 this logic is based on an overly strict reading of
the Fifth Amendment.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees the privilege against self-in-
crimination in criminal cases.2 ° ° The Supreme Court has consistently
held that the prosecution may not comment on a defendant's deci-
sion not to testify because that decision would not be probative of any
fact at issue. 20 ' Even though no government compulsion exists to
compel a defendant's silence at trial, such silence is clearly protected
by the Fifth Amendment. 20 2 Admitting pre-arrest silence simply be-
cause there was no government action compelling the silence 2 3 con-
flicts with Supreme Court jurisprudence prohibiting any comment on
a defendant's decision not to testify even though there is no govern-
194. Id.
195. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 240-41.
196. 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
197. Id. at 180.
198. U.S. CONST. art. VI; see also Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1566 (1st Cir. 1989)
(noting that a rule of evidence inferring guilt cannot trump a constitutional guarantee).
199. United States v. Zanabria, 74 F.3d 590, 593 (5th Cir. 1996); see also United States v.
Oplinger, 150 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding no violation of the privilege against
self-incrimination or due process because the silence occurred prior to an arrest or the
Miranda warning).
200. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
201. Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 497 (1926).
202. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
203. Zanabria, 74 F.3d at 593; Oplinger, 150 F.3d at 1067.
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ment compulsion involved. 204  This logic was recognized by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Savory,
where the court prohibited comment by the prosecution on the de-
fendant's pre-arrest silence because such a comment was analogous to
commenting on a defendant's decision not to testify.
20 5
The court in Weitzel also takes no notice of other courts that have
found pre-existing knowledge of the Miranda rights sufficient to in-
voke Miranda's constitutional protections prior to an arrest. In Cop-
pola v. Powell,2" 6 the First Circuit held that the prosecution could not
comment on evidence of Coppola's silence, even though the silence
was pre-arrest and pre-Miranda. The court reasoned that Coppola had
relied on his Miranda rights when he told the police that he would not
confess to anything and that he wanted to speak with a lawyer.20 7 Sim-
ilarly in United States v. Burson, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that Burson
invoked the privilege against self-incrimination when he knew he was
being investigated by IRS agents and indicated that he would not an-
swer any questions.20 8 The Sixth Circuit in Combs v. Coyle also noted
that the right to remain silent applies prior to arrest.209 The court in
Combs agreed with the logic outlined by the dissenting opinion in Jen-
kins that the right to be free from self-incrimination cannot be limited
to silence compelled by the government, because if there is a civil duty
to report a crime then reporting a self-committed crime would uncon-
stitutionally compel self-incrimination. 1 0 The Court of Appeals of
Maryland even concludes its opinion in Weitzel by observing that the
Miranda warnings have become common knowledge as a result of the
media and technology.211 This observation must be considered in tan-
dem with the Supreme Court's articulation in Doyle that a defendant's
silence after receiving the Miranda warning is insolvably ambiguous. 212
The court in Weitzel also makes no note of the fact that the pre-
requisite analysis for a tacit admission in other states supports the pro-
position that a defendant may exercise his Miranda rights prior to an
arrest. The process of determining the admissibility of a tacit admis-
sion in California is very similar to the analysis articulated by the Court
204. See Giffin, 380 U.S. at 615.
205. 832 F.2d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1987).
206. 878 F.2d 1562 (1st Cir. 1989).
207. Id. at 1567.
208. 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir. 1991).
209. 205 F.3d 269, 283-85 (6th Cir. 2000).
210. Id. at 284 n.9 (citingJenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 250 n.4 (1980) (Marshall,
J., dissenting)).
211. See 384 Md. at 461, 863 A.2d at 1004.
212. 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976).
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of Appeals of Maryland in Henry v. State,2 13 a California court must
determine if the silence of the defendant occurred under circum-
stances such that the defendant heard, understood, and would reply
to the accusation.214 California goes a step further, however, and asks
whether the circumstances "do not lend themselves to an inference
that [the defendant] was relying on the right of silence guaranteed by
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. '2 15 This cri-
terion reflects the importance given to knowledge of the Miranda
rights prior to an arrest and adds an additional burden to limit the
admissibility of pre-arrest silence.
The court in Weitzel ignores the principle that if there is a consti-
tutional right to remain silent prior to an arrest, offering evidence of
such silence in the prosecution's case-in-chief would violate the consti-
tutional rights of a defendant. Jenkins uses an impermissible burden
test to evaluate whether a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights have
been violated.2 16 The court looks at the legitimacy of the challenged
governmental practice to evaluate whether the defendant's rights
have been impermissibly burdened. 2 17 The Jenkins Court reasoned
that a defendant who decides to testify waives his Fifth Amendment
rights and is not impermissibly burdened by cross-examination be-
cause such questioning tests credibility and enhances the reliability of
the criminal process.2 11 If the defendant does not take the stand, he
remains safe from self-incrimination. 21 9
As noted in Jenkins, evidence of pre-arrest silence of a defendant
who does not testify on his own behalf would fail to test his credibility,
and would impermissibly burden his right against self-incrimina-
tion. 2 2 0 Proponents of admitting evidence of pre-arrest silence reason
that the government has a significant interest in presenting all rele-
vant evidence to a jury.221 This reasoning ignores the fact that the
probative value of evidence of silence has consistently been confined
by the Supreme Court to cross-examination 222 and that federal and
213. 342 Md. 204, 24142, 596 A.2d 1024, 1043 (1991).
214. E.g., People v. Preston, 508 P.2d 300, 304 (Cal. 1973).
215. Id.
216. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980).
217. Id.
218. See id; see also Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 634-35 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(noting that a prosecutor may comment on a defendant's silence as it relates to credibility
and prior inconsistency, but may not ask a juror to infer guilt from silence).
219. Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 499 (1926).
220. See 447 U.S. at 238.
221. E.g., Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617.
222. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238.
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state evidentiary rules prohibit even probative evidence if it is unfairly
prejudicial or will mislead the jury.223
The court in Weitzel also made no attempt to reconcile recent
Confrontation Clause interpretations that support restricting tacit ad-
missions. The Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington224
suggests a further restriction on tacit admissions and their possible
elimination. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "[i] n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted
with the witnesses against him."225 In Crawford, the Court held that
the Sixth Amendment requires the declarant of testimonial hearsay to
be unavailable and to have been subject to prior cross-examination for
the hearsay to be admissible. 226 The Court did not define "testimo-
nial" but cited various examples, including statements taken by police
during interrogation, pretrial statements the speaker could reasonably
expect to be used prosecutorially, and statements that an objective
witness believes would be used at a later trial.2 27 While Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence has not applied to statements that are made by a
declarant who is also the defendant,228 unique circumstances arise
when the statement is a tacit admission.
As explained by the Court of Appeals, a tacit admission occurs
when a statement is made that the defendant heard, understood, and
under the circumstances would be expected to deny.229 A tacit admis-
sion is admissible under a common hearsay exception as "[a] state-
ment that is offered against a party and is... a statement of which the
party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth. '23 0 If a tacit
admission is literally the statement of a third party offered against the
defendant, then regardless of any acquiescence, Crawford suggests that
the defendant has a right of confrontation unless the prosecution can
establish that the declarant was unavailable and there was a prior op-
portunity for cross-examination. 2 '1 The Supreme Court showed some
support for this application of Crawford to tacit admissions in vacating
a conviction based on an adoptive admission admitted without the op-
portunity for cross-examination. 232
223. FED. R. EVIn. 403; MD. R. 5-403.
224. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
225. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
226. 541 U.S. at 68.
227. Id. at 51-52.
228. Id. at 52 & n.3.
229. Henry v. State, 324 Md. 204, 24142, 596 A.2d 1024, 1043 (1991).
230. MD. R. 5-803; see FED. R. EVID. 801(d) (2) (B).
231. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
232. See Shields v. California, 541 U.S. 930, 930 (2004).
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A prosecutor might try to avoid Crawford and argue that a tacit
admission is a statement by the defendant and not the actual third-
party declarant, rendering the Confrontation Clause inapplicable.2 3
But such an interpretation either ignores the specific definition of a
tacit admission as manifesting an adoption or belief in someone else's
statement rather than the defendant's own statement 234 or attempts to
use a hearsay exception to circumvent a constitutional right.235 Craw-
ford specifically noted that the latter is impermissible and would
render the Confrontation Clause powerless.23 6 Crawford made clear
that the Sixth Amendment does not allow courts to create exceptions
to a constitutional guarantee. 2 7 Further, if a statement is admitted as
an adoptive admission by the defendant, this arguably results in a de-
fendant being forced to choose between unconstitutionally compelled
self-incrimination or forgoing the constitutional right to confronta-
tion. Unlike the hearsay exception for a forfeiture by wrongdo-
ing-where the defendant procures the unavailability of a witness and
loses the right of confrontation-a defendant who refuses to testify is
exercising a constitutional right.2 9 As seen in Fifth Amendmentjuris-
prudence, no adverse inference can be made by the prosecution from
that decision.24°
Alternatively, the prosecution might argue that a tacit admission
is nontestimonial in nature. This is problematic in three regards.
First, consider a defendant who remains silent in response to an accu-
sation and claims to remain silent because of her knowledge of the
Miranda rights. If a defendant's silence explicitly represents her de-
sire not to make a statement later available for trial, it does not follow
that her action of remaining silent should be considered nontestimo-
nial. Second, it would be illogical to declare that tacit admissions are
nontestimonial statements-thereby avoiding the protections of the
Confrontation Clause-and then allow the prosecution to argue in its
case-in-chief that the tacit admission is a confession, which is a testi-
233. See, e.g., Ohio v. Lloyd, 2004 Ohio 5813 para. 16 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (rejecting
defendant's argument that his lack of an opportunity to cross-examine his own prior state-
ment to police violated the Confrontation Clause).
234. SeeFED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B); MD. R. 5-803(a)(2).
235. SeeFED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A); MD. R. 5-803(a)(1).
236. 541 U.S. at 51.
237. Id. at 54. While the Court noted that dying declarations have been an historical
exception, they do not apply to this discussion. Id. at 55 n.6.
238. For a discussion of this scenario, see DANIELJ. CAPRA, 2004 UPDATE FOR EVIDENCE:
THE OBJECTION METHOD 28 (2d ed. 2004).
239. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
240. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
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monial statement. 24 1 Lastly, while the Court in Crawford did not de-
fine what constitutes a testimonial statement, the Court in Davis v.
Washington recently held that statements made in the course of police
interrogation are testimonial when there is no emergency requiring
police interrogation to render assistance, and "the primary purpose of
the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially rele-
vant to later criminal prosecution."2 4 2 Under this definition, the state-
ments in Weitzel by Crabtree to Officer Johnson appear testimonial, as
they were given in response to police questions trying to ascertain only
who specifically pushed Effland down the stairs and was thus crimi-
nally responsible.243
5. Conclusion.-In Weitzel v. State, the Court of Appeals held
inadmissible all evidence of pre-arrest silence in the presence of po-
lice as substantive evidence of guilt.2 44 In so doing, the Court failed to
explain the need for an exception to the tacit admission rule,2 4 5
missed an opportunity to provide guidance for future application of
the prerequisite analysis,24 6 and neglected to find all tacit admissions
inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt.
247
ScoTrr J. RICHMAN
241. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.
242. 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006).
243. See 384 Md. at 453, 863 A.2d at 1000.
244. Id. at 461, 863 A.2d at 1005.
245. See supra Part 4.a.
246. See supra Part 4.b.
247. See supra Part 4.c.
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C. A Missed Opportunity to Clearly Articulate an Impact-on-Verdict Test
for Harmless Error Analysis: Allowing Appellate Courts to
Assume the Role of the Juy While Failing to Restrict
the Improper Comments of Prosecutors
In Spain v. State,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed
whether a prosecutor's comments that a police officer would risk his
career by lying constituted reversible error. The court held that the
comments constituted improper vouching, but did not rise to the level
of reversible error. While correct in finding improper vouching, 2 the
court's reversible error analysis sets forth three inconsistent tests, cre-
ating an unclear standard for future courts to use in determining
whether an error merits reversal.' The court should have applied only
an impact-on-verdict test to prevent appellate courts from overstep-
ping their authority and becoming triers of fact.4 Lastly, the court
failed to realize that a relaxed standard encourages prosecutors to
make damaging comments knowing that reversal is unlikely.5 Instead
of articulating inconsistent tests to evaluate reversible error, the Spain
court should have applied an impact-on-verdict test to ensure both
that reviewing courts do not assume the role of the jury and that pros-
ecutors refrain from making improper comments.
1. The Case.--On February 3, 2002, Jesse Spain, Jr. was arrested
after fleeing the scene of a narcotics transaction.6 At trial, the State's
sole witness was Officer Cornelius Williams, who arrested Spain on the
steps of a nearby house several minutes after the transaction.7 The
defense also had only one witness, Spain's sister, who testified that
Spain planned to attend a Super Bowl party that evening near the
location of the narcotics transaction.'
During closing arguments, the prosecutor extensively discussed
the credibility of Officer Williams.' The judge allowed the prosecu-
tion to present, over a defense objection, the argument that Officer
1. 386 Md. 145, 872 A.2d 25 (2005).
2. See infra Part 4.a.
3. See infra Part 4.b.
4. See infra Part 4.c.
5. See infra Part 4.d.
6. Spain, 386 Md. at 149, 872 A.2d at 27.
7. Id. at 149-50, 872 A.2d at 27-28.
8. Id. at 150, 872 A.2d at 28.
9. Id. at 151-52, 872 A.2d at 28-29.
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Williams had no motive to lie and would suffer adverse employment
consequences if he did so.10
After closing arguments, on March 6, 2003, the jury returned a
guilty verdict on all counts, including distribution of a controlled dan-
gerous substance (CDS), using a minor to distribute a CDS, possession
of a CDS, possession of a CDS with intent to distribute, and three
counts of conspiracy involving the distribution of a CDS.' 1 Spain ap-
pealed to the Court of Special Appeals, claiming that the trial court
erred in allowing the State to bolster the credibility of Officer Wil-
liams during closing arguments.12 The Court of Special Appeals, how-
ever, affirmed Spain's conviction.13 In an unreported opinion, the
court found that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he
allowed the State's closing argument and that the State's argument
did not warrant reversal.14
Spain then petitioned the Court of Appeals, which granted certio-
rari to determine whether reversible error occurred when the trial
court allowed the prosecution to argue that Officer Williams had "no
motive to lie and would risk his career by testifying falsely." 5
2. Legal Background.-During closing arguments, prosecutors
are prohibited from commenting on facts outside of the evidence
presented at trial.16 If a prosecutor's comments exceed reasonable
inferences drawn from the evidence, they are deemed improper and
may be considered grounds for reversal. 7 But not every improper
comment made by the prosecution warrants reversal.1 8 Courts will
not overturn a verdict for what they deem to be harmless error.19 Ma-
ryland case law, however, does not provide a consistent test for deter-
mining whether an error is harmless.20
a. Courts Prohibit Prosecutors from Improperly Vouching for the
Credibility of Witnesses and Discussing Information Outside the Scope of Evi-
10. Id The court responded to the defense objection by stating that "the jury under-
stand [s] that this of course is closing argument, and that they will [consider the statements
to be] lawyers' arguments. Overruled." Id. at 151, 872 A.2d at 29.
11. 1& at 149 n.2, 152, 872 A.2d at 27 n.2, 29.
12. Spain v. State, No. 03-176, slip op. at 1 (Md. App. June 25, 2004).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 7-8.
15. Spain, 386 Md. at 152, 872 A.2d at 29.
16. See infra Part 2.a.
17. See infra Part 2.a.
18. See infra Part 2.b(l).
19. See infra Part 2.b(1).
20. See infra Part 2.b(2).
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dence.-During closing argument, prosecuting attorneys are generally
given great leeway to comment on the action of the accused, provided
their arguments do not exceed the scope of evidence presented at
trial or reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.2' When prosecutorial
comments exceed reasonable inferences that could be drawn from
the evidence, courts have consistently found such comments im-
proper.22 Specifically, when a prosecutor expresses personal knowl-
edge or vouches for the veracity of a witness's testimony, comments
are found to improperly go beyond the scope of evidence.23
In Walker v. State, for example, the prosecution undermined testi-
mony favorable to the defendant and conveyed to the jury her per-
sonal belief that the defendant was guilty by suggesting that the
defendant threatened one of the State's witnesses into testifying in a
manner favorable to the defense.24 The court found that the prosecu-
tor's conduct constituted improper vouching.25 Additionally, the
court stated that it is "improper for a prosecutor to make suggestions,
insinuations, and assertions of personal knowledge" because this
vouching can obstruct the defendant's right to a fair trial.26
While Maryland courts have not ruled on the issue before, other
jurisdictions have consistently concluded that it is improper for a pros-
ecutor to argue that a law enforcement officer would risk his or her
career by lying unless the statement is supported by the evidence. In
United States v. Martinez, a prosecutor stated in closing argument that a
police officer would not risk his eighteen-year career by testifying
falsely. 27 The Sixth Circuit found this to be improper vouching as it
referred to evidence outside the record.2' Likewise, in United States v.
Pungitore, a prosecutor argued that testifying law enforcement officers
would not script witness testimonies because they had sworn oaths of
office and would jeopardize their careers by doing so. 29 Pointing to
21. Wilhelm v. State, 272 Md. 404, 412-13, 326 A.2d 707, 714 (1974).
22. E.g., Hill v. State, 355 Md. 206, 222, 734 A.2d 199, 208 (1999).
23. Walker v. State, 373 Md. 360, 396, 818 A.2d 1078, 1099 (2003). The Supreme
Court has noted two problems that prosecutorial vouching can cause: (1) a prosecutor's
vouching may lead the jury to believe that the prosecutor knows of additional evidence
supporting the defendant's guilt, but not presented to the jury, and, therefore, can inter-
fere with the defendant's right to be tried solely on evidence presented to the jury; and (2)
a prosecutor's statement has the credibility of the government behind it so the jury may be
inclined to trust the government's judgment over its own. United States v. Young, 470 U.S.
1, 18-19 (1985).
24. 373 Md. at 404-05, 818 A.2d at 1103-04.
25. Id. at 404, 818 A.2d at 1104.
26. Id. at 396, 818 A.2d at 1099.
27. 981 F.2d 867, 871 (6th Cir. 1992).
28. Id.
29. 910 F.2d 1084, 1123 (3d Cir. 1990).
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the lack of evidence supporting such a claim, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that the statements improperly
bolstered the credibility of the police officers.30
b. A Prosecutorial Impropriety Mandates Reversal If It Prejudices
the Defendant.-After a court finds that improper vouching occurred, it
must then determine whether the statement prejudiced the defendant
or was simply harmless error.3 ' A complaining party must demon-
strate prejudice to the defendant as well as error to obtain reversal. 2
However, Maryland uses several tests to determine whether an im-
proper statement constitutes reversible error.
(1) The Federal Harmless Error Rule Has Shifted Back and
Forth from Focusing on the Weight of Evidence Against the Accused to the
Effect of an Error on the Verdict.-Maryland's harmless error rule, like
that of other states, was created in response to federal judicial reform
in the early 1900s. 3 Thus, a brief history of the federal harmless error
rule bears directly on the rationale underlying Maryland's rule. While
useful, the federal harmless error rule is not controlling in Maryland
as the states are principally responsible for trying state criminal cases
and the only requirement these trials must meet is that they comply
with the Constitution.34
Before the early 1900s, U.S. courts, wary of unjustly imposing
harsh criminal penalties, applied the English rule that "any error of
substance required a reversal. '35 In response to increasing dissatisfac-
tion with the English rule, under which guilty verdicts were often over-
turned for errors having no impact on the verdict, 6 Congress passed
§ 269 of the Judicial Code in 1919." v The statute, known as "the harm-
less error statute," mandates that a reviewing court examine the entire
record, disregarding technical errors and defects that do not affect a
defendant's substantial rights.3 '8 This ensured that appellate courts
30. Id. at 1125.
31. Harris v. David S. Harris, P.A., 310 Md. 310, 319, 529 A.2d 356, 360 (1987).
32. Id.
33. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 48 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
34. Id at 47-48.
35. Id. at 48.
36. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759 (1946). The court stated that "[s]o
great was the threat of reversal, in many jurisdictions, that criminal trial became a game for
sowing reversible error in the record, only to have repeated the same matching of wits
when a new trial had been thus obtained." Id.
37. The current version of the rule is found in 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2000).
38. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 757.
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would not have to, as one trial judge phrased it, "tower above the trials
of criminal cases as impregnable citadels of technicality.
3 9
In one of the earliest Supreme Court cases applying the harmless
error rule, Kotteakos v. United States, the Court held that in determin-
ing whether there has been harmless error, a reviewing court must
look to the effect the error may have had on the jury's verdict.4" In
Kotteakos, certain defendants were convicted of a single conspiracy to
fraudulently obtain credit under the National Housing Act.4 Despite
being indicted for only one count of conspiracy, evidence was
presented at trial to prove at least eight conspiracies committed by
different groups of defendants with no direct connection to each
other.4 2 The Court concluded that in assessing whether the defend-
ants were prejudiced by this error, the proper inquiry is not simply
whether there was enough evidence to support the result, but whether
the error substantially influenced the jury.4"
Later, in Chapman v. California, the Supreme Court held that an
appellate court must be able to declare that an error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt to be considered harmless.44 In Chapman,
two murder defendants had been convicted after both the prosecutor
and judge implied that the defendants' failure to testify mandated
that the jury draw inferences from evidence in favor of the State.45
Applying the rule that an error must be harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt to be deemed harmless, the Court found that the error was not
harmless and that the defendants were entitled to a new trial.46
39. Id. at 759 (quoting Marcus A. Kavanagh, Improvement of Administration of Criminal
Justice by Exercise of Judicial Power, 11 A.B.A. J. 217, 222 (1925)). The Supreme Court ex-
plained the importance of a harmless error rule when it stated:
The reversal of a conviction entails substantial social costs: it forces jurors, wit-
nesses, courts, the prosecution, and the defendants to expend further time, en-
ergy, and other resources to repeat a trial that has already once taken place;
victims may be asked to relive their disturbing experiences.... These societal
costs of reversal and retrial are an acceptable and often necessary consequence
when an error in the first proceeding has deprived a defendant of a fair determi-
nation of the issue of guilt or innocence. But the balance of interest tips decid-
edly the other way when an error has had no effect on the outcome of the trial.
United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72 (1986).
40. 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946).
41. Id. at 752.
42. Id. at 754. The only connection between many of the defendants was that their
conspiracies were of a like nature and involved the same key figure. Id. at 754-55.
43. Id. at 764-65.
44. 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
45. Id. at 25.
46. Id. at 24, 26.
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The Court focused its harmless error analysis on whether there
was overwhelming evidence of guilt against the accused in Harrington
v. California.4 1 In Harrington, a murder defendant was denied his right
to confront witnesses who testified against him.48 The Court held that
since the evidence of the defendant's guilt was overwhelming, the
conviction should not be reversed.49 However, since Harrington, the
Court has consistently resumed focusing on the effect of the error on
the jury's verdict when conducting harmless error analysis.5"
(2) Maryland Precedent Provides Conflicting Tests for Determin-
ing Whether an Error Is Harmless.-As with the federal harmless error
rule, there are inconsistencies in the harmless error rule in Maryland.
The Court of Appeals has articulated harmless error tests that range
from inquiring into the weight of the evidence against the accused, to
mandating reversal unless it can be found that the error in no way
influenced the verdict, to prohibiting reversal unless the trial judge
abused her discretion. Maryland also requires appellate courts to
avoid weighing the evidence of guilt against the accused because that
is the jury's function.51
Maryland courts often rely on the harmless error standard articu-
lated in Wilhelm v. State.52 The court in Wilhelm cited the Supreme
Court's Kotteakos decision for the proposition that a reviewing court
must examine the entire record to ensure that the error did not influ-
ence the verdict.53 The court then added that in deciding whether
there is reversible error, a reviewing court should evaluate "the close-
ness of the case," the importance of the issue affected by the error,
and any curative measures taken by the trial court to mitigate the ef-
fects of the improper comment.54
Another standard, which focuses solely on the effect of the error
on the jury's verdict, was articulated in Dorsey v. State.55 The Dorsey
court held that an error cannot be deemed harmless unless a court
concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in no way influ-
enced the verdict.5 '6 The court sought to determine whether a trial
47. 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969).
48. Id. at 252.
49. Id. at 252-54.
50. See generally Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141 (1998); O'Neal v. McAninch, 513
U.S. 432 (1995).
51. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
52. 272 Md. 404, 416, 326 A.2d 707, 716 (1974).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976).
56. Id.
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court erred in allowing a detective to answer questions regarding the
percentage of convictions resulting from his arrests.5 7 After finding
error, the court stated that a "uniform test" should be applied to de-
termine the extent of error in all criminal cases and adopted the im-
pact-on-verdict harmless error rule set forth in Chapman.5
A conflicting standard was articulated in Degren v. State, in which
the Court of Appeals held that an error is reversible only if the trial
judge abused her discretion to allow improper comments. 59  In
Degren, a prosecutor's closing argument included a statement that no
one in the country had more motive to lie than a defendant in a crimi-
nal trial.6 ° The Court of Special Appeals found the comment inappro-
priate, but held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
allowing the comments to be made.6' Upon review, the Court of Ap-
peals recognized that a conviction should only be reversed if the pros-
ecutor's remarks "actually misled the jury or were likely to have misled
or influenced the jury to the prejudice of the accused."62 The court
therefore concluded that absent both prejudice to the accused and
clear abuse of discretion, an appellate court should not reverse the
judgment of the trial court.63
While there are many inconsistent tests for determining whether
an error is harmless under Maryland law, the role of an appellate
court is quite clear. Maryland law empowers only the jury, as opposed
to the judge, to determine whether evidence is credible and what
weight certain evidence should be given.' Therefore, appellate
courts are not permitted to assume the role of the jury by weighing
the evidence against the accused.6 5 Such a rule is consistent with a
defendant's constitutionally protected right to be tried by an impartial
jury. 6
57. Id. at 641-42, 350 A.2d at 667-68.
58. Id. at 658-59, 350 A.2d at 677-78. Specifically, the court stated that once error is
established, "unless a reviewing court, upon its own independent review of the record, is
able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the
verdict, such error cannot be deemed 'harmless' and a reversal is mandated." Id. at 659,
350 A.2d at 678; accord Ragland v. State, 385 Md. 706, 726-27, 870 A.2d 609, 621 (2005);
Weitzel v. State, 384 Md. 451, 461, 863 A.2d 999, 1005 (2004).
59. 352 Md. 400, 431, 722 A.2d 887, 902 (1999).
60. Id. at 428-29, 722 A.2d at 901.
61. Id. at 429, 722 A.2d at 901.
62. Id. at 431, 722 A.2d at 902 (quotingJones v. State, 310 Md. 569, 580, 530 A.2d 743,
748 (1987)).
63. Id.
64. Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 224, 571 A.2d 1251, 1260 (1990).
65. Haslup v. State, 30 Md. App. 230, 239, 351 A.2d 181, 186 (1976).
66. See, e.g.,Jenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284, 299, 825 A.2d 1008, 1017 (2003) (stating that
both the United States Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights provide de-
1142 [VOL. 65:1136
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Spain v. State, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals
and held that the admission of improper comments made by a prose-
cutor during closing argument constituted harmless error, which did
not unduly prejudice the defendant.67
Writing for the majority, Judge Harrell found that the prosecutor
improperly vouched for a witness by commenting that Officer Wil-
liams did not testify falsely because if he did so, he would suffer ad-
verse career consequences.68 Explaining that the State never
introduced evidence at trial from which to infer that Officer Williams
risked his career by testifying falsely, the court deemed these com-
ments improper. 69 Furthermore, the court declared that even if such
evidence were admitted at trial, the prosecutor's comments still would
have constituted improper vouching because they would have implied
that a police officer's testimony should be considered more credible
than those of any other witnesses.7 °
After establishing that the prosecutor's comments were im-
proper, the court cited Degren v. State for the rule that reversal is only
appropriate if the comments misled or likely misled the jury.7 Em-
phasizing that not all improper remarks merit reversal, the court re-
cited Degren's explanation that appellate courts must determine
whether the defendant was prejudiced to decide if reversal is appro-
priate. 72 The court also cited Degren for the rule that an appellate
court should only reverse a criminal conviction if the trial court
clearly abused its discretion to the prejudice of the accused.73
The Court of Appeals then set out several factors to determine
whether a reversible error occurs, including: (1) the severity of the
remarks, (2) how the court cured any potential prejudice, and (3) the
amount of evidence against the accused.7 ' Applying these factors to
fendants in criminal trials with the fundamental right to be tried by an impartial jury); see
also U.S. CONsr. amends. VI, XIV, § 1; MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 21.
67. 386 Md. at 154, 872 A.2d at 30.
68. Id. at 156, 872 A.2d at 31. The court found that the comments concerning a lack of
a motive for Officer Williams to lie did not constitute improper vouching as they did not
express the prosecutor's personal beliefs or assure the jury of the credibility of Officer
Williams. Id. Instead, the court found the comments simply referred to the lack of evi-
dence presented at trial that Officer Williams had a motive to falsely implicate Spain in
criminal conduct. Id. at 155-56, 872 A.2d at 31.
69. Id at 156, 872 A.2d at 31-32.
70. Id. at 157, 872 A.2d at 32.
71. Id at 158, 872 A.2d at 33.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 158-59, 872 A.2d at 33.
74. Id. at 159, 872 A.2d at 33.
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the case, the court found the remarks were not severe, describing
them as "an isolated event that did not pervade the entire trial. 75
Furthermore, the court found the judge's reminder to the jury that
the comments were only attorneys' arguments and the subsequent
jury instructions regarding the credibility of witnesses mitigated any
potential prejudice. 76 The court acknowledged that the weight of the
evidence against Spain was not strong, but nonetheless found that
Spain was not unduly prejudiced.77 The court concluded that it was
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not influence
the jury's verdict.78
In his dissent, Chief Judge Bell agreed that the prosecution im-
properly vouched for Officer Williams's credibility, but disagreed with
the majority's holding that the error was harmless. 79 He explained
that the court should have applied the Dorsey test, which mandates
reversal if an appellate court cannot declare beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error did not affect the verdict."0 Under this standard,
Chief Judge Bell argued, the court could not be persuaded beyond a
reasonable doubt that the comments did not contribute to the guilty
verdict and, therefore, the error was not harmless.8
4. Analysis.-In Spain v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
held that a prosecutor's comments during closing argument were im-
proper, but did not warrant reversal.82 While the court correctly
found the prosecutor's comments improper, 3 its harmless error anal-
ysis will be difficult for future courts to implement.8 4 Instead of artic-
ulating three different harmless error tests, 85 the court should have
applied an impact-on-verdict test to guarantee that courts do not as-
sume the role of the jury.86 Doing so would have provided future
courts with a clear standard, and it would have ensured that prosecu-
tors are not afforded too much leeway to make improper comments.87
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 161, 872 A.2d at 34.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 165, 872 A.2d at 37 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 177, 872 A.2d at 44.
82. Id. at 158-61, 872 A.2d 33-35 (majority opinion).
83. See infra Part 4.a.
84. See infra Part 4.b.
85. See infta Part 4.b.
86. See infra Part 4.c.
87. See infra Part 4.d.
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a. The Court Followed Precedent in Finding That the Prosecutor's
Comments Were Improper.-The Spain court followed precedent to find
improper the prosecutor's comment that Officer Williams would not
testify falsely because he would risk his career. The argument went
beyond the scope of evidence presented at trial and reasonable infer-
ences drawn therefrom and was thus prohibited under Maryland
law."8 Members of the jury could have interpreted the prosecutor's
statements as personal knowledge of the credibility of Officer Wil-
liams, thereby threatening Spain's right to be tried solely on the evi-
dence presented at trial.8 9
In addition to being consistent with Maryland law, the Spain
court's rationale is widely accepted in other jurisdictions. The facts of
Spain are indistinguishable from United States v. Martinez, in which a
prosecutor stated in closing argument that a police officer would risk
his eighteen-year career by testifying falsely.90 Both the Martinez and
Spain courts correctly found that such a statement improperly vouches
for the witness by referring to evidence outside the record.9" The
court's decision also accords with United States v. Pungitore, in which a
prosecutor argued that officers would not script witness testimony be-
cause they had sworn oaths of office and would jeopardize their ca-
reers by doing so.9 2 In Pungitore, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit correctly held that the prosecutor attempted to
bolster the credibility of the police officers improperly.9 3 The court in
Spain was correct in acting similarly.
There are also important policy reasons for the Spain court's deci-
sion to find the prosecutor's comments improper.9 4 As discussed in
United States v. Young, such prosecutorial vouching can lead the jury
to believe that the prosecutor knows of additional evidence that was
not presented at trial, but which supports the defendant's guilt, inter-
fering with the defendant's right to be tried solely on the evidence
presented at trial.9 5 Additionally, a prosecutor's statement bears the
credibility of the government.9 6 The jury may therefore trust the gov-
88. Hill v. State, 355 Md. 206, 222, 734 A.2d 199, 208 (1999); Wilhelm v. State, 272 Md.
404, 413, 326 A.2d 707, 714 (1974).
89. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985); Walker v. State, 373 Md. 360, 396,
818 A.2d 1078, 1099 (2003).
90. 981 F.2d 867, 871 (6th Cir. 1992).
91. Id; Spain, 386 Md. at 156, 872 A.2d at 31.
92. 910 F.2d 1084, 1123 (3d Cir. 1990).
93. Id. at 1125.
94.. 386 Md. at 156, 872 A.2d at 31.
95. 470 U.S. 1, 18 (1995).
96. Id.
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ernment's interpretation of the facts over its own judgment.9 7 The
court in Spain thus acted correctly in at least taking some steps to cen-
sure the prosecutor's behavior.9"
b. The Court Provided Three Different Tests for Determining
Whether an Error Merits Reversal.--Instead of articulating a clear stan-
dard for reversible error, the Spain court provided conflicting tests to
determine whether an error warranted reversal and provided no in-
sight into how the tests should be applied.99 First, the court relied on
Degren for the proposition that a reviewing court should only reverse
when the improper comments misled or likely misled thejury.100 This
standard is more relaxed than the Dorsey standard, incorporated later
in the opinion, which requires a reviewing court to be convinced "be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the error in no way influenced the ver-
dict."' 0 ' The Dorsey test requires a higher level of certainty than the
Degren test."' Therefore, two different results could be reached de-
pending on which standard a court chooses to apply. Not only do
these conflicting tests allow for different results for similarly situated
defendants, but the tests may also provide future courts with unfet-
tered discretion to choose which one to apply.10 3
Additionally, the court in Spain, partly relying on the factors first
articulated by the Court of Appeals in Wilhelm v. State, set forth factors
to consider in determining whether there has been reversible error,
including the severity of the improper remarks, the steps taken to
cure prejudice, and the weight of evidence against the accused.'0 4
The court's application of these factors, however, provides little in-
sight as to whether the factors comprise yet another test or are in-
tended to be considered under either the Dorsey test or the Degren test.
The Spain court should have articulated a clear test to provide other
appellate courts with a definitive standard to apply in the future. A
clear test would ensure both that similarly situated defendants are
97. Id. at 18-19.
98. 386 Md. at 156-58, 872 A.2d at 31-33.
99. Id. at 158-61, 872 A.2d at 33-34.
100. Id. at 159, 872 A.2d at 33 (citing Degren v State, 352 Md. 400, 430-31, 722 A.2d 887,
902 (1999)).
101. Id. at 161, 872 A.2d at 34.
102. Id. at 167, 872 A.2d at 38 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
103. Such a result is particularly problematic considering judges are prohibited from
substituting their judgment for the judgment of thejury. Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 224,
571 A.2d 1251, 1260 (1990); Haslup v. State, 30 Md. App. 230, 239, 351 A.2d 181, 186
(1976).
104. 383 Md. at 159, 872 A.2d at 33.
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treated equally and that an appellate court is not able to simply apply
the test that provides the preferred outcome.
c. The Court Should Have Applied Only an Impact-on-Verdict
Test.-Despite the Spain court's articulation of different standards of
review, it only applied to the facts of the case the factors that require a
reviewing court to consider the severity of the remarks, the steps taken
to cure any prejudice, and the weight of the evidence against the ac-
cused. 10 5 The court's approval of these factors is problematic because
an appellate court should not itself weigh the evidence against the
accused.1"6 Allowing the reviewing court to assess the evidence of
guilt puts appellate judges in the position of the jury, but only the jury
should be a trier of fact.
10 7
The Spain court should have relied solely on an impact-on-verdict
test,10 8 which assesses whether the prosecutorial error could have in-
fluenced the verdict, instead of invoking an evidence-of-guilt test."0 9
In his authoritative work on harmless error, former California Su-
preme Court ChiefJustice RogerJ. Traynor explained that the impact-
on-verdict test for harmless error is superior to the evidence-of-guilt
test.1 10 Traynor stated that even if there is overwhelming evidence
against the accused, an error may still have contributed significantly to
the verdict.'' The appropriate test, he reasoned, does not focus on
whether there is enough evidence to support a conviction, but
whether the error affected the verdict." 2 Accordingly, the court
should have avoided usurping the jury's function, and it should have
instead used an impact-on-verdict test like the one set out in Dorsey.
105. Id
106. See, e.g., Haslup v. State, 30 Md. App. 230, 239, 351 A.2d 181, 186 (1976) ("The
weight to be given evidence is within the exclusive prerogative of the fact finder and is
beyond the [appellate courts'] power to review.").
107. See, e.g., Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 225, 571 A.2d 1251, 1261 (1990) (instructing
the jury that it is "the sole judge of facts in a criminal case").
108. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946) (focusing on the effect the
error may have had on the jury's verdict).
109. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969) (focusing on whether there
is overwhelming evidence of guilt against the accused).
110. ROGERJ. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 28 (1970).
111. Id. at 22. Specifically, he stated that
[e]ven overwhelming evidence in support of a verdict does not necessarily dispel
the risk that an error may have played a substantial part in the deliberation of the
jury and thus contributed to the actual verdict reached, for the jury may have
reached its verdict because of the error without considering other reasons un-
tainted by error that would have supported the same result.
Id.
112. Id. at 28.
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d. The Spain Court's Theory Affords Prosecutors Too Much Lee-
way to Make Improper Comments.-While the Spain opinion clarifies lit-
tle, it does provide prosecutors with great leeway to make improper
comments. The case turned on the credibility of two opposing wit-
nesses, and the credibility of one of them was improperly enhanced by
the prosecution."' Considering the limited information an appellate
court has concerning the jury's deliberation process, the court was not
positioned to conclusively determine that the bolstering of witness tes-
timony had no impact on the verdict. 1 4 The court's classification of
such a significant error as nonprejudicial reveals the court's reluc-
tance to reverse due to error, as well as the extremely high threshold
the error must reach to be considered grounds for reversal.11 The
court's high tolerance for error will likely lead to unjust convictions of
defendants who otherwise would have been found innocent if judged
solely on the basis of evidence presented at trial. 1 16
If comments as severely prejudicial as those in Spain are allowed
by the court, prosecutors may feel confident that they can make other
improper comments without the threat of reversal looming. Such a
loose standard could burden the court system with increased appeals
based on improper prosecutorial comments and further erode the
right to a fair trial.
5. Conclusion.-In Spain v. State, the Court of Appeals held that
a prosecutor's comments during closing arguments were improper,
but did not rise to the level of reversible error.1 7 While correct in
declaring the comments improper,"' the court failed to take the op-
portunity to articulate a clear standard for determining what consti-
tutes harmless error."1 9 Instead of perpetuating the confusion in
Maryland law concerning harmless error, the court should have ap-
plied an impact-on-verdict test.120 Creating a clear standard would
have ensured that prosecutors are not given too much leeway to make
113. Spain, 386 Md. at 149-52, 872 A.2d at 27-29.
114. See TRAYNOR, supra note 110, at 22-23 (stating that it is impossible for a reviewing
court to determine what evidence a jury considered and how heavily they relied on such
evidence).
115. See Spain, 386 Md. at 176-77, 872 A.2d at 44 (Bell, C.J. dissenting) (emphasizing the
majority's failure to recognize that improper argument can still mislead the jury).
116. See id. at 177, 872 A.2d at 44 (discussing the difficulty of determining which particu-
lar arguments affect a jury's verdict, thereby making it difficult to discount improper
arguments).
117. Id. at 158-161, 872 A.2d 33-35 (majority opinion).
118. See supra Part 4.a.
119. See supra Part 4.b.
120. See supra Part 4.c.
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improper comments at the expense of a defendant's right to a fair
trial. 121
CARRIE TIMLIN
121. See supra Part 4.d.
V. FAMILY LAW
A. Beyond the Traditional Realm of State Entity Liability and into a New
Era of Unchartered Territory: The Court of Appeals of Maryland
Extends the Scope of Government Liability
In Horridge v. St. Mary's County Department of Social Services,1 the
Court of Appeals of Maryland considered whether a state entity owed
a duty of care to a child after someone reported to the Department of
Social Services that the child was being abused. For the first time, the
court held that a state entity owes a duty of care when a statute man-
dates a specific obligation to an identified class of persons, and legisla-
tive intent expressly provides that a duty exists.2
By holding that the state may be liable for acting negligently, the
court correctly extended the scope of government liability. The
court's decision accords with the nationwide trend of holding that
state entities owe a duty when child abuse is at issue.' Underlying
social policy implications influenced the Horridge court's extension of
the law.4 However, in justifying its ruling, the Court of Appeals failed
to fully distinguish Horridge from prior cases addressing similar issues,
and it did not create clear guidelines for when this ruling will apply in
the future.5 Consequently, it is not clear under what circumstances
the Maryland courts will hold a state agency liable for breaching a
duty to the public.6
1. The Case.-When someone reports child abuse to a state
agency, Maryland law requires the local Department of Social Services
(DSS) to immediately investigate the child's health and safety.7 If the
report alleges sexual or physical abuse, the DSS must, within twenty-
four hours, visit the child and determine whether to remove her from
her current home.'
Between December 1999 and February 2000, Eric Horridge filed
eight reports with the DSS of St. Mary's County, charging that Tiffany
Fairris, or her boyfriend, Daniel Fowkes, physically abused nineteen-
1. 382 Md. 170, 854 A.2d 1232 (2004).
2. Id. at 189, 193, 854 A.2d at 1243, 1245.
3. See infra Part 4.b.
4. See infra Part 4.c.
5. See infra Part 4.c.
6. See infra Part 4.c.
7. Horridge, 382 Md. at 174, 854 A.2d at 1234.
8. Id.; MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-706 (LexisNexis 2004).
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month-old Collin.9 Collin was born to Horridge and Fairris in Texas
in June 1998.1' A year later, Fairris moved to St. Mary's County with
Collin and her boyfriend, while Horridge remained in Texas. 1
Shortly after the move, Horridge contacted the DSS of St. Mary's
County to report the abuse of his son.12 He stated that the abuse
arose during a series of phone conversations with Fairris during which
she would physically abuse Collin while threatening Horridge that he
would never see Collin again. 3 Horridge also informed the DSS of
Fairris's history of drug and child abuse.1 4
On January 28, 2000, four days after Horridge's phone call, Bri-
ana Shirey and Deborah Walsh, two DSS social workers, visited Col-
lin's home.1" Although Shirey observed on Collin circular bruising
not consistent with normal toddler play, she declined to act to ensure
his safety.16 Instead, the DSS workers relied on a statement that Collin
made in front of his mother that the injuries resulted from his play
activities." In early February 2000, the State closed the case. 8
Because of Horridge's reports to DSS, Fairris told him that she
would continue to abuse Collin.19 Although Horridge reported these
statements to the DSS, the State did not investigate the situation.2 °
Horridge continued to make reports of child abuse, as did a con-
cerned neighbor aware of the situation.21 In response, Shirey accused
Horridge of being a "disgruntled parent" and stated that she would
not listen to his complaints regarding Collin because she had closed
the case.
22
On February 25, 2000, either Fairris or her boyfriend beat Collin
to death.2' The autopsy showed that Collin had suffered multiple
9. Honidge, 382 Md. at 175, 854 A.2d at 1234.
10. Id. at 176, 854 A.2d at 1235.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. On one occasion, Collin was screaming in the background because Fairris had
pushed him into a wall. Id.
14. Id. A Texas court had previously restricted Fairris's visitation rights with another
one of her children, whom she also abused. Id.
15. Id. at 175-76, 854 A.2d at 1234-35. The DSS made an on-site visit four days after
Horridge reported abuse, in spite of the policy requiring the DSS to visit within twenty-four
hours of a reporting. Id. at 176, 854 A.2d at 1235.
16. Id. at 176-77, 854 A.2d at 1235.
17. Id. at 177,.854 A.2d at 1235.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 177, 854 A.2d at 1236.
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blunt force injuries, had serious wounds all over his body, and had
been struck by an adult's hand or knuckles.24 These wounds were
consistent with Horridge's reports of abuse. 25
Subsequently, Horridge filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for
Anne Arundel County, alleging two counts of negligence against the
State and two counts of negligence against Shirey and Walsh.26 In the
first complaint against the State, Horridge claimed that sections 5-702
through 5-706 of the Family Law Article created a duty that required
the DSS to investigate a report of child abuse and protect that child
from further danger. 7 Horridge argued that the DSS owed a specific
duty to Collin because Collin was a member of a class that the legisla-
ture intended the statute to protect.28 He stated that the DSS
breached this duty when it failed to protect Collin from the reported
abuse, properly investigate the reports as the statute required, ensure
that there was no continued abuse after the first visit, and investigate
reports after the case was closed. 29
The second count alleged that the DSS was negligent based on a
special relationship with Collin.3 ° Horridge claimed that this relation-
ship arose from the State's affirmative actions, which intended to pro-
tect Collin from danger resulting from child abuse.3 Count five
charged the DSS with negligent selection, retention, and supervision
of Shirey and Walsh.3 2
The circuit court dismissed all counts of the complaint as failing
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 3 Specifically, it
held that none of the defendants owed a duty to Collin and that, even
24. Id. at 177-78, 854 A.2d at 1236.
25. Id. at 178, 854 A.2d at 1236.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 179, 854 A.2d at 1236.
33. Id. at 175, 854 A.2d at 1234. In counts three and four, Horridge charged Shirey
and Walsh with gross negligence as a result of breaching their duty by willfully, wantonly,
and recklessly disregarding Collin's rights. Id. at 178-79, 854 A.2d at 1236. In counts six
and seven, Horridge pled that the State violated Articles 19 and 24 of the Maryland Decla-
ration of Rights. Id. at 179, 854 A.2d at 1237. Count eight alleged that the DSS, Shirey,
and Walsh intentionally inflicted emotional distress on Collin through their indifference to
his needs. Id. Horridge brought counts one through eight as the personal representative
of Collin's estate. Id. In count nine, Horridge sued on his own behalf for the wrongful
death of Collin, incorporating all of the allegations previously pled. Id. at 179-80, 854 A.2d
at 1237.
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if they did, "the breach of that duty was not the proximate cause of the
harm that ensued."34 Horridge subsequently appealed. 5
On appeal, Horridge abandoned six of the counts and only as-
serted the negligence claims against the State: counts one, two, and
five.3 6 Horridge argued that (1) the DSS had a duty to protect Collin
upon receiving a credible report that he was being abused, (2) the
circuit court erred in determining the issue of proximate cause on a
motion to dismiss, and (3) the negligent supervision claims were suffi-
cient to state a cause of action.3 7
Prior to the commencement of proceedings in the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals, the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to
determine (1) whether the statutory obligation to thoroughly investi-
gate a report of child abuse and protect the child 8 created a duty on
the DSS to the abused child, and if so, (2) whether the State or the
individual social workers were liable if harm ensued to the identified
child because of a negligent breach of that duty.3 9
2. Legal Background.-Historically, the State of Maryland en-
joyed immunity from tort liability for the acts of its employees. How-
ever, through the enactment of the Maryland Tort Claims Act, the
state legislature abrogated sovereign immunity.40 To allow an action
against the state for negligence, the state must owe an individual duty
to the plaintiff.4 ' Although the mere existence of a statute does not
impose a specific duty on state entities to the general public, the Mary-
land Family Law Article enumerates the state's obligations for when a
person reports child abuse.42 The courts have developed the rule that
statutory regulations do not impose a duty on government entities un-
less a special relationship exists.43 Across the country, courts have
confronted similar statutes governing child abuse protection and con-
34. Id. at 175, 854 A.2d at 1234.
35. Id. at 180, 854 A.2d at 1237.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-702 to -706 (LexisNexis 2004).
39. Horridge, 382 Md. at 174-75, 854 A.2d at 1234. If someone sues the State, the claim
is still subject to the State Tort Claims Act. Id.
40. MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 12-104 (LexisNexis 2004). Specifically, the statute
provides that "the immunity of the State and of its units is waived as to a tort action, in a
court of the State . . . ." Id. § 12-104(a) (1).
41. See infra Part 2.a.
42. See infra Part 2.b.(2).
43. See infra Part 2.b.(3).
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strued them to find that a special relationship exists between the state
and a specific class of abused children.44
a. Negligence.-To allege negligence, a plaintiff must prove
four elements: that (1) the defendant owed a duty of care to the plain-
tiff, (2) the defendant breached her duty of care, (3) the defendant's
breach of duty caused the type of harm the plaintiff suffered, and (4)
there was actual injury to the plaintiff.45
Whether a state owes a duty to its citizens depends on the circum-
stances.46 The Court of Appeals of Maryland has defined "duty" to
require an actor to conform to a specified standard of conduct to pro-
tect others against unreasonable risks.47 A duty may be created ex-
pressly, by statute or contract, or by implication.48 In general,
however, a person does not have an affirmative duty to protect an-
other from harm.49 Similarly, the state does not have a duty to protect
an individual against harm from a third party.5° However, a duty may
arise by virtue of a statute that creates a special relationship which
requires the state to protect a person from third parties. 1
b. The Child Protection Statute.-
(1) Evolution of the Statute.-In 1987, the Maryland legisla-
ture amended the Family Law Article and changed the title of sections
5-701 through 5-710 from "Neglected Children" to "Child Abuse and
Neglect."52 In 1994, the legislature expanded the definition of abuse
to include mental as well as physical injury.53 The legislature also
amended the statute in 1994 to broaden what constitutes abuse, stat-
44. See infra Part 2.b.(4).
45. Remsburg v. Montgomery, 376 Md. 568, 582, 831 A.2d 18, 26 (2003).
46. Williams v. Baltimore, 359 Md. 101, 142, 753 A.2d 41, 63 (2000).
47. See Remsburg, 376 Md. at 582, 831 A.2d at 26 (adopting Prosser and Keeton's defini-
tion of torts as "an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform
to a particular standard of conduct toward another") (quoting WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER &
PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984)).
48. Id. at 583-84, 831 A.2d at 27.
49. Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 166, 359 A.2d 548, 552 (1976); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).
50. Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 628, 510 A.2d 1078, 1083 (1986).
51. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 315-320 (1965). A special relationship
may arise when a plaintiff can prove that she relied on the defendant's affirmative act to
protect the specific victim. Ashburn, 306 Md. at 630-31, 510 A.2d at 1085. Other examples
of when a special relationship exists are as between parent and child, master and servant,
and those who have custody of others. Id. at 630 n.2, 510 A.2d at 1085 n.2.
52. Act of June 2, 1987, ch. 635, 1987 Md. Laws 2942, 2943.
53. Act of May 26, 1994, ch. 729, 1994 Md. Laws 3246. The bill also deleted the quali-
fier "significantly" that modifies the word "harmed" in the definitions of child abuse and
neglect. Id. at 3244.
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ing that abuse includes not only when a child's health actually is
harmed, but when there is a risk that the child's health will be
harmed.54 These initiatives reflect the acts of the Maryland legislature
to eliminate obstacles to protecting abused children.55 Furthermore,
these actions reflect the trend of the state toward adopting a more
stringent attitude to protect children.56
(2) The Statute in 2004.-Under Maryland law, to protect
children subject to abuse and neglect,57 the DSS or an appropriate law
enforcement agency must "make a thorough investigation of a report
of suspected" physical or sexual abuse.5" Within twenty-four hours of
the receipt of such a report, an investigator must observe the child
and attempt to interview the child's caretaker.59 In addition, within
twenty-four hours, the investigator shall determine whether the child
is safe at her current location.6" The investigator shall also assess the
safety of any other children in the household or in custody of the
suspected abuser.6' During the investigation, the DSS shall determine
the cause, extent, and nature of the abuse.6 2 The investigating agency
must report initial findings to the local office of the state's attorney
within ten days of the receipt of the report and complete the investiga-
tion within sixty days.6"
(3) Statutory Regulations Do Not Impose a Duty on Government
Entities Unless a Special Relationship Exists.-Generally, an individual
may not assert a duty arising from a statute that obligates a state
agency to protect the general public.64 However, this doctrine does
54. MD. CODE ANN., FAm. LAw § 5-701(b) (LexisNexis 2004).
55. At Governor Schaefer's Memorial Service for Victims of Domestic Violence, the
governor stressed that family violence would not be tolerated and there would be a stricter
policy on such violence. Letter from Susan C. Mize, Executive Director, Maryland Network
Against Domestic Violence, to Senator Baker, Chairman, SenateJudicial Proceedings Com-
mittee (Apr. 1, 1994) (on file with author).
56. Id.
57. § 5-702.
58. Id. § 5-706(a) (1). DSS must investigate a report of neglect within five days. Id. § 5-
706(b).
59. Id. § 5-706(b)(1)-(2).
60. Id. § 5-706(b) (3).
61. Id. § 5-706(b) (4).
62. Id. § 5-706(c) (1). In addition, if an investigator verifies the suspected abuse or
neglect, section 5-706 requires the investigator to determine the identities of the suspected
abuser and other children in the household as well as an evaluation of the environment
and the parents' fitness. Id. § 5-706(c) (3).
63. MD. CODE REGs. tit. 07, § .02.07.09 (1977).
64. Muthukumarana v. Montgomery County, 370 Md. 447, 486, 805 A.2d 372, 395
(2002). This rule is known as the public duty doctrine. Id.
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not apply if the court determines that a statute has created a specific
obligation to a particular class of persons, rather than to the public at
large.6 5 The Court of Appeals has considered several cases where it
analyzed whether a statutory regulation created an individual duty
upon a state entity.
First, in Lamb v. Hopkins,66 the Court of Appeals of Maryland con-
sidered whether a public entity was liable for an injury that resulted
when a probation officer failed to carry out his statutorily mandated
obligation. In Lamb, Russell Newcomer had violated his probation on
several occasions.67 On one of these occasions, the Division of Parole
and Probation did not report the violation to the sentencing judge.68
Subsequently, Newcomer, driving under the influence of alcohol, col-
lided with the Lambs' vehicle, paralyzing their infant daughter.6" The
Lambs sued the Division alleging that the probation officers were neg-
ligent for not reporting the probationer's misconduct to the court. 70
They said that the Division owed them a duty under article 41, section
124 of the Maryland Code. 71 The court, however, rejected the Lambs'
argument and stated that the statute did not create a duty to the pub-
lic at large.72 Instead, it stated that the statute created a duty from the
supervising officer to the court.73 As a result, the court held that the
Division was not liable and that the plaintiff did not show the exis-
tence of a special relationship between the probation officers and the
plaintiff.
7 4
65. Id. at 487, 805 A.2d at 396.
66. 303 Md. 236, 492 A.2d 1297 (1985). This obligation required the Division of Pa-
role and Probation to supervise the conduct of the identified probationer and report to
the court whether the individual is faithfully complying with the conditions of the proba-
tion. Id. at 252-53, 492 A.2d at 1305-06.
67. Id. at 239-40, 492 A.2d at 1299.
68. Id. at 240, 492 A.2d at 1299.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 251, 492 A.2d at 1305. Specifically, the Code states:
Whenever any court shall suspend the sentence of any person convicted of crime,
and shall direct such person, to continue, for a certain time, or until otherwise
ordered, under the supervision of the Division, it shall be the duty of the said
Division to supervise, when so requested by said court, the conduct of such per-
son and to ascertain and report to said court whether or not the conditions of
such probation or suspension of sentence are being faithfully complied with by
such person.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 124 (Supp. 1984).
72. Lamb, 303 Md. at 252, 492 A.2d at 1305.
73. Id. at 253, 492 A.2d at 1306.
74. Id.
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A few years later, in Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County,75 the Court of
Appeals once again evaluated whether a duty existed to a member of
the general public when a police officer's violation of a statutory re-
quirement resulted in injury to an individual. In Ashburn, an Anne
Arundel County police officer discovered an intoxicated man in the
driver's seat of a running automobile in the parking lot of a conve-
nience store. 76 Instead of detaining the man, as required under Mary-
land law,77 the officer simply instructed him not to drive.7" When the
officer left the area, the man resumed driving and hit and injured
Ashburn, a pedestrian.79 Ashburn brought a negligence suit under
the theory that the State owed an individual duty to protect him from
the criminal acts of a drunk driver, pursuant to a Maryland statute
mandating that police officers detain suspected drunk drivers.8 0
The Court of Appeals rejected Ashburn's argument."' In so do-
ing, the court developed a loose, two-prong test for determining when
the state owes a duty. 2 First, the court stated that a statute must assert
mandatory acts to protect a specific class of persons.83 However, the
court stated that the statute in Ashburn was for the protection of the
general public.84 Second, a statute may only create such an individual
duty when there is express legislative intent to create it.8 5 This case
therefore laid the foundation for when a statute may create an individ-
ual duty.86
In Willow Tree Learning Center, Inc. v. Prince George's County,8v the
court further defined the two-prong test it created in Ashburn. In Wil-
low Tree, the court considered whether the State owed an individual
duty of care to a child injured on a playground, arising from a statute
75. 306 Md. 617, 510 A.2d 1078 (1986).
76. Id. at 619, 510 A.2d at 1079.
77. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 16-205.1(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2002).
78. Ashburn, 306 Md. at 620, 510 A.2d at 1079.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 634-35, 510 A.2d at 1087.
82. Id. at 626-35, 510 A.2d at 1082-87.
83. Id. at 634-35, 510 A.2d at 1087.
84. Id. at 635, 510 A.2d at 1087.
85. Id. at 625, 634-35, 510 A.2d at 1082, 1086-87. The court stated that it would only
impose civil liability on an officer who failed to abide by the Maryland Code if the legisla-
ture expressly stated such an intent. Id.
86. See, e.g., Muthukumarana v. Montgomery County, 370 Md. 447, 488, 805 A.2d 372,
396 (2002) (relying on Ashburn to determine whether a statute created an individual duty).
87. 85 Md. App. 508, 584 A.2d 157 (1991).
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requiring safety inspections of playground equipment.88 First, the
court analyzed whether the statute in question required actions for
the protection of a specific class of persons.8 9 The court noted that
although the statute identified the need to protect children, children
did not constitute a class."0 Instead, the court determined that there
had to be a more specific and identifiable group of plaintiffs.9" The
court feared that if it found a duty, then the state would become liabil-
ity insurers of day care centers.92 Consequently, the court held that
the State did not owe an individual duty merely because of the enact-
ment of a statute.93 The court then analyzed the second prong of the
test to determine whether legislative intent imposed an individual
duty.94 The court found that the regulations did not expressly intend
to impose such liability on the state or its agencies.95 The court stated
that its decision was consistent with previous cases in Maryland and
the general reluctance to infer this type of duty on state entities. 96
Recently, the Court of Appeals further clarified the law when it
combined two cases to address the issue of a state's liability to its citi-
zens.9 7 In Muthukumarana v. Montgomery County,9 8 the court consid-
ered whether to shield the state from liability for negligent acts
committed by 911 operators providing emergency services. In one of
the cases, a Harford County 911 operator failed to relay the correct
information about the location of an unconscious assault victim.9 9 As
a result, the officer was unable to find the victim, who consequently
died from hypothermia. 0 0 The mother of the victim instituted a
wrongful death action against Harford County and the State of Mary-
land, alleging a failure of the government agencies to carry out their
statutory duties with reasonable care.1 '
88. Id. at 513-15, 584 A.2d at 160-61. The statute stated that group daycare center
playgrounds were to be free from conditions that may endanger a child. PRINCE GEORGE'S
COUN Y CODE § 5-125 (a) (24) (1987).
89. Willow Tree, 85 Md. App. at 518-20, 584 A.2d at 162-63.
90. Id. at 519 n.8, 584 A.2d at 162 n.8, The court noted that the day care centers had a
capacity of over 121,000 children statewide. Id.
91. Id. at 519, 584 A.2d at 162-63.
92. Id. at 515, 584 A.2d at 160.
93. Id., 584 A.2d at 160-61.
94. Id. at 520-22, 584 A.2d at 163-64.
95. Id. at 515-16, 584 A.2d at 161.
96. Id. at 516, 584 A.2d at 161.
97. Muthukumarana v. Montgomery County, 370 Md. 447, 805 A.2d 372 (2002).
98. Id. at 456, 805 A.2d at 377.
99. Id. at 460, 805 A.2d at 379-80.
100. Id. at 460-61, 805 A.2d. at 380.
101. Id. at 461, 805 A.2d at 380.
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In the second case, a woman called 911 from her home to report
that her husband attacked her.1 0 2 The woman informed the Mont-
gomery County 911 operator that her husband was still in the house
and was armed, but the operator failed to instruct the woman to flee
the location.' 3 The woman's husband saw her speaking on the
phone and fatally shot their children.' 4 The woman filed a wrongful
death and survival suit against the Montgomery County operator, al-
leging the failure to exercise reasonable care in executing her duty to
provide emergency assistance. 0 5
Assessing the first prong of the public entity liability test, the
Court of Appeals found that the operators did not owe a duty to indi-
viduals, but rather to the public at large.'0 6 The court further rea-
soned that policy concerns justified the use of the public duty
doctrine to protect 911 operators. 107 The court expressly extended
the protection of the public duty doctrine to 911 operators because of
the nature of emergency services and the importance of flexibility in
making instantaneous decisions. 0 8 The court stated that because
these decisions sometimes are incorrect, subjecting 911 personnel to
liability for discretionary mistakes would be dangerous and could po-
tentially diminish the state's resources.' 0 9  As a result, the
Muthukumarana court did not discuss the second prong.11 0
Although neither Lamb, Ashburn, Willow Tree, nor Muthukumarana
found that the government owed a public duty, these cases illustrated
that there are exceptions when a statute may impose a duty if a special
relationship exists between the state or county and an individual.11
This exception applies when a statute requires the state to protect a
specific class of persons1 2 and a legislative statement imposes liability
for failure to meet that statutory obligation. 1
102. Id. at 465, 805 A.2d at 382-83.
103. Id. at 466-68, 805 A.2d at 383-84.
104. Id. at 467 n.12, 805 A.2d at 384 n.12. After shooting the two children, the woman's
husband turned the gun on himself. Id.
105. Id. at 468, 805 A.2d at 384.
106. Id. at 490, 805 A.2d at 397.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 490-91, 805 A.2d at 397-98.
109. Id., 805 A.2d at 398.
110. Id. at 500-01, 805 A.2d at 404.
111. See, e.g., Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 630-31, 510 A.2d 1078,
1085 (1986) (noting that a plaintiff may assert a negligence claim against the state if the
state creates a "special relationship").
112. Id. at 635, 510 A.2d at 1087.
113. See id. at 634, 510 A.2d at 1087 (rejecting the argument that a special relationship
exists absent legislative intent).
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(4) Nationwide, Courts Are Expanding State Liability in Child
Abuse Cases.-A nationwide trend has developed to broaden the scope
of liability in child abuse cases. This movement has gained momen-
tum because of the tens of thousands of children injured under the
protection of a social service agency.11 4 An increasing number of
studies have tracked the correlation between children identified to a
social service agency as abused or neglected and those dying from
abuse and neglect.'1 5 Recent studies have estimated that approxi-
mately twenty-five percent of children killed from abuse or neglect
were previously identified and reported to a child protective
agency.11 6 A medical study, "The Battered-Child Syndrome,"1 17 has
increased the awareness and concern about protecting abused chil-
dren."' Such increased awareness and heightened concern has led
further to an increasing amount of litigation regarding the negligent
handling of child abuse cases and the increasing number of courts
holding social service agencies responsible.
For example, in Brodie v. Summit County Children Services Board,'19
the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected the public duty doctrine and
held that a Children Services Board (CSB) owed a statutory duty to
protect an abused child identified to the CSB. The complaint alleged
that the CSB failed to properly investigate the physical and mental
abuse of Tara Cook when her father and his female friend starved her,
chained her to a bathroom sink, and burned her.1 20
The Ohio court created a test to determine the applicability of
the public duty doctrine.1 2' This test stated that a special relationship
exists when the municipality promises to affirmatively act on behalf of
the injured party, knows that inaction could lead to harm, has direct
contact with the injured party, and knows that the party relied on its
undertaking. 1 2
2
114. REGION VI RESOURCE CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, CHILD DEATHS IN
TEXAS 26 (1981) [hereinafter RESOURCE CENTER]; Elizabeth Mayberry, Child Protective
Services in New York City: An Analysis of Case Management 109 (May 1979) (unpublished
manuscript) [hereinafter Case Management].
115. See, e.g., Child Welfare Information Gateway, Child Abuse & Neglect, http://
childwelfare.gov/can/index/cfm (last visited Aug. 24, 2006).
116. RESOURCE CENTER, supra note 114; Case Management, supra note 114.
117. C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered-Child Syndrome, 181 J. Am. MED. Assoc. 17
(1962).
118. 41 AM. JUR. Trials § 1 (1990). The publication of Dr. Kempe's work has led to an
increase in public concern about child abuse and a tightening of the laws protecting chil-
dren. Id.
119, 554 N.E.2d 1301 (Ohio 1990).
120. Id. at 1303.
121. Id. at 1308.
122. Id.
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The court used the above test to determine that the statute in-
tended to protect an abused child identified to the social service de-
partment, not the general public.1 2 3 The statute mandated action
within twenty-four hours and created an obligation to act affirmatively
on behalf of the identified child.124 The court also noted that the
General Assembly expressly intended for the CSB to take responsibil-
ity when investigating a report of child abuse. 12 1
Similarly, in Turner v. District of Columbia,126 the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals examined whether a public agency, the Child
Protective Services (CPS), could be held liable under a child abuse
statute for failing to act after being notified of the abuse. In Turner, a
mother sued the city for negligence in failing to fulfill its statutory
duty under the Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act 127 when
the father killed her child.12 ' The court reversed the lower court's
grant of summary judgment, noting that the State owed the plaintiffs
a special duty of care beyond the general duty owed to the public at
large. 129 The State's duty arose by virtue of a special relationship es-
tablished by the Child Abuse Act that required the CPS to protect a
narrow and otherwise helpless class of identified abused children.1" '
The court noted that if the CPS was negligent in carrying out its duty,
then the statutorily protected class would suffer differently from the
public at large.13
The Supreme Court of South Carolina similarly addressed the is-
sue of a social service agency's duty to an identified abused child in
Jensen v. Anderson County Department of Social Services.13 2 In Jensen, a
plaintiff sued the state and county alleging that they negligently failed
to prevent the death of an abused child. 3 The appellate court found
that the Child Protection Act imposed a special duty upon the DSS to
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 532 A.2d 662 (D.C. 1987).
127. D.C. CODE §§ 6-2102, 6-2121, 6-2122 (1981) (current version at D.C. CODE §§ 4-
1301.01 to 1301.04 (2001)).
128. Turner, 532 A.2d at 666.
129. Id. at 675.
130. Id. at 667-68.
131. Id. at 668. The Turner court relied on two other state courts that similarly decided
this issue. Id. at 669; see Mammo v. State, 675 P.2d 1347 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); Fla. First
Nat'l Bank ofJacksonville v. City ofJacksonville, 310 So. 2d 19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). In
those cases, a statute created a special relationship by requiring the child protection agen-
cies to act for the protection of the individually identified children. Turner, 532 A.2d at
670.
132. 403 S.E.2d 615 (S.C. 1991).
133. Id. at 616.
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act in child abuse cases and that a failure to act reasonably could re-
sult in a negligence claim. 34 In its reasoning, the court reaffirmed
the notion that while there is no common-law duty to act, a statute
may create an affirmative legal duty. 35 The court noted that while
state officials are usually immune from negligence claims under the
public duty doctrine, they are not immune when they owe a duty to
individuals rather than to the general public.' 36 The court formu-
lated a six-part test to determine when a statute creates a special duty
and the public duty doctrine does not apply.' 37 The court noted that
the test incorporated the issue of whether the legislature intended for
such a duty to exist.'3 8 In applying this test, the court determined that
the child abuse statute imposed a special duty on the state agency and
that the public duty doctrine was therefore not applicable.1 39
Courts across the country are expanding state liability in cases
involving claims of child abuse.' 4 ° Although Maryland courts have not
adopted a rigid test for determining when a special relationship and
an individual duty exist, they have adopted a broad test that enables
them to evaluate the issues on a case-by-case basis. 4 '
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Horridge v. St. Mary's County Depart-
ment of Social Services, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the
circuit court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's complaint, which al-
leged that the State negligently handled a report of child abuse. 142
Writing for the majority, Judge Wilner'43 divided the negligence ac-
tions against the State into three issues: (1) negligent supervision, (2)
negligence as it relates to duty, and (3) proximate cause.' 4 4
134. Id. at 617.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. To create a special duty, the court will look to see if (1) the statute protects
against a particular type of harm, (2) the statute mandates a specific public agent to guard
against the harm, (3) the statute is intended to protect a specific and identifiable class, (4)
the plaintiff constitutes a member of the protected class, (5) the public agent knows or
should know that failure to act reasonably will cause harm to the specific class, and (6) that
the agent is given authority to act on his own account in the scope of his position. Id.
138. Id. at 618.
139. Id. at 617-18.
140. See supra Part 2.b.(4).
141. Muthukumarana v. Montgomery County, 370 Md. 447, 494-96, 805 A.2d 372, 400-
02 (2002).
142. 382 Md. at 195-96, 854 A.2d at 1246.
143. Judge Wilner was joined by Chief Judge Bell and Judges Raker, Harrell, and
Greene. Id. at 174, 196, 854 A.2d at 1234, 1247.
144. Id. at 180-95, 854 A.2d at 1237-46.
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a. Negligent Superision.-The majority rejected Horridge's
first argument, which charged the State with negligent selection, train-
ing, and retention of its social workers.1 45 In coming to this conclu-
sion, Judge Wilner surveyed a series of cases outlining the rebuttable
presumption that an employer used due care before hiring an
employee. 146
The majority stated that Horridge's allegation of negligent super-
vision was unsupported because he failed to show evidence that Shirey
and Walsh were professionally or personally unqualified for their posi-
tions. 147 Rather, the majority stated that the evidence demonstrated
the opposite was true because Shirey and Walsh were licensed social
workers.' 48 Consequently, such evidence supported the impression
that Shirey and Walsh were professionally competent. 149
The Court of Appeals maintained that Horridge's argument
failed to identify all of the elements of a negligence claim and only
stated that the DSS improperly trained or supervised its employees.
1 50
Therefore, the majority held that the lower court properly dismissed
the negligent supervision claim.'
5 1
b. Negligence as It Relates to Duty.-The court next held that
the State had a duty to protect Collin and could be liable for negli-
gence if it breached that duty.1 52 To prove negligence, the court
stated, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant had a duty to
protect the plaintiff, (2) the defendant breached this duty, (3) the
plaintiff suffered actual injury, and (4) the injury resulted from the
defendant's breach of duty. I5 ' The issue before the court rested on
the first element: whether the defendant had a duty to protect the
plaintiff. 15
4
In examining this issue, the majority assessed prior case law to
evaluate when a duty exists.155 The court quoted its opinion in Rem-
145. Id. at 182, 854 A.2d at 1238.
146. Id. at 180-82, 854 A.2d at 1237-38.
147. Id. at 181, 854 A.2d at 1238.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 182, 854 A.2d at 1238. To succeed on a negligence claim, a pleading must
contain facts to support that there was (1) a duty owed, (2) a breach of duty, and (3) an
injury resulting from the breach. Id. at 181-82, 854 A.2d at 1238.
151. Id. at 182, 854 A.2d at 1238.
152. See id. at 193, 854 A.2d at 1245.
153. Id. at 182, 854 A.2d at 1238. An action against the State for negligence must be
brought under the State Tort Claims Act. Id.
154. See id. at 174, 854 A.2d at 1234.
155. Id. at 183, 186-93, 854 A.2d at 1239, 124145.
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sburg v. Montgomery, which listed factors to consider when evaluating
whether a duty exists, specifically foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff
and the relationship between the parties.
15 6
Horridge argued that the relationship between the parties was es-
tablished by sections 5-701 through 5-714 of the Family Law Article, 1
57
which created a duty to protect children subject to abuse or neg-
lect. 158 The statute requires an immediate investigation when there is
a report of abuse to protect the health and safety of the child.' 59 Spe-
cifically, within twenty-four hours of a report, the DSS must (1) see the
child, (2) interview the child's caretaker at the location where the
abuse is reported, (3) and decide on the safety of the child. 16  The
court also noted that the Department of Human Resources adopted
these statutory requirements in COMAR 07.02.07.05.161 The majority
determined that COMAR obligated the DSS to acquire additional in-
formation about the reported abuse if the reports were incomplete 162
and assess the immediate safety of the child.1
63
The court rejected the State's defense that because the legislature
did not expressly create a specific duty to individuals, the State did not
owe them one. 164 The majority stated that the legislature had ex-
pressly created a duty to protect abused children identified to the
DSS. 165 The State's argument was based on the notion of a "public
duty doctrine," which immunizes the state from tort liability when a
statute imposes a duty to the general public.'66 However, the majority
asserted that the public duty doctrine does not apply when a statute
mandates a specific obligation to an identified class of persons. 167
The court stated that section 5-706 imposed a specific obligation be-
cause it required the DSS to protect an identifiable class of children
suspected of being abused.168 The Court of Appeals of Maryland first
distinguished the facts of Horridge from prior cases that evaluated duty
156. Id., 854 A.2d at 1239.
157. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw §§ 5-701 to -714 (LexisNexis 2004).
158. Harridge, 382 Md. at 183, 854 A.2d at 1239.
159. Id. at 185-86, 854 A.2d at 1239-41.
160. Id. at 184-85, 854 A.2d at 1240.
161. Id. at 185-86, 854 A.2d at 1240-41; MD. CODE REGS. tit. 07, § .02.07.05 (1977).
162. Horridge, 382 Md. at 186, 854 A.2d at 1241. Horridge filed eight reports with the
DSS and a neighbor filed one report. Id. at 175, 854 A.2d at 1234.
163. Id. at 186, 854 A.2d at 1241.
164. Id. at 186-87, 854 A.2d at 1241.
165. Id. at 187, 854 A.2d at 1241.
166. Id. at 186-87, 854 A.2d at 1241.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 189-90, 854 A.2d at 1243; MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-706 (LexisNexis
2004).
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as it related to government regulations, noting that the statutes did
not identify a specific class of persons to which the state owed a
duty. 169
The majority then noted the trend among courts across the coun-
try that interpreted similar statutes or regulations and came to the
same conclusion that a state entity owes a duty to an identified child
reported of abuse.' 7 ° The Court of Appeals then compared the num-
ber of reportedly abused children in Maryland in 2003 with the num-
ber of children who died of abuse or neglect in the United States in
2002.' After making this comparison, the majority stated that the
harm to a child is foreseeable when a social service agency does not
act upon a report of child abuse.' 7 2 Consequently, the court main-
tained that the legislature created these regulations to protect chil-
dren suspected of being abused or neglected from a specific kind of
harm likely to occur if the DSS ignores its statutory duty.'7 3
Finally, the court also cited legislative intent to support its finding
that there was a statutory duty to act because of the policy implications
of preventing future harm to abused children. 1 4 The court found
that state employees may be liable when they fail to act reasonably,
resulting in harm to a child previously reported as subject to abuse.' 75
c. Proximate Cause.-The court next assessed whether the
circuit court correctly held that the negligence of the DSS was not the
proximate cause of Collin's death. 76 The majority reversed the lower
court and stated that when the statutory duty is to protect an individ-
ual from harm, then the foreseeability of the harm will determine the
issue of proximate cause. 
7 7
The Court of Appeals also rejected the circuit court's finding that
the negligence of Fairris or her boyfriend was a superseding cause
because the harm that resulted from the intervening act was foresee-
169. Horridge, 382 Md. at 187-88, 854 A.2d at 1241-42.
170. Id. at 190-92, 854 A.2d at 1243-44.
171. Id. at 192, 854 A.2d at 1244-45. In 2003, the Department of Human Resources
reported that there were nearly 7300 child abuse cases in Maryland. Id., 854 A.2d at 1244.
In 2002, approximately 1400 children died of abuse or neglect in the United States. Id.,
854 A.2d at 1244-45.
172. Id. at 192-93, 854 A.2d at 1245.
173. Id., 854 A.2d at 1244-45.
174. Id. at 193, 854 A.2d at 1245.
175. Id. at 192-93, 854 A.2d at 1245.
176. Id. at 193, 854 A.2d at 1245. The circuit court stated that Fairris or her boyfriend
caused Collin's death. Id.
177. Id. at 193-94, 854 A.2d at 1245.
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able.1 78 The court noted that only if the breach of duty increases the
likelihood of a criminal event will a private defendant be liable.17 9 As
a result, the court held that the DSS and the social workers could have
proximately caused injury because their breach of duty enhanced the
likelihood that Collin was in danger and would be hurt. 80
Judge Cathell dissented' 8 ' and questioned the majority's inten-
tion of changing present law to create a duty as a means of reducing
the death of abused children.'8 2 He contended that by establishing a
duty, the majority created a broad cause of action against the state.' 83
Judge Cathell also stated that the majority changed Maryland case
law such that, for the first time, government officials may be liable for
making discretionary decisions that turn out to be incorrect.'8 4 Con-
sequently, the dissent argued that this change will have a devastating
effect on governmental and administrative entities that are guided by
statutes and regulations.'8 5 Judge Cathell noted that if the legislature
intended to create an actionable duty, they could have changed the
law.' 8 6 Judge Cathell also wrote that although the majority cited Mary-
land cases that set the negligence standard with respect to duty, they
did not follow the standard.' 8 7 The dissent refuted the majority's
treatment of the cases they used to support their holding.'8 8 As a re-
sult, the dissent stated that the ruling was incompatible with prior case
law.'8 9 Instead, the dissent contended that the majority should have
178. Id. at 194, 854 A.2d at 1245. The court noted that it would be illogical to deny a
person recovery from harm caused by someone violating a duty designed to prevent the
type of harm that occurred. Id. at 194-95, 854 A.2d at 1246.
179. Id. at 195, 854 A.2d at 1246.
180. Id.
181. Judge Cathell was joined by Judge Battaglia. Id. at 196, 854 A.2d at 1247.
182. Id. (Cathell, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 197, 854 A.2d at 1247. As a result, the dissent predicted, the State will be
forced to overreact every time a report is made for fear of being sued in the future. Id.
The dissent opined that this would require the DSS to involve themselves in the affairs of
divorced couples fighting over the custody of their children and accusing one another of
child abuse. Id. at 198, 854 A.2d at 1248.
184. Id. at 197, 854 A.2d at 1247.
185. Id. at 209-17, 854 A.2d at 1254-59. Judge Cathell stated that human beings are
bound to make mistakes in their discretionary actions and will now be held liable in tort
law. Id. at 209-10, 214, 854 A.2d at 1254-55, 1257. Judge Cathell presented several exam-
ples where civil tort liability exists where it previously had not. Id. at 210-17, 854 A.2d at
1255-59. For example, he referred to the Health-General Article, section 14-407, which
governs summer camps. Id. at 211, 854 A.2d at 1255-56. He said that as a result of the
majority's holding, when a child is injured at camp, she may claim there was a mistake in
the inspection of the facility for which the government entity is liable. Id.
186. See id. at 210-11, 854 A.2d at 1255.
187. Id. at 199, 854 A.2d at 1248.
188. Id. at 198-204, 854 A.2d at 1248-54.
189. Id. at 200, 854 A.2d at 1249.
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simply overruled prior case law as opposed to distinguishing cases that
were not properly distinguishable. 90
4. Analysis.-In Horridge v. St. Mary's County Department of Social
Services, the Court of Appeals correctly broke away from the previous
notion that state entities may not be liable for failing to act reasonably
and held that the DSS owed a duty of reasonable care to an identified
child who died as a victim of abuse or neglect. 1 ' Several justifications
explain the Court of Appeals's decision: first, a nationwide trend
emerged toward holding agencies liable in similar circumstances; 9 2
second, surrounding social and policy implications encouraged the
decision;' 93 and third, past cases addressing this issue outlined the cir-
cumstances for an exception.
194
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, however, failed to properly
explain its reasoning and define why this case differed from previous
Maryland cases addressing the same issue.19 Because the court did
not identify clear guidelines for when to hold that a state owes a duty
to a class of persons, it is not clear what standard the court will apply
in future cases.' 9 6
a. The Court of Appeals Correctly Followed the Nationwide Trend
by Rejecting the Public Duty Doctrine as a Defense.-The Court of Appeals's
decision in Horridge to hold the DSS liable is consistent with the na-
tionwide trend to broaden the scope of liability in child abuse cases 19 7
and limit the public duty doctrine.' 98 Indeed, courts are now more
willing to broaden liability in child abuse cases by finding that a spe-
cial relationship exists between the state and victims of child abuse.1 99
In accordance with the trend, the Horridge court adopted an ex-
ception to the public duty doctrine by finding that a special relation-
190. Id. at 209, 854 A.2d at 1254.
191. Id. at 193, 854 A.2d at 1245 (majority opinion); see also Andrea F. Siegel, Md. Ruled
Liable in Abuse, Neglect Cases; Court of Appeals Says State Can Be Sued over Social Workers' Mis-
takes, BALT. SuN, July 29, 2004, at lB.
192. See infra Part 4.a.
193. See infra Part 4.b.
194. See infra Part 4.c.
195. See infra Part 4.c.
196. See infra Part 4.c.
197. See Susan Smith Hudson, Note, The Broadening Scope of Liability in Child Abuse Cases,
27J. F.am. L. 697, 712 (1988).
198. Jason This, Note, Brodie v. Summit County Children Services Board: A Statutory
Duty Exception to the Public Duty Rule for Children Service Agencies, 17 Omo N.U. L. Rv. 711,
712, 716-17 (1991).
199. Hudson, supra note 197, at 712.
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ship existed.2 °° The Horridge court relied on Brodie v. Summit County
Children Services Board as an example of limiting the applicability of the
doctrine.2"' The court in Brodie asserted that the public duty doctrine
does not apply when a statutory requirement mandates a specific ac-
tion towards an identified child.20 2 The Brodie court took this excep-
tion one step further by abrogating the doctrine as a defense in child
abuse cases.20 3 If the Horridge court had similarly adopted a clearer
standard as to when the public duty doctrine applies, future courts
and litigants would benefit from guidelines to prevent confusion as to
its applicability.
Similarly, the Horridge court correctly cited to the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals, which followed the same trend and rejected
the public duty defense in Turner v. District of Columbia.2°4 The court
in Turner stated that a statute creates a special duty when a class of
plaintiffs constitutes an otherwise helpless group and the individuals
rely on the agency's duty to act.
2 0 5
In accordance with courts around the country confronting the
complex issue of how to determine when a special relationship exists
and when an individual may assert a claim of negligence against the
state,20 6 the Horridge court rejected the adoption of a rigid test to de-
termine the existence of a special relationship. 2 7 This contrasts with
Jensen v. Anderson County, where that court created a six-factor test to
determine when a special relationship exists. 20 8
Although the interpretation of child abuse statutes vary according
to each court, the Court of Appeals of Maryland acted consistently
with the trend of courts nationwide creating a cause of action when
interpreting such statutes. 20 9 Therefore, in ruling that a state entity
may be liable when the disputed issue involves abused children, Mary-
200. Horridge, 382 Md. at 189-90, 854 A.2d at 1243.
201. Id.
202. 554 N.E. 2d 1301, 1308 (Ohio 1990).
203. This, supra note 198, at 716.
204. 532 A.2d 662 (D.C. 1987).
205. Id. at 668.
206. See Susan Lynn Abbott, Liability of the State and Its Employees for the Negligent Investiga-
tion of Child Abuse Reports, 10 ALAsKA L. REv. 401, 402 (1993) (noting that due to a rising
awareness of child abuse cases involving governmental agencies, the issue of state liability
has become an increasingly litigated issue in recent years).
207. Horridge, 382 Md. at 192, 854 A.2d at 1244.
208. Jensen v. Anderson County, 403 S.E.2d 615, 617 (S.C. 1991). However, South Caro-
lina courts have rarely found a statute to create a special duty. Jon E. Ozmint & James H.
Elliot, Jr., High Hurdles... Proving Duty in Claims Against State Licensing Boards, S.C. LAw,
Dec. 8, 1996, at 41.
209. Hudson, supra note 197, at 712.
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land joined other courts around the country in taking a proactive role
to combat child abuse. °
b. Far-Reaching Policy Implications Drove the Horridge Court's
Decision to Create a Duty to Protect a Vulnerable Population.-The Horridge
court found a duty requiring the state to protect an identified class of
plaintiffs who constitute a vulnerable and helpless group of young
children.21  The court adjudicated this case during a time of increas-
ing concern around the nation regarding the high number of deaths
of abused and neglected children. 212 Each year, approximately 20,000
Maryland children are reportedly abused or neglected.2 1 3 Half of
them are seven years old or younger.214 Horridge will have significant,
long-lasting ramifications because it will improve the way the DSS op-
erates in Maryland.215
Therefore, the court in Horridge recognized that there should be
an enforceable duty when the protection of a specific class of persons
depends on the government.21 6 One reason for creating a duty is be-
cause the state agency is best situated to help this class of children and
prevent future abuse and neglect.217 The state has the ability to take
an aggressive stance and protect this otherwise helpless group because
it is the only entity with the resources to prevent continued abuse.2 1
Furthermore, a child has no other advocate and therefore requires a
higher level of protection or duty owed.2 19
210. See Horridge, 382 Md. at 190-92, 854 A.2d at 1243-44.
211. Id. at 189-90, 854 A.2d at 1243.
212. Id. at 190-93, 854 A.2d at 1243-45.
213. Brief for Pub. Justice Ctr. & Advocates for Children & Youth as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Petitioner at 1, Horridge, 382 Md. 170, 854 A.2d 1232 (No. 237) [hereinafter Pub.
Justice Ctr. Brief].
214. Id.
215. See This, supra note 198, at 719 (noting that as a result of Brodie, Ohio's "govern-
ment agencies will be more conscious of their actions, and children services boards will
better serve the children who are meant to be protected by the statute").
216. See Pub. Justice Ctr. Brief, supra note 213, at 26-27 (noting the uniqueness and
specificity of a class of children who are victims of abuse or neglect and reported to the
state).
217. See id. at 9 (noting that the State's failure to act reasonably would endanger the
safety of thousands of children). Collin's mother or boyfriend killed him when he was only
nineteen months old. Horridge, 382 Md. at 177, 854 A.2d at 1235. Collin is just one exam-
ple of an infant who was under the protection of a state's social service agency. Young
children nationwide age three and younger, are the most frequent victims of child fatalities
because they are the most vulnerable. Press Release, Nat'l Adoption Info. Clearinghouse,
Child Abuse and Neglect Fatality: Statistics and Intervention 2 (April 2004).
218. Pub.Justice Ctr. Brief, supra note 213, at 8 (noting the state's indispensable role in
addressing the problem because only the state government has the resources, institutional
capacity, and legal authority to protect large amounts of children from abuse).
219. Id. (noting that victims of abuse and neglect are often defenseless).
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A second reason for creating a duty is because if the government
fails to act reasonably in preventing abuse, the cost will eventually bur-
den society.22 ° Studies have found that child abuse and neglect vic-
tims are more prone to antisocial and physically aggressive behavior,
as well as drug abuse, teen pregnancy, juvenile delinquency, and adult
criminality.221 One study estimated that the economic cost of child
abuse and neglect in the United States is $94 billion annually. 222
A third reason the Horridge court correctly acted to enforce the
will of the legislature is because the court must hold someone ac-
countable, and a child who is already in a disadvantaged position de-
serves recourse. 223 Therefore, the Horridge court correctly utilized its
position by interpreting the statutes created by the legislature as man-
dating an intervention when an individual reports a case of child
abuse, reversing the common-law rule.22 4 The court stated that the
legislature did not intend to merely reprimand DSS workers when
their failure to act reasonably results in the death of a child.225 The
wording of the statute reveals the legislature's intent to create a spe-
cial relationship between the DSS, its workers, and abused children,
thereby requiring the DSS to immediately respond to a report of child
abuse. 22 '6 Therefore, the court in Horridge correctly determined that
the DSS owes a duty to abused children and that the DSS may be lia-
ble when social workers fail to satisfy their statutory obligation.227
c. The Evolution of State Liability.-In surveying prior case
law, the Horridge court correctly established that the facts in Horridge
differed from former cases evaluating a state's liability to an individ-
ual.228 Lamb v. Hopkins, the first case to which the Horridge court cited
as establishing state liability, 229 noted that a statutory obligation man-
dating state action did not create a general duty to the public at
220. Id. at 7.
221. Id.
222. Id. The estimated amount combined included such costs as immediate and long-
term health care for the victim, an increase in juvenile delinquency and adult criminality,
and the administrative costs of the child welfare system. Id. at 8.
223. SeeJessica K. Heldman, Comment, Court Delay and the Waiting Child, 40 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1001, 1031 (2003) (noting that social service systems have been held accountable
for failing to comply with laws to protect children in foster care).
224. See Pub. Justice Ctr. Brief, supra note 213, at 3 (noting the requirement enacted by
the Maryland legislature to report cases of child abuse to the DSS, reversing the general
common-law rule that an individual owes no duty to report a crime).
225. Horridge, 382 Md. at 193, 854 A.2d at 1245.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 187-88, 854 A.2d at 1241-42.
229. Id. at 188, 854 A.2d at 1242.
1170 [VOL. 65:1150
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
large.230  Both Lamb and Horridge evaluated whether a state entity
owed a duty of care to a specific individual when a statute mandated
certain obligations for the benefit of the plaintiff.2 1 Although the
court correctly distinguished these cases, it failed to explain fully their
differences.232 The court should have strengthened its reasoning to
clarify the law by noting that the two cases were different partly be-
cause of the agencies involved. 23  Police have a very different duty to
society than social service workers. Social service workers must protect
a specific class of individuals that are unable to help themselves. In
comparison, police have a general duty to the public.234 If the court
would have come full circle in its conclusion, it would have set a stan-
dard for the types of agencies that could be liable in the future.23 5
The Horridge court should also have noted the difference in the
statute referred to in Lamb, compared to the statute in Horridge. The
statute and regulations referred to in Horridge mandated specific and
detailed guidelines for how the state should act when an individual
suspects abuse of a child and reports it to the DSS.236 For example,
the child abuse statute in Maryland obligates the DSS to visit the iden-
tified child within twenty-four hours and act to ensure the child's
safety.2 37 In comparison, the statute in Lamb merely imposed a duty
from the supervising officer to the court, not to the general public. 238
Therefore, to guide future litigants, the Court of Appeals should have
acknowledged the distinction that the statute in Horridge mandated a
specific duty to a specific individual and was not for the general
public.2
39
230. 303 Md. 236, 252-53, 492 A.2d 1297, 1306 (1985).
231. Horridge, 382 Md. at 188, 854 A.2d at 1242.
232. Id.
233. Compare id. at 174-75, 854 A.2d at 1234 (Department of Social Services), with Lamb,
303 Md. at 240, 492 A.2d at 1299 (Parole and Probation Division).
234. Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 628, 510 A.2d 1078, 1084 (1986);
see also 63 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 492 (1999) (noting that a police officer's duty
involves the enforcement of laws, the prevention of crime, the assisting in the detection of
crime and regulating traffic).
235. See Robert Barnhart, Principled Pragmatic Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases, 80 NO-
TRE DAME L. REV. 1911, 1922 (2004-2005) (stating that courts are obligated to explain why
they are departing from precedent and why their precedent should be followed in the
future).
236. Horridge, 382 Md. at 184-86, 854 A.2d at 1240-41.
237. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-706 (LexisNexis 2004).
238. Lamb v. Hopkins, 303 Md. 236, 253, 492 A.2d 1297, 1306 (1985). The statute re-
ferred to in Lamb stated that when a person is under the supervision of the Division, the
Division must report to the court if the individual is not complying with the conditions of
the probation. Id. at 252-53, 492 A.2d at 1306.
239. Horridge, 382 Md. at 187, 854 A.2d at 1241.
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The Horridge court should also have evaluated the difference in
the type of relationship between the parties involved in Lamb and the
parties involved in Horridge. In Lamb, there was no special relationship
between the parole officer and the child injured because the two par-
ties had no interaction before the incident.24 In Horridge, a special
relationship existed between the abused child and the DSS because
the plaintiff had ongoing communication with the state entity.241 In
concluding that the cases were different, the court should have
strengthened its reasoning by clarifying the difference and further de-
fining the type of special relationship that must exist to declare when
a state entity owes a duty to a class of persons.242 By not establishing
these differences, the Horridge court failed to demonstrate why it prop-
erly departed from Lamb.243
The Horridge court correctly acknowledged the similar theme in
Ashburn as evaluating whether a state entity owed a special duty of care
to a specific individual arising from a statute mandating the state to
act.244 The Court of Appeals however, failed to show that the Ashburn
case was symbolic of how the law is evolving.245 In establishing the
principles of when an exception to the general rule of no duty applies,
the Ashburn case set the stage for the transformation of the law.246
The Ashburn case helped form the exception to the rule that there is
no general duty for a state entity to control a third party's conduct to
prevent harm to another unless a "special relationship" exists between
the state and the person injured. 247 The court in Ashburn stated that a
special relationship may exist: (1) if a statute mandates certain actions
for the protection of a specific class of persons248 and indicates an
2491
express legislative intent stating that such a duty exists, or (2) if the
state entity affirmatively acted to protect the specific victim and the
victim relied on the state's actions. 250
240. See Lamb, 303 Md. at 241, 492 A.2d at 1300 (noting that no special relationship
exists between the Division and the Lambs).
241. See Horridge, 382 Md. at 175, 854 A.2d at 1234 (noting that Horridge made eight
reports to the DSS alleging abuse of his son).
242. Id. at 187, 854 A.2d at 1241.
243. Barnhart, supra note 235, at 1922.
244. Horridge, 382 Md. at 192, 854 A.2d at 1244.
245. See Ashburn, 306 Md. at 635, 510 A.2d at 1087 (noting how to make an exception to
the standard no duty rule).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 630-31, 510 A.2d at 1085.
248. Id. at 635, 510 A.2d at 1087. The court in Ashburn stated that a statute must require
specific acts be taken for the protection of an identified class of persons, not the general
public. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 631, 510 A.2d at 1085.
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To strengthen its reasoning, the Horridge court should have high-
lighted how the decision in Ashburn allowed the court to rule that the
DSS owed a duty to an abused child. Although the facts of the
Ashburn case did not fall into the exceptions created by the special
relationship, the Horridge case fell into the exceptions because the DSS
was obligated to protect a specific class of identified children subject
to abuse, and legislative intent indicated that a duty existed.25' If the
court clarified how it reached its decision, it would have correctly pro-
vided explicit guidance for how future cases should apply the law.252
The Horridge court also erred when it cited Willow Tree Learning
Center Inc. v. Prince George's County25 3 without properly explaining why
the two cases resulted in different outcomes. 54 In Willow Tree, the
court stated that its holding was consistent with the overall reluctance
of Maryland courts to infer a duty by statute.255 However, the Horridge
court should have clarified its reasoning and distinguished the cases
to clarify the circumstances under which courts will infer a duty by
statute.256
The Horridge court should have indicated in its reasoning how
specific the class must be to constitute an identifiable class of persons.
An important difference between Horridge and Willow Tree is that in
Willow Tree, the statute at issue failed to specify an identifiable class of
persons.25 7 However, Willow Tree was a significant case because it al-
lowed the Horridge court to conclude that abused children identified
to the state constituted a specific class of persons. 258 The Willow Tree
court refined the law when it defined what does not constitute an
identifiable class. 259 For example, the court noted that the word "chil-
dren" alone in a statute is not sufficiently specific to constitute an
identifiable class because this general language could create
thousands of potential plaintiffs. 260 Although this determination al-
lowed the Horridge court to conclude that previously reported abused
251. Horridge, 382 Md. at 192-93, 854 A.2d at 1244-45.
252. See Raj Bhala, The Power of the Past: Towards De Jure Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudica-
tion (Part Three of a Trilogy), 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. Rv. 873, 949-50 (2001) (stating that
stare decisis allows future parties to behave according to prior holdings).
253. 85 Md. App. 508, 584 A.2d 157 (1991).
254. Horridge, 382 Md. at 188, 854 A.2d at 1242.
255. Willow Tree, 85 Md. App. at 516, 584 A.2d at 161.
256. See State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 811-12 (Wash. 1986) (criticizing courts that do
not explain or justify their departure from federal constitutional interpretations for failing
to guide counsel in future cases).
257. Willow Tree, 85 Md. App. at 519, 584 A.2d at 162.
258. Horridge, 382 Md. at 188-90, 854 A.2d at 1242-43.
259. 85 Md. App. at 519 & n.8, 584 A.2d at 162 & n.8.
260. Id. at 519 n.8, 584 A.2d at 162 n.8.
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children constitute an identifiable class, 26 1 the future impact of the
ruling is unclear. By not stating what comprises an identified class,
the court left unclear whether other vulnerable groups identified to
the state may constitute a protected class, such as battered women, the
elderly, and handicapped individuals.262
To strengthen its conclusion in Horridge, the Court of Appeals
also should have noted Willow Tree's significance in reinforcing the
importance of legislative intent. 263 The court in Willow Tree noted that
absent an explicit statement by the legislature creating a specific type
of duty, it is not the court's responsibility to create a cause of
264action.
In ruling that the plaintiff has a cause of action, the Horridge court
correctly rejected the public duty doctrine as a defense. 26" The Hor-
ridge court relied on Muthukumarana v. Montgomery County to explain
when the doctrine applies.2 66 But the Horridge court failed to distin-
guish clearly why the public duty doctrine applied in Muthukumarana,
yet was not applicable to Horridge.267 The court in Muthukumarana
stated that part of its motivation for applying the public duty doctrine
to 911 personnel was to prevent state employees from becoming liable
for discretionary acts on behalf of the state.26" The Horridge court,
however, failed to distinguish how this outcome would not similarly
subject the state to civil suits for discretionary acts by state
employees.269
The Horridge court's failure to explain its departure from
Muthukumarana is especially problematic because Muthukumarana was
the most recent case, prior to Horridge, that confronted the issue of
state entity liability and the public duty doctrine.270 The Horridge
court simply stated that the doctrine does not apply when a statute has.
261. Horridge, 382 Md. at 189-90, 854 A.2d at 1243.
262. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Transnational Law as a Domestic Resource: Thoughts on the
Case of Women's Rights, 38 NEW ENG. L. REv. 689, 711 (2004) (noting arguments that in
some instances, battered women constitute a protected class); Lauren R. Sturm, Fair Hous-
ing Issues in Continuing Care Retirement Communities: Can Residents Be Transferred Without Their
Consent?, 6 N.Y. CTy L. REv. 119, 121 (2003) (noting that the handicapped and elderly
often constitute a protected class).
263. Willow Tree, 85 Md. App. at 522, 584 A.2d at 164.
264. Id.
265. Horridge, 382 Md. at 187, 854 A.2d at 1241.
266. Id., 854 A.2d at 1241-42.
267. Id. at 187-88, 854 A.2d at 1241-42.
268. Muthukumarana v. Montgomery County, 370 Md. 447, 490, 805 A.2d 372, 398
(2002).
269. Horridge, 382 Md. at 198, 854 A.2d at 1248 (Cathell, J., dissenting).
270. The Court of Appeals adjudicated Muthukumarana in 2002. 370 Md. at 447, 805
A.2d at 372.
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created a special duty or specific obligation to an identified class27 1
and the legislative intent expressed a duty to children identified to the
DSS.2 7 2 Simply stating when the doctrine does not apply does not set
a clear standard for future courts and attorneys.
Instead, the Horridge court should have set clear guidelines and
exceptions for when the public duty doctrine may be a defense. One
motivation for the rejection of the doctrine may relate to the govern-
ment agency asserting its protection. In the Horridge case, the DSS was
the agency asserting the doctrine after failing to comply with a statu-
tory obligation mandating that the DSS protect abused children.273 In
Muthukumarana, by contrast, the agency asserting the doctrine was the
county police, after acting within the scope of its police duty.27 4 Po-
lice officers' duties extend across a broad range of obligations from
patrolling the streets to responding to a threat of violence.275 Police
officers' roles are to maintain order in society.276 There is an inher-
ent difference between protecting society at large and acting for the
protection of abused children because abused children often have no
other outlet to turn to and are already in a vulnerable position.277
Although the Muthukumarana court stated that the public duty doc-
trine is not limited to police officers, 271 the court in Horridge should
have plainly stated that the public duty doctrine does not apply to
social service workers once someone identifies an abused child to the
department. 279 Because the Court of Appeals created an unclear stan-
dard and did not outline when a special relationship exists, the Hor-
ridge decision may create a bottomless pit for when the court will hold
that the state owes a duty to the public.
5. Conclusion.-In Horridge v. St. Mary's County Department of So-
cial Services,28 ° the Court of Appeals of Maryland correctly held that a
state entity owes a duty of care to an identified child subject to abuse if
271. Horidge, 382 Md. at 187, 854 A.2d at 1241.
272. Id. at 193, 854 A.2d at 1245.
273. Id. at 186-87, 854 A.2d at 1241.
274. Muthukumarana, 370 Md. at 486-87, 805 A.2d at 395.
275. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
276. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
277. See Pub. Justice Ctr. Brief, supra note 213, at 19-20 (noting that when the state
receives a child abuse report, "it enters into a relationship with that child fundamentally
different from its relationship with members of the public generally").
278. Muthukumarana, 370 Md. at 488, 805 A.2d at 396.
279. See Brodie v. Summit County Children Serv. Bd., 554 N.E.2d 1301, 1308 (Ohio
1990) (holding that a statutorily imposed duty to investigate reports of child abuse created
a specific duty abrogating the public duty doctrine of immunity).
280. 382 Md. 170, 854 A.2d 1232 (2004).
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it fails to act reasonably in protecting that child. In arriving at its deci-
sion, the court correctly conformed to the nationwide trend of hold-
ing state entities to a higher duty when there is a report of child abuse
than when interacting with the general public.281 The Horridge court
also correctly recognized the unique obligation that a state owes to
society and the importance of holding a state accountable due to its
ability to prevent a child's death resulting from abuse.282 Therefore,
the Horridge court correctly extended the traditional realm of state en-
tity liability. However, the court failed to follow through in its reason-
ing and explain why the outcome of this case was different than
previous cases addressing the same issue.283 Consequently, the court
failed to make clear for future litigants when a state entity may be
liable. 284 Instead, the court should have set clear guidelines for deter-
mining when a state agency owes a duty to an individual plaintiff.285 It
is therefore not clear to what extent the Horridge decision will apply in
the future.286
MARGALIT A. WEINBLATT
See supra Part 4.a.
See supra Part 4.b.
See supra Part 4.c.
See supra Part 4.c.
See supra Part 4.c.
See supra Part 4.c.
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B. Failing to Temper the Natural Parent Presumption in Third-Party
Custody Cases Undermines the Best Interest of the Child
In McDermott v. Dougherty,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland con-
sidered the appropriate standard to determine custody in third-party
custody cases. The court joined the majority of jurisdictions and
adopted for third-party custody cases a natural parent presumption,
which can be rebutted by demonstrating either that the natural par-
ent is unfit or that extraordinary circumstances exist.2 The court
overzealously applied the natural parent presumption when it omitted
crucial exceptional circumstance findings of the lower court, and it
failed to adequately consider the exceptional circumstance factors in
light of Maryland case law.' In so doing, the court failed to evaluate
the third-party standard in its totality and therefore allowed the natu-
ral parent presumption to be determinative. 4 The court also should
have tempered the natural parent presumption with a psychological
parent exception to protect the best interest of the child by elevating a
third party that the child emotionally regards as a parent to equal sta-
tus as the natural parent.' The McDermott court allowed its unsubstan-
tiated fear of judicial social engineering to influence its decision. 6 By
failing to adequately apply the exceptional circumstance factors, fail-
ing to adopt a psychological parent exception, and allowing its fear of
social engineering to influence its decision, the court neglected the
best interest standard, which is always determinative in Maryland cus-
tody cases.
1. The Case.-McDermott arose out of a custody dispute over Pat-
rick Michael McDermott (Patrick), the child of Charles David McDer-
mott (Mr. McDermott) and Laura A. Dougherty (Ms. Dougherty).'
Patrick's parents separated soon after his birth and began custody pro-
ceedings in the Circuit Court for Harford County on September 29,
1995.8
1. 385 Md. 320, 869 A.2d 751 (2005). Third-party custody disputes arise when a per-
son other than a natural parent or the state challenges a natural parent for custody of a
child. Id. at 355, 869 A.2d at 771.
2. Id. at 374-75, 869 A.2d at 783.
3. See infra Part 4.a.
4. See infra Part 4.a.
5. See infra Part 4.b.
6. See infra Part 4.c.
7. 385 Md. at 326, 869 A.2d at 754. Patrick was born on April 30, 1995. Id.
8. I-
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From 1995 through 2005, the parties engaged in substantial liti-
gation, including various custody, divorce, and child support plead-
ings, briefs, and petitions.9 In November 2001, Ms. Dougherty was
convicted of her fourth drinking and driving offense, which resulted
in her incarceration.'" At that time, Ms. Dougherty had primary resi-
dential custody of Patrick, and she signed a power of attorney to her
parents, Hugh and Marjorie Dougherty (the Doughertys), giving them
the power to care for Patrick and make decisions on his behalf during
her incarceration.'1 On January 8, 2002, Mr. McDermott filed a mo-
tion for a temporary modification of a November 8, 2001 custody or-
der and an additional notarized letter the following day.12 Through
these documents, Mr. McDermott requested that physical custody be
given to the Doughertys and that both the Doughertys and the
McDermotts, Patrick's paternal grandparents, be given the power to
make decisions on Patrick's behalf. 3
Prior to January 10, 2002, Mr. McDermott entered into a six-
month seaman's contract.14 Mr. McDermott was at sea from the first
half of January through the middle of 2002.15 After Mr. McDermott's
departure, the formerly cooperative relationship between him and the
Doughertys deteriorated. 6
On February 12, 2002, the Doughertys and the McDermotts"7
filed a complaint against their adult children in the Circuit Court for
Harford County, seeking to share joint legal custody of Patrick. 8 The
complaint stated that Patrick had lived with the Doughertys for ap-
proximately one-third of his life and that the McDermotts were also
extremely involved with his life.' 9 On February 13, 2002, the court
ordered both sets of grandparents to share temporary joint legal cus-
tody of Patrick, with the Doughertys having residential custody.20 The
9. Id. at 326-27, 869 A.2d at 754-55.
10. Id. at 327, 869 A.2d at 755.
11. Id.
12. McDermott v. McDermott, No. 12-C-95-23852, slip op. at 7 (Harford County Cir. Ct.
Sept. 8, 2003). Under the November 8, 2001 custody order, Mr. McDermott and Ms.
Dougherty were granted joint legal custody and Ms. Dougherty received primary custody,
with Mr. McDermott receiving visitation. Id. at 7-8.
13. Id. at 8. The motion was granted on January 16, 2002. Id.
14. McDermott, 385 Md. at 327, 869 A.2d at 755.
15. Id. at 327-28, 869 A.2d at 755.
16. Id. at 328, 869 A.2d at 755.
17. The paternal grandparents are not party to this appeal. Id at 324, 869 A.2d at 753.
18. Id. at 324, 869 A.2d at 753. Furthermore, Ms. Dougherty is not a party in this case.
Id at 324 n.1, 869 A.2d at 753 n.1.
19. Complaint for Third-Party Custody at 2, Dougherty v. McDermott, No. 12-C-95-
23852 (Harford County Cir. Ct. Feb. 12, 2002).
20. McDermott, 385 Md. at 328, 869 A.2d at 756.
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court granted the parents visitation rights at the mutual approval and
convenience of the grandparents.2'
Upon Mr. McDermott's return in earlyJuly 2002, the Doughertys
voluntarily returned Patrick to him, and Patrick remained with him
throughout 2002.22 On July 25, 2002, Mr. McDermott filed a com-
plaint seeking permanent primary residential and legal custody of Pat-
rick. 2' The Doughertys moved to dismiss the complaint because they
were not confident in Mr. McDermott's ability to care for Patrick and
because they felt that a change in custody was not in the child's best
interest. 2' Furthermore, the Doughertys believed that they had pro-
vided the only stable presence in Patrick's life.25
The trial occurred on July 1 and 2, 2003, at which all parties
presented testimony regarding Mr. McDermott's and Ms. Dougherty's
fitness as parents. 26 Mr. McDermott testified that he intended to es-
tablish permanent residence in Maryland if he obtained full custody
of Patrick and that he and Patrick were currently residing with an-
other family in a harmonious living arrangement.
27
On September 8, 2003, the circuit court awarded the Doughertys
sole legal and physical custody of Patrick.28 The court determined
that Ms. Doughtery was an unfit parent.29 Although the court found
Mr. McDermott fit to parent, it noted that a psychological evaluation
concluded that Mr. McDermott has disturbances in his cognitive
thinking that promoted faulty judgment and that he is inflexible.30
The court declined to award Mr. McDermott custody, however,
because it found exceptional circumstances sufficient to rebut the nat-
ural parent presumption after considering seven factors.31 The court
first found that the Doughertys had custody of Patrick for several ex-
tended periods of time.32 Second, the court determined that Patrick
was six when the Doughertys received temporary custody and was cur-
21. Id. at 329, 869 A.2d at 756.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. Patrick's paternal grandparents, who shared legal custody with the Doughertys,
agreed with Mr. McDermott that a change in legal custody to him was proper. Id.
25. Id. at 330, 869 A.2d at 757.
26. Id., 869 A.2d at 756. In the interim, Mr. McDermott worked as a seaman to earn
money to pay for a custody attorney. Id.
27. Id., 869 A.2d at 756-57.
28. Id., 869 A.2d at 757.
29. Id.
30. McDermott v. McDermott, No. 12-C-95-23852, slip op. at 14, 22 (Harford County
Cir. Ct. Sept. 8, 2003).
31. McDermott, 385 Md. at 330-31, 869 A.2d at 757.
32. McDermott, No. 12-C-95-23852, slip op. at 17.
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rendy eight."3 Third, the court found that Patrick had a strong emo-
tional attachment to all parties, and he was doing well in school.3 4
The court also determined that the Doughertys provided Patrick with
stability and that Mr. McDermott's "propensity for using Patrick as a
pawn in the conflict between him and Ms. Dougherty" could obstruct
a relationship with Patrick's maternal side of the family."5
Turning to the fourth factor, the court found that when Mr. Mc-
Dermott relinquished custody of Patrick, it was generally due to his
employment at sea.3 6 Fifth, the court observed that Patrick was very
close to his grandparents. 37 As for the sixth factor, the court deter-
mined that Mr. McDermott believed he had a genuine interest in rais-
ing Patrick."s But the court also found that Mr. McDermott's interest
in custody was motivated in part by his desire to control Patrick's
mother, and the court found that Mr. McDermott has made decisions
that prioritize his needs over his son's.3 9
Finally, the court also found that Patrick lacked a stable father
because of Mr. McDermott's lengthy work-related absences.4 ° All this
was evident through Patrick's misbehavior at school during these peri-
ods and the fact that Mr. McDermott did not have his own residence
or a job and exhibited inflexible and narcissistic tendencies.4' Mr.
McDermott also once left Patrick with Ms. Dougherty at a halfway
house and further testified that he would place Patrick with his par-
ents in Alabama should he return to sea for a long period of time.42
The Doughertys, by contrast, lived in the same home throughout the
many proceedings and willingly provided Patrick with care when his
parents could not.
43
On September 16, 2003, Mr. McDermott filed a motion to alter
or amend judgment, in which he contended that the circuit court
ruled contrary to state and federal case law.44 The circuit court de-
33. Id. at 17.
34. Id. at 18.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 18-19.
39. Id. (relying on the testimony of Ms. Carlevaro, a social worker involved in the case).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id at 19, 22-23.
44. McDermott, 385 Md. at 331, 869 A.2d at 757.
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nied Mr. McDermott's motion." He also filed a Notice of Appeal to
the Court of Special Appeals. 6
On April 5, 2004, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the lower
court's decision. 7 On May 21, 2004, the Court of Special Appeals
denied Mr. McDermott's motion for reconsideration. 4s On August
25, 2004, the Maryland Court of Appeals granted Mr. McDermott's
request for certiorari to decide whether Mr. McDermott's employ-
ment was an exceptional circumstance under Maryland law. 40
2. Legal Background.-In Maryland custody disputes, "the best
interest of the child standard is always determinative. 50 In third-party
custody disputes, the best interest of the child is presumed to be in
custody with the natural parent; therefore, Maryland courts apply a
natural parent presumption that may be overcome by a showing of
parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances. 5' Maryland consid-
ers seven exceptional circumstance factors to protect the best interest
of the child, but not all seven need be present.52 However, a concern
for judicial social engineering has influenced a recent Court of Ap-
peals custody case, thus indicating a higher level of protection for nat-
ural parents.5" Nationally, courts employ one of three standards in
third-party custody cases.5 4 First, some jurisdictions apply a pure best
interest standard. 5 Second, some jurisdictions employ a hybrid of the
natural parent presumption and the best interest standard.56 Third, a
majority of courts apply a natural parent presumption that the best
interest of the child is satisfied by custody in the natural parent.
57
45. ld
46. Id.
47. Id The Court of Special Appeals determined that the lower court had not abused
its discretion in finding that Mr. McDermott's employment constituted exceptional cir-
cumstances that overcame the natural parent presumption. McDermott v. Dougherty, No.
1103, slip op. at 4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 5, 2004).
48. McDermott, 385 Md. at 331, 869 A.2d at 757.
49. Id. at 324-25, 869 A.2d at 753-54. The court also granted certiorari to decide
whether Mr. McDermott's employment was enough of a concern to satisfy the "only to
prevent harm or potential harm" standard required by the United States Supreme Court in
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), and whether the order violated the holding of Schae-
fer v. Cusack, 124 Md. App. 288, 722 A.2d 73 (1998), which requires custody determinations
to be based upon present circumstances and not future or past behavior. Id.
50. Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 178, 372 A.2d 582, 587 (1977).
51. See infra Part 2.a(1).
52. See infra Part 2.a(2).
53. See infra Part 2.a(3).
54. Watkins v. Nelson, 748 A.2d 558, 587-89 (N.J. 2000) (Stein, J., dissenting).
55. See infra Part 2.b(1).
56. See infra Part 2.b(2).
57. See infra Part 2.b(3).
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a. Maryland Third-Party Custody Jurisprudence.-
(1) Ross v. Hoffman.-The best interest standard is
strongly entrenched in Maryland and is critical to custody considera-
tions." The standard is determinative in all Maryland custody cases.59
In Hoffman, the Court of Appeals of Maryland espoused the stan-
dard for third-party cases. 60 In such cases, the court applies a pre-
sumption in favor of the natural parent, which can be rebutted by a
finding of either parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances, be-
cause the best interest of the child is presumed to be served by custody
in the natural parent.6" A rebuttal of the natural parent presumption
triggers a best interest analysis.62 The court articulated that in all cus-
tody disputes, the best interest standard is determinative, but in third-
party disputes, the court presumes that the child's best interest is in
custody with the parent, and thus the natural parent enjoys a pre-
sumption of custody.63 Therefore, in third-party custody disputes,
only when an equity court determines that the parent is unfit or that
exceptional circumstances exist does it inquire into the best interest
of the child.64
The Hoffman court outlined seven factors indicative of excep-
tional circumstances:
[T] he length of time the child has been away from the bio-
logical parent, the age of the child when care was assumed by
58. Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 116, 43 A.2d 186, 191 (1945).
59. E.g., Boswell v. Boswell, 352 Md. 204, 219-20, 721 A.2d 662, 669 (1998); Petrini v.
Petrini, 336 Md. 453, 469, 648 A.2d 1016, 1023 (1994); McCready v. McCready, 323 Md.
476, 481, 593 A.2d 1128, 1130 (1991); Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 303, 508 A.2d 964, 970
(1986); Nagle v. Hooks, 296 Md. 123, 128, 460 A.2d 49, 51 (1983).
60. 280 Md. 172, 178-79, 372 A.2d 582, 587 (1977).
61. Id. In third-party cases, the best interest factors are explicitly considered only when
the natural parent presumption is rebutted by either a finding of parental unfitness or of
exceptional circumstances. Id. at 179, 372 A.2d at 587. In contrast, when a custody dispute
is between two biological parents, the court begins its analysis by considering the following
factors in determining the best interest of the child: (1) the fitness of the parents; (2) the
character and reputation of the parties; (3) the desire of the natural parents and any agree-
ments between them; (4) the potential for maintaining natural family relations; (5) the
preference of the child, when the child is of sufficient age and capacity to form a rational
judgment; (6) material opportunities affecting the future life of the child; (7) the age,
health, and sex of the child; (8) the residences of the parents and opportunities for visita-
tion; (9) the length of the separation of the parties; and (10) whether there was a prior
voluntary abandonment or surrender of custody of the child. JOHN F. FADER, II & RICHARD
J. GILBERT, MARYLAND FAMILY LAw § 6-3 (3d ed. 2000) (1990). If adultery of one of the
parties is proven, trial courts are also instructed to consider whether it has a detrimental
effect on the child. Id. § 6-3(b)(1).
62. Hoffman, 280 Md. at 178-79, 372 A.2d at 587.
63. Id.
64. Id,
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the third party, the possible emotional effect on the child of
a change of custody, the period of time which elapsed before
the parent sought to reclaim the child, the nature and the
strength of the ties between the child and the third party
custodian, the intensity and genuineness of the parent's de-
sire to have custody of the child, the stability and certainty as
to the child's future in the custody of the parent.65
Hoffman involved a third-party dispute between a natural mother,
Mrs. Ross, and the Hoffmans, who were not consanguineously related
to the ten-year-old child, Melinda.66 Mrs. Hoffman served as full-time
caregiver for over eight-and-a-half years, with Mrs. Ross visiting Me-
linda and paying minimal child support.67 The court awarded the
Hoffmans custody because exceptional circumstances overcame the
natural parent presumption." The court found that nearly all of the
exceptional circumstances were present because Melinda was sepa-
rated from her natural mother for several years, starting in infancy,
and Melinda had a strong attachment to the Hoffmans. 69 Further-
more, Melinda had a strong emotional reaction to a possible change
in custody, Mrs. Ross waited for over eight years to reclaim Melinda,
and Mrs. Ross's motives for wanting custody were unclear.7 °
(2) Post-Hoffman Cases.-Several cases following Hoffman
have reinforced the notion that the best interest of the child is the
overarching concern in all custody disputes. 71 Courts grant custody to
third parties upon a showing of exceptional circumstances, particu-
larly where the child has established a significant relationship with a
third party.
One such third-party case, Pastore v. Sharp, involved a dispute be-
tween the natural mother, Margaret Pastore (Ms. Pastore) and the pa-
ternal aunt and uncle, Nancy and William Sharp (the Sharps), over
Ms. Pastore's five-year-old son, Nicholas. 72 Because both of Nicholas's
parents were addicted to drugs, the Sharps cared for him for two of
his first five years. 73 The court awarded custody to the Sharps because
exceptional circumstances existed.74 Specifically, the court found that
65. Id at 191, 372 A.2d at 593.
66. Id. at 179, 372 A.2d at 587.
67. Id at 181-82, 372 A.2d at 588-89.
68. Id. at 192, 372 A.2d at 594.
69. Id
70. Id.
71. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
72. 81 Md. App. 314, 316, 567 A.2d 509, 510 (1989).
73. Id. at 316, 322, 567 A.2d at 510, 513.
74. Id. at 322, 567 A.2d at 513.
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the Sharps had custody for more than two years, during which Ms.
Pastore had essentially relinquished custody.7 5 The court also deter-
mined that Nicholas was well-cared for by the Sharps, but lacked sta-
bility when in his mother's care.76 Further, the court noted that Ms.
Pastore's apartment was not large enough for her son and that Ms.
Pastore had very indefinite future plans.77
In Newkirk v. Newkirk,78 the court affirmed the chancellor's find-
ing of exceptional circumstances and upheld an award of custody to a
third party. Upon the death of the mother, the legal custodian, the
natural father, Richard, and an adult half-brother, Derek, both re-
quested custody of the two children. 79 In her will, the mother re-
quested that Derek receive custody.8° The court awarded Derek
custody because it found that the children's relationship with their
father was distant, whereas their relationship with Derek was strong.81
The court further determined that the teenaged children did not
want to live with their father and that they were emotionally well-ad-
justed with Derek.82
Likewise, in Shurupoff v. Vockroth,8" the court upheld an award of
custody to the grandparents, the Vockroths, instead of the biological
father, Mr. Shurupoff. The court based its decision on an examina-
tion of the seven exceptional circumstance factors.84 The child,
Kimberly, had only lived with her father for nine months and had
minimal contact with him since then.85 Although Kimberly was ten
when the Vockroths assumed full-time care of her, they had been very
involved in her life since her birth.86 Kimberly was very emotionally
attached to her grandparents, and a change of custody to her father
would have had a detrimental effect because her father's family
viewed her with suspicion, whereas the Vockroths viewed Kimberly
very positively.8 7 Lastly, Mr. Shurupoff had not been a parent to
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. 73 Md. App. 588, 535 A.2d 947 (1988).
79. Id. at 590, 535 A.2d at 948.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 594-96, 535 A.2d at 950-51.
82. Id at 594-95, 535 A.2d at 950.
83. 372 Md. 639, 814 A.2d 543 (2003).
84. Id at 646-48, 814 A.2d at 547-49.
85. Id. at 646, 814 A.2d at 548.
86. Id. at 647, 814 A.2d at 548.
87. Id. at 647-48, 814 A.2d at 548.
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Kimberly, which led the court to doubt the stability of her family life
should Mr. Shurupoff receive custody.
88
The court in Shurupoff clarified the Hoffman standard by observ-
ing that Hoffman should not have required that a court inquire into
the best interest of the child only if there is first a determination that
the parent is unfit or that exceptional circumstances exist.89 The
court determined that judges in all custody cases must examine the
child's best interest because that is the critical inquiry. ° The Shuru-
poff court, however, continued to recognize a presumption in favor of
the natural parent in third-party cases, which may be overcome by
demonstrating that the parent is unfit or that exceptional circum-
stances exist.91
In sum, the best interest of the child is always determinative in
Maryland. In third-party cases, the best interest of the child is pre-
sumed to be in custody with the natural parent. However, the natural
parent presumption is rebuttable by a showing of parental unfitness
or exceptional circumstances. Further, Maryland courts have awarded
custody to third parties pursuant to a finding of exceptional circum-
stances, particularly when the third party has had custody, and the
child has developed a significant attachment to the third party.
(3) The Court's Fear of Social Engineering.-A recent case
demonstrates the Court of Appeals's concern about the opportunity
for courts to engage in social engineering. In In re Adoption/Guardian-
ship Nos. J9610436 &J9711031,9 2 the court granted custody to the nat-
ural father, Mr. F., in a termination of parental rights (TPR)
proceeding. The majority found that, although Mr. F. had cognitive
limitations, he could care for his children with properly tailored state
88. Id at 648, 814 A.2d at 548-49.
89. Id. at 661-62, 814 A.2d at 557.
90. Id. at 661, 814 A.2d at 557.
91. Id. at 661-62, 814 A.2d at 557.
92. 368 Md. 666, 796 A.2d 778 (2002). Although this was a termination of parental
rights (TPR) proceeding and not a third-party custody case, the decision remains relevant
because the McDermott majority based its decision partly on a fear of judicial social engi-
neering. McDermott, 385 Md. at 435, 869 A.2d at 818-19. In TPR proceedings, the state
initiates an adversarial proceeding that, if successful, permanently severs the parent-child
relationship. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 103 (1996). In contrast, private custody pro-
ceedings determine who will make legal decisions and provide day-to-day care for the
child. Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 296-97, 508 A.2d 964, 967 (1986). In almost all cases,
an award of custody to one parent does not permanently sever the other parent's relation-
ship with the child because the noncustodial parent receives visitation. Boswell v. Boswell,
352 Md. 204, 220, 721 A.2d 662, 669 (1998).
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reunification services.9 3 Furthermore, the majority asserted concerns
that parental rights may only be terminated when the parent, regard-
less of financial means or education, cannot care for the child in the
future, even with proper assistance.94 Next, the court cautioned that
the best interest analysis should not be a search for a better situation
and that except in extreme cases, a parent's financial circumstances
should be irrelevant.
9 5
The dissent maintained that the majority overlooked specific facts
in favor of furthering specific societal, moral, and legal values. 96 For
example, the Department of Social Services (DSS) noted that, despite
Mr. F.'s desire to care for his children, he would never have the ability
to do so, regardless of DSS assistance. 97 The dissent observed that the
majority improperly concluded that Mr. F. was capable of supporting
his two children because his job paid $6.50 an hour, he was renting a
two-bedroom townhouse without a phone, and his only means of
transportation was a bicycle.98 The dissent argued that the majority
disregarded the trial court's findings, cherry-picked certain facts, and
discovered new facts when it was convenient, which therefore led to
an improper award of custody to the father.9 In conclusion, in In re
Adoption/Guardianship Nos. J9610436 & J9711031, the Court of Ap-
peals demonstrated its concern for judicial social engineering when
the dispute is between a natural parent and a non-parent.
b. National Third-Party Custody Standards.-
(1) Minority View: Pure Best Interest Standard.--A handful of
states focus solely on the best interest of the child in third-party cases,
and these states permit this consideration alone to overcome the natu-
ral parent presumption.'0 0 For example, in Colorado, Delaware,
Michigan, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania, courts will permit the
natural parent presumption to be rebutted if custody in the third
party is in the child's best interest, regardless of whether the parent is
unfit.10 1
93. In re Adoption/Guardianship Nos. J9610436 &J9711031, 368 Md. at 700, 796 A.2d at
798.
94. Id. at 699-700, 796 A.2d at 797.
95. Id. at 700, 796 A.2d at 797-98.
96. Id at 735, 796 A.2d at 818 (Harrell, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 710, 796 A.2d at 804. Even Mr. F.'s aunt, testifying on his behalf, said she
would like to adopt the children because Mr. F. is unstable. Id at 734, 796 A.2d at 817.
98. Id. at 738 n.40, 796 A.2d at 820 n.40.
99. Id. at 736-39, 796 A.2d at 819-20.
100. Watkins v. Nelson, 748 A.2d 558, 588-89 (N.J. 2000) (Stein, J., dissenting).
101. Id.
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(2) The Hybrid View: The Natural Parent Presumption in Con-
junction with the Best Interest Standard.-A small number ofjurisdictions
recognize the natural parent presumption, but make the best interest
of the child controlling in third-party cases. 10 2 For example, in Wash-
ington, courts award third parties custody upon a showing of detri-
ment to the child, although parental unfitness is not required.' °3 In
In re the Marriage of Allen, a stepmother was granted custody of a deaf
child, rather than the natural father, because she knew sign language
and the child's educational progress was a result of her efforts.10 4 The
court found that to grant a third party custody, there must be a show-
ing of detriment to the child less than parental unfitness, but more
than simply the best interest of the child.10 5
(3) The Majority Standard: A Rebuttable Natural Parent Pre-
sumption.-When determining third-party cases, the majority of juris-
dictions employ a rebuttable natural parent presumption of
custody.10 6 The reason is two-fold: first, parents have a well-estab-
lished fundamental liberty interest in parenting their children that
third parties lack;"0 7 and second, there is a presumption that fit par-
ents act in the best interest of their child."0 8 Jurisdictions find that
this presumption may be rebutted by proof that the parent is unfit.10 9
In addition, most jurisdictions find that the presumption may be
rebutted by demonstrating exceptional circumstances. 110 What con-
stitutes an exceptional circumstance varies widely between jurisdic-
tions and appears to be fact-dependent.1 Some jurisdictions take
such a narrow view of exceptional circumstances that the approach is
comparable to a TPR standard; they will only award custody to a third
party if there is a showing of harm to the child.112 In other jurisdic-
tions, surrender, abandonment, neglect, and other factors establish
an exceptional circumstance." 13
Some jurisdictions in the majority find that the natural parent
presumption may be overcome if the third party is considered a "psy-
102. Id. at 567 (majority opinion).
103. In re the Marriage of Allen, 626 P.2d 16, 22 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981).
104. Id at 23.
105. Id. Such determinations are made on a case-by-case basis. Id.
106. Watkins, 748 A.2d at 565.
107. Id. at 563-64.
108. Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 178-79, 372 A.2d 582, 587 (1977).
109. Watkins, 748 A.2d at 565.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 589 (Stein, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 574-75.
113. Id. at 587.
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chological parent," which triggers a best interest standard.'14 An
adult becomes a psychological parent of a child by daily interaction,
shared experiences, and companionship. 15 The role can be satisfied
by any adult, regardless of biological or legal status.116 The psycholog-
ical parent theory involves two main principles: normal child develop-
ment requires a relationship with a loving adult and disruptions of
this relationship may cause immediate and lasting harm to the
child." 7 Thus, the psychological parent theory emphasizes the impor-
tance of continuity of relationships, surroundings, and environment
in a child's life, and supports the preservation of the child's bond with
whatever adult is the psychological parent.'1 8 The psychological par-
ent theory as applied to third-party custody recognizes that successful
child development depends on the continuation of the psychological
relationship between the parent and the child."19
Jurisdictions that have an explicit psychological parent exception
often do so because the natural parent presumption results in custody
in the natural parent, who has often served either no or a small paren-
tal role, as opposed to the parental substitute.' 20 Upon a finding that
a third party functions as a psychological parent, courts elevate the
third party to natural parent standing because the third party has
taken such a role. 12 ' The courts then apply a best interest standard to
the custody dispute.
22
114. See, e.g., In re the Marriage of Huber, 723 N.E.2d 973, 975 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)
(permitting three extraordinary circumstances to overcome the natural parent presump-
tion: if the parent is unfit, if the child has lived with the third party for a lengthy duration,
or if the natural parent voluntarily relinquished custody to a third party allowing the affec-
tions of the child and the third party to become so interwoven that a separation would
have detrimental effects on the child); Watkins, 748 A.2d at 565 (noting that psychological
parenthood is not specifically limited to cases in which the natural parent was found unfit);
Hamers v. Guttormson, 610 N.W.2d 758, 759-60 (N.D. 2000) (allowing psychological
parenthood to rebut the natural parent presumption, but noting that such an exception
has only been employed when the child had been in physical custody of the third party for
a lengthy amount of time); In re the Adoption of J.J.B., 894 P.2d 994, 1009 (N.M. 1995)
(allowing a psychological parent to overcome the natural parent presumption, even in the
absence of neglect or abandonment, when the psychological harm of removal on the child
is extremely severe).
115. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 19 (1973).
116. Id.
117. See id. at 18-19.
118. Id. at 31-32.
119. Vanessa L. Warzynski, Comment, Termination of Parental Rights: The "Psychological
Parent" Standard, 39 VILL. L. REv. 737, 767 (1994).
120. Katharine T. Bartlett, U.S. Custody Law and Trends in the Context of the ALI Principles of
the Law of Family Dissolution, 10 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 5, 41 (2002).
121. Watkins v. Nelson, 748 A.2d 558, 568-69 (N.J. 2000).
122. Id.
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In conclusion, jurisdictions employ one of three standards in
third-party cases. First, some courts apply only a best interest stan-
dard. Second, some jurisdictions employ a hybrid of the best interest
standard and the natural parent presumption. Third, a majority of
jurisdictions apply a natural parent presumption, which can be over-
come by a demonstration of parental unfitness or exceptional circum-
stances. Some courts in the majority of jurisdictions also allow the
natural parent presumption to be overcome if the third party func-
tions as a psychological parent, which elevates the third party to the
same legal standing as the natural parent and triggers a best interest
analysis.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In McDermott, the Court of Appeals
granted custody of Patrick to the natural father, Mr. McDermott, and
held that the proper standard in third-party custody cases is a natural
parent presumption that may be rebutted by a demonstration of pa-
rental unfitness or extraordinary circumstances. t 23 Writing for the
majority, Judge Cathell124 aligned Maryland with the majority of states
by clarifying that, in third-party cases, the court does not reach the
best interest standard unless the parent is first found unfit or ex-
traordinary circumstances are present. 125 Under this rule, the court
held that because Mr. McDermott was not unfit, and his employment
in the merchant marines did not present an extraordinary circum-
stance, custody in Mr. McDermott was proper. 126
The court observed that parents have a fundamental constitu-
tional right to raise their children. 127 Judge Cathell then turned to
Maryland jurisprudence, which also grants a fundamental constitu-
tional right to parent, and noted that Maryland courts consider the
parent-child relationship important.1 28 The court also observed that
the parties in third-party disputes do not assert equal rights because
123. 385 Md. 320, 869 A.2d 751.
124. Chief Judge Bell and Judges Harrell, Raker, Battaglia, and Green joined this opin-
ion. Id. at 436, 869 A.2d at 819.
125. Id. at 374-75, 869 A.2d at 783.
126. Id. at 435, 869 A.2d at 818-19.
127. Id. at 331-53, 869 A.2d at 757-70. The court found Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57
(2000), persuasive because the Supreme Court held that a Washington statute permitting
grandparents to petition for visitation was unconstitutional insofar as it interfered with a
parent's fundamental constitutional right to parent. Id, at 349-51, 869 A.2d at 767-69.
128. Id. at 352, 869 A.2d at 770.
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the parent invokes a fundamental constitutional right, whereas the
private third party has no such right to raise the children of others. 1 29
Next, the court grouped the standards employed by other state
courts in third-party cases into three categories: the minority view, the
hybrid view, and the majority view.' 30 The court noted that until Mc-
Dermott, Maryland was likely in the hybrid category.1 3 The courts ad-
hering to the minority view apply the best interest standard as the only
consideration in third-party cases.' 32 The McDermott court noted that
jurisdictions in the hybrid category follow contradictory standards or
have differing intermediate appellate decisions.3 3 The court ex-
pressed its concern that a recent Court of Appeals case, Shurupoff v.
Vockroth, placed Maryland in the hybrid category."3 Shurupoffmodi-
fled Ross v. Hoffman by emphasizing that the court must always inquire
into the child's best interest because that is the definitive factor.'
The court then overruled the language in Shurupoff that modified
Hoffman.'3 6 In doing so, the court found that Maryland was closer to,
but not within, the majority view. 13 7
To obviate any remaining confusion, the court held that in pri-
vate actions in which third parties are disputing custody with natural
parents, a court must first find that the parent is unfit or that ex-
traordinary circumstances exist before applying the best interest stan-
dard.'38 The court thus definitively established Maryland's position as
consistent with the majority view. 13 9 The court then discussed the ju-
risdictions falling within this category.' 4 °
The court ruled that the circuit court inappropriately found that
the absences necessitated by Mr. McDermott's job as a merchant
marine constituted an exceptional circumstance.' The court noted
that the circuit court did not find Mr. McDermott unfit and that it
129. Id. at 353, 869 A.2d at 770. The court stated that this principle does not alter the
application of the best interest standard in custody or visitation disputes between fit par-
ents. Id. at 354, 869 A.2d at 770.
130. Id. at 356-57, 869 A.2d at 772.
131. Id at 361, 869 A.2d at 775. The court noted that there is some ambiguity within
the courts in this category, such as Vermont. Id.
132. Id. at 357-58, 869 A.2d at 773.
133. Id. at 361, 869 A.2d at 775.
134. Id. at 374, 869 A.2d at 782 (citing Shurupoff v. Vockroth, 372 Md. 639, 662, 814
A.2d 543, 557 (2003)).
135. Id. (discussing Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 372 A.2d 582 (1977)).
136. Id. at 374-75, 869 A.2d at 783.
137. Id. at 375, 869 A.2d at 783.
138. Id. at 374-75, 869 A.2d at 783.
139. Id at 375, 869 A.2d at 783.
140. Id. at 375-417, 869 A.2d at 783-808.
141. Id. at 422, 869 A.2d at 811.
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failed to defer to his fundamental constitutional right to parent. 142
The court analyzed the seven exceptional circumstance factors and
concluded, unlike the lower court, that they did not overcome the
natural parent presumption.
1 4 3
To so hold, the court observed that Mr. McDermott, like many
other parents, is involved in a line of work that requires extended ab-
sences from his home and family.' 44 The court noted that it did not
want to jeopardize a parent's right to custody because the parent's job
requires lengthy absences.' 45
In his concurring opinion, Judge Wilner agreed with the majority
that the trial court erred in granting custody to the Doughertys. 14
6
However, Judge Wilner did not concur with the court's sudden and
unnecessary rejection of the Hoffman standards that he believed had
been consistently applied. 147 Judge Wilner argued that the majority's
holding sows uncertainty in an area that requires clear and accessible
guidelines because at least seven cases following Hoffman have restated
and confirmed those principles.
1 48
Judge Wilner also suggested that underlying the majority's hold-
ing is a concern that the best interest standard in third-party cases
could result in judges engaging in social engineering by placing chil-
dren with whichever party is more advantaged.' 49 But Judge Wilner
further found that the best interest standard does not allow this ap-
proach and that the trial court did not intend to engage in social engi-
neering by placing Patrick with the Doughertys.' 50
4. Analysis.-In McDermott, the Court of Appeals rearticulated its
third-party custody standard by adopting a natural parent presump-
tion that can be overcome by exceptional circumstances or a showing
that the natural parent is unfit.15' The court overzealously applied
the natural parent presumption, which directly contradicts the ulti-
142. Id. at 422, 431-32, 869 A.2d at 811, 816.
143. Id at 420-22, 869 A.2d at 809-11.
144. Id. at 425-26, 869 A.2d at 813. The court listed maritime work, military deploy-
ments, ground transportation of goods, natural gas and oil production, offshore commer-
cial fishing, United Nations jobs, and steel workers as examples of the countless vocations
that require extended absences from home. Id. at 426, 426 n.45, 869 A.2d at 813, 813 n.45.
145. Id at 426, 869 A.2d at 813.
146. Id at 436-37, 869 A.2d at 819 (Wilner, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 437, 869 A.2d at 819.
148. Id., 869 A.2d at 820. Judge Wilner also found that the majority chose an unnecessa-
rily convoluted path in its decision. Id, at 439, 869 A.2d at 821.
149. Id. at 439, 869 A.2d at 821.
150. Id.
151. 385 Md. 320, 869 A.2d 751.
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mate consideration in all custody cases-the best interest of the
child.' 52 The court failed to accurately analyze its exceptional circum-
stances factors by omitting some of the lower court's findings and by
giving short shrift to some factors which, in other cases, were sufficient
to overcome the natural parent presumption. 153  The court also
should have adopted an explicit psychological parent exception,
which tempers the natural parent presumption and provides for the
child's best interests.154 Underlying the court's 112-page slip opinion
is an unfounded fear of judicial social engineering that Maryland's
case law neither permits nor has produced in the almost thirty years
since Hoffman.155 Although the court believed it had aligned Mary-
land with the majority ofjurisdictions,'56 the court applied the natural
parent presumption without proper consideration of the third-party
custody standard in its totality and, in doing so, undermined the ulti-
mate goal in all custody proceedings-the best interest of the child. 1
57
a. The Court Failed to Adequately Consider Exceptional Circum-
stances and Allowed the Natural Parent Presumption to Be Determinative.-
The McDermott court ignored the third-party custody standard it
adopted by failing to fully consider whether exceptional circum-
stances were present because it did not discuss all of the trial court's
findings and it allowed the natural parent presumption, rather than
the best interest of the child, to be determinative. In third-party cases,
the natural parent presumption may be overcome by a demonstration
that the parent is unfit or that exceptional circumstances exist.' In
its exceptional circumstance analysis, however, the court failed to
mention many factors that the circuit court found exceptional,15 9 giv-
ing the impression that Mr. McDermott's employment as a seaman
was the only possible exceptional circumstance. 6 ' Furthermore, the
McDermott court ignored its own jurisprudence, which has found facts
similar to those in McDermott to constitute exceptional circumstances.
152. Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 178-79, 372 A.2d 582, 587 (1977).
153. See infta Part 4.a.
154. See infra Part 4.b.
155. See infra Part 4.c. In his concurrence, Judge Wilner noted that the Hoffman stan-
dards do not permitjudicial social engineering. McDermott, 385 Md. at 439, 869 A.2d at 821
(Wilner, J., concurring).
156. McDermott, 385 Md. at 374-75, 869 A.2d at 783 (majority opinion).
157. See infra Part 4.a.
158. McDermott, 385 Md. at 374-75, 869 A.2d at 783.
159. See McDermott v. McDermott, No. 12-C-95-23852, slip op. at 17-19, 22-23 (Harford
County Cir. Ct. Sept. 8, 2003).
160. McDermott, 385 Md. at 425-28, 869 A.2d at 813-15.
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The court in McDermott failed to mention several facts that were
unfavorable to Mr. McDermott.1 6 ' The trial court's opinion analyzed
each factor individually and concluded that exceptional circum-
stances were present based not only upon Mr. McDermott's employ-
ment, but upon several additional considerations.16 ' Specifically,
Patrick had lived with the Doughertys for one-third of his life, and the
court found that they were the only source of stability in Patrick's
life.'6 3 The lower court also found that Mr. McDermott's work-related
absences had an adverse effect on Patrick, demonstrated by Patrick's
in-school misconduct during his father's absences. 164 At one point,
Mr. McDermott also left Patrick with Ms. Dougherty in a halfway
house.1 65 During trial, Mr. McDermott admitted that if he were to
return to sea, he prefers to leave Patrick with his parents in Ala-
bama.16 6 Further, the circuit court found that Mr. McDermott had no
job, had no home, lived with another family rent-free, had abandoned
Patrick on several occasions by choice to work, was highly inflexible
and narcissistic, and was motivated to obtain custody by his desire to
control Ms. Dougherty.1 6 7
Although the McDermott court discussed all seven exceptional cir-
cumstance factors, it omitted several key findings that the lower court
deemed relevant. 6 8 For its analysis of the first five exceptional cir-
cumstance factors, the McDermott court quoted almost verbatim from
the lower court's opinion. 6 9 For the sixth and seventh factors, how-
ever, the court omitted several key findings. The McDermott court
failed to discuss the trial court's finding that Mr. McDermott habitu-
ally prioritized his own needs over Patrick's. 170 The court also did not
discuss that Mr. McDermott is unemployed without his own residence
and that a psychological evaluation found him to be inflexible and
narcissistic. 171 The court further failed to consider that Mr. McDer-
mott left Patrick in a halfway house with Ms. Dougherty; that if Mr.
McDermott ships out again, he would leave Patrick in Alabama; and
161. See McDermott, No. 12-C-95-23852, at 17-19, 22-23.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 17, 23.
164. Id. at 19.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 22.
167. Id. at 19, 22.
168. See id. 17-19, 22-23.
169. McDermott, 361 Md. at 420-21, 869 A.2d at 809-810; McDermott, No. 12-C-95-23852, at
17-18.
170. See McDermott, No. 12-C-95-23852, slip op. at 18-19.
171. See id. at 22.
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that the Doughertys provide Patrick with constant stability. 172 Because
it omitted crucial circuit court findings, the Court of Appeals failed to
adequately consider whether exceptional circumstances were present
in McDermott.
The McDermott court also ignored Maryland case law, in which
facts similar to those in McDermott were found to constitute excep-
tional circumstances. Maryland courts have found exceptional cir-
cumstances sufficient to rebut the natural parent presumption in
several third-party cases.
For example, in Ross v. Hoffman,'7" the court found that excep-
tional circumstances warranted custody in a third party. The Hoffman
court found that the child, Melinda, who was separated from her natu-
ral mother for several years starting in infancy, had a strong attach-
ment to the third party, and had a strong emotional reaction to a
possible change in custody.17 4 Additionally, the mother waited for
over eight years to reclaim Melinda, and her motives for wanting cus-
tody were unclear.175 Hoffman shares similarities to McDermott that the
court should have fully considered in its analysis, such as Patrick's
length of separation from his father, his attachment to his grandpar-
ents, the effect a change of custody would have on him, and the trial
court's finding that Mr. McDermott sought custody partly to control
Ms. Dougherty.' 76
The McDermott court also failed to fully consider whether excep-
tional circumstances existed because it did not fully discuss Mr. Mc-
Dermott's living circumstances and his future plans. 177 In Pastore v.
Sharp, the court granted custody of a child to a third party because the
Sharps had custody for two of the child's five years, the mother had
essentially relinquished custody for two years, the child was well-cared
for by the Sharps, the child lacked stability with his mother, his
mother's apartment was not large enough for her son, and she had
very indefinite future plans. 178 The court should have followed Pastore
and discussed the trial court's finding that Mr. McDermott's living sit-
uation was less than ideal for a child, as well as the findings regarding
the specifics surrounding Patrick's care.179
172. See id. at 19, 22-23.
173. 280 Md. 172, 372 A.2d 582 (1977).
174. Id. at 192, 372 A.2d at 594.
175. Id.
176. See McDermott, No. 12-C-95-23852, at 17-19.
177. See id at 22-23.
178. 81 Md. App. 314, 322, 567 A.2d 509, 513 (1989).
179. See McDermott, No. 12-C-95-23852, at 22-23.
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Specifically, the court should have recognized that Mr. McDer-
mott lives rent-free with another family through an agreement subject
to their good will and that his future plans are indefinite because he
has no job. 80 Further, the McDermott court should have thoroughly
considered that Patrick had lived with the Doughertys for the past two
years, that Patrick was well-cared for by the Doughertys, and that be-
cause Mr. McDermott surrendered custody of Patrick to the
Doughertys on several occasions, Patrick acted out in school. 8 1
Similarly, the court in McDermott failed to fully consider Patrick's
relationship with the Doughertys and the stability they provided Pat-
rick. In Newkirk v. Newkirk, the court considered similar factors in its
analysis of exceptional circumstances.182 The Newkirk court noted that
the children's relationship with their father was distant, whereas their
relationship with the third party was strong.1 83 The court in Newkirk
also noted that the teenaged children did not want to live with their
father and that they were emotionally well-adjusted when in the care
of the third party.184 The trial court found that the Doughertys pro-
vided Patrick with stability and that Mr. McDermott testified that if he
returned to sea, he would likely leave Patrick with his parents in
Alabama. 18
5
As recently as 2003, in Shurupoff v. Vockroth,'86 the Court of Ap-
peals upheld an award of custody to grandparents because it found
exceptional circumstances. The Shurupoff court found that the child,
Kimberly, had minimal contacts with her father, and the grandparents
had been very involved in her life since her birth.' 7 Additionally, the
court found that she was very emotionally attached to her grandpar-
ents, that a change of custody to her father would have a detrimental
effect, and that the father was not like a parent to her, which led the
court to doubt her stability should he receive custody' 88 The court in
McDermott failed to adequately consider factors that were persuasive in
Newkirk and Shurupoff The court should have considered Patrick's re-
lationship with the Doughertys, whether he was emotionally well-ad-
justed with them, and his stability with his father.'89 This last factor is
180. See id.
181. See id. at 17, 19.
182. 73 Md. App. 588, 535 A.2d 947 (1988).
183. 1& at 594-96, 535 A.2d at 950-51.
184. Id. at 594-95, 535 A.2d at 950.
185. See McDermott, No. 12-C-95-23852, at 19, 22-23.
186. 372 Md. 639, 814 A.2d 543 (2003).
187. Id. at 646, 814 A.2d at 548.
188. Id at 647-48, 814 A.2d at 548.
189. See McDermott, No. 12-C-95-23852, at 18-19, 22-23.
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particularly relevant because the trial court found that the Doughertys
were the only source of stability in Patrick's life.190
In sum, the court, in omitting several lower court exceptional cir-
cumstance findings and Maryland case law detailing their application,
failed to adequately consider whether exceptional circumstances were
present in McDermott. Furthermore, the court's overzealous standard
renders the natural parent presumption determinative because it is
difficult to imagine a case where the parent is not unfit and the excep-
tional circumstances alone can overcome the presumption.'91 In Mc-
Dermott, Patrick had lived with the Doughertys for one-third of his life,
and the Doughertys were the only stable presence in Patrick's life.1
9 2
Mr. McDermott had no job, had no home, was living with another
family rent-free, and had wilfully abandoned Patrick on several occa-
sions to work. 9 Moreover, a psychologist found Mr. McDermott
highly inflexible and motivated to seek custody in part to control Ms.
Dougherty. 94 While the court's new standard purports to consider
more than unfitness by also allowing exceptional circumstances to re-
but the natural parent presumption, if the court did not find the
aforementioned factors to qualify as exceptional in McDermott, it is dif-
ficult to imagine a case where such circumstances will be found.
The court failed to apply its third-party custody standard in its
totality because it neglected to fully consider whether exceptional cir-
cumstances existed, and it chose to omit several relevant lower court
findings. In doing so, the court ignored the fact that the natural par-
ent presumption exists to serve the child's interest insofar as it presup-
poses that custody with the natural parent is in the best interest of the
child absent a showing of unfitness or exceptional circumstances.195
When the court failed to apply the third-party standard in its totality,
the natural parent presumption became determinative in the custody
assessment, rather than remaining a rebuttable presumption. 196 The
court failed to protect Patrick's interest when it gave short shrift to its
exceptional circumstance analysis because both the natural parent
190. See id. at 23.
191. Watkins v. Nelson, 748 A.2d 558, 574-75 (N.J. 2000) (Stein, J., dissenting).
192. McDermott, No. 12-C-95-23852, at 17, 23.
193. Id. at 22.
194. Id. at 15, 19.
195. See Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 178-79, 372 A.2d 582, 587 (1977) (stating that in
all custody cases the best interest of the child standard is determinative, but in third-party
cases, the child's best interest is presumed to be with custody in the parent).
196. See generally id. (explaining that the natural parent presumption is rebutted by a
showing of parental unfitness or extraordinary circumstances).
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presumption and the exceptional circumstances rule exist to serve the
child's best interest. 197
b. The Court Should Have Adopted a Psychological Parent Excep-
tion.-While adopting a new third-party custody standard, the McDer-
mott court should have also adopted a psychological parent exception
to grant more deference to the best interest of the child by consider-
ing to which party-regardless of biology-the child is psychologically
attached. A psychological parent exception, employed by some juris-
dictions in the majority, allows the third party to rise to the same legal
standing as the natural parent if the child has formed a significant
psychological attachment to the third party.198 Once the court deter-
mines a third party is a psychological parent, the court applies the best
interest standard.19 In applying this standard, courts acknowledge
that the welfare of the child is not always best served by custody in the
natural parent, even when fit, because the child may suffer harm
when removed from custody with her psychological parents.200
Although the McDermott court modeled its survey of other juris-
dictions after Watkins v. Nelson, it failed to mention that some jurisdic-
tions in the majority, including New Jersey in Watkins, have a
psychological parent exception. 20 1 Jurisdictions that adopt a psycho-
logical parent exception often do so because the use of the natural
parent presumption sometimes results in custody in natural parents
who have often served little to no parental role, as opposed to the
adult who meets the child's emotional needs-the psychological par-
ent.20 2 While protecting the constitutional right to parent and imple-
menting a natural parent presumption, some courts recognize that
when a child has been in the custody of a third party for a long time,
the psychological harm of removing the child is severe, and the third
party should have custody.20' The psychological parent exception
properly defers to the child's interest by allowing a child to remain
with the person she recognizes as her parent, regardless of whether
that person is a biological parent.204 These courts have remained
197. See Watkins v. Nelson, 748 A.2d 558, 587 (NJ. 2000) (Stein,J., dissenting) (noting
that in third-party cases, the natural parent presumption exists because the child's best
interest is presumed to be in custody with the natural parent, rather than the third party).
198. Id. at 564-65 (majority opinion).
199. Id. at 568-69 (Stein, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 590; accord Warzynski, supra note 119, at 764-65.
201. Watkins, 748 A.2d at 565 (noting that New Jersey has a psychological parent
exception).
202. Bartlett, supra note 120, at 41.
203. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 115, at 19.
204. Warzynski, supra note 119, at 764-65.
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within the majority and nevertheless allow a specific exception for psy-
chological parents so as to account for the child's interest.
2 °5
Although other jurisdictions in the majority have adopted a psy-
chological parent exception, the McDermott court did not consider
whether adopting such an exception would be appropriate in Mary-
land.2 °6 The court should have adopted a psychological parenthood
exception because it safeguards the determinative standard in all Ma-
ryland custody proceedings, the best interest standard.20 7 Psychologi-
cal parenthood allows the natural parent presumption to be overcome
when the child and the third party form a parent-child bond that the
natural parent and the child lack.2 8 Because the natural parent pre-
sumption aims to protect the child's best interest by presupposing that
custody in the parent is in the child's best interest, when the natural
parent and the child have not formed a psychological parent-child
bond, custody with the parent is not in the best interest of the
child. 20 9 Thus, the natural parent presumption no longer serves the
function of safeguarding the child's best interest.
Because the McDermott court failed to adequately apply its own
exceptional circumstance factors, the court should have at least
adopted a psychological parent exception to protect the child's inter-
est. In implementing this standard, if the court establishes that the
third party is a psychological parent, the psychological parent would
be treated as a biological parent in determining custody.210 The court
would then evaluate the custody proceeding under a best interest
standard.2 1
1
The welfare of the child is not always best served by custody in the
natural parent, even when fit, because the child may suffer substantial
harm when removed from custody with her psychological par-
ent(s).212 Furthermore, experts find that successful child develop-
ment depends on the continuation of the psychological relationship
between the child and parent, rather than the biological parent.213
Thus, adopting an explicit psychological parent exception affords
205. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
206. See Watkins, 748 A.2d at 565-67 (observing that courts in the majority employ a
psychological parent exception to the natural parent presumption).
207. See Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 178, 372 A.2d 582, 587 (1977).
208. See Watkins, 748 A.2d at 590 (Stein, J., dissenting).
209. See Bartlett, supra note 120, at 41.
210. See Watkins, 748 A.2d at 590.
211. See id.
212. Warzynski, supra note 119, at 764-65.
213. See generally id. at 765-66.
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proper deference to the child's interests. 214 Such a standard ade-
quately considers which party the child psychologically views as her
parent and ensures that the court considers the totality of the custody
dispute's impact on a child.
2 11
In McDermott, Patrick would have benefited from a psychological
parent exception because the court could have considered whether
Patrick was psychologically attached to the Doughertys. If the court
had found that the Doughertys were psychological parents, the natu-
ral parent presumption would have been overcome, thus allowing the
court to make its custody determination based solely upon Patrick's
best interest-with neither party having a presumption-rather than
an exceptional circumstance analysis that affords Mr. McDermott a
presumption of custody. A psychological parent exception therefore
properly considers the child's stake in the custody proceeding, and
the McDermott court should have adopted such an exception.
c. The Court Allowed Its Unfounded Fear of Social Engineering to
Influence Its Opinion.-In McDermott, the court allowed its unfounded
fear of inappropriate judicial social engineering to affect its deci-
sion.2 16 The court feared that an unfettered application of the best
interest standard would allow courts to remove children from poor or
otherwise disadvantaged parents and give custody to wealthier, more
advantaged third parties because the children would be better off with
the latter.21 7 This fear is apparent in the court's dictum in In re Adop-
tion/Guardianship Nos. J9610436 & J97110312 "l  and now in
McDermott.
2 19
The court's fear is unfounded because neither Maryland's third-
party custody standard in Ross nor the modified approach found in
Shurupoff permit third-party custody awards based upon wealth or
other advantages. 22' Furthermore, Maryland's case law applying the
214. See generally id.
215. See generally id.
216. See McDermott, 385 Md. at 439-40, 869 A.2d at 821 (Wilner, J., concurring) (observ-
ing that the majority is unnecessarily concerned with inappropriate social engineering be-
cause the Hoffman approach does not allow for such usage, nor do the Maryland trial
judges interpret the cases as such); see also id. at 380, 869 A.2d at 786 (majority opinion)
(observing that adopting a standard outside the majority would give courts the opportunity
to reallocate custody in a manner that victimizes the poor).
217. Id. at 439, 869 A.2d at 821 (Wilner, J., concurring).
218. 368 Md. 666, 796 A.2d 778 (2002).
219. See 385 Md. at 435, 869 A.2d at 818-19. The majority assumes that the lower courts
awarded custody of Patrick to the Doughertys either because of social engineering or be-
cause the particular judge believed Patrick might be better off with them. Id.
220. McDermott, 385 Md. at 439-40, 869 A.2d at 821 (Wilner, J., concurring).
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third-party standard does not permit judicial social engineering. The
standard in Hoffman affords the natural parent a presumption rebutta-
ble only upon a showing of parental unfitness or exceptional circum-
stances.2 21 Neither of these exceptions to the presumption permit a
judge to base a custody decision upon whether a child might be better
off with the third party who could give the child a more affluent up-
bringing. 222 Maryland's third-party standard examines seven specific
factors that do not permit judicial social engineering. 223
The McDermott court's fear of social engineering is further un-
founded, despite a rise in third-party custody cases, 224 because in the
almost thirty years since Hoffman, custody has not been awarded based
upon wealth. 225  In the Maryland cases where a third party was
awarded custody, the court so ruled because the natural parent pre-
sumption was rebutted and not because the third parties were more
affluent. In Ross v. Hoffman, the child lived with the third parties, her
babysitters, for more than eight years, during which the natural
mother had made no attempt to reclaim her.226 In Pastore v. Sharp,
the court awarded custody to a third party who cared for a child for
two of his first five years and who provided him with stability.2 27 In
Newkirk v. Newkirk, the court made no mention of the financial status
of either party, and it awarded custody to an adult half-brother instead
of the natural father because the children had lived with the half-
brother, were emotionally well-adjusted to him, and preferred him to
their father.22 8 None of these cases granted custody to the third party
221. 280 Md. 172, 178-79, 372 A.2d 582, 587 (1977).
222. See McDermott, 385 Md. at 440, 869 A.2d at 821 (WilnerJ., concurring) (noting that
the Maryland standard does not permit judges to engage in social engineering).
223. See Hoffman, 280 Md. at 191, 372 A.2d at 593.
224. Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: Redefining
Families, Reforming Custody Jurisdiction, and Refining Support Issues, 34 FAM. L.Q. 607, 631
(2001).
225. Interestingly, the Court's fear of social engineering could actually work against
poor communities and minorities. See Solangel Maldonado, When Father (or Mother) Doesn't
Know Best: Quasi-Parents and Parental Deference After Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L. REV. 865,
905-07 (2003) (discussing the effects of the natural parent presumption on low-income
families and families of color). In less affluent families, which are disproportionately Afri-
can American or Latino, grandparents are more integral to the nuclear family and more
parenting responsibilities are expected of them. Id. at 906. In such families, grandparent
roles are indistinguishable from parental roles because the focus is on the community. Id.
at 909-10. These communities do not subscribe to the traditional middle-class notion that
the parent alone has a fundamental right in child-rearing. Id. at 910. At least one com-
mentator argues that courts should consider such societal differences when determining
custody standards. Id. at 909-10.
226. 280 Md. at 181, 372 A.2d at 588.
227. 81 Md. App. 314, 322, 567 A.2d 509, 513 (1989).
228. 73 Md. App. 588, 595, 535 A.2d 947, 950 (1988).
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solely because of greater material opportunities. The third parties re-
ceived custody because the court found extraordinary circumstances
in that the custodians had previously cared for the children. Likewise,
the trial court's award of custody to the Doughertys was not a result of
impermissible judicial social engineering, but rather was based upon a
consideration of all of the exceptional circumstance factors.2 2 9 There-
fore, the court's fear of social engineering is unfounded because cus-
tody decisions based on material opportunities has not been a
problem in Maryland in the almost thirty years since Hoffman.
5. Conclusion.-In McDermott, the Court of Appeals joined the
majority of jurisdictions and held that the proper standard in third-
party custody cases is to grant the biological parent properly a natural
parent presumption. 230 The court, however, failed to apply its third-
party custody standard because it omitted several of the lower court's
relevant exceptional circumstance findings and gave short shrift to
factors that in other cases were sufficient to rebut the natural parent
presumption. 31 In so doing, the court ignored the fact that the natu-
ral parent presumption exists to serve the child's interest, not vice-
versa.2 32 The court also failed to safeguard the best interest standard
by not adopting a psychological parent exception.233 Further, the Mc-
Dermott court allowed its unfounded fear ofjudicial social engineering
to improperly influence its opinion. 234 In neglecting to fully consider
the exceptional circumstance factors, failing to adopt a psychological
parent exception, and allowing its unsubstantiated fear of social engi-
neering to influence its decision, the McDermott court allowed the nat-
ural parent presumption to be determinative and undermined the
best interest standard.
LINDSEY A. WHITE
229. See McDermott v. McDermott, No. 12-C-95-23852, slip op. at 17-19, 22-23 (Harford
County Cir. Ct. Sept. 8, 2003).
230. 385 Md. 320, 869 A.2d 751.
231. See supra Part 4.a.
232. See supra Part 4.a.
233. See supra Part 4.b.
234. See supra Part 4.c.
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VI. LABOR LAW
A. Maryland Employers Lose Again: The Mayland Court of Appeals's
Interpretation of the Mayland Workers' Compensation Act and
Other Relevant Statutes
In Gleneagles v. Hanks,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland consid-
ered whether it had the authority to stay a Workers' Compensation
Commission award during an appeal. After considering two compet-
ing statutes, the court held that it did not have such authority and
thus required employers to pay workers' compensation payments to
employees throughout the process.2 Although this decision is consis-
tent with Maryland precedent denying employers the ability to recover
those payments should the employer be successful on appeal, the
court missed an opportunity to correct the inequity created by its deci-
sions.3 In so holding, the court disregarded the employer's right to
restitution as an integral component of the right to appeal and al-
lowed the employee to be unjustly enriched.4 The court should have
created an avenue for restitution as courts in other jurisdictions have
done, preventing future injustice for defendants who are successful on
appeal.5
1. The Case.-The Court of Special Appeals traces the path of
Linda Hanks's claim, beginning with the initial filing of a workers'
compensation claim, continuing through the procedures of the Work-
ers' Compensation Commission, and finally the arrival in the Mary-
land courts.6 After losing its appeal in the Circuit Court of Harford
County, Gleneagles, Inc. appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland.7
a. Proceedings Before the Workers' Compensation Commission.-
On February 12, 1991, Linda Hanks sought benefits from her em-
ployer, Gleneagles, Inc., stemming from a disabling incident that had
occurred one year earlier.' Deeming her claim compensable, the
1. Gleneagles, Inc. v. Hanks, 385 Md. 492, 869 A.2d 852 (2005).
2. Id. at 494, 869 A.2d at 853-54.
3. See infra Part 4.a.
4. See infra Part 4.b.
5. See infra Part 4.c.
6. Gleneagles, Inc. v. Hanks, 156 Md. App. 543, 547, 847 A.2d 520, 522 (2003).
7. Gleneagles, 385 Md. at 494, 869 A.2d at 852, 853-54.
8. Gleneagles, 156 Md. App. at 547, 847 A.2d at 522. Neither the specific disabling
incident nor injury are described within any of the courts' opinions.
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Workers' Compensation Commission ordered Gleneagles to pay bene-
fits for a period of two years, beginning on April 26, 1991.' Hanks
subsequently filed additional claims alleging a worsening of her condi-
tion together with a causally connected shoulder condition."'
The Commission held a hearing on June 5, 1997, at which it es-
tablished Hanks's entitlement to medical treatment and payment of
medical expenses. 1  The Commission also effectively denied
Gleneagles's claims (1) that Hanks should be required to file a new
claim for any new conditions and (2) that the statute of limitations on
this new claim had expired. 12
Less than one year later, Hanks filed a new claim alleging another
neck condition resulting from the original incident.13 In response to
Hanks's request for a hearing on her permanent partial disability is-
sues, Gleneagles argued that the statute of limitations barred her
claim. 4 Hanks filed for permanent total disability in November
2001.15 The Commission determined that the limitations did not ex-
clude Hanks's additional claims and instead issued an award of com-
pensation accruing from 1992.16
b. Proceedings Before the Circuit Court of Harford County.-Fol-
lowing the Commission's order, Gleneagles petitioned for judicial re-
view on the grounds that the corporation would be unable to recoup
funds should it ultimately prevail on the limitations issue.17 To pre-
vent this loss, Gleneagles filed a request for an immediate temporary
restraining order and a request for stay and/or preliminary
injunction.'"
9. Id.
10. Id at 547-48, 847 A.2d at 522. Hanks's condition also included permanent partial
disability to the left and upper right extremities, arms, shoulder, and hands. Id.
11. Id. at 548, 847 A.2d at 523.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 549, 847 A.2d at 523. Hanks filed after she had time to implead the Subse-
quent Injury Fund. Id. The Subsequent Injury Fund is a Maryland state agency that pays
workers' compensation benefits pursuant to § 9-802 of the Labor and Employment Article
of the Maryland Code. This agency exists to encourage the hiring of workers with pre-
existing disabilities by assuming financial responsibility for the combined effects of a pre-
existing disability and an accidental workplace injury. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 10-
204 to -219 (West 2005).
16. Gleneagles, 385 Md. at 494, 869 A.2d at 853-54. The Commission awarded Hanks
$282 per week for 333 weeks from Gleneagles and $144 for 240 weeks from the Fund;
reaching back to April 1992, damages totaled $93,906 and $34,560 respectively. Id.
17. Gleneagles, 156 Md. App. at 546, 847 A.2d at 521-22.
18. Gleneagles, 385 Md. at 495, 869 A.2d. at 854.
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The court initially granted Gleneagles's requests and stayed
Hanks's awarded damages.' 9 However, the court overruled its previ-
ous decision, finding that it lacked authority to grant a stay of an
award of compensation issued by the Commission, 20 pursuant to Rule
7-2052' and § 9-74122 of the Labor and Employment Article of the Ma-
ryland Code, both of which govern compensation.
c. Proceedings Before the Court of Special Appeals of Mayland.-
Gleneagles appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, ar-
guing that Rule 7-205 permits a stay of an order or action of an admin-
istrative agency and that the courts have plenary equity powers to issue
such a stay.23 The appeal further supported Gleneagles's contention
that the Commission's own rule can stay payment of an award, as
Commission-ordered attorney fees are placed in escrow pending the
appeal's passing period or adjudication.24
Hanks responded by arguing that § 9-741 of the Labor and Em-
ployment Article applied. 25 She argued that the appellants were at-
tempting to circumvent § 9-741's no-stay provision and successfully
doing so would effectively disregard the provision's intent to ensure
plaintiffs a speedy and certain recovery.26
The court found the statutory language unambiguous and re-
fused to respond to Gleneagles's request to determine legislative in-
tent or to analyze the provisions' validity by interpreting the meaning
of the interrelationship between Rule 7-205 and § 9-741.27 Further-
more, the court squashed Gleneagles's second argument regarding
the Commission's rules by reiterating that the Commission's rules per-
tain to attorneys' fees, while § 9-741 involves payment of compensa-
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. This rule states that "the filing of a petition does not stay the order or action of the
administrative agency. Upon motion and after hearing, the court may grant a stay, unless
prohibited by law, upon conditions as to bond or otherwise that the court considers
proper." MD. R. 7-205 (2003).
22. This rule reads, "An appeal is not a stay of: (1) an order of the Commission requir-
ing payment of compensation; or (2) an order or supplemental order of the Commission
requiring the provision of medical treatment." MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-741
(West 2005).
23. Gleneagles, Inc. v. Hanks, 156 Md. App. 543, 551, 847 A.2d 520, 524 (2003).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 551-52, 847 A.2d at 525. Hanks argued that Labor and Employment Article
§ 9-741 prohibits appeals staying the Commission's awards and trumps Maryland Rule 7-
205. Id.
26. Id. at 552, 847 A.2d at 525. The court did not want to deny injured workers imme-
diate benefits because an opposing party soughtjudicial review. Id. at 555, 847 A.2d at 527.
27. Id. at 553, 847 A.2d at 526.
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tion and renders the two awards disparate concepts.28 Ultimately,
concluding that the no-stay language would be essentially meaningless
if the circuit court's equity power directed payment of benefits, the
Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision and re-
fused to circumvent the no-stay provision of § 9-741.29
Gleneagles then sought review by the Court of Appeals, arguing
that the circuit court did not have the authority to grant injunctive
relief for a monetary award granted in a workers' compensation case
while an appeal is pending." The court granted certiorari to address
the issue of which statute controlled: Rule 7-205 or § 9-741."
2. Legal Background.--Maryland courts have a long history of
construing the Workers' Compensation Act.32 Maryland courts have
shown deference to employees, ruling that employers may not recover
any awards paid out before or during the appeal process.33 Rather,
the courts have made numerous appeals to the legislature to revisit
the issue, expressing some discontent with this area of law.34 Al-
though the right to restitution is judicially recognized,35 Maryland
courts have not, however, done what courts in other jurisdictions
have: recognize the right to restitution as part of the appeal process. 6
a. The Maryland Workers' Compensation Act.-By enacting the
Workers' Compensation Act in 1914, Maryland created a mechanism
through which employees could recover compensatory awards in
place of wages lost from injury, disability, or death occurring in the
course of employment. 7 The Act provides injured employees with a
definite and expedient method for compensation and protects em-
ployers from large monetary awards in civil suits filed by their employ-
ees.38 The Workers' Compensation Commission (WCC) determines
28. Id. at 554, 847 A.2d at 526.
29. Id. at 555-57, 847 A.2d at 527-28.
30. Gleneagles, 385 Md. at 495, 869 A.2d at 854.
31. Id.
32. See infra Part 2.a.
33. See infra Part 2.b.
34. See infra Part 2.c.
35. See infra Part 2.d.
36. See infra Part 2.e.
37. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-101 to -1201 (West 2005).
38. Philip Elecs. N. Am. v. Wright, 348 Md. 209, 210, 703 A.2d 150, 151 (1997); Polom-
ski v. Baltimore, 344 Md. 70, 76, 684 A.2d 1338, 1340-41 (1996); see Larimore v. Am. Ins.
Co., 314 Md. 617, 619 n.1, 624-625, 552 A.2d 889, 889 n.1, 892 (1989) (noting that civil
actions may only be maintained against tortious co-employees); Egeberg v. Md. Steel
Prods. Co., 190 Md. 374, 379, 58 A.2d 684, 685-86 (1948) (explaining that the WCC is the
proper venue for such claims, protecting both the employee and employer).
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employees' claims. 9 The Act also provides for an employer's right to
appeal WCC decisions,4 ° enabling courts to construe the Act's
provisions.41
In so construing, the courts must constantly consider the Act's
overall purpose to effectuate the legislature's intent.4 2 While a stat-
ute's actual language is the primary tool for ascertaining legislative
intent, courts look beyond a statute's words and use statutory interpre-
tation to determine legislative intent if the words are not free from
ambiguity and do not express a definite and simple meaning. 43 Mary-
land courts rely upon canons of statutory interpretation to determine
the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act.44
Several Maryland court decisions trace the development of intent-
based statutory interpretation of the WCC. In Branch v. Indemnity In-
surance Co., the court determined that the Act's purpose was to pro-
vide speedy and certain relief, regardless of fault, for injured
employees and their dependents.4" The court further explained that
the WCC may under the police power circumvent the Due Process
Clause and order payments even though an employer has not been in
court.46 Next, in Polomski v. Baltimore, the court echoed Branch by
opining that another goal of the Act is to protect employers from the
unpredictable nature and expense of litigation.47 Finally, while the
court determined in Lombardi v. Montgomery County that it must con-
strue law liberally in a light favorable to the plaintiff in uncertain
cases, the court also determined that it must not construe law to pro-
vide for more compensation than originally intended by the Act.48
39. Egeberg, 190 Md. at 379.
40. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-737 to -745 (West 2005).
41. See, e.g., Polomski, 344 Md. at 72, 684 A.2d at 1340; Lombardi v. Montgomery
County, 108 Md. App. 695, 697, 673 A.2d 762, 764 (1996); Branch v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of
N. Am., 156 Md. App. 482, 483, 144 A.2d 696, 697 (1929).
42. Marriott Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 346 Md. 437, 444,
607 A.2d 455, 458 (1997). Also, in terms of statutory interpretation, the court has previ-
ously indicated that it should never read a statute in a manner inconsistent with common
sense. Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 128-30, 756 A.2d 987, 991-92 (2000); accord Office
of People's Counsel v. Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 355 Md. 1, 31-32, 733 A.2d 996, 1012
(1997); Wright, 348 Md. at 216, 703 A.2d at 153.
43. Chase, 360 Md. at 128-30, 756 A.2d at 991-92.
44. E.g., Polomski, 344 Md. at 72, 684 A.2d at 1340; Lombardi, 108 Md. App. at 697, 673
A.2d at 764; Branch, 156 Md. App. at 483, 144 A.2d at 697.
45. 156 Md. App. at 485-87, 144 A.2d at 697.
46. Id. at 487, 144 A.2d at 697.
47. 344 Md. at 76, 684 A.2d at 1340-41.
48. See 108 Md. App. at 703, 673 A.2d at 766 (describing a concept that parallels the
Supreme Court's determination that parties be returned to the status quo following an
appeals reversal).
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b. The Court Denies Recovery-Back upon Successful Appeals.-
The court has also used the canons of statutory interpretation to de-
termine whether the Act prohibits "recovery-back." This term is used
to describe the situation in which a defendant may recover an award
previously paid to the plaintiff should the court overturn the award on
appeal.49
The Court of Appeals has ruled that an employer cannot recoup
any funds overpaid by the defendant during the appeal of an initial
award, should the award ultimately be lowered.5 ° In Hoffman, an in-
surer made an overpayment to a claimant during an appeal." When
the court ruled in favor of the insurer, the insurer tried to overturn
the lien on the claimant's attorney's fees to help reimburse itself.
52
The court refused to overthrow the lien and found that precedent
required an employer to make payments during an appeal.5 ' The
court added that the employee did not owe money to the employer
because precedent prohibited a recompense for funds overpaid dur-
ing an appeal.54
In St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance v. Treadwell, the court also
held that the Act intended to preclude recovery-back, even in the face
of the common-law theory of unjust enrichment. 55 In Treadwell, an
insurer made workers' compensation payments to an employee pend-
ing an appeal of that award.56 The court reversed the WCC's order
upon finding that the Commission had erroneously conferred the
award, but refused the insurer's action to recover the payments. 57 Be-
cause there is no specific language in the Act either allowing or deny-
ing recovery-back, the court reached its conclusion by reasoning that
there was no way that the legislature simply missed the issue that pay-
ments made to plaintiffs could be subsequently reversed or vacated on
appeal.58 Instead, the court determined that the absence of a provi-
sion-a statutory silence on the issue allowing for such recovery-in-
dicated that the legislature considered and rejected such a
provision.59 The court reasoned that instead of allowing the employer
49. Gleneagles, 385 Md. at 501, 869 A.2d at 857-58; Hoffman v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 232
Md. 51, 56, 191 A.2d 575, 578 (1963).
50. Hoffman, 232 Md. at 56, 191 A.2d at 578.
51. Id. at 54, 191 A.2d at 577.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 54-57, 191 A.2d at 577-78.
54. Id. at 56, 191 A.2d at 578.
55. 263 Md. 430, 439, 283 A.2d 601, 606 (1971),
56. Id. at 430-31, 283 A.2d at 602.
57. Id. at 435-36, 283 A.2d at 604-05.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 437-38, 283 A.2d at 605.
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to recover, the legislature expedited appeals under the Act above all
noncriminal cases. 60
In Philip Electronics North America Corp. v. Wright, the court held
again that even if the court reduces or overturns Commission awards,
an employer is not entitled to reimbursement, recovery, or credit to
another payment. 61 In Wright, the court reduced the plaintiffs disa-
bility from fifty to forty percent, thus lowering the amount that the
employer paid to the employee each week.62 The employer sought
credit for the total sum overpaid, whereas the employee argued that
the credit should be only for the number of weeks of benefits paid.63
The court stated that upon an award recalculated on appeal, the em-
ployer must essentially pay the new weekly amount, regardless of the
fact that the employer has been paying a higher amount during the
appeal.64 The court again refused to credit the overpayment of one
award to a future separate award in Sealy Furniture of Maryland v.
Miller.65 When Sealy overpaid Miller for her temporary total disability
payment, it sought credit towards its payments for her permanent par-
tial disability.66 The court, however, refused such a credit, holding
that the Act's silence on the issue indicated statutory intent to bar
recovery to the employer.67
c. The Court Alludes to Restitution and Asks the Legislature for
Guidance.-Although the court refused to allow recovery-back, it has
also long recognized that the legislature should reevaluate the Act. In
the 1970s, the court explicitly requested that the legislature correct
the court if the court wrongly interpreted the Act as prohibiting an
employer from recovering-back a vacated award.68 Later, in Montgom-
ery County v. Lake, the court invited the legislature to revisit "potential
inequities" presented by the prohibition of a stay during an appeal.69
In Lake, an employer sought to recover-back an overturned award by
offsetting overpayment made on one award against the balance of a
second award.7' The court refused the employer's request, specifying
60. Id.
61. 348 Md. 209, 215, 703 A.2d 150, 153 (1997).
62. Id. at 213, 703 A.2d at 152.
63. Id. at 209-10, 703 A.2d at 150-51.
64. Id. at 223, 703 A.2d at 156-57.
65. 356 Md. 462, 740 A.2d 594 (1999).
66. Id. at 465, 740 A.2d at 596.
67. Id. at 466, 740 A.2d at 596-97.
68. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. Treadwell, 263 Md. 430, 439, 283 A.2d 601, 606
(1971).
69. 68 Md. App. 269, 280, 511 A.2d 541, 547 (1986).
70. Id. at 271, 511 A.2d at 542.
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that the law in Maryland is firmly established that once an employer
pays money out, the money is not recoverable under any theory ex-
cept fraud.7 However, the Lake court acknowledged the inequities
presented: it admitted that a payment, absent legal vindication,
should be recoverable-especially if the payment is made in a lump
sum rather than weekly payments.7 2 The Lake court addressed the
need for further amendment in this area, determined the provisions
to be inequitable, and invited the legislature to redress it.7" Likewise,
in State Retirement & Pension System of Maryland v. Thompson, the court
acknowledged the inequities imposed by a lack of recovery-back, but
refused to contravene the statutory mandate as previously
interpreted."4
Changing this trend, the court in General Motors Corp. v. Koscielski
offered a viable remedy to the issue surrounding recovery-back when
it alluded to concepts of restitution.75 In Koscielski, the WCC awarded
an employee workers' compensation, including attorneys' fees.76 In
an important shift from past rulings, the court held that it could stay
attorneys' fees and that the employer could recover the fees if the
court did not stay them.77 The court reasoned both that it did not
want to make the workers' compensation appeal proceedings compli-
cated or costly and that under certain circumstances an employer
should recover through restitution.78 The court wrote that should it
reverse a judgment on appeal, the court retains authority to require
restitution to restore the parties to their previous positions.79 Like-
wise, the court stated that it has authority to restore parties to the
status quo by ordering restitution. The court also mentioned that this
71. Id. at 274, 511 A.2d at 544.
72. Id. at 279, 511 A.2d at 546. The court suggested that the burden would be even
heavier when awards were granted in lump sums rather than weekly payments. Id.
73. Id. at 280, 511 A.2d at 547.
74. 368 Md. App. 53, 60, 792 A.2d 277, 284 (2002). The Thompson court, by refusing to
deviate from the mandated statutory interpretation, followed precedent. Id.; see Hebden v.
Keim, 196 Md. 45, 49, 75 A.2d 126, 128 (1950) (valuing precedent). But see Aravanis v.
Eisenberg, 237 Md. 242, 250, 206 A.2d 148, 161 (1965) (stating that stare decisis should
not be an excuse for a decision where reason is lacking); accord White v. King, 244 Md. 348,
354, 223 A.2d 763, 767 (1966).
75. 80 Md. App. 453, 462-63, 564 A.2d 114, 119 (1989).
76. Id. at 456, 564 A.2d at 115. The court did not consider attorneys' fees to be the
same type of support as compensation payments. Id. at 462, 564 A.2d at 118.
77. Id. at 462, 564 A.2d at 119. The court wrote that the "trial court judge believed by
virtue of legislative enactment and subsequent appellate decision that his hands were tied
and the fees were not recoverable . . . we view the law differently than did the trial judge."
Id at 460, 564 A.2d at 118.
78. Id. at 462, 564 A.2d at 119.
79. Id. at 463, 564 A.2d at 119.
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power is inherent in every court, that it may undo what it originally
had no authority to do and restore the parties to their former
80position.
The Court of Appeals also recognized the right to recovery in
Podgurski v. One Beacon Insurance Co."1 In Podgurski, an employee fell
during work in a hair salon that was part of a larger department
store.82 The court determined that since the employee already recov-
ered damages from the third-party department store, the employee
must pay back the compensation the court earlier awarded to her
from her employer, the hair salon. 83 The court held that the em-
ployer was entitled to reimbursement, which was fair to everyone
involved.84
d. The Right to Restitution Is Judicially Recognized.-The Su-
preme Court has determined several times that the right to restitution
exists.8 5 Moreover, the right to recover what was lost by the enforce-
ment of a judgment subsequently reversed is also well established. 86
In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v. Florida, the Court examined restitu-
tion in the context of reversed judgments.8 7 The Court recognized as
a general rule that in the event of a reversal, the Court shall restore
what a litigant lost to an opposing party who unjustly benefited due to
compulsion of ajudgment.88 The Court determined that the question
is not whether the law puts a party in possession of money in a new
transaction, but whether the law takes money out of the possession of
a plaintiff after he or she collected it from a defendant.89  In
Arkadelphia Milling v. St. Louis Southwestern Railroad, the Court stated
that when the plaintiff is awarded judgment later reversed or vacated
on appeal, he or she should restore the defendant who lost the
award. °0
e. Other Jurisdictions Recognize Common-Law Restitution as Part
of the Appeal Process.--Courts in several states have recognized the right
80. Id.
81. 374 Md. 133, 821 A.2d 400 (2003).
82. Id. at 138, 821 A.2d at 403.
83. Id. at 155, 821 A.2d at 413.
84. Id. at 154, 821 A.2d at 413.
85. E.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301, 309 (1935); Arkadelphia
Milling Co. v. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co., 249 U.S. 134, 145 (1918).
86. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 781, 786 (1929).
87. 295 U.S. at 304.
88. Id. at 309.
89. Id. at 310.
90. 249 U.S. at 145.
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of restitution and allowed employers to recover-back awards or bene-
fits even when workers' compensation statutes are silent on the is-
sue.9 The New Jersey Supreme Court has ruled that employers, as a
matter of basic fairness, should be able to recover overpaid awards on
the basis of unjust enrichment.92 In Hajnas v. Englehard, an employer
attempted to recover compensation benefits from a widow who had
remarried and thus was not entitled to receive benefits on behalf of
her deceased spouse.93 The court determined that the employer was
entitled to restitution, even though the statute did not specifically pro-
vide for such recovery.94
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied on restitution to reim-
burse an employer who sought to recover an overpaid award.95 In
Lucey v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, the court awarded an
employee compensation for medical expenses and then arranged a
separate deal with his medical care provider to pay a lower amount
than originally decided.96 The employer sought to recover-back the
excess funds or to have the excess amount credited to the lower future
payments upon realizing that it was overpaying the employee because
of the employer's new deal.97 Although the Pennsylvania Workers'
Compensation Act did not provide the statutory framework for such a
recovery, the court cited the law of restitution and held that the em-
ployer was entitled to restitution.98
In Reil v. State Compensation Mutual Insurance Fund, the Montana
Supreme Court examined whether the Fund could recover compensa-
tion that it already paid to an employee after the court subsequently
vacated the award on appeal.99 Although the employee argued that
the Fund could not recover the payments because the Montana work-
ers' compensation statute was silent on the issue, the court held that
restitution applied regardless of the statute's absence of an applicable
91. See, e.g., Lucey v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd., 732 A.2d 1201, 1203 (Pa. 1999);
Reil v. State Comp. Mut. Ins. Fund, 837 P.2d 1334, 1336 (Mont. 1992); Hajnas v. Englehard
Mineral & Chem., 555 A.2d 716, 719 (N.J. 1989).
92. Hajnas, 555 A.2d at 721. Unjust enrichment is defined as either the unjust reten-
tion of a benefit to the loss of another, or the retention of money or property of another
against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good conscience. Richard F.
Kline, Inc. v. Signet Bank of Md., 102 Md. App. 727, 731, 651 A.2d 442, 444 (1995).
93. Hajnas, 555 A.2d at 717.
94. Id. at 719.
95. Lucey, 732 A.2d at 1204.
96. Id. at 1202-03.
97. Id. at 1203-04.
98. Id. at 1205.
99. 837 P.2d 1334, 1334-35 (Mont. 1992).
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provision.' Based solely on the importance of restitution, the court
applied to the workers' compensation ruling the principle that an em-
ployer has the right to recover-back awards reversed or vacated on
appeal.10'
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Gleneagles, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland decided whether § 9-741 or Rule 7-205 controlled the issue
of whether or not an appeal grants a stay of an award.'0 2 Writing for
the court, Judge Greene began by noting that the court must interpret
the Workers' Compensation Act in a light most favorable to the in-
jured plaintiff.10 3 The court then quickly resolved the conflict be-
tween the competing statutes by clarifying that Rule 7-205 allows a
court to grant a stay "unless prohibited by law,"'1 4 whereas the court
held that § 9-741 prohibits stays of Workers' Compensation Commis-
sion orders awarding compensation.' ° 5 The court determined that
§ 9-741 takes precedence over Rule 7-205 and ultimately held that the
circuit court cannot grant stays or injunctions for awards granted by
the Workers' Compensation Commission while an appeal is
pending. 10
6
Although Gleneagles attempted to argue that a stay is different
from an injunction, the court disagreed and instead concluded that
regardless of what Gleneagles called the action, Hanks would forfeit
her compensation during the appeal process."' The court implied
that this outcome was exactly the result that the legislature designed
the statute to avoid by limiting the general equitable powers of the
court.10 8 In response to Gleneagles highlighting the injustice of over-
payment and the inability to recover-back any payments should
Gleneagles win on appeal, 0 9 the court again disagreed and reasoned
that the Act, as the court interpreted it, prohibited recovering over-
payment. 1 0 Although it empathized with Gleneagles's position, the
100. Id. at 1335.
101. Id. at 1337.
102. 385 Md. at 495, 869 A.2d at 854.
103. Id. at 496, 869 A.2d at 855. Chief Judge Bell, and Judges Cathell and Battaglia
joined the majority opinion. Id. at 506, 869 A.2d at 861.
104. Id. at 497, 869 A.2d at 855.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 506, 869 A.2d at 861.
107. Id. at 497-99, 869 A.2d at 855-57.
108. See id. at 499-500, 869 A.2d at 857 (noting that according to Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article § 1-501, courts have equity powers "except where by law jurisdiction
has been limited").
109. Id. at 501, 869 A.2d at 857.
110. Id. at 502, 869 A.2d at 858.
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court deferred to the legislature and noted that the legislature likely
foresaw this issue when it drafted the "no-stay" provision."' The court
asserted that the legislature considered but disregarded this idea and
that as a way of mitigating the employer's burden to make payments,
the legislature instead gave appeals precedence over all other non-
criminal cases.
1 1 2
While the court noted that Gleneagles was in an especially diffi-
cult situation because Gleneagles was ordered to pay a lump-sum
award, the court deferred to the Commission and stated that it could
not assume that the Commission did not properly consider all of the
circumstances before acting.' The court concluded by noting that it
had discussed in previous cases the inequities of the Act and con-
cluded that the legislature, and not the court, must correct any inequi-
ties in the Act." 4
Judge Wilner, in dissent,' 15 argued that § 9-741 severely limits,
but does not prohibit, a court granting a stay of the Commission's
monetary award pending an appeal. 1 6 The dissent placed more
weight on the language in Rule 7-205, which allows the court to grant
stays that it considers proper.117
While Judge Wilner agreed that no-stay provisions in workers'
compensation cases are common," 8 he argued that courts should per-
mit stays in appropriate cases, such as when an employer makes a
strong showing of success on the merits."' Finally, Judge Wilner con-
cluded by asserting that if the legislature had really intended to pro-
hibit a court from granting such stays, it could have done so
explicitly. 1
2
4. Analysis.-In Gleneagles v. Hanks, the court held that appeals
while pending do not stay awards granted by the WCC and deter-
mined that employers can not recover-back funds paid during the ap-
peal should the award be overturned.' 2' Although the Gleneagles
111. Id. at 502-03, 869 A.2d at 858-59.
112. Id. at 502, 869 A.2d at 858. The legislature, however, provided for recovery in cases
of fraud. Id. at 502, 869 A.2d at 858-59.
113. Id, at 503-04, 869 A.2d at 859.
114. Id. at 504, 869 A.2d at 860.
115. Judges Raker and Harrell joined Judge Wilner's dissent. Id. at 506, 869 A.2d at 861
(Wilner, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 506, 869 A.2d at 861.
117. Id. at 507, 869 A.2d at 861.
118. Id. at 508, 869 A.2d at 861.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 508-09, 869 A.2d at 861.
121. Gleneagles, 385 Md. at 506, 869 A.2d at 861.
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decision comports to the doctrine of stare decisis, 122 the court missed
an opportunity to rectify an inequity.12' The court in Gleneagles ig-
nored the right to restitution and its importance to the appeal pro-
cess, thus allowing one party to be unjustly enriched. 124 The court
should have recognized this right and created an avenue for restitu-
tion as courts in other jurisdictions have done.125
a. The Court Missed an Opportunity to Correct a History of Ineq-
uity Created by Its Interpretation of the Workers' Compensation Act.-The
court's decision in Gleneagles v. Hanks was consistent with Maryland
courts' previous statutory interpretation of the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act denying employers who win on appeal the right to recover-
back payments made before and during the appeal process. 126 The
Court of Appeals's strict construction of the Workers' Compensation
Act thus prohibited Gleneagles from recovering an overturned or
overpaid award. 27 The court missed an opportunity to correct a his-
tory of inequity when it continued its trend of urging the legislature to
revisit the issue.12 ' Instead, the Gleneagles court held consistent with
Maryland case law in concluding that statutory silence indicates a leg-
islative intent to not allow recovery-back. t29 Although its decision to
adhere to precedent posed certain inequities, the court was influ-
enced and supported by the doctrine of stare decisis.1
3 0
122. Stare decisis is a Latin term for the doctrine of precedent, literally translating to "to
stand by things decided." BLACK'S LAw DIcTIoNARY 1443 (8th ed. 2004) ("The doctrine of
precedent, under which it is necessary for a court to follow earlier judicial decisions when
the same points arise again in litigation.").
123. See infra Part 4.a.
124. See infra Part 4.b.
125. See infra Part 4.c.
126. E.g., Marriott Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 346 Md. 437,
444, 607 A.2d 455, 458 (1997); Larimore v. Am. Ins. Co., 314 Md. 617, 619, 552 A.2d 889,
891 (1989); Egeberg v. Md. Steel Prods. Co., 190 Md. 374, 376, 58 A.2d 684, 686 (1948);
Branch v. Indem. Ins. Co., 156 Md. App. 482, 483, 144 A.2d 696, 697 (1929).
127. Gleneagles, 385 Md. at 505, 869 A.2d at 860.
128. For cases in which the court suggested that the legislature review and reevaluate
the court's interpretation of the Act, see State Retirement & Pension System of Maryland v.
Thompson, 368 Md. App. 53, 792 A.2d 277 (2002); General Motors Corp. v. Koscielski, 80 Md.
App. 453, 564 A.2d 114 (1989); Montgomery County v. Lake, 68 Md. App. 269, 511 A.2d 541
(1986).
129. E.g., Philip Elecs. N. Am. v. Wright, 348 Md. 209, 215, 703 A.2d 150, 153 (1997); St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. Treadwell, 263 Md. 430,439, 283 A.2d 601, 606 (1971); Hoffman
v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 232 Md. 51, 56, 191 A.2d 575, 578 (1963).
130. According to this doctrine, once a court has created a principle of law that applies
to a particular set of facts, the court should adhere to that principle and apply it to any
future cases in which the facts are substantially the same. Hebden v. Keim, 196 Md. 45, 49,
75 A.2d 126, 128 (1950).
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Hence, when the court in Gleneagles denied the ability of
Gleneagles to recover-back payments, 131 it did so in light of estab-
lished precedent, as stare decisis discourages courts from deciding a
case based solely on first impression and requires that courts take pre-
cedent into account as authority.132 Four significant cases-Hoffman,
Treadwell, Wright, and Sealy-highlight the reasoning on which the
Gleneagles court based its decision. 33 In all four cases, Maryland
courts consistently denied each employer the ability to recover over-
paid workers' compensation funds, whether the funds were overpaid
because the award was subsequently lowered, reversed, or vacated,
and refused to reimburse the employer, be it during the appeal pro-
ceeding or in a separate, subsequent civil suit for restitution.'
34
Throughout these cases, the courts' justification for prohibiting recov-
ery-back was that the legislature considered the possibility that an em-
ployer would fail to recover such funds and simply rejected the
concept of recovery-back.' 5 The Gleneagles court explicitly followed
these previous decisions and gave no further indication as to how or
why the legislature came to the conclusion rejecting recovery-back.' 3 6
Instead, the court construed the Act as preventing recovery-back with-
out additional explanation.
137
Stare decisis also influenced the Gleneagles court's decision to al-
lude to the unfairness posed by denial of restitution and urge the leg-
islature to reevaluate the law. 138 Rather than take action to correct
the inequity, the Gleneagles court again followed previous Maryland
courts, like Podgurski and Koscielski, which alluded to the inequity the
denial of restitution imposed on defendants. 139 Furthermore, the
131. Gleneagles, 385 Md. at 502, 869 A.2d at 858.
132. See BLACK's LAw DICrIONARY, supra note 122, at 1443 ("[I]t is necessary for a court
to follow earlier judicial decisions.").
133. Sealy Furniture of Md. v. Miller, 356 Md. 460, 466, 740 A.2d 594, 596-97 (1999);
Wright, 348 Md. at 215, 703 A.2d at 153; Treadwell, 263 Md. at 434, 283 A.2d at 606; Hoffman,
232 Md. at 56, 191 A.2d at 578.
134. Sealy, 356 Md. at 466, 740 A.2d at 596-97; Wright, 348 Md. at 215, 703 A.2d at 153;
Treadwell 263 Md. at 434, 283 A.2d at 606; Hoffman, 232 Md. at 56, 191 A.2d at 578.
135. See, e.g., Treadweli 263 Md. 430, 437, 283 A.2d 601, 605 (explaining legislative
silence).
136. 385 Md. at 502, 869 A.2d at 858-59.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 503, 869 A.2d at 860; see State Retirement & Pension Sys. of Md. v. Thompson,
368 Md. App. 53, 60, 792 A.2d 277, 284 (2002); Montgomery County v. Lake, 68 Md. App.
269, 280, 511 A.2d 541, 547 (1986).
139. 385 Md. at 502, 869 A.2d at 858; see Koscielski, 80 Md. at 462, 564 A.2d at 119 (allud-
ing to restitution by ruling that attorneys' fees in workers' compensation cases are recover-
able should the employer prevail on appeal because the court had the authority to require
restitution to restore the parties to their previous positions should it reverse judgment on
appeal); Podgurski v. One Beacon Ins. Co., 374 Md. 133, 154, 821 A.2d 400, 413 (2003)
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Gleneagles court adhered to precedent, like Lake and Thompson, by ad-
dressing the legislature's need for further amendment in this area of
law. 40 The court in Gleneagles refused to address the seeming inequi-
ties presented by the statute and stated that the legislature should ad-
dress any inequities presented by the case.141
While stare decisis is well established, a court may take the oppor-
tunity to deviate from precedent if the principle established by the
precedent is unreasonable.142 The Gleneagles court could have devi-
ated from precedent because the precedent the Gleneagles court fol-
lowed is unreasonable for three reasons. First, because the court in
Gleneagles refused to address the inequities posed by its application of
the Act, employers face uncertainty as they wait for one branch of
government to address an inequity that both the legislature and the
courts should know well.' 43 During the legislature's inaction, numer-
ous cases pertaining to this issue have arisen to no resolve, and this
will continue to happen until the legislature amends the Act or the
court offers another remedy.
Second, decisions denying recovery-back are unreasonable be-
cause they are self-imposed. The legislature did not explicitly prohibit
an employer from recovering overpaid awards; the court construed
the legislature's silence to indicate a legislative intent to deny an em-
ployer the remedy. 144 Because the court construed the statute in this
manner, the court should fix its self-imposed inequity.1 45 Further-
more, in Lombardi, the court stated that the Act should not be resolved
to provide for compensation beyond that authorized; yet this is exactly
(implying support of restitution by allowing an employer to recover-back an award when
an employee received payments from both the employer and the third-party owner of the
employer's premises).
140. See Lake, 68 Md. App. at 279, 511 A.2d at 546 (addressing the potential inequities
posed by the Act's lack of a recovery-back provision and the need for further amendment
in this area of law); accord Thompson, 368 Md. App. at 60, 792 A.2d at 284.
141. 385 Md. at 505, 869 A.2d at 860.
142. Aravanis v. Eisenberg, 237 Md. 242, 250, 206 A.2d 148, 161 (1965) ("Stare decisis
ought not be the excuse for decision where reason is lacking."); see White v. King, 244 Md.
348, 354, 223 A.2d 763, 767 (1966) (stating that courts may deviate from precedent when
circumstances leave precedent inapplicable).
143. Maryland courts have been urging the legislature to address the Act's inequities for
close to forty years. E.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. Treadwell, 263 Md. 430, 439, 283
A.2d 601, 606 (1971).
144. E.g., Sealy Furniture of Md. v. Miller, 356 Md. 460, 466, 740 A.2d 594, 596-97
(1999); Philip Elecs. N. Am. v. Wright, 348 Md. 209, 233, 703 A.2d 150, 156-57 (1997);
Treadwell, 263 Md. at 430, 283 A.2d at 606; Hoffman v. Liberty Mutual Ins., 232 Md. 51, 56,
191 A.2d 575, 578 (1963).
145. Sealy, 356 Md. at 466, 740 A.2d at 596-97; Wright, 348 Md. at 233, 703 A.2d at 156-57;
Treadwell, 263 Md. at 430, 283 A.2d at 606; Hoffman, 232 Md. at 56, 191 A.2d at 578.
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what the court is doing.146 By denying employers the ability to recoup
funds that are later vacated on appeal, the court is construing the Act
in such a way that provides an employee with compensation beyond
that which was authorized.'
4 7
Third, the precedent to which the court in Gleneagles adheres is
also unreasonable because the precedent operates as a disincentive
for employers to seek appellate relief. With respect to statutory inter-
pretation, the court has indicated that it should never read a statute in
a way that is inconsistent with, or ignores, common sense or logic.
148
Yet the court's interpretation of the Act prohibiting recovery-back ig-
nores common sense: the court recognized a right to appeal, yet pro-
hibited an effectuation of that right by interpreting the Act in such a
way that denies the employer a right to recovery.149 Common experi-
ence suggests that a primary reason that an employer would exercise
the right to appeal a WCC award is to recover money, especially in
cases where the award was paid as a lump sum. 150 In cases where the
payment is made as a lump sum, the logical reason that an employer
would appeal is to recover that payment.151 With respect to stare deci-
sis, the principle that precedent must usually be followed is partly
based on the assumption that parties should be able to regulate their
conduct and enter into relationships with reasonable assurance of the
governing rules of law.' 52 As such, Maryland employers considering
established precedent denying them the ability to recover-back have
no real incentive to appeal and can be expected to regulate their con-
duct by not bothering to seek appellate relief.
1 5 3
146. 108 Md. App. 695, 703, 673 A.2d 762, 766 (1996).
147. GleneagleA 385 Md. at 505, 869 A.2d at 860 (providing Hanks with compensation
not authorized should the court vacate the Commission's order on appeal).
148. See Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 128-30, 756 A.2d 987, 991-92 (2000) (discuss-
ing how statutory interpretation should be conducted); accord Office of People's Counsel v.
Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 355 Md. 1, 31-32, 733 A.2d 996, 1012 (1997); Wright, 348 Md. at
216, 703 A.2d at 153.
149. See Gleneagles, 385 Md. at 505, 869 A.2d at 860 (providing Gleneagles the ability to
appeal but not to recoup its overpaid award).
150. In lump-sum cases, the full amount is paid out at once. See id. (defining lump-sum
cases). Unlike payment cases where an appeal may prevent future harm by stopping pay-
ments, the harm is already done in lump-sum cases. See generally Gleneagles, 385 Md. at 505,
869 A.2d at 860 (discussing the greater hardship imposed on employers against which the
Commission orders a lump-sum payment).
151. Id.
152. 20 Am. JUR. 2D Couris § 129 (2004).
153. See id. (suggesting that parties acting according to established precedent is part of
the principle of stare decisis).
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b. The Court Ignored the Right to Restitution as an Integral Com-
ponent of the Right to Appeal, Wrongly Allowing One Party to Be Unjustly
Enriched.-The Gleneagles court's decision ignores restitution's impor-
tance to the appeal process. 154  The court's interpretation of the
Workers' Compensation Act confirms that both parties have a right to
appeal. 15 5 Part of that right includes the Court of Appeals's ability to
reverse lower court findings. 156 The intended result of a reversed or
vacated decision is that both parties return to the same posture they
were in before the original judgment.157
"Restitution" is a term used to denote this return to the status
quo. 158 Ajudicially recognized right, restitution is an integral compo-
nent of the right to appeal. 159 Often used in terms of financial reim-
bursement, a party obtains restitution when the court restores him to
his previous condition, including the returning back of something to
its rightful owner.16 ° As a result, a defendant, upon a vacated or re-
versed judgment, is entitled to what was taken from him following the
judgment. 61 In this view, restitution makes a direct appeal to the
standards of equitable and conscientious behavior as a source of obli-
gations that society will enforce with legal action.16 2 Thus, a defen-
dant who pays money as part of an award to the plaintiff and
subsequently wins the appeal should recover back the money already
paid out to effectuate the goal of the appeal.'63 The Gleneagles court,
154. See 385 Md. at 505, 869 A.2d at 860 (providing Gleneagles the ability to appeal but
not to recoup its overpaid award and return to the status quo).
155. See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-737 to -745 (West 2005) (outlining the process
of appeals from the Workers' Compensation Commission). See generally 385 Md. 492, 869
A.2d 852 (recognizing appeals of WCC awards under the Act).
156. 5 Am. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 853 (2004).
157. See Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 781, 786 (1929) (discuss-
ing that the appeal process includes the well-established right to recover what was lost by
the enforcement of a judgment subsequently reversed).
158. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 122, at 1573-74 ("A body of substantive law
in which liability is based not on tort or contract but on the defendant's unjust enrich-
ment .... Return or restoration of some specific thing to its rightful owner or status.").
159. See generally Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301, 309 (1935);
Arkadelphia Milling Co. v. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co., 249 U.S. 134, 145 (1918).
160. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT: GENERAL PRINCI-
PLES § I (Discussion Draft, 2000). The definition of restitution is that "a person who is
unjustly enriched at the expense of another is liable in restitution to the other." Id.
161. Atlantic, 295 U.S. at 309.
162. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1. This idea is
consistent with Podgurski v. One Beacon Insurance Co., where the court held that if an em-
ployee recovers excess money above that awarded by the Commission, the insurer or em-
ployer has no further obligation to pay the employee as well as a right to full
reimbursement. 374 Md. 133, 138, 821 A.2d 400, 403 (2003).
163. Arkadelphia, 249 U.S. at 145.
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however, ignored the importance of restitution to the appeals process.
If Gleneagles wins on appeal, Gleneagles will not be able to recover
the award that it paid to Hanks in this proceeding or in a separate civil
claim, thus allowing Hanks to be unjustly enriched.164
By ignoring the right to restitution, the Gleneagles court wrongly
allowed one party to be unjustly enriched. The substantive part of the
law of restitution is concerned with identifying those forms of enrich-
ment that the law considers "unjust."165 An enrichment is unjust if
the benefit conferred is the result of a non-consensual transfer-a
court-ordered payment-that becomes void or voidable by an invali-
dating cause, such as enforced payments, which are later invalidated
or overturned. 16 6 In the same way, if a court reverses or vacates a
workers' compensation award already conferred to the employee, and
the employer cannot recover-back the funds based on restitution,
then the employee is retaining a benefit the court has determined
rightfully belongs to the employer. 167 As such, a restitution claim
based on unjust enrichment is valid if a court determines that a bene-
fit belongs to the party that has already conferred it upon a second
party.168 Thus, an employee, like Hanks, will be unjustly enriched if
she retains an award paid by the employer, like Gleneagles, which the
court has later reversed or vacated.1 69 Maryland courts should allow
for an employer to recover-back payments made and later reversed on
appeal based on restitution and unjust enrichment.1 70 Because the
court ignored the right to restitution and continues to prohibit an
employer from recovering-back overpaid money, Gleneagles loses the
ability to be restored to the status quo it was in before the decision
and Hanks stands to be unjustly enriched.17'
The Gleneagles court, however, believed that the legislature was
the correct body to amend this area of law and refused to remedy the
164. See generally Gleneagles, 385 Md. at 505, 869 A.2d at 860 (noting that Gleneagles will
not recover the amount paid to Hanks regardless of success on appeal).
165. BLACK'S LAw DIerIONARY, supra note 122, at 1573-74.
166. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1.
167. Id.; see Gleneagles, 385 Md. at 501, 869 A.2d at 857 (applying the court's decision to
deny recovery-back under the principle of unjust enrichment).
168. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1.
169. See generally Gleneagles, 385 Md. at 501, 869 A.2d at 857 (providing support for the
proposition that Hanks will be unjustly enriched); accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITU-
TION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1.
170. See generally Gleneagles, 385 Md. at 501, 869 A.2d at 857; accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1.
171. See generally Gleneagles, 385 Md. at 505, 869 A.2d at 860 (implying that even if
Gleneagles is successful on appeal it is prohibited from recovering the funds paid during
appeal).
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unfairness unless some basic right was infringed, even if inequities
were present. 172 This rationale, however, ignored the fact that a suc-
cessful appeal is not made to limit damage but to restore the status
quo and disregarded the employer's right to restitution as part of the
appeal process.1 73 While the court may not consider the right to resti-
tution a "basic right"-in Gleneagles, the court refused to make
changes to the controversy surrounding a defendant's ability to re-
cover-back unless it infringed on some basic right-the Supreme
Court has recognized that restitution is integral to the right to an ap-
peal and that the defendant is entitled to return to his original posi-
tion.1 74 The court in Gleneagles should have recognized that it would
be well within its power to remedy the inequity imposed by its prior
interpretation of the Act.
c. The Court Should Have Followed Other Jurisdictions That Have
Recognized the Importance of Restitution. -The court's decision in
Gleneagles and its request to the legislature to revisit the recovery-back
inequity posed by its interpretation of the Act is insufficient when
compared to other states that actually provide a vehicle through which
defendants can recover-back awards.' 71 After nearly forty years of de-
ferring to the legislature to make changes,176 Maryland courts, like
other jurisdictions, should recognize the importance of restitution.
Maryland should join other jurisdictions that allow for restitution in
the face of statutory silence instead of merely leaving it up to the legis-
lature; doing so would prevent further inequities, including deterring
employers from seeking appellate relief and unjust enrichment. For
example, Montana, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania all allow employers
to recover overpaid funds regardless of the fact that each state's work-
ers' compensation statute is silent on the issue. 177 The high court in
each of those states could have deferred to the legislature and merely
asked the legislature to revisit the statute.178 Instead, all three su-
172. Id. at 505, 869 A.2d at 860.
173. See id. (leaving Gleneagles without restitution even though the company may win
on appeal).
174. E.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301, 309 (1935); Arkadelphia
Milling Co. v. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co., 249 U.S. 134, 145 (1918).
175. See generally id. (noting its limited decision on recovery-back).
176. Maryland courts have been urging the legislature to address the Act's inequities for
close to forty years. E.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. Treadwell, 263 Md. 430, 439, 283
A.2d 601, 606 (1971); accord Reil v. State Comp. Mut. Ins. Fund, 837 P.2d 1334, 1336
(Mont. 1992); Hajnas v. Englehard, 555 A.2d 716, 719 (N.J. 1989); Lucey v. Workmen's
Comp. Appeal Bd., 732 A.2d 1201, 1203 (Pa. 1999).
177. See Reil, 837 P.2d at 1336; Hajnas, 555 A.2d at 719; Lucey, 732 A.2d at 1203.
178. Reil, 837 P.2d at 1336; Hajnas, 555 A.2d at 719; Lucey, 732 A.2d at 1203.
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preme courts recognized the importance of restitution. 179 NewJersey,
despite statutory silence, relied upon the principle of unjust enrich-
ment in Hajnas v. Englehard to hold that an employer was entitled to
restitution. 8 ° The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, likewise, relied upon
the law of restitution in Lucey v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board
to hold that if an employer wrongly overpaid an employee, restitution
was appropriate. 8' Finally, the Montana Supreme Court, in a case
very analogous to Gleneagles, determined that restitution applied to
cases where an employer, who paid funds to an employee, successfully
appealed and the court overturned the employee's award.' 82 The
Court of Appeals should follow the examples set by courts in jurisdic-
tions like Montana, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, and allow for com-
mon-law restitution as a remedy for employers to recover-back funds
paid which are later overturned on appeal. 8 '
5. Conclusion.-The court's holding in Gleneagles v. Hanks that it
does not have the authority to stay a WCC award during an appeal
means that employers cannot recover-back funds paid during the ap-
peal should the award be overturned. 184 Although the Gleneagles deci-
sion comports with the doctrine of stare decisis, the precedent it
adhered to was unreasonable, and the court missed the chance to re-
solve the inequity stemming from its interpretation of the Workers'
Compensation Act."8 5 Instead, the court in Gleneagles ignored the
right to restitution and restitution's importance to the appeal process,
thus allowing Hanks to be unjustly enriched should Gleneagles ulti-
mately win on appeal. 86 The court should allow recovery-back based
on the common-law principles of restitution and unjust enrichment as
courts in other jurisdictions have done.18 7
JESSICA P. BuTKERA
179. Re, 837 P.2d at 1336; Hajnas, 555 A.2d at 719; Lucey, 732 A.2d at 1203.
180. 555 A.2d at 719-22.
181. 732 A.2d at 1203-04.
182. Re/, 837 P.2d at 1336.
183. See id.; Hajnas, 555 A.2d at 719; Lucey, 732 A.2d at 1203.
184. Gleneages, 385 Md. at 506, 869 A.2d at 861.
185. See supra Part 4.a.
186. See supra Part 4.b.
187. See supra Part 4.c.
VII. LEGAL ET-Hics
A. Public Prosecutors and the Appearance ofJustice: How the Court of
Appeals Erred in Gatewood by Treating a State's Attorney as
an Ordinary Advocate
In Gatewood v. State,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland consid-
ered whether a state's attorney should be disqualified from prosecut-
ing a defendant he previously represented in an unrelated criminal
matter. The court held that such a prosecutor did not have to be
disqualified per se, and the appropriate response in such a situation is
for the trial court to exercise its discretion after inquiring into poten-
tial prejudice to the defendant.2 The court specified that the trial
court should examine whether the current and prior cases are sub-
stantially related and whether the defendant might be unfairly
prejudiced in the case before it due to previous disclosure of confi-
dential information.' In so holding, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision consistent with attorney conflict-of-interest guidelines in the
Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct.4 The court erred,
however, by treating conflicts involving public prosecutors in the same
manner as conflicts involving private attorneys.5 In particular, the
court did not recognize or give sufficient weight to substantial legal
authority that establishes a greater need for impartiality and disinter-
est by public prosecutors due to their unique role as state advocates
for justice.6 Additionally, the court neglected to resolve whether the
longstanding "appearance of impropriety" doctrine7 can still consti-
tute grounds for attorney disqualification in Maryland, whether for
public prosecutors or private attorneys. The court should have con-
cluded that while the appearance of impropriety doctrine is perhaps
unduly burdensome for private attorneys, the doctrine should apply
1. 388 Md. 526, 880 A.2d 322 (2005).
2. Id. at 532, 880 A.2d at 325.
3. Id.
4. MD. L.AwYERs' RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2006).
5. See infra Part 2.c.
6. See infra Part 2.c.
7. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1969). The American Bar Associ-
ation's [hereinafter ABA] Model Code was replaced by the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct in 1983, but is still looked to as a guide for ethical behavior. See infra notes 59-83
and accompanying text.
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to prosecutors, just as it does for judges,8 because prosecutors possess
a unique public role and high degree of discretion.9
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals should have required that
whenever a conflict is alleged due to prior representation of the de-
fendant by a prosecutor, the trial court should inquire not just into
potential prejudice from disclosed confidential information, but also
into the prosecutor's ability to act and appear impartial10 If the judge
concludes that the prior representation makes it significantly more
difficult for the prosecutor to remain impartial, or makes the prosecu-
tion appear improper in a way that affects the public's faith in the
integrity of the judicial system, the prosecutor should be
disqualified.11
1. The Case.-In 2003, Troy Arness Gatewood was prosecuted in
the Circuit Court for Cecil County1 2 for possession and distribution of
a "controlled dangerous substance" (CDS).1s Just before trial, the de-
fense moved to disqualify the prosecutor, state's attorney14 Christo-
pher Eastridge, because Eastridge had defended Gatewood in the
past.' 5 Gatewood argued that the prior representation created a con-
flict and "the specter of impropriety" in that Eastridge might have
gleaned confidential information he could use to impeach Gatewood
during cross-examination.16 In a bench conference, the judge asked
8. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (2004).
9. See infra notes 234-244 and accompanying text.
10. See generally Sinclair v. State, 278 Md. 243, 363 A.2d 468 (1976) (holding that a
prosecutor should not have a personal or private interest in obtaining a conviction). Ac-
cord Young v. United States ex reL Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
11. See infra Part 4.c.
12. Cecil County is located in Northeast Maryland. By Maryland standards, it is a me-
dium-sized county with approximately 95,000 people. U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/24/24015.htm (last visited Nov. 12,
2006). At the time of Gatewood's trial, the county state's attorney's office had one full-time
state's attorney and seven part-time assistant state's attorneys. Telephone Interview with
Cecil Co. State's Attorney's Office (Dec. 16, 2005).
13. Gatewood, 388 Md. at 530, 880 A.2d at 324. The CDS was cocaine. Id. at 532, 880
A.2d at 325.
14. Both the Court of Special Appeals and Gatewood's appeal refer to Eastridge as an
"Assistant State's Attorney," but the Court of Appeals notes this appears to have been an
error. Id. at 530 n.1, 880 A.2d at 324 n.1.
15. Id. at 530-31, 880 A.2d at 324-25. Eastridge was an attorney for the Public De-
fender's Office from 1986 through 1998 before being elected state's attorney for Cecil
County in 2002. Id at 532 n.4, 535, 880 A.2d at 325 n.4, 327. Gatewood apparently did not
recognize Eastridge as his former defense counsel until just after voir dire was complete, at
which point he notified his defense attorney, who then raised the matter with the judge.
Id. at 532, 880 A.2d at 325-26. The CDS indictments against Gatewood were obtained by
Eastridge's predecessor as state's attorney. Id. at 532 n.4, 880 A.2d at 325 n.4.
16. Id. at 532, 880 A.2d at 326.
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Eastridge if he recalled representing Gatewood or had any special
knowledge that could be used in the pending case.17 Eastridge re-
plied that he vaguely recalled Gatewood from his time at the Public
Defender's office but had "no specific recollection" of representing
him.'" He added that he had no knowledge that would be useful in
the current prosecution and would rely on other cases culled from the
state's attorney's office files in impeaching Gatewood should he take
the stand. 9 The judge denied the defense motion.20
After opening arguments, Gatewood's attorney checked the
records and found that Eastridge had represented Gatewood in 1998
on burglary and drug distribution charges, which concluded with a
nolle prosequi and guilty plea, respectively. 2 ' The defense then re-
newed its motion to disqualify, arguing that the record clearly demon-
strated there had been "some significant contact" between Eastridge
and Gatewood.22 Eastridge responded by reiterating that he had no
recollection of either case, adding that during his twelve years as a
public defender, he had represented "hundreds if not thousands of
individuals," and as state's attorney, he could not possibly disqualify
himself from every case involving a former client.23 Eastridge also
pledged that any cross-examination would be limited to the present
case and information gleaned not from his prior representation of
Gatewood, but from the state's attorney's office files. 24 The judge de-
nied the renewed motion to disqualify Eastridge, stating that while he
recognized Gatewood's concern, he did not see that it was prejudicial
to have Eastridge remain as prosecuting attorney.25 The trial pro-
ceeded and, when Gatewood testified on his own behalf, Eastridge im-
peached him by citing two prior convictions for theft, but Eastridge
did not raise either case in which he had represented Gatewood while
a public defender. 26 The jury convicted Gatewood of three counts of
distribution of cocaine. 27 Eastridge then submitted a sentencing rec-
ommendation of thirty-six to sixty years, arguing that because Gate-
17. Id. at 532-33, 880 A.2d at 326.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 533, 880 A.2d at 326.
20. Id. at 534, 880 A.2d at 326.
21. Id., 880 A.2d at 327. Nolleprosequi is the voluntary withdrawal of the charges by the
prosecutor. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1074 (8th ed. 2004). The guilty plea was for conspir-
acy to possess CDS. Gatewood, 388 Md. at 534, 880 A.2d at 327.
22. Gatewood, 388 Md. at 535, 880 A.2d at 327.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 536, 880 A.2d at 328.
27. Gatewood v. State, 158 Md. App. 458, 462, 857 A.2d 590, 592 (2004).
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wood had at least eleven prior convictions, he should be regarded as a
prior adult criminal offender and receive a long sentence.2 ' The trial
judge noted that Eastridge's sentencing recommendation was on the
"high" side due to Gatewood's prior criminal record, but sentenced
Gatewood to less than the maximum permitted because the judge
concluded Gatewood was just a "low level dealer."29
Gatewood appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing, in-
ter alia, that the trial court erred in not disqualifying the prosecutor.30
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding
that (1) the decision to disqualify counsel is left to the discretion of
the trial court, (2) disqualification is not required per se in every in-
stance involving prior representation by a prosecutor and only man-
dated when the two cases are "substantially related," and (3)
Eastridge's prior representation did not involve matters substantially
related to the prosecution at bar. 3' Therefore, held the court, dis-
qualification was not required.32
Gatewood appealed to the Maryland Court of Appeals, which
granted certiorari3 3 to rule on two issues: (1) whether a prosecutor
should be disqualified because of the appearance of a conflict arising
from prior representation in an unrelated criminal matter, and (2)
whether the trial judge had abused his discretion in ruling there had
been no prejudice to the defendant.34
2. Legal Backgound.-Prosecutorial conflict of interest matters
in Maryland are governed by the Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct (the Maryland Rules) 35 and Maryland common law.
Additional significant influences include federal case law and the ethi-
cal guidelines set forth in the American Bar Association's (ABA)
Model Rules of Professional Conduct 36 and its predecessors-the
28. Gatewood, 388 Md. at 552, 880 A.2d at 337.
29. Id. at 552 n.20, 880 A.2d at 337 n.20. The Maryland sentencing guidelines recom-
mended a sentence of twelve to sixty years, depending on whether the sentences were to
run consecutively or concurrently. Id. The judge sentenced Gatewood to twenty years on
each count with the sentences to run concurrently. Id.
30. Id. at 531-32, 880 A.2d at 325.
31. Gatewood, 158 Md. App. at 466-68, 857 A.2d at 594.
32. Id.
33. Gatewood v. State, 384 Md. 448, 863 A.2d 997 (2004).
34. Gatewood, 388 Md. at 531-32, 880 A.2d at 325.
35. MD. LAwYERS' RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2006).
36. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (1983).
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Model Code of Professional Responsibility (the Model Code) 7 and
the Canons of Professional Ethics."
These authorities have established three essential principles for
courts to consider and apply when evaluating prosecutorial conflicts
of interest. The first is that no attorney, whether prosecutor or private
advocate, should represent a client when the attorney has previously
represented an adverse party in the same or a "substantially related"
matter. 9 The primary focus of this restriction, and its application by
the courts, has been the potential prejudice to an adverse party due to
prior disclosure of confidential information.4 ° The second considera-
tion, and one given varying weight by various courts, is the appearance
of impropriety and its impact on public confidence in the judicial sys-
tem.4" Third, the Maryland Rules,42 Model Rules,43 and Maryland
and federal case law have all also recognized that public prosecutors
occupy a unique role that requires a higher degree of impartiality and
disinterest than that demanded of private attorneys.44
a. The "Same or Substantially Related" Prohibition.-The Mary-
land Rules of Professional Conduct 1.6, 1.7,46 and 1.947 establish
37. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1969).
38. CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS (1908).
39. MD. LI-wYERs' RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.9; Buckley v. Airshield Corp., 908 F.
Supp. 299, 304 (D. Md. 1995).
40. Buckly, 908 F. Supp. at 304.
41. See, e.g., Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Los Angeles Rams Football Co., 284 Md.
86, 95-96, 394 A.2d 801, 806-07 (1978) (considering the appearance of impropriety but
calling it a "general standard that serves solely as a warning" and not a strict rule); Sorci v.
Iowa Dist. Ct. for Polk County, 671 N.W.2d 482, 493-94 (Iowa 2003) (noting that if the
appearance of impropriety would undermine public trust in the legal system it could re-
quire attorney disqualification).
42. MD. LAwYERS' RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8.
43. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8.
44. E.g., Sinclair v. State, 278 Md. 243, 256-57, 363 A.2d 468, 476 (1976); Young v.
United States ex rel Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 803 (1987).
45. MD. LAWYERs' RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) provides, "A lawyer shall not
reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after
consultation ......
46. MD. LAwYEPs' RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 provides,
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be
directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the
relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third
person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely af-
fected; and
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that an attorney should not represent a client in an adverse position to
a former client if the two matters are the same or substantially related
or if the prior representation provided the attorney with confidential
information that could be used to the detriment of the former client.
Additionally, Rule 1.1048 states that if a lawyer who has a conflict asso-
ciates with a private firm, ordinarily that entire firm may not represent
a party whose interests are adverse to those of the conflicted attorney's
prior client.49
The Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct became effective
January 1, 1987, and since that date, Maryland courts have had few
opportunities to apply them to conflict-of-interest cases involving
prior representation." ° There are no published Maryland state cases
since 1987 that specifically address the issue, whether involving a pros-
ecutor or a private attorney. The United States District Court for the
District of Maryland, however, applied the Maryland Rules to a prior
representation conflict involving a private attorney in Buckley v. Air-
shield Corp. 1
(2) the client consents after consultation.
47. MD. LAwYERs' RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9 provides,
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:
(a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in
which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client consents after consultation; or
(b) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the for-
mer client except as Rule 1.6 would permit with respect to a client or when the
information has become generally known.
48. MD. LAwYERs' RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(a) provides,
While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a
client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so
by Rules 1.7 or 1.9, unless the prohibition is based on a personal interest of the
prohibited lawyer and does not present a significant risk of materially limiting the
representation of the client by the remaining lawyers in the firm. ... (c) When a
lawyer becomes associated with a firm, no lawyer associated in the firm shall
knowingly represent a person in a matter in which the newly associated lawyer is
disqualified under Rule 1.9 unless the personally disqualified lawyer is timely
screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the
fee therefrom.
This rule does not apply to public prosecutors. MD. LAwYERs' RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.11 cmt. 2 (2006).
49. Exceptions are sometimes available when either the former client consents or when
a strict screening method is put in place to ensure that other attorneys at the firm do not
come into contact with confidential information known to the conflicted attorney. Clinard
v. Blackwood, No. O1AO1-9801-CV-00029, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 729, at *54 (1999), affd,
46 S.W.3d 177 (Tenn. 2001). The use of screening arrangements, however, remains con-
troversial. Id.
50. Buckley v. Airshield Corp., 908 F. Supp. 299, 304 n.5 (D. Md. 1995).
51. Id. at 299.
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In Buckley, an attorney with a firm acting as Buckley's patent
counsel left that firm and began representing Airshield.52 Buckley
then sued Airshield for patent infringement and urged that the attor-
ney be disqualified because he had worked on Buckley's previous pat-
ent enforcement cases and was privy to confidential information.53
The federal court relied on Maryland Rule 1.9 and analogous case law
from other jurisdictions in holding that a private attorney should be
disqualified if the current and prior cases were the same or "substan-
tially related" because of concern that confidential information
gleaned from the prior representation could be used to a former cli-
ent's disadvantage.54 Because the current and prior representation in
Buckley involved the same patent and similar litigation issues, the court
concluded they were substantially related and the attorney should be
disqualified.55
The "same or substantially related" test for attorney disqualifica-
tion cases has also been widely applied in other jurisdictions.5 6 Justifi-
cations generally cited for the same-or-substantially-related test are
both the potential for misuse of client confidences, 7 as well as the
need to preserve public confidence in the integrity of attorneys and
the judicial system.58
b. The Appearance of Impropriety Doctrine.-The need to pre-
serve public confidence in the legal system is also central to the "ap-
pearance of impropriety" doctrine, which continues to influence
courts in Maryland and other states in evaluating whether an apparent
conflict necessitates attorney disqualification.5 ' The doctrine traces
its origins to ethical principles adopted by the ABA nearly a century
52. Id. at 302. The switch occurred before Buckley sued Airshield, but while the two
parties were negotiating with each other. Id. at 302-03.
53. Id. at 303. The attorney argued that he had not received any confidential informa-
tion, but did not deny that he had done some patent work for Buckley. Id. at 306.
54. Buckley, 908 F. Supp. at 304 (citing Avnet, Inc. v. OEC Corp., 498 F. Supp. 818, 820
(N.D. Ga. 1980); Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Graphix Hot Line, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1200,
1204 (E.D. Pa. 1992)).
55. 908 F. Supp. at 306, 308.
56. E.g., Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1980); Brown v. Dist. of Columbia Bd.
of Zoning Adjustment, 486 A.2d 37 (D.C. 1984); Tessier v. Plastic Surgery Specialists, Inc.
731 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Va. 1990).
57. Tessier, 731 F. Supp. at 728.
58. Id. at 729.
59. E.g., Sinclair v. State, 278 Md. 243, 256, 363 A.2d 468, 476 (1976); State ex rel.
Cosenza v. Hill, 607 S.E.2d 811, 817 (W. Va. 2004). For a revealing account by the Ameri-
can Bar Association of the origins of the doctrine, see generally Kathleen Maher, Keeping Up
Appearances, ABA CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, available at http://www.abanet.org/judi-
cialethics/resources/TPLAppearanceoflmpropriety.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
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ago.6 ° In 1908, the ABA formulated its Canons of Professional Ethics,
which laid out a series of principles, or Canons, regarding appropriate
attorney conduct and situations involving conflicts of interest.
6 1
These original Canons were guidelines and not bright-line rules,6 2 but
were used and interpreted by courts and ethics committees when eval-
uating possible attorney ethical violations.6" The Maryland state bar
association adopted the ABA Canons in 1922,64 and the influence of
the Canons can be seen as early as Derlin v. Derlin,65 a 1923 case involv-
ing a private attorney who simultaneously represented two sides in a
family estate negotiation. In Derlin, the Court of Appeals held that
even though there was no evidence the attorney had improper mo-
tives or acted with prejudice toward one party, it was improper to re-
present adverse parties in the same case, "however slight such adverse
interest may be."66 The Derlin court noted that the principle barring
attorneys from representing adverse parties was "a rigid one," de-
signed not just to prevent unethical practitioners from fraudulent be-
havior, but to preclude honest attorneys from putting themselves in
awkward positions where they might have to choose between conflict-
ing obligations.6 7
The actual phrase "appearance of impropriety" was not expressly
included in the original Canons, but first entered in the legal lexicon
in 1932, when an ABA ethics committee interpreting the Canons
opined that it would be inappropriate for a part-time public prosecu-
tor to defend a client in a civil case while simultaneously prosecuting
him on felony charges.68 The committee recognized that normally a
private attorney might be permitted to represent adverse parties with
the clients' consent, but said that a public prosecutor had a duty "to be
and remain above all suspicion" and thus should not only avoid all
impropriety but also avoid "the appearance of impropriety."69
60. Maher, supra note 59, at 2.
61. CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS (1908). The Canons were based on common-law rules.
Clinard v. Blackwood, No. OlAO-9801-CV-00029, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 729, at *18
(1999), affd, 46 S.W.3d 177 (Tenn. 2001).
62. Clinard, 1999 Tenn. App. at *19.
63. See id. (stating that prior to the ABA Canons, the judiciary created common-law
rules governing ethical legal conduct, but following 1908, the courts began to cite the
Canons as authority for their decisions regulating attorney behavior).
64. Att'y Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Gansler, 377 Md. 656, 678, 835 A.2d 548, 560
(2003).
65. 142 Md. 352, 121 A. 27 (1923).
66. Id. at 364, 121 A. at 31.
67. Id.
68. ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Grievances Formal Op. 77 (1932).
69. Id.
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When the ABA formally revised its Canons in 1969, creating the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility with its Canons, Ethical
Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules, the drafters concluded that
the appearance of impropriety principle was worth formally including
and extending to all attorneys, not just prosecutors, and devised Ca-
non 9, A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional
Impropriety.7" Canon 9 was based not just on the need to guide attor-
neys in their conduct, but on the perceived need to maintain public
confidence and trust in the legal system.71 A similar Canon was
crafted for the judiciary and remains a guiding force to this day.72
Maryland adopted the Model Code verbatim and in its entirety in
1970, 7 and eventually, every state except California adopted a version
of the Code recognizing the appearance-of-impropriety Canon.7
4
Just as the original Canons of Professional Ethics had been guide-
lines and not bright-line rules,75 the Canons and Ethical Considera-
tions of the Model Code were not binding rules, but rather
aspirational principles that lawyers were encouraged to follow. 76 The
Model Code had an additional set of Disciplinary Rules meant to pro-
vide a basis for court disciplinary action and to establish a minimum
standard for acceptable attorney conduct.77 Thus, even after a state
formally adopted the Model Code, giving it the force and effect of law,
attorneys were not necessarily subject to sanctions for failing to abide
by the Canons and Ethical Considerations because they were mere
"general concepts."78 Even so, numerous courts, commentators, and
70. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 9.1 (1969) provides that "[c]ontinuation
of the American concept that we are to be governed by rules of law requires that the
people have faith that justice can be obtained through our legal system. A lawyer should
promote public confidence in our system and in the legal profession." EC 9-6 adds, "Every
lawyer owes a solemn duty to uphold the integrity and honor of his profession ... and to
strive to avoid not only professional impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety."
Id.
71. Id.; Clinard v. Blackwood, No. 01A01-9801-CV-00029, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 729,
at *54 (1999), affd, 46 S.W.3d 177, 187-88 (Tenn. 2001).
72. MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 2, AJudge Shall Avoid Impropriety and
the Appearance of Impropriety in All of the Judge's Activities (2004); see Jefferson-El v.
State, 330 Md. 99, 107, 622 A.2d 737, 741 (1992) (applying the appearance of impropriety
standard to a case involving judicial conduct).
73. Atty. Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Gansler, 377 Md. 656, 681, 835 A.2d 548, 562
(2003).
74. State v. Loyal, 753 A.2d 1073, 1094 (N.J. 2000).
75. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
76. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITv Preamble (1969); see also Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co. v. Los Angeles Rams Football Co., 284 Md. 86, 95-96, 394 A.2d 801, 806-07
(1978) (discussing the application of the Model Code's Disciplinary Rules and Canons).
77. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSIBILITY Preamble (1969).
78. Peat, Marwick, 284 Md. at 95, 394 A.2d at 806.
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attorneys looked to the principles in the Canons and Ethical Consid-
erations as guidelines for judging attorney conduct, and courts often
disciplined or disqualified attorneys for violating the Canons and Con-
siderations as well as the Disciplinary Rules.79 As a result, the line
between the aspirational principles and actual disciplinary rules be-
came somewhat blurred and led to the evolution of what became
known as the "appearance of impropriety doctrine" with respect to
attorney disqualification and misconduct.80 In evaluating whether an
attorney need be disqualified because of a conflict, courts looked not
only at whether an actual conflict existed, but at whether the public
might perceive a particular action as inappropriate or "unseemly."81
Some courts held that the appearance of impropriety alone was
sufficient to disqualify counsel,82 while others, including the Maryland
Court of Appeals (in a case involving a private attorney), viewed it as
one of several factors to consider when evaluating an attorney's
conduct.
83
(1) Applying the Doctrine to Prosecutors in Mayland.-The
first published Maryland court case in which a prosecutor's actions
were judged under the appearance of impropriety standard was Sin-
clair v. State, an appeal of a conviction won by a prosecutor who had
been simultaneously representing a party adverse to the defendant in
a civil lawsuit.8 4 The trial judge had denied the defendant's motion
for prosecutorial disqualification without a hearing, stating that a
prosecutor was by nature "hostile" to the defendant, so it mattered
little whether he had additional incentive for aggressively prosecuting
79. Clinard, No. 01A01-9801-CV-00029, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS at *19.
80. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
81. State v. Loyal, 753 A.2d. 1073, 1094 (N.J. 2000).
82. E.g., In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig.,
658 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); Oswall v. Tekni-Plex, Inc., 691 A.2d 889 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1997); see also Lovell v. Winchester, 941 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Ky. 1997) ("[T)he mere
appearance of impropriety is just as egregious as any actual or real conflict."); INA Under-
writers Ins. Co. v. Rubin, 635 F. Supp. 1, 5 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (noting that the appearance of
impropriety can require disqualification).
83. Peat, Marwick, 284 Md. at 95-96, 394 A.2d at 806; see Bd. of Educ. of N.Y. v. Nyquist,
590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that the appearance of impropriety alone is
too slender a reed on which to rest a disqualification order except in the rarest cases").
84. 278 Md. 243, 252, 363 A.2d 468, 474 (1976). The state's attorney was simultane-
ously representing a bank that held a note against the defendant and allegedly told the
defendant that if he contested the note, he would be indicted for writing bad checks. Id. at
248, 363 A.2d at 471. The state's attorney subsequently filed a criminal information against
Sinclair and sought to prosecute the case. Id.
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the case.15 The Court of Appeals reversed, declaring that the trial
judge had misconstrued the obligations of a state's attorney.8 6
The Sinclair court noted that a violation of the Model Code alone
did not necessitate reversal of a criminal conviction, but required at
least an inquiry by the trial judge into potential prejudice.8 7 The
court held that whenever it is alleged a prosecutor may have a per-
sonal or pecuniary interest that might impair his or her ability to act
impartially, the trial judge must hold a factual inquiry into whether
there is a conflict.88 This is vital, noted the court, because a prosecu-
tor is not an ordinary attorney, but rather is one vested with the sover-
eign's power of discretion as to whether to press forward with a
prosecution. 9 The court cited the Model Code's Canon 9 for the
proposition that a prosecutor should avoid the appearance or reality
of a conflict of interest with respect to official duties.9 ° Therefore, the
court continued, if a prosecutor has, or would appear to a reasonable
observer to have, an interest which might impair that prosecutor's
ability to act impartially toward the accused, the prosecutor should be
disqualified." The court then remanded the case for an evidentiary
hearing on whether the conviction should be vacated.92
In Lykins v. State, the Court of Appeals considered whether a pros-
ecutor's prior representation of the defendant in a marginally related
civil matter created such an appearance of impropriety that the prose-
cutor should be disqualified and the indictment dismissed. The
court held that while disqualification was not required per se because
85. Id. at 250, 363 A.2d at 472.
86. Id. at 254, 363 A.2d at 475.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 260, 363 A.2d at 479.
89. Id. at 257, 363 A.2d at 476.
90. Id. at 259, 363 A.2d at 477. The Sinclair court also cited the A.B.A. Project on
Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function (Approved
Draft, 1971) § 1.2(a). Id
91. Id. at 254, 363 A.2d at 475. An inquiry into possible bias by the prosecutor was vital,
declared the court, because a prosecutor's decisions regarding whether and how to prose-
cute must be impartial and "untainted by any contaminating influence." Id. at 260, 363
A.2d at 478. Because the trial judge in Sinclair had not conducted an inquiry into whether
the prosecutor's impartiality was tainted, the Court of Appeals remanded the case and
overturned the conviction. Id.
92. Id. at 260, 363 A.2d at 478.
93. 288 Md. 71, 84, 415 A.2d 1113, 1121 (1980). In private practice, the prosecutor
had represented the client in her marital separation proceeding. Id. at 73, 415 A.2d at
1115. The criminal case involved a charge of attempted murder against a man the woman
had been involved with prior to her separation and who presumably was one of the motiva-
tions for separating from her husband. Id. The prosecutor said he had handled over a
thousand such separation agreements and could not recall any mention of the man Lykins
was accused of stabbing. Id. at 74, 415 A.2d at 1116.
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of the prior representation, the trial judge's decision to remove the
prosecutor was not an abuse of discretion.94 However, the Lykins
court drew the line at extending the appearance of impropriety doc-
trine to require dismissal of the entire indictment, holding that the
trial judge's decision to dismiss the indictment was an error because
the charge had not been brought with improper motives as in
Sinclair.
95
The Court of Appeals again acknowledged the appearance of im-
propriety doctrine in 1983 in Young v. State, a case involving imputed
disqualification due to a defense attorney joining the state's attorney's
office while it was prosecuting one of the attorney's former clients.96
The prosecution involved the same criminal charge the attorney had
been defending, but after joining the prosecutor's office, the attorney
had not been involved in the actual prosecution of his former client.97
The court noted the "important public interest of confidence in the
impartiality of the prosecution,"9 but went on to find that the appear-
ance of impropriety doctrine did not extend so far as to require dis-
qualifying an entire state's attorney's office.99 The Young court held
that the appropriate action was for the trial court to inquire into
prejudice to the defendant from the potential disclosure of confiden-
tial information between the defendant's former counsel and his cur-
rent colleagues in the state's attorney's office.1° ° If the trial judge did
not find potential prejudice, it was not an abuse of discretion to allow
the other prosecutors to continue prosecuting the case.10 1
In rejecting imputed disqualification for the entire state's attor-
ney's office, the Young court noted with approval that other jurisdic-
tions encountering similar matters had looked to the fact that public
prosecutors are different in nature than private attorneys. 1 2 While a
private law firm was traditionally "conflicted out of' (i.e., barred from)
taking on a client if an attorney with that firm had previously repre-
sented a party with an adverse interest,1' the Young court found that
94. Id. at 85, 415 A.2d at 1121.
95. Id
96. 297 Md. 286, 286-87, 465 A.2d 1149, 1149-50 (1983).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 288, 465 A.2d at 1150 (quoting Young v. State, 52 Md. App. 550, 450 A.2d
1323 (1982)).
99. Id. at 298, 465 A.2d at 1155.
100. Id. at 288, 298, 465 A.2d at 1151, 1155.
101. See id.
102. Id. at 295, 465 A.2d at 1154.
103. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(d) (1969). This bright-line rule
was softened somewhat for private attorneys with the switch from the Model Code to the
Maryland Rules. Rule 1.10 (c) permits other members of a firm to represent a client ad-
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because prosecutors are deemed impartial seekers of justice rather
than interested advocates, vicarious disqualification of the entire of-
fice is not automatically required.1 °4
(2) Dissatisfaction with the Appearance of Impropriety Doctrine
and the Switch to the Model Rules.-Even as the Model Code reached
near universal adoption in the United States, thus extending the ap-
pearance of impropriety Canon to nearly every attorney, the doctrine
was often criticized by attorneys and commentators as vague and ill-
defined because it neither explained what qualified as impropriety
nor specified how to gauge whether an attorney's conduct appeared
proper and to whom.1"5 Others complained that it unduly limited
clients' choice of representation even when no conflict existed and
unnecessarily restricted attorney job mobility.10 6 Eventually, the ABA
reached a similar conclusion,10 7 and when it replaced the Model Code
with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 1983, the appear-
ance of impropriety standard was expressly omitted.' The Model
Rules also replaced the Model Code's three-part system of Canons,
Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules with one set of bright-
line rules followed by notes and comments explaining the ethical
principles underlying the rules.10 9 Instead of focusing on avoiding
verse to a new member's former client if the new member is screened from any participa-
tion and does not receive part of the fee from such representation. See infra note 48 and
accompanying text.
104. Young, 297 Md. at 295-96, 465 A.2d at 1154.
105. Clinard v. Blackwood, 46 S.W.3d 177, 186 (Tenn. 2001); Innovative Fin. Servs. v.
Angel, No. CV040834591, 2005 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2397, at *7 (2005); see Dennis A. Estis,
Let's Not Be Sacrilegious, But Let Us Say a Very Loud, Amen!, THE MIDDLESEX ADVOCATE (Mid-
dlesex Co. Bar Ass'n, Middlesex, N.J.), Feb. 2004, available at http://www.mcbalaw.com/
Feb2004a.html (calling the appearance of impropriety doctrine an "ambiguous, impossible
standard which caused so many lawyers over the years to scratch their heads and wonder,
'Is the action that I am about to take or have taken in violation of the appearance of
impropriety rule?'"); see also Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Legal Representation:
Should the Appearance of Impropriety Rule Be Eliminated in New Jersey-Or Revived Everywhere
Else?, 28 SETON HALL L. REv. 315, 354 (1997) (stating that the appearance of impropriety
standard as applied to private practitioners is too vague); Leonard E. Gross, The Public
Hates Lawyers: Why Should We Care?, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 1405, 1405-06 (1999) (asserting
that there is little correlation between public dislike for lawyers and actual unethical
conduct).
106. State v. Loyal, 753 A.2d 1073, 1095 (N.J. 2000); Innovative Fin., 2005 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 2397 at *5.
107. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10 cmt. (1983) (noting that the appear-
ance of impropriety standard could be construed too broadly to cover any representation
that might make an attorney's former client nervous and left unclear what amounted to
"impropriety" or the appearance thereof).
108. Id.
109. MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1983).
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the appearance of impropriety, the Model Rules focus on preserving
client confidentiality and avoiding positions directly adverse to a for-
mer client. 10
While Maryland did not adopt the Model Rules verbatim, the Ma-
ryland Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct are very similar to the
Model Rules and likewise do not contain any mention of the appear-
ance of impropriety standard.1l ' Since 1983, the vast majority of
other states have adopted similar attorneys' rules omitting the phrase
"appearance of impropriety. ' 12
Despite the switch to the Model Rules, however, many courts, at-
torneys, and commentators continue to look to the appearance of im-
propriety standard and other Canons and Ethical Considerations
from the Model Code as persuasive authority when examining conflict
of interest issues.' In 2004, for instance, the Supreme Court of West
Virginia, a state that had statutorily dropped the Model Code and re-
placed it with the Model Rules, held that the appearance of impropri-
ety was independently sufficient to disqualify an attorney, even absent
the existence of confidential information that could prejudice a for-
mer client, and despite the fact that the Model Rules does not contain
a prohibition on the appearance of impropriety.1 1 4
The remaining relevance of the appearance of impropriety doc-
trine in Maryland, whether for prosecutors or private attorneys, is un-
clear, but Maryland case law prior to adoption of the Maryland Rules
established several holdings with respect to prosecutorial conflicts that
have yet to be expressly disclaimed or overruled."1 5 These include
that an allegation of prosecutorial conflict due to personal interest
110. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10 cmt. (1983).
111. MD. LAwYERS' RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (1987).
112. As of November 2005, forty-seven states have adopted the Model Rules, usually with
minor modifications. ABA CENTER FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, DATES OF ADOPTION OF THE
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/alpha states
.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2005). New York and Ohio still apply a code of ethics based on
the Model Code. Id. Maine developed its own Code of Professional Responsibility, but it
shares many of the same principles as the Model Rules and Model Code. CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY, R. 3, Maine Bd. of Overseers of the Bar, available at http://www.mebar
overseers.org/Home/Code%20of%2OProfessional%2OResponsibiliy.html (last visited
Nov. 11, 2006).
113. E.g., Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 491 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting);
Amparano v. ASARCO, Inc., 93 P.3d 1086, 1094 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004); First Am. Carriers,
Inc. v. Kroger Co., 787 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Ark. 1990).
114. State ex rel. Cosenza v. Hill, 607 S.E.2d 811 (W. Va. 2004). The court reasoned that
judges have long been given broad discretion to disqualify an attorney when continued
representation "threatens the integrity of the legal profession" in the eyes of the public. Id.
at 817.
115. See supra notes 84-104 and accompanying text.
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does not require disqualification per se;' 1 6 that the trial court judge
has the discretion to determine whether there is a conflict after con-
ducting an inquiry into the circumstances;"'7 that even if the trial
court concludes that there is a prosecutorial conflict due to prior rep-
resentation of the defendant, that is insufficient to require per se dis-
missal of the criminal indictment unless the indictment was brought
with improper motives by the prosecutor;1 ' and that a conflict with
one prosecutor does not require disqualification of other state's attor-
neys in the same office absent an exchange of confidential informa-
tion between prosecutors.1 9 The Court of Appeals has also held that
it can be a conflict for a prosecutor to simultaneously represent a
party adverse to the defendant in a private civil matter. 2 °
Only one published Maryland case has examined the issue of
whether a prosecutor's representation of the defendant in a prior
criminal matter constitutes a conflict. In Green v. State, the prosecutor,
after the jury verdict and during discussion on the appropriate bond
pending sentence, told the trial judge he had represented the defen-
dant two years earlier on a petty larceny charge. 2' The defendant did
not raise an objection, either then, at the motion for new trial, or at
sentencing, leaving him to argue on appeal that the conviction should
be overturned due to "plain error."'22 The Court of Special Appeals
rejected the argument that the conviction was plain error and com-
mented in dicta that the "mere fact" that the prosecutor had once
represented the defendant in a completely unrelated criminal case
did not, standing alone, constitute a conflict requiring the prosecu-
tor's disqualification.' 23 The Green court did not explain its rationale,
discuss the appearance of impropriety doctrine, or cite any Maryland
authority for its conclusion, instead pointing solely to the fact that the
two cases were unrelated and there was no existing attorney-client re-
116. Sinclair v. State, 278 Md. 243, 256, 363 A.2d 468, 476 (1976).
117. Id.
118. Lykins v. State, 288 Md. 71, 415 A.2d 1113 (1980).
119. Young v. State, 297 Md. 286, 465 A.2d 1149 (1983).
120. Sinclair, 278 Md. at 256, 363 A.2d at 474.
121. Green v. State, 49 Md. App. 1, 5, 430 A.2d 1122, 1124 (1981).
122. Id. The plain error standard requires a more glaring and damaging mistake by the
trial court in order to merit appellate reversal. See State v. Hutchinson, 287 Md. 198, 209-
19, 411 A.2d 1035, 1041-47 (1980) (Smith, J., dissenting) (discussing application of the
plain error standard); BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY, supra note 21, at 583 (defining plain error
as an error "so obvious and prejudicial that an appellate court should address it despite the
parties' failure to raise a proper objection").
123. Green, 49 Md. App. at 5, 430 A.2d at 1124.
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lationship at the time of prosecution. 124 Green was never appealed so
the Court of Appeals did not address the issue.
c. The Unique Role of The Prosecutor. -The Maryland Rules,' 25
the Model Rules,' 26 and the Model Code have long recognized the
unique role of a state prosecutor.' 27 All emphasize that prosecutors
possess the discretionary power of the state to decide what prosecu-
tions to bring or maintain, and are therefore different in form and
function than private advocates. 128
Furthermore, there is a long tradition of both Maryland and fed-
eral courts recognizing the unique power and corresponding height-
ened responsibility of a public prosecutor. In Brack v. Wells, the Court
of Appeals said a court could not order a prosecutor to prosecute a
case 129 and noted that it is the prosecutor's responsibility not just to
advocate for a conviction, but to render discretionary judgments
about guilt and innocence. 3 ' In 1975, two Maryland cases again con-
sidered the unique discretionary power of the public prosecutor. In
Murphy v. Yates, the court held that a statute creating a new Office of
State Prosecutor violated the Maryland Constitution because it in-
fringed on the right of state's attorneys to decide when and whether
124. Id.
125. Md. Lawyers' Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 3.8 (1987): Special Responsibilities of a Prose-
cutor, states that
[t]he prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
(a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported
by probable cause ...
(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to
the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the of-
fense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tri-
bunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except
when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the
tribunal ....
126. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (1983) (rules 3.8(a) and (d) are identical
to the Maryland Rules).
127. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1969) EC 7-13 states that
[t~he responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate;
his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict. This special duty exists because:
(1) the prosecutor represents the sovereign and therefore should use restraint in
the discretionary exercise of government powers, such as in the selection of cases
to prosecute; (2) during trial the prosecutor is not only an advocate but he also
may make decisions normally made by an individual client, and those affecting
the public interest should be fair to all; and (3) in our system of criminal justice
the accused is to be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts.
128. MD. LAWYERS' RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (1987) (referring to a prose-
cutor as a "minister of justice" and not simply a normal advocate, thus carrying special
obligations of fairness and impartiality).
129. 184 Md. 86, 90, 40 A.2d 319, 321 (1944).
130. Id.
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to prosecute a case.' 31 Then, in State's Attorney of Baltimore City v. Balti-
more, the court held that the judiciary could not order prosecutors to
prosecute all violations of the law; rather they had the discretion to
decide for themselves which violations to pursue. 1 12 Based on this
"awesome" discretionary power,' 33 the Court of Appeals in Sinclair
found an accompanying responsibility on the part of prosecutors to
act impartially in deciding whether to pursue a criminal charge.
1 3 4
The court cited with approval a Louisiana Supreme Court decision
that referred to a prosecutor as a "quasi judicial officer" with an obli-
gation to conduct a criminal case in a fair and impartial manner.' 35
The Maryland view is consistent with federal rulings dating as far
back as the Confiscation Cases of 1869, when the U.S. Supreme Court
established that a prosecutor had the discretionary power to enter a
nolleprosequi as he or she saw fit. 1 36 The premise that with a prosecu-
tor's great power comes a special ethical responsibility was perhaps
most clearly articulated in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils
S.A., in which the Court reversed a criminal contempt conviction be-
cause it had been prosecuted by a private prosecutor who was also
representing an adverse party to the defendant in a related civil ac-
tion. 137 The Court called the use of a prosecutor with a private profes-
sional interest a fundamental error which violated the premise of the
American legal system that the state "wield its formidable criminal en-
forcement powers in a rigorously disinterested fashion ....",s The
Court noted that while a prosecutor may be held to a somewhat less
stringent standard of neutrality than a judge, the appointment of an
"interested" prosecutor creates an appearance of impropriety that im-
pacts the public's faith in the fairness and impartial nature of the
courts.' 39 The Court went on to declare a categorical rule against ap-
pointing interested private prosecutors to preserve public confidence
in the integrity of the justice system. 4 °
131. 276 Md. 475, 490, 348 A.2d 837, 845 (1975).
132. 274 Md. 597, 606, 337 A.2d 92, 98 (1975).
133. Murphy, 276 Md. at 495, 348 A.2d at 837.
134. 278 Md. 243, 254, 363 A.2d 468, 475 (1976).
135. Id. at 256, 363 A.2d at 476 (citing State v. Tate, 171 So. 108, 112 (La. 1936)).
136. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457 (1869).
137. 481 U.S. 787 (1987). The case involved infringement of the respondent's trade-
mark and was prosecuted by the private attorney for the respondent, Louis Vuitton. Id. at
789.
138. Id. at 810.
139. Id. at 811.
140. Id.
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3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Gatewood v. State, the Maryland
Court of Appeals, in a 5-2 decision, upheld the defendant's conviction
at trial even though the prosecuting attorney had previously repre-
sented the defendant in two criminal cases.' 41 Writing for the major-
ity, Judge Harrell concluded that per se disqualification is not
required every time a defendant alleges that a prosecutor may have a
conflict of interest due to prior representation and that the mere "ap-
pearance of impropriety" is not the conclusive factor. 14 2 Instead, the
court held that disqualification is only required when the prior and
current cases are the same or substantially related or when confiden-
tial information was divulged that is relevant to the current prosecu-
tion and "materially adverse" to the defendant. 4 ' The court stated
that this determination is left to the discretion of the trial judge,
whose judgment is then reviewable under an abuse of discretion stan-
dard.'44 The court then held that the trial judge in Gatewood had not
abused his discretion in allowing the prosecutor to continue despite
previously representing the defendant in an unrelated matter.145
The court reached its conclusion by first citing Sinclair and Lykins
for the proposition that automatic disqualification is not required
when a prosecutor is alleged to have a conflict due to a personal inter-
est or prior representation. 146 Rather, the court noted that under Sin-
clair and Lykins, the proper response is for the trial court to exercise
its discretion after an appropriate inquiry into the facts of the situa-
tion. 147 The court then stated that under Young, abuse of discretion is
the appropriate standard of review for a trial court's decision regard-
ing disqualification of a prosecutor due to a conflict.'48 The court
noted that a trial court's exercise of discretion will not normally be
questioned or overturned by an appellate court unless patently
unreasonable. 1
49
Having established this threshold for overturning a trial court's
exercise of discretion, the court held that the trial court decision in
Gatewvood did not stray far enough from the realm of acceptability to
141. Gatewood, 388 Md. at 532, 880 A.2d at 325.
142. Id. at 546, 880 A.2d at 334. Judges Cathell, Greene, Raker, and Wilner joined the
majority opinion. Id. at 554, 880 A.2d at 339.
143. Id. at 547, 880 A.2d 334.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 551, 880 A.2d at 337.
146. Id. at 536-39, 880 A.2d 328-30 (citing Sinclair v. State, 278 Md. 243, 260, 363 A.2d
468, 478 (1976); Lykins v. State, 288 Md. 71, 84-85, 415 A.2d 1113, 1121 (1980)).
147. Id. at 538-39, 880 A.2d at 330.
148. Id. at 540, 880 A.2d at 330 (citing Young v. State, 297 Md. 286, 465 A.2d 1149
(1983)).
149. Id.
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require reversal. 150 The court reached this conclusion upon finding
that Maryland conflict-of-interest jurisprudence requires disqualifying
a prosecutor in two situations: (1) where the attorney had previously
represented the client in the same case he or she was now prosecuting
and (2) where the case before it was substantially related to the prior
case or cases.
15 1
The court acknowledged that the appearance of impropriety is an
important consideration a court may take into account when deter-
mining whether a conflict exists, but stated that Sinclair and Lykins had
established that there was not a per se disqualification rule for prose-
cutors based on the mere appearance of impropriety.152 The court
further pointed to Young, where the court had declined to disqualify
an entire state's attorney's office due to an alleged conflict with one
prosecutor, as an additional reflection of its "reluctance" to require
disqualification solely due to an appearance of impropriety. 53
The court also cited Maryland Rules 1.7 and 1.9 as providing sup-
port for the principle that disqualification is required only in in-
stances involving the same or substantially related matters. 154 The
concern when a prosecutor previously represented a criminal defen-
dant, explained the court, is that he or she may become privy to confi-
dential information that could jeopardize the client's defense when
that attorney switches sides.' 55 Because this would be "directly ad-
verse" to a prior client under Maryland Rule 1.7, possessing confiden-
tial information that could prove detrimental to a prior client
amounts to a conflict requiring disqualification.156
The court noted that Maryland Rule 1.9 states that an attorney
shall not represent one client in the same or a substantially related
matter in which that person's interests are adverse to the interests of a
former client unless the former client consents. 157 The court further
noted that the Comment to Maryland Rule 1.9 states that subsequent
representation of a position adverse to a former client may be permis-
sible. 158 As applied to a prosecutor, this means, according to the
150. Id. at 551, 880 A.2d at 337.
151. Id. at 540-45, 532, 880 A.2d at 331-33. The court also briefly noted the opinion of
the Court of Special Appeals in Green that an unrelated prior representation does not cre-
ate a prosecutorial conflict, but explained that the language was mere dicta. Id. at 543
n.11, 880 A.2d at 332 n.11.
152. Id. at 546, 880 A.2d at 334.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 541, 453, 880 A.2d at 331-32.
155. Id. at 541, 880 A.2d at 331.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 543, A.2d at 332.
158. Id.
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court, that if an attorney who once represented a client later prose-
cutes that client for the state, the prosecuting attorney has a conflict if
the two matters are the same or are "substantially related."' 59 The
court therefore concluded that the trial judge must inquire into and
decide whether the cases are substantially related.1 60 The court fur-
ther explained that the term "substantially related" does not require
the exact same facts, case, or victim, but rather a situation where confi-
dential information would have been disclosed that could affect the
pending case."' A mere similarity in the types of offenses, however,
would not be sufficient to create a substantial relationship. 16
2
Turning to the facts before it, the court noted that the case did
not involve an attorney prosecuting a former client in the same matter
he had formerly defended and that the trial judge had conducted an
inquiry as to whether the current case had a substantial relationship to
the prosecutor's prior representation, concluding in the negative.163
Because the trial judge conducted a proper inquiry in which he
weighed the information, and the judge's decision was not outside the
realm of acceptability, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court
had not abused its discretion in rejecting the motion to disqualify.' 64
Judge Battaglia, joined by ChiefJudge Bell, dissented, stating that
the trial court decision should have been reviewed de novo and re-
versed because disqualification is automatic under the circum-
stances.1 65 The more deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, wrote
Judge Battaglia, should apply to their review of any penalty imposed
by a trial judge after finding a conflict of interest, not to the trial
judge's determination of whether a conflict existed.' 66
Judge Battaglia contended that prior Court of Appeals decisions
had established that when a state's attorney is alleged to have a con-
flict of interest resulting from prior representation of a defendant, the
appearance of a conflict alone is sufficient to warrant disqualification,
and the only remaining issues are whether the criminal indictment
should be dismissed or the entire prosecutor's office disqualified as
159. Id. at 544, 880 A.2d at 332-33.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 548-49, 880 A.2d at 335-36. As support, the court cited the Arizona case In re
Ockrassa (which was actually raised by Gatewood), noting that the Arizona Supreme Court
stated that a prior DUI was not "substantially related" to a current DUI unless the previous
crime was an element of the subsequent offense as part of a repeat offender charge. Id.
(citing In re Ockrassa, 799 P.2d 1350, 1352 (Ariz. 1990)).
163. Id. at 547, 880 A.2d at 334-35.
164. Id. at 551, 880 A.2d at 337.
165. Id. at 555, 880 A.2d at 339 (Battaglia, J., dissenting).
166. Id.
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well. 6 ' Therefore, Judge Battaglia maintained that because the de-
fense showed that Eastridge represented Gatewood on two occasions,
and Eastridge acknowledged that he remembered him, a conflict of
interest existed that merited disqualification. 16' Judge Battaglia ex-
plained that she would have reversed the conviction and remanded
the case for a new trial with a different prosecutor.
1 69
4. Analysis.-The court's decision in Gatewood was consistent
with the Maryland Rules and case law governing treatment of attor-
neys in conflict of interest cases. 7 ' The Court of Appeals in Gatewood
correctly interpreted the Maryland Rules and case authority as estab-
lishing that when evaluating whether an attorney has a conflict due to
prior representation of an adverse party, the relevant consideration is
ordinarily the disclosure of confidential information, and thus the in-
quiry is whether the two matters are the same or substantially re-
lated. 7 ' The court also properly concluded that the appearance of
impropriety standard alone is insufficient to disqualify a private attor-
ney.172 However, the court erred by treating public prosecutors in the
same manner as private attorneys. The court neglected to account for
persuasive case authority and longstanding ethical principles that em-
phasize the unique role and responsibilities of a public prosecutor
and the importance of maintaining the public's faith in the legal sys-
tem.' 73 The court also misinterpreted its precedent as establishing
that the appearance of impropriety is insufficient to disqualify a prose-
cutor when in fact, prior case law had merely resolved narrow issues
with respect to the appearance of impropriety doctrine and had not
conclusively addressed its status in Maryland. 174 The court thus
missed an opportunity to settle what force, if any, the appearance of
impropriety doctrine has in Maryland. 175
Had the court duly considered the unique role of the public pros-
ecutor in conjunction with the rationale behind the appearance of
impropriety doctrine, it would have recognized that the doctrine
167. Id., 880 A.2d at 339-40.
168. Id. at 559, 880 A.2d at 341.
169. Id. at 560, 880 A.2d at 342.
170. See infra Part 4.a.
171. See infra Part 4.a.
172. See infra notes 188-191 and accompanying text.
173. See infra notes 216-236 and accompanying text.
174. See Gatewood, 388 Md. at 542, 880 A.2d at 359 (Battaglia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that prior case law had not established that the appearance of impropriety is insufficient to
disqualify a prosecutor).
175. See infra notes 195-215 and accompanying text.
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should be preserved as a necessary check on prosecutorial power. 176
The court should not have settled for one inquiry by the trial court
merely examining whether a prosecutor's prior representation dis-
closed confidential information that could functionally prejudice the
defendant. Instead, the court should have required a second inquiry
into the prosecutor's impartiality and whether the appearance of im-
partiality was compromised in a manner that undermines the goal of
preserving public trust in the legal system.
a. The Court Correctly Interpreted the Maryland Lawyers' Rules of
Professional Conduct and Prior Case Law Regarding Private Attorneys.-The
court in Gatewood properly noted that Maryland Rules 1.6-1.10177 and
case law178 establish that if a private attorney previously represented a
party adverse to the defendant, per se disqualification is not required,
and the attorney need only be disqualified if the two matters are the
same or substantially related. 179 In Buckley, the federal court had re-
quired a sufficient similarity of the litigation issues for the cases to
qualify as substantially related, focusing on whether confidences
might have been disclosed during the prior representation. 80 Apply-
ing that approach to Gatewood, the Court of Appeals correctly deter-
mined that because the current drug possession charge was dissimilar
to the previous burglary charge, it could not be viewed as substantially
related."' 1 And while the previous drug distribution charge does
share facial similarities with drug possession in terms of the type of
crime, the cases lacked any relationship that might suggest that confi-
dential information from the first case could impact the second one.
The Gatewood court's interpretation and application of the substan-
tially related doctrine is also consistent with other states' treatment of
private attorney conflict-of-interest cases.182
Moreover, the policy rationale for using the substantially-related
rule when considering private attorney conflicts makes sense when the
competing considerations are weighed and evaluated.' First, a client
176. See infra notes 242-244 and accompanying text.
177. MD. LAwYERS' RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 1.6, 1.7, 1.9, and 1.10 (2006).
178. Buckley v. Airshield Corp., 908 F. Supp. 299 (D. Md. 1995).
179. Gatewood, 388 Md. at 544, 880 A.2d at 332.
180. Buckley, 908 F. Supp. at 304-06.
181. Gatewood, 388 Md. at 54748, 880 A.2d at 334-35.
182. E.g., Tessier v. Plastic Surgery Specialists, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Va. 1990); see
Clinard v. Blackwood, No. O1AO1-9801-CV-00029, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 729, at *45-*46
(1999) (noting that the substantial relationship inquiry is universally accepted as the start-
ing point for disqualification analysis); Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1980);
Brown v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 486 A.2d 37 (D.C. 1984).
183. MD. LAWYERS' RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9 cmt. (2006).
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must feel free to discuss confidential matters with his or her attor-
ney. 184 If a client fears that an attorney may switch sides and use confi-
dential information to the client's detriment, that fear will lead to a
reticence on the client's part that will both hamper the attorney's abil-
ity to adequately represent the client and impair the eventual realiza-
tion of just and fair results. 85
In situations such as Gatewood, where an attorney has the poten-
tial to use confidential information gleaned from prior representation
of the defendant, clients would be far less likely to be forthcoming
with their attorneys, fearing their attorneys might someday switch
sides. Furthermore, clients might be reluctant to take the stand, fear-
ing they could be impeached with their own divulged confidential
communication."" An unfortunate consequence might be that some
attorneys would be deliberately kept in the dark by their clients.
187
At the same time, it is not in the interest of the legal system to
unduly limit the freedom of attorneys and prevent them from filling
different positions in different organizations. 8 Overbearing restric-
tions on the mobility of attorneys to switch firms or positions could
stunt professional development of attorneys; diminish their experi-
ence, knowledge, and abilities; and lead to more attorneys exiting the
field.1 8 9
These competing interests require a happy medium, which the
"same or substantially related" test fosters by focusing the inquiry on
actual potential prejudicial impact to an involved party when the op-
posing counsel has previously been the party's counsel.19 ° This ap-
proach also gives clear notice to attorneys about how to behave, and is
more straightforward to apply than the "appearance of impropriety"
model, with its imprecise standard and questions pertaining to what
qualifies as "impropriety" and to whom.1 9" ' The same-or-substantially-
related rule is thus properly applied to private attorneys and prior
representation.
184. Id. R. 1.6 cmt.
185. Id.
186. Lykins v. State, 288 Md. 71, 73, 415 A.2d 1113, 1115 (1980).
187. Id.
188. MD. LAwyERs' RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9 cmt. 4 (2006).
189. MD. LAwvR' RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.11 cmt. 4 (2006); see Innovative Fin.
Servs. v. Angel, No. CV040834591, 2005 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2397, at *6 (2005) (recogniz-
ing that it is common for attorneys to change firms and stating that disqualification rules
should not unreasonably bar lawyers from taking on new clients).
190. See MD. LAwYERs' RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.11 cmt. (2006) (discussing the
reasons for limiting conflicts involving prior representation to matters substantially related
to the matter subjudice).
191. See supra notes 105-110 and accompanying text.
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b. The Court Failed to Recognize That Prosecutors Demand More
Scrutiny Than Private Attorneys.-While the Gatewood court correctly
recognized that the substantially-related doctrine is appropriate for
the majority of private attorney conflict-of-interest cases, 19 2 the court
misinterpreted its precedent as establishing the same-or-substantially-
related rule as the sole test for prosecutorial conflicts. 19 3 The court
neglected to recognize that public prosecutors are vested with the sov-
ereign's power to restrict individual liberty; they have tremendous dis-
cretionary authority to exercise that power and thus have a greater
responsibility than private attorneys to act and appear free of conflicts
of interest.'9 4
(1) The Court Misinterpreted Its Precedent as Holding That the
Appearance of Impropriety Is Insufficient to Disqualify a Prosecutor.-As
Judge Battaglia noted in her dissent, the majority in Gatewood incor-
rectly cited its precedent as holding that the mere appearance of im-
propriety alone is insufficient to merit disqualification of a
prosecutor.1 "5 Neither Lykins, Young, nor Sinclair establishes that prin-
ciple. To the contrary, those cases indicate that the appearance of
impropriety can be sufficient grounds for disqualification.
Instead of establishing that the appearance of impropriety due to
prior representation is not grounds for disqualifying a prosecutor, Ly-
kins merely established that the appearance of impropriety did not
require dismissing an entire indictment.' 96 The Court of Appeals in
Lykins specifically upheld the trial court's decision to disqualify the
prosecutor despite the lack of a crystal clear relationship between the
current and prior representation, commenting that it was not an abuse
of discretion by the trial judge to remove the prosecutor, even though
the judge's primary ground for removal was the appearance of impro-
priety.19 7 The court said that while the trial judge was not required to
disqualify the prosecutor because of the appearance of impropriety,
he had not abused his discretion by doing so.' In Gatewood, the
Court of Appeals reiterated its support for the decision by the trial
judge in Lykins, commenting again that the trial court properly exer-
cised its discretion to disqualify the prosecutor after finding a conflict
192. E.g., Avnet, Inc. v. OEC Corp., 498 F. Supp. 818, 820 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Common-
wealth Ins. Co. v. Graphix Hot Line, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1200, 1204 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
193. See Gatewood, 388 Md. at 554-60, 880 A.2d at 33942 (Battaglia, J., dissenting).
194. See supra Part 2.c.
195. Gatewood, 388 Md. at 556-59, 880 A.2d at 340-42 (Battaglia, J. dissenting).
196. 288 Md. 71, 85, 415 A.2d 1113, 1121 (1980).
197. Id. at 84, 415 A.2d at 1121.
198. Id. at 85, 415 A.2d at 1121.
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due to prior representation.199 The two cases in Lykins, however, were
only remotely related, and the trial judge made his decision without
finding actual impropriety. 20 Thus, in stating its approval of the dis-
qualification in Lykins, the Gatezwood court endorsed a prosecutorial
disqualification that was based not on actual conflict but on the ap-
pearance of a conflict.
It is also worth noting a similarity between Lykins and Gatewood in
that the prosecutor in both cases claimed he had represented a great
many clients before joining the state's attorney's office and had no
specific memory of confidential information that could be used
against the defendant.2 1 This asserted inability to recall confidential
information did not dissuade the judge in Lykins from disqualifying
the prosecutor due to the appearance of impropriety,20 2 and there is
little reason the Gatewood court should find such an assertion persua-
sive either.
The Court of Appeals's reference to Young as reflecting its "reluc-
tance" to require disqualification merely for an appearance of impro-
priety is also misplaced. Young provides little support for the argument
that a prosecutor should not be disqualified solely due to an appear-
ance of impropriety.2 " The Young decision concerned whether an
appearance of impropriety due to prior representation was sufficient
to merit imputed disqualification of an entire state's attorney's of-
fice.2 0 4 Young said nothing about whether the appearance of impro-
priety was sufficient to disqualify the actual conflicted attorney.
Clearly the burden of proof should be higher to require vicarious dis-
qualification of an entire state's attorney's office because otherwise
such offices would face the choice of either never hiring former de-
fense attorneys or being conflicted out all the time.20 5 But this does
not alter the analysis for a case involving a single state's attorney who
previously represented the defendant he or she is now prosecuting.
Despite assertions from the majority, Sinclair did not establish
that disqualification is not required per se for prosecutors based on
the mere appearance of impropriety. While the Court of Appeals in
Sinclair remanded the case to the lower courts for a hearing (instead
199. Gatewood, 388 Md. at 546, 880 A.2d at 334.
200. Lykins, 288 Md. at 84, 415 A.2d at 1121.
201. Id. at 74, 415 A.2d at 1116; Gatewood, 388 Md. at 880 A.2d at 327.
202. 288 Md. at 84, 415 A.2d at 1121.
203. 297 Md. 286, 295-96, 465 A.2d 1149, 1154 (1983).
204. Id.
205. See id. at 295, 465 A.2d at 1154 (noting that if government lawyers were subjected to
the same imputation restrictions as private attorneys, the government's ability to function
would be impaired).
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of applying a per se disqualification rule), the hearing was meant to
determine whether the conviction should be overturned, not whether
the prosecutor should be disqualified.2 °6 The Sinclair court clarified
that the prosecutor should be replaced if there was an appearance of
impropriety, stating that if a trial court found that it would appear to a
reasonable person that a prosecutor had a personal interest that
might impair his ability to act impartially toward the defendant, the
prosecutor should be disqualified on the basis of public policy.
20 7
When Sinclair was remanded, a special prosecutor was appointed to
represent the state, and an evidentiary hearing was held not about
disqualification, but regarding whether the conviction should be
thrown out.
20
Furthermore, the Gatewood court correctly concluded that the
Court of Special Appeals's comment in Green is simply dicta and thus
provides no support for the argument that a prosecutor's former rep-
resentation in an unrelated case cannot be grounds for disqualifica-
tion. 20 9 The "plain error" standard of review created as a result of
Green's attorney's failure to properly preserve the issue altered the
Green court's evaluation significantly and makes the Green opinion al-
most irrelevant. 210
Thus, prior to Gatezwood, the Court of Appeals had never clearly
resolved the question of whether the appearance of impropriety
should disqualify a prosecutor or a private attorney.21 For prosecu-
tors in particular, Maryland case law did not establish that the appear-
ance of impropriety can never be grounds for disqualification and, if
anything, suggests that it can.
These cases, however, were all decided under the Model Code
standard 212 before the switch to the Maryland Rules, which lack the
"appearance of impropriety" standard.21 3 The extent to which the en-
actment of the Maryland Rules has diminished the authority of pre-
enactment case law involving attorney conflicts of interest is unclear.
206. 278 Md. 243, 260, 363 A.2d 468, 478 (1976).
207. Id. at 254, 363 A.2d at 475.
208. Lykins v. State, 288 Md. 71, 81 n.4, 415 A.2d 1113, 1119 n.4 (1980). No final deci-
sion was made on overturning the conviction because Sinclair chose to plead nolo contendere
to the charge before the hearing was concluded. Id.
209. Gatewood, 388 Md. at 543, 880 A.2d at 332.
210. 49 Md. App. 1, 5, 430 A.2d 1122, 1124 (1981).
211. Although the Court of Appeals did indicate in Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Los
Angeles Rams Football Co. that even under the Model Code, in Maryland, the appearance of
impropriety standard did not always require disqualification of private attorneys. 284 Md.
86, 95-96, 394 A.2d 801, 806-07 (1978).
212. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
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While the appearance of impropriety doctrine is no longer expressly
included in the Maryland attorney ethics rules, it is a longstanding
principle2 1 4 with continuing influence in other jurisdictions, as
demonstrated by West Virginia's and other states' reliance and invoca-
tion of the Model Code despite adoption of the newer Model Rules. 5
The Gatewood court thus missed an opportunity to clarify whether the
doctrine has continuing relevance in Maryland, either for private at-
torneys or for prosecutors. The result is that both prosecutors and
private attorneys in Maryland will practice with a strong suspicion that
the doctrine is no longer pertinent to their actions, but without the
certainty that it will never be invoked in a particular situation.
(2) The Court Failed to Account for the Unique Role of the Pub-
lic Prosecutor.-In neglecting to fully consider and evaluate the appear-
ance of impropriety standard, the court also failed to recognize that a
public prosecutor must be far more impartial and disinterested than a
private attorney.2 16 As detailed in the Maryland Rules,217 Model
Rules,218 and Model Code,219 and in case law such as Brack v. Wells,22°
Sinclair,22 ' and Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 2 22 prose-
cutors have tremendous power and broad discretion when deciding
whether to bring charges or pursue a prosecution. 2 3 Thus, anything
affecting a prosecutor's impartiality can have a significant impact on a
defendant's right to a fair trial and on public confidence in the fair-
ness of the trial.
214. The principle dates back at least seventy-four years, and it is well-established that it
can merit counsel disqualification. ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics and Grievances Formal
Op. 77 (1932); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig.,
658 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); Lovell v. Winchester, 941 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Ky. 1997); Oswall
v. Tekni-Plex, Inc., 691 A.2d 889 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997); INA Underwriters Ins.
Co. v. Rubin, 635 F. Supp. 1, 5 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
215. See, e.g., Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 491 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting);
Amparano v. ASARCO, Inc., 93 P.3d 1086, 1094 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004); First Am. Carriers,
Inc. v. Kroger Co., 787 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Ark. 1990); Sorci v. Iowa Dist. Court for Polk
County, 671 N.W.2d 482, 493-94 (Iowa 2003); State v. Loyal, 753 A.2d 1073, 1094 (NJ.
2000); State ex rel. Cosenza v. Hill, 607 S.E.2d 811 (W. Va. 2004).
216. Sinclair v. State, 278 Md. 243, 252, 363 A.2d 468, 474 (1976); accord Young v.
United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 811 (1987).
217. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
220. 184 Md. 86, 40 A.2d 319 (1944).
221. 278 Md. 243, 363 A.2d 468 (1976).
222. 481 U.S. 787 (1987); see Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457 (1868) (es-
tablishing that prosecutors have broad discretionary power).
223. Sinclair, 278 Md. at 252, 363 A.2d at 474.
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In Gatewood, state's attorney Eastridge was not the prosecutor who
initially brought the criminal charges,224 so it was not a situation anal-
ogous to Sinclair in that the indictment itself might have been
tainted.225 Even so, Eastridge's prior representation of Gatewood
could have influenced the prosecutor's opinion of Gatewood's charac-
ter and thereby affected everything from Eastridge's decision to con-
tinue to pursue charges and/or accept a plea bargain to gauging
Gatewood's potential credibility as a witness and the gravity of his of-
fense. 226 Additionally, as Gatewood himself argued, the prosecutor's
prior representation may have influenced Eastridge's recommenda-
tion of sentence-a recommendation that the judge described as on
the "high" side.22 7 The Court of Appeals rejected this argument be-
cause Eastridge had not requested the absolute maximum allowed
under law,228 but the court failed to recognize that requesting less
than the maximum does not mean that a more disinterested prosecu-
tor would have requested the same high sentence. Even if Eastridge
did not consciously consider his prior representation of Gatewood,
the immense discretionary power of a state's attorney, combined with
the fact that Gatewood's liberty was at stake, can make every influence
on the prosecutor's sentencing recommendation significant.
Although private attorneys have to make many similar strategic
trial decisions, such as whether to settle and how to approach a cross
examination, they lack a prosecutor's unique power and discretionary
authority that makes any misuse or improper influence so trouble-
some. This difference explains why in numerous situations, the Mary-
land Rules,2 2 9 the ABA,23 ° and the courts have emphatically declared
that prosecutors are not ordinary advocates and instead fall some-
where between judges and private attorneys in terms of expected im-
partiality.231 The Court of Appeals in Young relied on this difference
to preclude disqualification of an entire State's Attorney's Office
224. Gatewood, 388 Md. at 532 n.4, 880 A.2d at 325 n.4.
225. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
226. Gatewood, 388 Md. at 552, 880 A.2d at 337.
227. Id.
228. Id The judge attributed the high sentencing recommendation to Gatewood's
prior record, but a prosecutor's broad discretion with respect to sentencing makes it im-
possible to know what factors influenced Eastridge's recommendation. Id.
229. MD. LAwYERs' RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. (2006) (referring to a prosecu-
tor as a "minister of justice").
230. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILTY EC 7-13 (1969) (stating that "[t]he re-
sponsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek
justice, not merely to convict").
231. See supra Part 2.c.
20061 1249
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
when one prosecutor was conflicted. 23 2 The unique character of the
prosecutor has also been cited as one of the justifications for exempt-
ing prosecutors from the general imputation rule that disqualifies
other attorneys in the same firm if one has a conflict. 233 It is at best
problematic for a court to recognize the unique role of the prosecutor
to justify not disqualifying a prosecutor, but then ignore the unique
role when it might be a reason for disqualification.
The Gatewood court failed to follow Maryland's longstanding rec-
ognition of the prosecutor's unique quasi-judicial role and discretion-
ary power,2 4 as well as the U.S. Supreme Court's recognition of it.
2 35
In solely examining whether Eastridge's prior representation involved
a same or substantially related matter to the case before it, the court
in Gatewood incorrectly treated a prosecutorial conflict as though it
were equivalent to that involving a private practitioner. 23 6
The Gatewood court's approach also failed to adequately consider
the importance of maintaining the public's confidence in an impartial
judicial system.23 7 As the district court noted in Buckley, while disquali-
fication is a harsh result, the inconvenience of replacing an attorney is
secondary to the court's obligation to maintain high ethical standards
and "insure and preserve trust in the integrity of the bar."2 8
From the facts of Gatewood, it is not clear how much of an incon-
venience disqualification would truly have caused because the Cecil
County State's Attorney's Office had seven other prosecutors. 239 On
the other hand, the seven apart from Eastridge were part-time attor-
neys, and as the only full-time elected prosecutor, Eastridge would be
expected to shoulder the majority of the caseload. 240 One could ar-
gue that if a medium-sized Maryland county with more than 95,000
232. Young v. State, 297 Md. 286, 295, 465 A.2d 1149, 1154 (1983).
233. Id.; MD. LA yERs' RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.11 cmt. 2 (2006); see Clinard v.
Blackwood, No. OIAO1-9801-CV-00029, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 729, at *54 (1999), affd, 46
S.W.3d 177 (Tenn. 2001) (noting that exceptions are sometimes available when either the
former client consents or when a strict screening method is put in place).
234. Sinclair v. State, 278 Md. 243, 363 A.2d 468 (1976); State's Att'y of Baltimore City v.
Baltimore, 274 Md. 597, 337 A.2d 92 (1975); Brack v. Wells, 184 Md. 86, 40 A.2d 319
(1944); Murphy v. Yates, 276 Md. 475, 348 A.2d 837 (1975).
235. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 803 (1987) (noting
that a public prosecutor must be more disinterested than a private attorney).
236. See 388 Md. at 546, 880 A.2d at 334 (failing to recognize a difference between pros-
ecutors and private attorneys with respect to conflicts of interest).
237. See Sinclair, 278 Md. at 252, 363 A.2d at 473-74.
238. 908 F. Supp. 299, 308 (D. Md. 1995) (quoting Tessier v. Plastic Surgery Specialists,
Inc., 731 F. Supp. 724, 729 (E.D. Va. 1990)).
239. Telephone Interview with Cecil Co. State's Attorney's Office (Dec. 16, 2005).
240. Id.
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people has only one full-time prosecutor,2'" then imposing a stricter
disqualification rule could entail a severe burden for smaller counties
that may have even fewer prosecutors. Integrity, however, should out-
weigh inconvenience as a general matter.
Critics of the appearance of impropriety doctrine have noted that
it is vague and difficult to apply with any consistency.242 Such criti-
cism, however, is far less applicable to public prosecutors than to pri-
vate attorneys. Questions about to whom conduct need appear
proper are easily answered for prosecutors: the public. Questions
about what is improper are also answerable: something that would
likely create injustice. It is worth noting that the appearance of im-
propriety doctrine was initially created partly because of the impor-
tance of maintaining public trust in prosecutors and only later was the
doctrine fully extended to private practitioners.243 While challenges
and complexities in the doctrine's application may justify dropping
the appearance of impropriety standard for private attorneys, there is
still a valid foundation for maintaining the appearance of impropriety
standard for state's attorneys, just as it remains in effect for judges in
Maryland and nationwide. 2
44
c. One Solution Is to Require a Second Judicial Inquiry at the Trial
Level.-The Gatewood court could have accounted for the higher stan-
dards for prosecutors if it had required a second test whenever prose-
cutors are alleged to have a conflict of interest. In addition to the
currently required inquiry into actual or potential prejudice to the
defendant from disclosure of confidential information, a second in-
quiry could ask: (1) whether anything in the prior representation may
have affected the impartiality of the prosecutor even if little or no
harmful confidential information had been disclosed and (2) whether
allowing the prosecutor to remain despite the prior representation
would appear improper to the public.
241. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 105-110 and accompanying text.
243. See Green, supra note 105, at 315-18 (discussing the origin of the appearance of
impropriety doctrine).
244. See MD. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (2005): "Avoidance of Impropriety
and the Appearance of Impropriety-A judge . . . should avoid even the appearance of
impropriety. Ajudge should respect and comply with the law and should act at all times in
a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judici-
ary." See also MODEL CODE OFJUDICtAL CONDUCT, Canon 2, AJudge Shall Avoid Impropri-
ety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All of the Judge's Activities (2004);Jefferson-El
v. State, 330 Md. 99, 107, 622 A.2d 737, 741 (1993) (commenting that the appearance of
impropriety is a concern because the process must not only be fair, but also must appear to
the public to be fair).
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In Gatewood, for instance, the court could have required an in-
quiry into whether Eastridge harbored any animosity or critical opin-
ion towards Gatewood that was formed during the prior
representation. If so, the court could conclude that it might make it
more difficult for him to possess the high degree of impartiality re-
quired of a public prosecutor and disqualify Eastridge even though he
claimed not to possess confidential information he could use to the
defendant's detriment.24 5 Even if no animus were found on East-
ridge's part, if the court determined that the continued prosecution
might raise red flags with the public, it could also require a different
prosecutor to handle the case. Finally, even if the court concluded
that neither situation required disqualification, the double inquiry
would at the very least have provided more reassurance to the public
that legitimate questions of judicial fairness had been thoroughly in-
vestigated and resolved.
5. Conclusion.-In Gatewood v. Maryland, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that a prosecutor's prior representation of the defen-
dant did not require disqualification, and the mere appearance of im-
propriety was insufficient to require removal absent evidence that the
defendant had or could be unfairly prejudiced.246 The court stated
that if the current and prior representation were on related matters,
and the trial court held an inquiry into potential prejudice, then the
decision regarding disqualification was soundly within the discretion
of the trialjudge.24 7 The Court's decision was consistent with the Ma-
ryland Rules and with prior treatment of private attorney conflict of
interest issues,2 48 but did not sufficiently consider the different role
and responsibilities of a public prosecutor.2 49 Because a prosecutor is
invested with unique discretionary power to try, maintain, and discard
a prosecution, the prosecutor must maintain a higher degree of im-
partiality than a private advocate. 250 A more stringent level of scrutiny
is therefore appropriate, both by the courts and the public. 25' Ac-
cordingly, a prosecutor should avoid not just actual conflict, but also
245. SeeYoung v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 811 (1987) (hold-
ing that a prosecutor representing a party adverse to the defendant in a civil action was by
nature too "interested" to act as an advocate for impartial justice in a criminal case); Sin-
clair v. State, 278 Md. 243, 252; 363 A.2d 468, 474 (1976) (same).
246. Gatewood, 388 Md. at 547, 880 A.2d at 334.
247. Id.
248. See supra Part 2.a.
249. See supra Part 4.b(2).
250. Sinclair v. State, 278 Md. 243, 254-55. 363 A.2d 468, 475-76 (1976).
251. Id.; see Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 811 (1987)
(holding that a prosecutor must be more disinterested than a private attorney).
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the appearance of conflict. Therefore, a trial court should be re-
quired to go beyond a mere inquiry into disclosure of confidential
information and whether the two cases are substantially related.25 2
The trial court should also be required to examine the impartiality of
the prosecutor, both to ensure he or she is sufficiently disinterested
and to ensure that the public does not believe otherwise.253
PAUL B. SPELMAN
252. See supra Part 4.c.
253. See supra Part 4.c.
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VIII. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. Interpretive Shift Weakens the Rule of Liberal Construction Applied to
Ambiguities in Workers' Compensation Legislation
In Johnson v. Baltimore,1 the Court of Appeals decided whether the
combined-benefits provision of section 9-503 of the Labor and Em-
ployment Article2 applied to surviving dependents of deceased
firefighters who qualified for such benefits while living. The court
held that the statute unambiguously neglected to extend combined
benefits to those surviving dependents.4
In so deciding, the Court of Appeals failed to apply the rule of
liberal construction' to its interpretation of section 9-503.6 The Court
of Appeals inappropriately weakened the rule of liberal construction
by not applying it to the ambiguous Workers' Compensation Act 7 pro-
vision at issue in Johnson.8 This departure from precedent will have
deleterious effects on lower courts' ability to consistently apply the
rule of liberal construction and will reduce the ameliorative benefits
of workers' compensation legislation.9 The Court of Appeals should
clarify its interpretation of the legislative purpose of the Act and ex-
plicitly state the degree of statutory ambiguity required for lower
courts to use the rule of liberal construction. °
1. The Case.-Ernest Johnson (Mr. Johnson), a Baltimore City
firefighter, contracted colon cancer." Mr. Johnson's cancer was
1. 387 Md. 1, 874 A.2d 439 (2005).
2. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-503 (LexisNexis 1999).
3. The court only addressed the issue of whether the surviving dependents of de-
ceased firefighters who qualified for a statutory presumption of compensability for occupa-
tional disease under section 9-503(c) (1) were eligible to receive combined benefits under
section 9-503(e). Johnson, 387 Md. at 3, 874 A.2d at 441.
4. Id. at 22, 874 A.2d at 452.
5. The rule of liberal construction is a canon of statutory interpretation that the
Court of Appeals applies to workers' compensation legislation, resolving any statutory un-
certainty in favor of the claimant. Lovellette v. Baltimore, 297 Md. 271, 282, 465 A.2d
1141, 1147 (1983).
6. See Johnson, 387 Md. at 30, 874 A.2d at 456-57 (BattagliaJ., dissenting) (stating that
a liberal construction of section 9-503 requires finding in favor of the claimants).
7. The Workers' Compensation Act is codified in a series of statutes in the Labor and
Employment Article. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 9-101 to -1201 (LexisNexis 1999).
8. See infra Part 4.a.
9. See infra Part 4.b.
10. See infra Part 4.c.
11. Johnson, 387 Md. at 3, 874 A.2d at 441. Though not specifically listed in the statute,
the parties agree that Mr. Johnson's colon cancer qualifies as a compensable occupational
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caused by repeated exposure to carcinogens that he encountered as a
firefighter. 12 While working as a firefighter, Mr. Johnson's average
weekly wage was $989.75.13 Mr. Johnson died from colon cancer on
March 11, 1994, and his wife (Mrs. Johnson) was wholly financially
dependent on him at the time of his death.14 After Mr. Johnson's
death, Mrs. Johnson received $603.90 per week from her husband's
Baltimore City pension plan.1 5
Daniel Luster (Mr. Luster) contracted pancreatic cancer16 while
employed as a Baltimore City firefighter, also due to his employment
as a firefighter.' 7 Mr. Luster's average weekly wage was $821.52.18 He
died from pancreatic cancer on August 8, 2000, and his wife (Mrs.
Luster) was wholly dependent on his income at the time of his
death. 9 Mr. Luster's Baltimore City pension plan paid Mrs. Luster
$294.83 per week in death benefits. 20
Mrs. Johnson and Mrs. Luster each filed claims for death benefits
with the Workers' Compensation Commission.2' The Commission de-
termined that the combined-compensation provision of section 9-503
applied to the widows' claims, and thus the widows were entitled to
receive both workers' compensation and pension benefits.22 The City
of Baltimore appealed both cases to the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City.2 In each case, both parties moved for summary judgment. 24
The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the widows.25
The circuit court concluded that the legislature intended section 9-
503 to apply to dependents of firefighters, partially because the court
found it inconsistent to award combined workers' compensation and
disease within the meaning of section 9-503(c)(1). Id. at 3 n.1, 874 A.2d at 441 n.l. The
court has defined an occupational disease as an illness naturally caused by the inherent
characteristics of a person's occupation. Id. at 6 n.5, 874 A.2d at 442 n.5.
12. Id at 3 n.1, 874 A.2d at 441 n.1.
13. Id. at 3, 874 A.2d at 441.
14. Id. at 3-4, 874 A.2d at 441.
15. Id. at 4, 874 A.2d at 441. Under BALTImoRE CITY, MD., CODE art. 22, § 34(h)
(2004), deceased firefighters' spouses are entitled to death benefits as part of the employee
pension plan. Baltimore v. Johnson, 156 Md. App. 569, 574, 847 A.2d 1190, 1192 (2004).
16. Mr. Luster's pancreatic cancer expressly qualifies as a compensable occupational
disease within the meaning of section 9-503(c) (1). Johnson, 387 Md. at 4 n.2, 874 A.2d at
441 n.2.
17. Id. at 4, 874 A.2d at 441.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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pension benefits to firefighters while they were alive but deny the
same benefits to firefighters' dependents upon death.26 The City ap-
pealed both cases to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
27
The Court of Special Appeals held that the general setoff provi-
sion of section 9-610 of the Labor and Employment Article 2' applies
to dependents of deceased firefighters who, while alive, qualified for
combined workers' compensation and pension benefits under section
9-503(c).29 In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals
held that Mrs. Luster qualified for workers' compensation benefits
subject to the setoff provision of section 9-610.3o The Court of Special
Appeals emphasized that the text of section 9-503 is unambiguous and
does not mention dependents."1 The court thus reasoned that judi-
cial extension of the combined-benefits provision of section 9-503 to
deceased firefighters' dependents was unacceptable because it would
require the court to insert words into the statute. 2
Mrs. Johnson and Mrs. Luster both filed petitions for certiorari to
the Court of Appeals of Maryland.33 The Court of Appeals consoli-
dated the cases to decide whether the combined-benefits provision of
section 9-503(e) applies to the dependents of deceased firefighters or
whether their claims must be reduced according to the general setoff
provision of section 9-610." 4
26. Baltimore v. Johnson, 156 Md. App. 569, 575-76, 847 A.2d 1190, 1193 (2004).
27. Johnson, 387 Md. at 4, 874 A.2d at 441.
28. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-610 (LexisNexis 1999).
29. Johnson, 156 Md. App. at 597, 847 A.2d at 1206. Mrs. Johnson was eligible to receive
workers' compensation death benefits of $510.00 per week. Johnson, 387 Md. at 4 n.3, 874
A.2d at 441 n.3. Section 9-610 requires that payment of workers' compensation benefits be
reduced by the amount paid in pension death benefits. § 9-610(a) (1). Since Mrs. John-
son's pension payments exceeded the amount of workers' compensation benefits she was
eligible to receive, the application of the setoff provision of section 9-610 precluded her
from receiving any workers' compensation benefits. Johnson, 387 Md. at 4 n.3, 874 A.2d at
441 n.3.
30. Baltimore v. Luster, No. 1059, slip op. at 9-10 (Md. App. June 25, 2004). Mrs.
Luster was eligible to receive workers' compensation benefits of $510.00 per week. Johnson,
387 Md. at 5 n.4, 874 A.2d at 442 n.4. Section 9-610 requires that amount to be reduced by
the amount of her pension death benefits. § 9-610(a) (1). Mrs. Luster thus received pay-
ment of $215.17 per week in workers' compensation death benefits. Johnson, 387 Md. at 5
n.4, 874 A.2d at 442 n.4.
31. Johnson, 156 Md. App. at 596-97, 847 A.2d at 1205-06.
32. Id. at 597, 847 A.2d at 1205-06.
33. Johnson v. Baltimore, 383 Md. 214, 856 A.2d 723 (2004); Luster v. Baltimore, 383
Md. 214, 857 A.2d 1131 (2004).
34. Johnson, 387 Md. at 5, 874 A.2d at 442.
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2. Legal Background.-The Court of Appeals interprets statutes
to effectuate legislative intent.3 5 Accordingly, the court adopted the
rule of liberal construction to effectuate the remedial purpose of the
Workers' Compensation Act, resolving statutory ambiguity in favor of
the claimant.36 However, the court has occasionally shifted its inter-
pretation of the legislative purpose of the Workers' Compensation
Act.37 The legislature crafted section 9-503 to mandate exceptions to
general workers' compensation provisions 38 reducing the claimant's
burden of proof and increasing benefits, in recognition of the greater
hazards faced by firefighters and certain other government
employees.39
a. Statutory Interpretation Should Effectuate Legislative Intent.-
The court's primary object in statutory interpretation is to ensure that
its construction is consistent with the legislature's intent.4° To ascer-
tain legislative intent, the court first examines the text of the statute.41
The court assigns words their common, everyday meaning if that con-
struction results in a clear, unambiguous expression. 42 However, the
court does not read the words of the statute in isolation.43 The court
determines whether or not the plain meaning of a provision qualifies
as clear and unambiguous by examining its language within the con-
text of the general purpose of the statutory scheme and the context of
the specific statute as a whole.44 To determine the context of statu-
tory language, the court may look to other persuasive evidence, in-
cluding legislative history, that indicates the legislature's intent.45
b. The Court of Appeals Uses the Rule of Liberal Construction to
Effectuate the Legislative Purpose of Workers' Compensation Legislation.-
35. Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995).
36. Howard County Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Walls, 288 Md. 526, 530, 418
A.2d 1210, 1213 (1980); see MD. CODE ANN., LB. & EMPL. § 9-102 (LexisNexis 1999) (re-
quiring courts to construe workers' compensation legislation to effectuate its general
purpose).
37. See infra Part 2.c.
38. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-503 (LexisNexis 1999). Section 9-610 contains
the general setoff provision applicable to workers' compensation benefits. MD. CODE ANN.,
LAB. & EMPL. § 9-610 (LexisNexis 1999).
39. See infra Part 2.d(2)-(4).
40. Oaks, 339 Md. at 35, 660 A.2d at 429.
41. Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 261, 647 A.2d 1204, 1206 (1994).
42. Id. at 261, 647 A.2d at 1206-07.
43. Serio v. Baltimore County, 384 Md. 373, 390, 863 A.2d 952, 962 (2004).
44. Forbes v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 322 Md. 689, 697, 589 A.2d 944, 948 (1991);
Tucker v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 75, 517 A.2d 730, 732 (1986).
45. Kaczorowski v. Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514-15, 525 A.2d 628, 632-33 (1987).
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Section 9-102 of the Labor and Employment Article requires review-
ing courts to construe workers' compensation legislation to effectuate
its general purpose. 46 The Court of Appeals has a long line of prece-
dent interpreting that purpose as remedial to the hardships faced by
employees and their families when a worker is injured at the work-
place or contracts a work-related disease.47 Consistent with this inter-
pretation of legislative purpose, the court instituted the rule of liberal
construction to effectuate the benevolent purposes of the Workers'
Compensation Act.48 When a workers' compensation provision is un-
clear, the rule of liberal construction requires courts to resolve any
statutory uncertainty in favor of the claimant.49 The court has consist-
ently stressed the remedial purpose of the Act in its analyses of work-
ers' compensation claims.5°
The Court of Appeals emphasized the remedial purposes of the
Workers' Compensation Act in Breitenbach v. N.B. Handy Co., in which
it applied the rule of liberal construction to a provision of the Act.5 I
In Breitenbach, the court carefully explained the statutory interpreta-
tion methodology that it applies to the Act.52 First, the court exam-
ines the plain meaning of the statutory text in conjunction with both
the overall purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act and the spe-
cific purpose of the portion of the Act in question.5 ' If the plain
meaning of the statutory text is unclear, ambiguous, or inconsistent
with either express general or specific statutory purposes, then the
court examines other factors, such as legislative history and prior case
46. MD. ConE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-102 (LexisNexis 1999).
47. E.g., Martin v. Beverage Capital Corp., 353 Md. 388, 398, 726 A.2d 728, 733 (1999);
Soper v. Montgomery County, 294 Md. 331, 335, 449 A.2d 1158, 1160 (1982); Bethlehem-
Sparrows Point Shipyard, Inc. v. Damasiewicz, 187 Md. 474, 480, 50 A.2d 799, 802 (1947).
48. Howard County Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Walls, 288 Md. 526, 530, 418
A.2d 1210, 1213 (1980).
49. Id. The court's consistent application of the rule of liberal construction to ambigu-
ous workers' compensation legislation is also valuable as a tool to ensure judicial predict-
ability. See Livesay v. Baltimore County, 384 Md. 1, 14-15, 862 A.2d 33, 40-41 (2004)
(valuing judicial predictability and consistency).
50. Breitenbach v. N.B. Handy Co., 366 Md. 467, 474, 784 A.2d 569, 573 (2001).
51. Id. at 484, 784 A.2d at 579. Section 9-660 of the Labor and Employment Article,
the provision at issue in Breitenbach, required employers to pay employees' medical bills
incurred as a result of treating workplace injuries or diseases. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. &
EMPL. § 9-660 (LexisNexis 1999). The Breitenbach court applied the rule of liberal construc-
tion to interpret the statute as requiring employers to pay reasonable transportation costs
to and from treatments, despite the absence of any reference in the statute to transporta-
tion costs. Breitenbach, 366 Md. at 484, 784 A.2d at 579.
52. Breitenbach, 366 Md. at 473, 784 A.2d at 572-73.
53. See id., 784 A.2d at 572 (noting that the court's exercise in statutory interpretation
ends when the plain meaning of statutory text is consistent with the statutory scheme and
the purpose of the examined provision).
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law interpretation, to determine legislative intent.54 Finally, the court
applies the rule of liberal construction to resolve any ambiguities in
favor of the claimant.
55
c. The Court's Different Interpretations of the Legislative Purpose of
Workers' Compensation Legislation.-On occasion, the court has posited
purposes for the Workers' Compensation Act other than protecting
injured or sick employees and their families.56 In Paul v. Glidden Co.,
the court stated that the Act was passed to promote the interests of
Maryland's citizens, who otherwise would bear the brunt of caring for
incapacitated employees and their families.57 The Glidden court ex-
plained the Act's purposes as it interpreted the statute to allow a
favorable recovery for an injured employee.5 ' The court explained
that though it might seem that the terms of the statute were inequita-
ble to the employer, the legislature enacted workers' compensation
legislation to redistribute the burdens of workplace injuries in a man-
ner beneficial to society as a whole.5"
In addition to taxpayers, the court has occasionally named em-
ployers as beneficiaries of the remedial purposes of the Act.6" In
Polomski v. Baltimore, the court stated that the purposes of the Act in-
clude providing certain relief from financial hardship for injured
workers and their families, protecting employers from the unpredict-
ability of tort liability, and preventing taxpayers from shouldering the
burden of paying for injured workers and their dependents.6 The
court recently reiterated this list of beneficiaries in Design Kitchen &
54. Id.
55. Id., 784 A.2d at 572-73.
56. See, e.g., Design Kitchen & Baths v. Lagos, 388 Md. 718, 732-33, 882 A.2d 817, 826
(2005) (stating that the Act protects employees, employers, and taxpayers); Polomski v.
Baltimore, 344 Md. 70, 76, 684 A.2d 1338, 1341 (1996) (same); B. Frank Joy Co. v. Isaac,
333 Md. 628, 634, 636 A.2d 1016, 1019 (1994) (explaining that the Act protects employees,
their dependents, and taxpayers); Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co. v. Goslin, 163 Md. 74, 80,
160 A. 804, 807 (1932) (noting that the Act protects the state from the expense of caring
for injured employees).
57. 184 Md. 114, 119, 39 A.2d 544, 546 (1944); accord B. Frank Joy Co., 333 Md. at 634,
636 A.2d at 1019; Liggett, 163 Md. at 80, 160 A. at 807.
58. 184 Md. at 119-20, 39 A.2d at 546. The Glidden court held that the statute at issue
required the employer to pay the injured employee for a forty-five percent loss of the use
of a hand, even though only five percent of that loss was due to the workplace injury. Id. at
120, 39 A.2d at 546.
59. Id. at 119, 39 A.2d at 546; accord Belcher v. T. Rowe Price Found., Inc., 329 Md. 709,
736-37, 621 A.2d 872, 885-86 (1993).
60. E.g., Design Kitchen & Baths, 388 Md. at 732-33, 882 A.2d at 826; Polomski, 344 Md. at
76, 684 A.2d at 1341.
61. 344 Md. at 76, 684 A.2d at 1341.
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Baths v. Lagos.62 Nonetheless, the court has maintained that applying
the rule of liberal construction to Maryland workers' compensation
legislation effectuates the Act's purposes.63
d. Section 9-503 Mandates Exceptions to General Workers' Com-
pensation Provisions.-
(1) The General Setoff Provision of Section 9-610.-Section 9-
610 directs government employers to reduce payment of workers'
compensation benefits to an employee or a deceased employee's de-
pendents by the amount of pension benefits paid.6 4 If the pension
benefit is less than the workers' compensation benefit, then govern-
ment employers must pay covered employees or their dependents the
difference.6 5 Thus, the general rule of section 9-610 means that city
and state employers reduce a government employee's workers' com-
pensation payment dollar-for-dollar by any amount that the employee
receives in pension benefits. 66 In most cases, section 9-610 prevents
covered government employees from recovering combined funds
from workers' compensation and their pensions.6 7 Thus, the court
has interpreted the purpose of section 9-610 as a legislative attempt to
reduce outlay of public funds by preventing government employees
from recovering combined funds from multiple sources.6"
(2) The Scope and Function of Section 9-503.-Maryland law
requires employers to compensate covered employees and their de-
pendents for disability or death caused by an occupational disease.6 9
Employers are only liable if the covered employee's disability or death
is caused by the occupational disease and the weight of the evidence
indicates that the disease was contracted in the course of
employment.
70
The Maryland legislature created an alternative to the general
weight-of-the-evidence standard that employees must meet to prove
that an occupational disease was contracted as a result of employ-
62. 388 Md. at 732, 882 A.2d at 826.
63. Martin v. Beverage Capital Corp., 353 Md. 388, 400, 726 A.2d 728, 734 (1999).
64. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-610(a) (1) (LexisNexis 1999). The City of Balti-
more pays former employees pension benefits, including death benefits to dependents of
deceased employees. BALTIMORE, Mn., CODE art. 22, § 34(h) (2004).
65. § 9-610(a) (2).
66. Id.
67. E.g., Blevins v. Baltimore County, 352 Md. 620, 622-23, 724 A.2d 22, 23 (1999).
68. Id. at 625, 724 A.2d at 24.
69. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-502 (LexisNexis 1999).
70. § 9-502(d).
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ment. 71 Section 9-503 contains four provisions, each of which address
a different combination of type of employee and type of disease.7 2
The first two provisions contain identical language describing the se-
verity of illness necessary to qualify for the presumption of compen-
sability: the illness must result in partial or total disability or death. 7
In contrast, section 9-503(c) requires a lesser standard. To qualify for
the compensability presumption under section 9-503(c), firefighters
need only show that their occupational disease has rendered them
unable to perform their normal duties.7 4 If a firefighter meets the
statutory criteria listed in sections 9-503(a), (b), or (c), the firefighter
qualifies for a legal presumption that she suffers from a compensable
occupational disease.75
The legislature has exempted firefighters who meet the criteria of
section 9-503 from the general setoff provision of section 9-610.76
Thus, under section 9-503, firefighters who are eligible for workers'
compensation benefits receive both workers' compensation benefits
and any pension benefits. 77 The total amount of weekly compensa-
tion a firefighter may receive under section 9-503 is capped at the
firefighter's former weekly salary.7 8
(3) Legislative History of Section 9-503.-The Maryland leg-
islature enacted the original version of section 9-503 to establish a pre-
sumption of compensable occupational disease for firefighters
suffering from specific diseases.79 The preamble to the original enact-
ment declared that the purpose of the provision was to provide the
presumption for firefighters "sustaining temporary or total disability
or death."' Thus, the initial legislation included dependents within
71. See id. § 9-502(d) (2) (requiring the Workers' Compensation Commission to decide
if the weight of the evidence reasonably favors a conclusion that the claimant suffers from a
disease caused by her employment).
72. See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-503(a) (LexisNexis 1999) (providing a pre-
sumption of compensability for firefighters with heart disease, hypertension, or lung dis-
ease); § 9-503(b) (providing a presumption of compensability for police officers); § 9-
503(c) (providing a presumption of compensability for firefighters with several types of
cancer); § 9-503(d) (providing a presumption of compensability for Department of Natu-
al Resources officers with Lyme disease).
73. § 9-503(a) (2); § 9-503(b) (1) (ii).
74. § 9-503(c). Qualifying illnesses under section 9-503(c) include several types of can-
cers that are caused by contact with toxic substances that firefighters encounter in the line
of duty. § 9-503(c) (1).
75. § 9-503.
76. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-503(e) (LexisNexis 1999).
77. § 9-503(e)(1).
78. § 9-503(e)(2).
79. Act of May 24, 1971, ch. 695, 1971 Md. Laws 1484.
80. Id. at 1485.
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its terms by listing "death" as a qualifying condition for firefighters
seeking workers' compensation under the predecessor of section 9-
503. The statute has undergone several amendments that added new
categories of qualifying employees and illnesses, 8' and section 9-503
was codified as such without substantive change in 1991.82 The legisla-
ture has never added or deleted the word "dependents," though the
preamble indicates that the legislature intended that surviving depen-
dents be eligible for the benefits accruing to qualifying firefighters
under this section.83
(4) Maryland Precedent Interpreting Section 9-503.-The
court has interpreted the terms of and purposes behind section 9-503
on several occasions. In Board of County Commissioners v. Colgan, 4 the
court upheld the constitutionality of the predecessor of section 9-503,
holding that the legislature could constitutionally provide different
compensation criteria for firefighters based on their higher levels of
occupational exposure to health hazards. The court reaffirmed the
legislature's intent to carve out a special category for firefighters who
risk their health in the line of duty in Montgomery County Fire Board v.
Fisher.85 The court noted that the legislature singled out firefighters
for the presumption that their health problems were work-related be-
cause firefighters are consistently exposed to toxic substances.8 6
81. SeeAct of May 26, 2005, ch. 553, 2005 Md. Laws 3193 (adding Montgomery County
correctional officers who suffer from heart disease or hypertension); Act of April 22, 2003,
ch. 107, 2003 Md. Laws 1263 (adding Baltimore City deputy sheriffs who suffer from heart
disease or hypertension); Act of April 25, 2000, ch. 160, 2000 Md. Laws 847 (adding Prince
George's County correctional officers who suffer from heart disease or hypertension); Act
of April 27, 1999, ch. 179, 1999 Md. Laws 1764 (adding Department of Natural Resources-
paid law enforcement officers who suffer from Lyme disease); Act of May 12, 1998, ch. 446,
1998 Md. Laws 2170 (adding sworn members of the Office of the State Fire Marshal); Act
of April 30, 1996, ch. 118, 1996 Md. Laws 1398 (adding volunteer advanced life support
unit members); Act of May 23, 1996, ch. 637, 1996 Md. Laws 3645 (adding Prince George's
County deputy sheriffs who suffer from heart disease or hypertension); Act of May 12,
1992, ch. 341, 1992 Md. Laws 2690 (adding Montgomery County deputy sheriffs who suffer
from heart disease or hypertension); Act of April 9, 1991, ch. 8, 1991 Md. Laws 846 (revis-
ing previous version without substantive change). The preambles to the subsequent
amendments either mention disability and death as qualifying categories or omit any refer-
ence to the deleterious effects of the compensable disease.
82. See Act of April 9, 1991, ch. 8, 1991 Md. Laws 846, 850 (revising previous version
without substantial change).
83. See id.
84. 274 Md. 193, 334 A.2d 89 (1975).
85. 298 Md. 245, 468 A.2d 625 (1983).
86. Id. at 256, 468 A.2d at 630.
1262
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
The court examined the intersection of the predecessors of both
section 9-503 and section 9-610 in Harris v. Baltimore.87 The legislature
had not yet amended section 9-503 to extend combined benefits to
employees covered under its terms, so the court relied on the plain
language of both statutes to conclude that the claimants' workers'
compensation benefits must be offset by their pension benefits."8
In Polomski v. Baltimore,89 the court rejected a claimant's section 9-
503 argument that he was eligible for combined pension and workers'
compensation benefits beyond his former weekly salary because sec-
tion 9-610 only required a setoff for similar benefits. The court relied
heavily on the fact that the legislature deleted the "similar benefits"
language when it recodified section 9-610.90 The court did not apply
the rule of liberal construction because the language of section 9-503
and section 9-610 was clear on its face.91 The court also characterized
the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act as a legislative attempt
to balance the competing interests of injured employees, employers,
and taxpayers.92 Consistent with this characterization, the court re-
jected Polomski's fairness argument because the legislature is not re-
quired to treat all employees equally with regard to their retirement
benefits because it often must make compromises when it doles out
public funds.93
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Johnson v. Baltimore, the Court of
Appeals held that the language of section 9-503 clearly and unambigu-
ously failed to extend combined benefits to dependents of deceased
firefighters.94 The court noted that this interpretation of the statute
aligned with legislative intent, as evidenced by the text of section 9-
87. 306 Md. 669, 511 A.2d 52 (1986).
88. Id. at 676, 511 A.2d at 56. The Harris court noted that its interpretation comported
with the principle that the plain meaning of statutory text controls the question of legisla-
tive intent as long as that meaning is sensible. Id.
89. 344 Md. 70, 684 A.2d 1338 (1995).
90. Id. at 82, 684 A.2d at 1344.
91. See id. at 75, 684 A.2d at 1340 (noting that no further interpretation of legislative
intent is ordinarily needed if the text is clear). The court also noted that it must make this
determination of the statute's clarity within the context of the statute's overall purpose. Id.
at 75-76, 684 A.2d at 1340.
92. Id. at 76-77, 684 A.2d at 1341.
93. See id. at 82-83, 684 A.2d at 1344 (noting that the offset provision in question might
have been a legislative attempt to balance the need to compensate ailing firefighters
against the need to conserve city funds).
94. Johnson, 387 Md. at 22, 874 A.2d at 452.
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503, 5 the overall statutory scheme,96 and the purposes of the Work-
ers' Compensation Act.97
The court stressed the absence of the word "dependents" in the
text of section 9-503.98 The court emphasized that, according to the
text of the statute, the combined benefits granted in section 9-503 ac-
crue to the "individuals" who participated in the retirement system.99
The court contrasted the language of section 9-503 with the general
setoff provision of section 9-610, which by its terms specifically applies
to dependents of deceased employees.1 0 In addition, the court noted
the existence of numerous other workers' compensation provisions
that specifically mention dependents and reasoned that these show
the legislature's capacity to explicitly provide benefits to dependents
when that is its intent.101
The court reasoned that a legislative decision to give combined
benefits to certain living firefighters without extending the same bene-
fits to their dependents upon death was not inconsistent with the over-
all statutory scheme.10 2 In support of this interpretation, the court
noted that the general setoff provision of section 9-610 includes the
dependents of firefighters who die as a result of injury in the line of
duty or occupational disease other than those statutorily presumed
compensable.'0 3 The court also noted that the legislature is not con-
strained to provide the same benefits to employees and their
dependents. 104
95. See id. at 9, 874 A.2d at 444 (emphasizing that section 9-503 does not contain a
reference to dependents).
96. See id. at 17-18, 874 A.2d at 449 (noting the inconsistency of giving enhanced bene-
fits to dependents of deceased firefighters who succumb to specific occupational diseases
while preserving the status quo for dependents of firefighters who died from different
occupational diseases or accidentally in the line of duty).
97. See id. at 21, 874 A.2d at 451 (noting that the Workers' Compensation Act is the
result of the legislature's judgment regarding the ideal management of public funds with
respect to workers, employers, and taxpayers).
98. Id. at 9, 874 A.2d at 444.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 9-10, 874 A.2d at 444-45.
101. Id. at 16 n.9, 874 A.2d at 448 n.9. The court explained that the existence of explicit
provisions for dependents indicated that the legislature had spent a great deal of time and
effort providing for dependents in workers' compensation legislation. Id. The court fur-
ther reasoned that this indicated the legislature's ability to provide for living dependents of
deceased firefighters in section 9-503 if the legislature was so inclined. Id.
102. Id. at 17, 874 A.2d at 449.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 18, 874 A.2d at 449.
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The court also emphasized the legislature's various purposes in
enacting workers' compensation legislation.1"5 The court reasoned
that construing section 9-503 to include dependents was equivalent to
questioning legislative judgment regarding the optimum allocation of
funds among employers, employees, and taxpayers.10 6 The court em-
phasized that the legislature bears sole responsibility for the correc-
tion of any perceived unfairness in employee benefit allocation.
10 7
Judge Battaglia dissented on the ground that the majority inap-
propriately failed to apply the rule of liberal construction to section 9-
503. ' 0 The dissent maintained that, properly construed, section 9-
503 includes dependents as recipients of combined benefits.109 Judge
Battaglia concluded that the majority relied too heavily on the bare
language of the statute. 110 She argued that the majority's construc-
tion of section 9-503 ignored the legislature's intent to bestow special
benefits on firefighters who suffer from diseases inherent to their
profession.' 11
4. Analysis.-In Johnson v. Baltimore, the Court of Appeals held
that the language of section 9-503 unambiguously failed to extend
combined benefits to living dependents of deceased firefighters.' 1 2
The court inappropriately weakened the rule of liberal construction
by not applying the rule to the interpretation of an ambiguous statute,
section 9-503. i ' This departure from Maryland precedent will have
deleterious effects on lower courts' ability to consistently interpret
statutes and apply the rule of liberal construction and will reduce the
ameliorative benefits of workers' compensation legislation.' 14 If the
Court of Appeals interprets the legislative purpose behind the Work-
ers' Compensation Act as a balancing of interests, it should expressly
limit or abrogate the rule of liberal construction as inapposite.1 5 If
the Court of Appeals merely wishes to apply the rule more sparingly, it
105. Id. at 12-13, 874 A.2d at 446. The Court of Appeals has explained that workers'
compensation legislation protects employees and their families from overwhelming ex-
pense, employers from unpredictable and expensive litigation, and the public from ardu-
ous tax burdens. Id.
106. Id. at 21, 874 A.2d at 451.
107. Id., 874 A.2d at 452.
108. Id. at 25, 874 A.2d at 453-54 (Battaglia, J., dissenting).
109. See id. (construing the statute with emphasis on the remedial nature of the Act and
the purpose of the rule of liberal construction).
110. Id. at 25, 874 A.2d at 454.
111. Id. at 29-30, 874 A.2d at 456.
112. Id. at 22, 874 A.2d at 452 (majority opinion).
113. See infra Part 4.a.
114. See infra Part 4.b.
115. See infta Part 4.c.
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should explicitly state the degree of statutory ambiguity required for
lower courts to use the rule of liberal construction." 6
a. The Court of Appeals Inappropriately Weakened the Rule of Lib-
eral Construction by Failing to Apply It to Section 9-503.-
(1) Section 9-503 Is Ambiguous.-The Johnson court failed
to apply the rule of liberal construction to the ambiguous statutory
text of section 9-503.11 Maryland precedent dictates that courts apply
the rule of liberal construction to any ambiguous provisions of the
Workers' Compensation Act.'18 The language of section 9-503 is suffi-
ciently ambiguous to qualify for application of the rule of liberal con-
struction when considered within the context of the entire statute and
in light of the remedial purposes of the Act and the specific provision
at issue.11
The Johnson court should have applied the rule of liberal con-
struction in its interpretation of section 9-503 because section 9-503 is
facially ambiguous. The court examined section 9-503(c), which is
the provision applicable to Mr. Johnson and Mr. Luster.'20 To qualify
for the presumption of compensability under section 9-503(c), a
firefighter must be unable to perform her normal duties as a result of
suffering from one of the types of cancers listed in section 9-
503(c)(1).2' Section 9-503 is facially ambiguous because it is unclear
whether the requirement that a firefighter be unable to perform her
duties incorporates or expands upon the requirement in sections 9-
503(a) and (b) that the government employee be incapacitated to the
point of severe disability or death.122 On its face, the statute appears
to require a lesser degree of affliction to qualify for the compen-
sability presumption from firefighters suffering from one of the dis-
116. See infra Part 4.c.
117. See 387 Md. at 30, 874 A.2d at 456-57 (Battaglia, J., dissenting) (dissenting because
the majority did not liberally construe the statute in favor of the claimant).
118. Howard County Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Walls, 288 Md. 526, 530, 418
A.2d 1210, 1213 (1980).
119. The court determines whether statutory text is ambiguous by examining its lan-
guage within the context of the general purpose of the statutory scheme and in light of the
specific provision being interpreted. Forbes v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 322 Md. 689, 697,
589 A.2d 944, 948 (1991); Tuckerv. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 75, 517 A.2d 730,
732 (1986).
120. The parties agreed that both Mr. Johnson and Mr. Luster suffered from cancers
included in the terms of section 9-503(c) (1). Johnson, 387 Md. at 3 n.1, 4 n.2, 874 A.2d at
441 nn.1-2.
121. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-503(c)(1) (LexisNexis 1999).
122. Compare § 9-503 (a) (2) (requiring disability or death for presumption of compen-
sability), and § 9-503(b) (2) (same), with § 9-503(c) (3) (requiring inability to perform nor-
mal duties for presumption of compensability).
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eases listed in section 9-503(c) (1) than those who qualify for the
compensability presumption under sections 9-503(a) and (b).' 2 3
Those employees who qualify for the compensability presumption
under section 9-503(a) or (b) must prove at least partial disability
while firefighters who qualify under section 9-503(c) need only prove
inability to perform normal duties.'2 4 The court inappropriately clas-
sified section 9-503(c) as unambiguous because it is facially unclear
whether the compensability presumption of section 9-503(c) incorpo-
rates the severely disabled and deceased categories of sections 9-
503(a) and (b).125
The Johnson court relied too heavily on the absence of the words
"death" and "dependents" to conclude that the text of section 9-503
clearly did not include deceased firefighters.1 26 A deceased employee
is necessarily unable to perform her normal duties. 127 Therefore, de-
spite the absence of the word "death" in section 9-503(c), the provi-
sion's requirement of inability to perform normal duties could
include any deceased employee.'
28
The Johnson court's reliance on the absence of "dependents" is
inappropriate because that absence does not prove that the legislature
intended to exclude deceased firefighters from section 9-503(c) quali-
fication. 12' The court has expressed in previous decisions that omit-
ting a term in a statute is not necessarily sufficient indication that the
legislature intended to exclude that term in the statute's applica-
tion. ' In Breitenbach, the court held that section 9-660 implicitly pro-
vided for transportation costs to and from medical treatments, even
though the statute made no mention of transportation costs. 13 1 Simi-
larly, in Johnson, there is no express provision for dependents in sec-
tion 9-503(c). 13 '2 The Breitenbach court explained that the omission of
an express provision for transportation costs in section 9-660 might be
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See 387 Md. at 25, 874 A.2d 454 (Battaglia, J., dissenting) (implying that the major-
ity's focus on the absence of the word "dependents" amounts to reading the statutory text
in a vacuum).
127. Section 9-503(c) requires that claimants be unable to perform their normal job
duties to qualify for the compensability presumption. § 9-503(c) (3).
128. See § 9-503(c) (3) (requiring inability to perform normal firefighting duties as a re-
sult of suffering from a listed type of cancer).
129. See 387 Md. at 9, 874 A.2d at 444 (noting at the outset of the court's discussion that
section 9-503 does not include the word "dependents").
130. E.g., Breitenbach v. N.B. Handy Co., 366 Md. 467, 480, 784 A.2d 569, 576 (2001).
131. Id. at 484, 784 A.2d at 579.
132. See § 9-503(c) (omitting the word "dependents").
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considered dispositive if the court read statutory language in a vac-
uum. 133 However, when the court considered section 9-660 in light of
the entire statutory scheme and relevant provisions of the Workers'
Compensation Act, it concluded that the omission of provisions for
transportation costs was ambiguous within that context. 13 4 The court
concluded that the rule of liberal construction applied because of the
remedial nature of both the Act as a whole and the specific provision
of section 9-660.135
The statute at issue in Johnson is analogous to the one at issue in
Breitenbach because there is a similar omission of statutory language, in
Johnson, "dependents."'3 6 Dependents of deceased employees who
qualified under the terms of section 9-503(a) or (b) could be entitled
to receive combined benefits, however, because deceased employees
are expressly included within the terms of those two provisions. 137
Section 9-503(e) could include dependents of deceased employees
who qualified under sections 9-503(a) and (b). 13' Therefore, even
within section 9-503, the very same section of the Act that the court
interprets in Johnson, certain surviving dependents should be entitled
to benefits without being expressly named in the statutory
language. 1
39
The Johnson court's decision also departs from its credo to inter-
pret statutes consistent with common sense.1 40 Under the court's in-
terpretation of section 9-503 in Johnson, a widow of a firefighter who
died from lung cancer receives combined benefits under section 9-
503(e). 4 1 But widows like Mrs. Johnson and Mrs. Luster, whose
spouses died from pancreatic or rectal cancer, would be barred from
receiving combined benefits under section 9-503(e).' 42 There is a se-
rious question as to why the legislature would favor the dependents of
employees who died from one type of cancer over those who died
from a different type of cancer. Thus, Johnson incorporates an illogi-
133. 366 Md. at 480, 784 A.2d at 577.
134. Id. at 484, 784 A.2d at 579.
135. Id.
136. Johnson, 387 Md. at 9, 874 A.2d at 439.
137. See § 9-503(a) (2) (requiring disability or death for the presumption of compen-
sability); § 9-503(b) (1) (ii) (same).
138. See § 9-503(e) (qualifying anyone who meets the criteria established in sections 9-
503(a), (b), (c), or (d) for combined workers' compensation and pension benefits).
139. Id.
140. See Serio v. Baltimore County, 384 Md. 373, 390-91, 863 A.2d 952, 962 (2004) (ex-
plaining that the court strives to give common sense interpretations to statutes).
141. See § 9-503(a) (1).
142. Johnson, 387 Md. at 22, 874 A.2d at 452.
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cal conclusion that violates the court's stated goal of interpreting the
law in a common sense manner. 143
(2) The Workers' Compensation Act and Section 9-503 Have Re-
medial Purposes.-The Johnson court ignored the remedial nature of
both the Workers' Compensation Act and section 9-503 in its interpre-
tation of the statute. 44 The remedial nature of the Act is coextensive
with the court's adoption of the rule of liberal construction to resolve
uncertainties in favor of the claimant whose hardships the Act seeks to
remedy. 45 Furthermore, the Johnson court's failure to apply the rule
of liberal construction is inconsistent with precedent because, like sec-
tion 9-660 in Breitenbach,146 section 9-503 is explicitly remedial in na-
ture.'47 The court has repeatedly acknowledged that the legislature
created the compensability presumption in section 9-503 because of
firefighters' continued exposure to toxic, life-threatening substances
in the line of duty.1" 8 Accordingly, the Johnson court should have ap-
plied the rule of liberal construction to its interpretation of the reme-
dial legislation of section 9-503(c).
Additionally, the Johnson court should have incorporated the leg-
islative history of section 9-503, which indicates that the statute's reme-
dial purpose was intended by the legislature to encompass both living
and deceased firefighters.149 The original language used by the legis-
lature in the preamble clearly states that dead firefighters qualify for
the benefits of the predecessor to section 9-503.15o Thus, contrary to
the majority's assertion that the legislature has drawn lines excluding
surviving dependents,"' legislative history indicates that the legisla-
143. Serio, 384 Md. at 390-91, 863 A.2d at 962; see also Harris v. Baltimore, 306 Md. 669,
676, 511 A.2d 52, 56 (1986) (stating that plain meaning of statutory text controls the ques-
tion of legislative intent if it is exact and sensible).
144. See 387 Md. at 25, 874 A.2d at 454 (Battaglia, J., dissenting) (stressing the need to
read workers' compensation legislation in light of the benevolent purposes of the Act).
145. E.g., Martin v. Beverage Capital Corp., 353 Md. 388, 398, 726 A.2d 728, 733 (1999);
Soper v. Montgomery County, 294 Md. 331, 335, 449 A.2d 1158, 1160 (1982); Bethlehem-
Sparrows Point Shipyard, Inc. v. Damasiewicz, 187 Md. 474, 480, 50 A.2d 799, 802 (1947).
146. Breitenbach v. N.B. Handy Co., 366 Md. 467, 484, 784 A.2d 569, 579 (2001).
147. See Johnson, 387 Md. at 25, 874 A.2d at 453 (Battaglia, J., dissenting) (noting the
remedial nature of the Workers' Compensation Act).
148. E.g., Montgomery County Fire Bd. v. Fisher, 298 Md. 245, 256, 468 A.2d 625, 630
(1983); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Colgan, 274 Md. 193, 208, 334 A.2d 89, 97 (1975).
149. See Kaczorowski v. Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514-15, 525 A.2d 628, 632-33 (1987)
(noting that the court may look to legislative history as evidence of the legislature's intent
when examining statutory language).
150. See Act of May 24, 1971, ch. 695, 1971 Md. Laws 1484, 1485 (declaring the compen-
sability presumption of the predecessor of section 9-503 available to disabled or deceased
firefighters).
151. Johnson, 387 Md. at 3, 874 A.2d at 440.
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ture intended to include such dependents within the ambit of section
9-503.
b. The Inappropriate Weakening of the Rule of Liberal Construc-
tion Will Have Deleterious Effects.-
(1) Lower Courts Will Have Difficulty Consistently Applying the
Rule of Liberal Construction.-The Court of Appeals inappropriately
weakened the rule of liberal construction in its Johnson decision. 152
This will have deleterious effects on the ability of lower courts to con-
sistently and predictably interpret workers' compensation legislation.
Lower courts will likely have particular trouble with interpreting chal-
lenges of statutory omissions. The court's decision in Johnson contra-
dicts its decision in Breitenbach because the court has now decided the
question of whether an omission of a term constitutes a clear, unam-
biguous meaning in opposite ways.'5 3 Lower courts that encounter
arguments about omission of statutory terms will not know whether an
omission may properly be considered ambiguous for purposes of ap-
plication of the rule of liberal construction. This lack of clarity may
result in judicial inconsistency and unpredictability.
Weatherly v. Great Coastal Express Co.' 54 illustrates the complica-
tions lower courts face when relying on the Johnson decision. The
Court of Special Appeals decided Weatherly in accordance with the
Johnson court's ambiguity analysis.155 The Weatherly court examined a
workers' compensation claim for death benefits presented by a surviv-
ing dependent of a deceased employee. 56 The surviving dependent
lived with the deceased for thirty years before his death, though they
never married.' 57 The Weatherly court ruled against the surviving de-
pendent, relying heavily on the Court of Appeals's reasoning in John-
son. 158  The Weatherly decision repeated the Johnson court's
characterization of the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act as
152. See id. at 30, 874 A.2d at 456-57 (Battaglia, J., dissenting) (arguing that applying the
rule of liberal construction to section 9-503 should have led the court to the opposite
result).
153. CompareJohnson, 387 Md. at 22, 874 A.2d at 452 (emphasizing that the omission of
"dependents" in section 9-503(c) is clear and unambiguous), with Breitenbach v. N.B.
Handy Co., 366 Md. 467, 484, 784 A.2d 569, 579 (2001) (holding that the omission of a
provision for transportation costs was not conclusive proof that the legislature declined to
extend payment for those costs).
154. 164 Md. App. 354, 883 A.2d 924 (2005).
155. Id. at 378, 883 A.2d at 938.
156. Id. at 359, 883 A.2d at 927.
157. Id. The statutory provision at issue extended special benefits to surviving "spouses"
in one section and referred to surviving "dependents" in a similar, preceding section. Id. at
376-78, 883 A.2d at 937-38.
158. Id. at 378-79, 883 A.2d at 938-39.
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threefold, protecting employees, employers, and taxpayers.' 59 Consis-
tent with this characterization of the Act's purpose, the Weatherly court
again relied on Johnson for its reply to the claimant's fairness argu-
ment.160 The Court of Special Appeals repeated the Johnson court's
reasoning that the legislature faced the difficult task of balancing in-
terests and drawing lines to exclude claimants and likewise repeated
the Johnson decision's conclusory language that the legislature had al-
ready drawn a line excluding the claimant.161
The Johnson decision created an analytical problem for the Weath-
erly court when it confronted the claimant's reliance on Breitenbach in
her argument for liberal construction of the benefits provision. 62
First, the Weatherly court stated in conclusory terms that the statute at
issue in Breitenbach was ambiguous, while the one in Johnson was not.16
But the Weatherly court made no attempt to clarify why.16" Next, the
Weatherly court attempted to distinguish Breitenbach from Johnson be-
cause the Breitenbach court found another provision in the Workers'
Compensation Act that implied a general entitlement to payment of
transportation costs.16 5 The Weatherly court failed to mention that the
statutory provisions surrounding section 9-503 could have easily given
rise to a similar implication of entitlement in Johnson. 6 6 As exempli-
fied by the Weatherly decision, the irreconcilable differences in the stat-
utory interpretation of workers' compensation legislation in
Breitenbach and Johnson will have deleterious effects on lower courts'
ability to consistently apply the rule of liberal construction.
(2) Claimants Face Harsher Burden from Courts.-The weak-
ening of the rule of liberal construction by the Johnson court also ham-
pers the remedial effect of the Workers' Compensation Act. The
Court of Appeals adopted the rule of liberal construction for the ex-
press function of judicially promoting the Act's ameliorative pur-
poses.167 Whenever the court fails to apply the rule when interpreting
provisions that call for its application, the court reduces the benevo-
lent effects of the Act.
159. Id. at 379-80, 883 A.2d at 939.
160. Id. at 383-84, 883 A.2d at 941-42.
161. Id. at 383, 883 A.2d at 941.
162. See id. at 384, 883 A.2d at 942 (attempting to distinguish Johnson from Breitenbach).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See supra Part 4.a(2).
167. Howard County Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Walls, 288 Md. 526, 530, 418
A.2d 1210, 1213 (1980).
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The Johnson decision's incongruity with the Breitenbach decision
creates further uncertainty in that potential claimants will be unable
to reliably predict judicial interpretation of statutory omissions in
workers' compensation legislation. Thus, claimants not only face the
burden of no longer having ambiguous statutes construed in their
favor; they also may shy away from filing suit due to an inability to
evaluate the success of their claims before the investment of litigation.
Such a chilling effect would undermine the remedial purpose of the
Workers' Compensation Act. 1
6 8
c. The Court of Appeals Should Clarify Its Interpretation of Legisla-
tive Purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act and Its Standard for the Appli-
cability of the Rule of Liberal Construction.-The Johnson court missed the
opportunity to clarify the Court of Appeals's interpretation of the gen-
eral purpose behind the Workers' Compensation Act. Judicial clarity
is desirable because the Maryland legislature requires courts to con-
strue the Act according to its general purpose.169 However, the Court
of Appeals has provided varying interpretations of that legislative pur-
pose. 170 To logically support the rule of liberal construction, the pri-
mary purpose of the Act must be the compensation of injured
employees and their families.' 7' There is no need to construe the
Act's provisions in favor of claimants if the legislature intended merely
to balance coequal, competing interests in its workers' compensation
legislation.1 7 2 Furthermore, the court's interpretation of legislative
purpose becomes particularly salient when, as in Johnson, it is used to
rationalize the court's failure to construe the provision liberally in ac-
cordance with the rule. 173 Thus, the Johnson court should have taken
168. See id. (requiring liberal construction in favor of the claimant to effectuate the Act's
benevolent purpose).
169. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-102 (LexisNexis 1999). Furthermore, the court's
primary goal in interpreting any statute is to effectuate the intent of the legislature. Oaks
v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995).
170. See, e.g., Martin v. Beverage Capital Corp., 353 Md. 388, 398, 726 A.2d 728, 733
(1999) (identifying the Act's purpose as the protection of workers and their families from
the hardships inflicted by work-related health problems); Polomski v. Baltimore, 344 Md.
70, 76, 684 A.2d 1338, 1341 (1996) (stating that the Act's purpose is to protect employees,
employers, and taxpayers); B. FrankJoy Co. v. Isaac, 333 Md. 628, 634, 636 A.2d 1016, 1019
(1994) (emphasizing the Act's goals of ensuring efficient relief for injured employees and
their families and protecting taxpayers from overwhelming burdens).
171. See Walls, 288 Md. at 530, 418 A.2d at 1213 (stating that workers' compensation
legislation should be construed as liberally as possible in favor of the claimant when statu-
tory text is ambiguous).
172. See Polomski, 344 Md. at 76, 684 A.2d at 1341 (stressing the Act's purpose to protect
employees, employers, and taxpayers).
173. See Johnson, 387 Md. at 2, 874 A.2d at 440 (discussing the legislature's task of balanc-
ing competing interests when enacting workers' compensation legislation). The court has
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the opportunity to clarify whether the Act's purpose is primarily reme-
dial in favor of workers so that lower courts may consistently comply
with the legislature's mandate to interpret the Act in accord with its
general purpose.17 1
The Johnson court also missed the opportunity to promote judicial
consistency and predictability by providing lower courts with specific
standards for the application of the rule of liberal construction. If the
Johnson decision indicates the court's intention to abandon or lessen
its characterization of the Act as primarily an ameliorative remedy for
injured employees and their families in favor of an interpretation of
legislative intent that more closely resembles legislative balancing of
competing, coequal interests, the court should have specified whether
a different application of the rule of liberal construction or its abroga-
tion altogether was warranted. If the Johnson interpretation of legisla-
tive purpose warrants a more stringent application of the rule of
liberal construction, the court should explicitly acknowledge that and
provide lower courts with clear standards as to when the rule of liberal
construction should apply.
For example, the court has repeatedly stressed the importance of
workers' compensation legislation as a device to protect taxpayers
from the overwhelming burdens of caring for injured employees and
their dependents. 175 If the Johnson court concluded that taxpayer pro-
tection was a legislative purpose of equal importance to that of em-
ployee protection, the court should have generated a stricter standard
for the application of the rule of liberal construction when interpret-
previously used a broader characterization of legislative purpose with regard to workers'
compensation to extend, rather than deny, its provisions to claimants. See, e.g., Design
Kitchen & Baths v. Lagos, 388 Md. 718, 732-33, 882 A.2d 817, 826 (2005) (emphasizing the
public policy aspects of workers' compensation legislation in interpreting statutory benefits
provision to include undocumented alien workers); Belcher v. T. Rowe Price Found., Inc.,
329 Md. 709, 737, 621 A.2d 872, 886 (1993) (emphasizing the theoretical underpinnings of
workers' compensation legislation as a societal loss distribution tool in justifying expansion
of the definition of "injury" to encompass psychological injury); Paul v. Glidden Co., 184
Md. 114, 120, 39 A.2d 544, 546 (1944) (interpreting the statute to allow an injured em-
ployee to recover loss of forty-five percent of his hand use when the workplace accident
only caused five percent loss). The Polomski and Johnson decisions represent a recent de-
parture in the court's use of legislative purpose to justify denying benefits to workers' com-
pensation claimants. See Polomski, 344 Md. at 76, 79, 684 A.2d at 134142 (deciding that a
setoff provision reduced claimant's combined injury-related workers' compensation and
time-earned retirement benefits and stressing the Act's purpose to protect employees, em-
ployers, and taxpayers); Johnson, 387 Md. at 2-3, 874 A.2d at 440 (noting that the legislature
must draw lines between competing interests in the realm of workers' compensation
legislation).
174. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-102 (LexisNexis 1999).
175. E.g., B. Frank Joy Co. v. Isaac, 333 Md. 628, 634, 636 A.2d 1016, 1019 (1994); Lig-
gett & Meyers Tobacco Co. v. Goslin, 163 Md. 74, 80, 160 A. 804, 807 (1932).
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ing workers' compensation provisions that implicate public fi-
nances. 176 The Johnson court could have explicitly stated that a less
lenient application of the rule of liberal construction is appropriate in
cases in which the legislature has created another countervailing pro-
vision with the purpose of cutting public expenditures.1 7 7 However, if
the general purpose of the Act is indeed primarily ameliorative with
respect to employees and their dependents, the Johnson court should
have promoted judicial consistency by explicitly stating necessary crite-
ria to implicate use of the rule of liberal construction.1 7 ' The Court
of Appeals's refusal to apply the rule of liberal construction to a
claimed statutory omission in Johnson differed from its willingness to
use the rule under similar circumstances in Breitenbach.17 1 Since the
Johnson decision narrowed the application of the rule of liberal con-
struction in cases involving statutory omissions, the Johnson court
should have explicitly stated a narrower standard for lower courts to
use when deciding whether the rule of liberal construction applies.180
Finally, the Johnson court should have provided further clarity by
describing the degree of statutory ambiguity necessary for the inter-
preting court to apply the rule of liberal construction. 18
1
5. Conclusion.-The Court of Appeals inappropriately weakened
the rule of liberal construction by failing to apply the rule to its inter-
pretation of section 9-503 in Johnson.l"2 Section 9-503 is ambiguous,
and the remedial purposes of the Act and the specific provision war-
176. See 387 Md. at 21, 874 A.2d at 451-52 (expressing concern about judicial intrusion
into legislative decisionmaking regarding resource allocation).
177. The legislature expressed its desire to prevent combined source recovery in most
instances and thus limit public expenditures in section 9-610. See Blevins v. Baltimore
County, 352 Md. 620, 625, 724 A.2d 22, 24 (1999) (stating that the legislature intended a
previous version of section 9-610 to reduce expenditure of public funds).
178. See Livesay v. Baltimore County, 384 Md. 11, 14, 862 A.2d 33, 40-41 (2004)
(stressing the value of judicial predictability and consistency).
179. See supra notes 129-139 and accompanying text.
180. An explicit standard would enhance judicial consistency and predictability in lower
court decisions involving workers' compensation legislation. See Livesay, 384 Md. at 14, 862
A.2d at 40-41 (valuing judicial predictability and consistency).
181. In deciding whether to apply the rule of liberal construction, the reviewing court
must first determine if the statute is ambiguous. Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 261, 647 A.2d
1204, 1206 (1994). Because the Breitenbach and Johnson decisions differ on whether a statu-
tory omission creates ambiguity, the Johnson court should have clarified how to determine
whether an omission is ambiguous in the context of workers' compensation legislation.
Compare Johnson, 387 Md. at 22, 874 A.2d at 452 (emphasizing that the omission of "depen-
dents" in section 9-503(c) is clear and unambiguous), with Breitenbach v. N.B. Handy Co.,
366 Md. 467, 484, 784 A.2d 569, 579 (2001) (holding that omission of provision for trans-
portation costs was not conclusive proof that the legislature declined to extend payment
for those costs).
182. See supra Part 4.a(1).
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rant application of the rule of liberal construction. 183 The weakening
of the rule of liberal construction will have deleterious effects on
lower courts' ability to apply the rule consistently and will reduce the
ameliorative benefits of workers' compensation legislation. 84 The
Court of Appeals should state more clearly how it interprets the legis-
lative purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act; if the court wishes
to apply the rule more sparingly, it should explicitly state the degree
of statutory ambiguity required for lower courts to use the rule of lib-
eral construction.
8 5
MARY E. SYLVESTER
183. See supra Part 4.a(2).
184. See supra Part 4.b.
185. See supra Part 4.c.
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IX. TORTS
A. A Blemished Construction of Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Negligence
Jurisprudence Thwarts the Prospective Application
of Judicial Decisionmaking
In Polakoff v. Turner,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland consid-
ered, inter alia, whether the modified negligence standard of Brooks v.
Lewin Realty III, Inc.,2 based upon a landlord's violation of the Balti-
more City Housing Code,3 applied retroactively to a tenant's negli-
gence action.4 In affirming the judgment of the Court of Special
Appeals,5 the Court of Appeals held that the ruling in Brooks applied
retroactively to all cases pending when Brooks was filed.6 Thus, the
Brooks holding applied to Polakoff which was pending in the Court of
Special Appeals when Brooks was issued.7 The court reasoned that
Brooks's modified standard for establishing a prima facie case of negli-
gence provided a new interpretation of the Housing Code rather than
a change in the common law.8 Therefore, the court held that the
statutory interpretation provided in Brooks should apply retroactively
to all cases pending where the parties preserved the issue for appellate
review. 9
1. 385 Md. 467, 869 A.2d 837 (2005).
2. 378 Md. 70, 835 A.2d 616 (2003). In Brooks, a tenant brought against her landlord
a negligence action arising from consumption of lead-based paint found in the leased
property, in violation of the local housing code. Id. at 72, 835 A.2d at 617. The Brooks
court overruled precedent by holding that the tenant did not have to demonstrate a land-
lord's notice of Housing Code violations to establish a prima facie case of negligence. Id.
3. See BALTIMORE, MD. HOUSING CODE §§ 702(a), 703(b)(3) (2000) (requiring that
landlords continually keep occupied dwellings in good repair and safe condition, clean
and free of flaking, loose, or peeling paint).
4. Polakoff 385 Md. at 473, 869 A.2d at 841. The court also examined: (1) whether it
correctly decided Brooks, (2) whether the Court of Special Appeals mistakenly applied
Brooks to the case before it, and (3) whether sufficient evidence existed to support the
jury's conclusion that Polakoff and Chase Management did not act reasonably under the
circumstances to ensure continued compliance with the Housing Code. Id.
5. Polakoffv. Turner, 155 Md. App. 60, 841 A.2d 406 (2004), affJd, 385 Md. 467, 869
A.2d 837 (2005).
6. Polakoff 385 Md. at 473, 869 A.2d at 841.
7. Id. Additionally, the court held that (1) it correctly decided Brooks, (2) the Court of
Special Appeals properly applied Brooks to the case before it, and (3) ajury could reasona-
bly conclude based on the evidence that the landlord and the landlord's management
company did not act reasonably under the circumstances to comply with the Housing
Code. Id. at 473, 485, 489, 869 A.2d at 841, 848, 851.
8. Id. at 489 & n.16, 869 A.2d at 850-51 & n.16.
9. Id. at 488-89, 869 A.2d at 850-51.
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In so reasoning, the court misconstrued Brooks's modified stan-
dard as a new interpretation of the Housing Code instead of as a si-
multaneous derogation of the common law and an expansion of the
Housing Code's jurisdiction.1 ° By failing to recognize the impact of
Brooks on the common law and summarily dismissing its reasoning as
statutory interpretation, the court inappropriately selected a retroac-
tive application of the Brooks holding.11 Instead, the court should
have applied Brooks prospectively, including to the parties before it so
as not to undermine the true impact of Brooks.12
1. The Case.-Jasmine Turner, a minor tenant,13 resided in a
rental property14 located at 17 North Bentalou Street in Baltimore
City. She lived with her mother, Crystal Whittington, and grand-
mother, Lelia Whittington,15 from her birth on April 3, 1990 until
August 1994.16 In 1993, a routine physical examination demonstrated
that Turner had an elevated blood lead level of twenty-two pg/dl (mi-
crograms per deciliter) .17 Crystal claimed that Turner suffered lead-
based paint poisoning from exposure to lead-based paint while resid-
ing in the property.18 Accordingly, in 1994, Crystal filed a complaint
against Polakoff on her daughter's behalf in the Circuit Court for Bal-
timore City, asserting negligence, a violation of the Maryland Con-
10. See infra Part 4.a(2).
11. See infra Part 4.b.
12. See infra Part 4.c.
13. A minor tenant is a person who has not reached full legal age and occupies and
uses another's land under a lease. BLACK'S LAw DicrIONARY 1017, 1506 (8th ed. 2004).
14. Petitioner Lawrence Polakoff owned the property from 1975 until 1992, when he
transferred his ownership interest to C.F.A.S. Limited Partnership, a company in which he
acts as a limited partner and serves as president. Polakoff 385 Md. at 473 & n.2, 869 A.2d at
841 & n.2. A property manager handled the day-to-day management and maintenance of
the property until its sale to CFAS, at which time Chase Management acquired such duties.
Id. at 473, 869 A.2d at 841.
15. For purposes of clarity, Crystal and Lelia Whittington will be referred to as "Crystal"
and "Lelia" respectively because they share the same last name.
16. Id. at 473, 869 A.2d at 841.
17. A child's blood lead level is considered elevated at ten Pg/dl. Id. at 474 & n.4, 869
A.2d at 842 & n.4.
18. During the trial, Crystal and Lelia introduced evidence of defective property condi-
tions in violation of the Housing Code. Id. at 474, 869 A.2d at 841-42.
Both women testified that during a walk-through inspection, prior to moving into the
property, they observed that the windowsills had been recently painted but that the paint
unevenly covered preexisting, chipping paint. Id, 869 A.2d at 841. Moreover, during their
tenancy, they noticed that the paint around the windows had begun to chip and flake. Id.
Prior to Turner's birth, a worker painted the two windowsills in the living room by painting
on top of the old chipping and flaking paint, which, according to testimony, continued to
chip. Id., 869 A.2d at 841-42.
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sumer Protection Act,19 and strict liability.20 In 1998, the circuit court
granted Polakoff's motion for summary judgment on the negligence
claim and denied Crystal's request to add CFAS and Chase as defend-
ants.2 ' As a result, Crystal appealed the entry of summary judgment
and the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed.22
Subsequently, Crystal filed a separate action that contained multi-
ple counts against CFAS and Chase. 23 The court consolidated Crys-
tal's new suit with her prior action against Polakoff and tried the
entire case in October 2002.24 The only claim that the jury reviewed
was Crystal's negligence claim against the three defendants. 2 A jury
awarded Crystal $500,000 against Polakoff and Chase26 but found in
favor of CFAS.27 Polakoff and Chase then filed a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and, alternatively, to apply the statutory
cap on non-economic damages. 2' Although the court denied the mo-
tion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, it applied the statutory
cap 29 and reduced the initial judgment to $350,000.30 Polakoff and
Chase appealed to the Court of Special Appeals to overturn the denial
of their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.31 Crystal
cross-appealed to contest the circuit court's use of the statutory dam-
age cap.32
19. See generally MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 13-301 (LexisNexis 2005) (prohibiting
deceptive trade practices).
20. Polakoffv. Turner, 155 Md. App. 60, 63-64, 841 A.2d 406, 408 (2004). The circuit
court later dismissed the Maryland Consumer Protection Act and strict-liability claims. Id.
at 64, 841 A.2d at 408.
21. Id., 841 A.2d at 408-09.
22. Id., 841 A.2d at 409.
23. Id.
24. Id. At or before the start of the trial, all claims, except the negligence action, were
either dismissed willingly or by court order. Id.
25. Id.
26. The circuit court determined that Polakoff and Chase were liable because they had
reason to know of the flaking, loose, or peeling paint, and Polakoff, through his agent,
should have been on notice of the Housing Code violations. Polakoff 385 Md. at 489-90,
869 A.2d at 851.
27. Polakoff 155 Md. App. at 64, 841 A.2d at 409.
28. Id.; see also MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 11-108 (LexisNexis 2005) (impos-
ing a limitation on non-economic damages that arise from personal-injury or wrongful-
death actions).
29. Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, section 11-108 of the Maryland Code re-
stricts awards of non-economic damages to $350,000 in personal-injury actions sustained
between July 1, 1986 and October 1, 1994. § 11-108(b)(1).
30. Polakoff 155 Md. App. at 64, 841 A.2d at 409.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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Before the Court of Special Appeals considered the case, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland decided Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc.,"
which overruled, in part, RichwindJoint Venture v. Brunson.4 The jury
in Polakoff relied upon Richwind in its assessment of the appellant's
liability.3 5 Accordingly, on appeal, the Court of Special Appeals con-
sidered whether the holding in Brooks applied retroactively to Polakoff
as well as whether the statutory cap on non-economic damages that
the circuit court imposed was constitutional.3 6
The Court of Special Appeals rejected the appellants' claim that
the holding in Brooks should only apply prospectively.3 7 The court dis-
tinguished between the retroactive effect of a judicial decision that
renders a new interpretation of a constitutional or statutory provision
and the prospective effect of a judicial decision that changes the com-
mon law of Maryland." In reaching its decision, the Court of Special
Appeals reasoned that while Brooks overruled prior decisions, it did
not change the common law.3 ° Thus, the intermediate appellate
court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court and held that Brooks
applied retroactively to Polakoff40 The Court of Special Appeals also
upheld the constitutionality of the statutory cap on non-economic
damages.4 1
Polakoff and Chase petitioned the Court of Appeals to consider
four issues: (1) whether the Court of Appeals properly decided Brooks,
(2) whether the circuit court erred in denying the defendant's motion
forjudgment notwithstanding the verdict due to insufficient evidence,
(3) whether the Court of Special Appeals erred by retroactively apply-
ing Brooks, and (4) whether Brooks applies retroactively to Polakoff42
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari on May 14, 2004. 41
33. 378 Md. 70, 835 A.2d 616 (2003).
34. Polakoff, 155 Md. App. at 62, 841 A.2d at 408. In Richwind, the Maryland Court of
Appeals sustained the now-defunct Maryland common-law principle that a landlord is not
liable for a defective condition on the leased property unless she either knows or has rea-
son to know of the condition and has a reasonable opportunity to correct it. 335 Md. 661,
676, 645 A.2d 1147, 1154 (1994).
35. Polakoff 155 Md. App. at 62, 841 A.2d at 408.
36. Id at 63, 841 A.2d at 408.
37. Id. at 70-71, 841 A.2d at 412-13. The appellants asserted that the retroactive appli-
cation of Brooks was unjust because Baltimore City landlords relied on precedent like
Richwind Id
38. Id at 66-67, 841 A.2d at 410.
39. Id. at 69, 841 A.2d at 412.
40. Id at 70-71, 841 A.2d at 412-13.
41. Id. at 71, 841 A.2d at 413.
42. Polakoff 385 Md. at 473, 869 A.2d at 841.
43. Id
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2. Legal Background.-Maryland courts recognize the well-settled
principle that remedial statutes in conflict with the common law, such
as the Housing Code, should be strictly construed but should also ef-
fectuate the legislature's intent in enacting the statute.44 Moreover,
once a court adopts a particular construction of a statute, that con-
struction ordinarily applies retroactively to the case before it, as well as
to issues in pending cases preserved for appellate review.45 Neverthe-
less, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has reasoned that the retroac-
tive application of a judicial decision is generally inappropriate when
the decision overrules precedent.4
6
Additionally, over the past thirty years, Maryland law governing
lead-based paint poisoning negligence actions has significantly
changed because of the Maryland courts' increased willingness to
eliminate the requirement that a landlord have notice and knowledge
of the presence or risks of lead-based paint.47 Throughout this pe-
riod, the Maryland legislature modified the common law of negli-
gence, originally used to support lead-based paint poisoning claims,
with statutory provisions that place landlords on notice of potentially
hazardous conditions on their leased premises.48 Accordingly, private
claims brought in the landlord-tenant lead-based paint poisoning con-
text have become increasingly rooted in a violation of a statutory duty
of care because such claims circumvent the notice requirement under
traditional negligence theory.4 9 In particular, the past ten years have
witnessed a notable change in how Maryland courts construe the in-
teraction between statutory provisions of the Housing Code and the
common law regarding a landlord's knowledge of a hazardous
condition.50
a. Maryland Canons of Statutory Construction.-To prevent the
perpetuation of erroneous principles of law, courts may engage in
44. E.g., Bradshaw v. Prince George's County, 284 Md. 294, 302, 396 A.2d 255, 260
(1979).
45. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Goldstein, 312 Md. 583, 591, 541 A.2d 955, 958 (1988).
46. See, e.g.,Julian v. Christopher, 320 Md. 1, 10-12, 575 A.2d 735, 739-40 (1990) (apply-
ing a change in the common law's interpretation of "silent consent" clauses prospectively
to protect landlord-tenant contracts executed in reliance on the court's prior
interpretation).
47. See infra Part 2.c(2)-(3).
48. See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
49. See infra Part 2.c(3).
50. Compare RichwindJoint Venture v. Brunson, 335 Md. 661, 676, 645 A.2d 1147, 1154
(1994) (holding that the Housing Code did not "alter or supercede the common law con-
cerning a landlord's knowledge of a defective condition on the premises"), with Brooks v.
Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70, 88-89, 835 A.2d 616, 627 (2003) (holding that the Hous-
ing Code abolishes a landlord's notice requirement in a common-law negligence action).
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statutory interpretation. 1 The fundamental goal of statutory inter-
pretation is to determine the legislature's intent in enacting a statute,
which may oftentimes conflict with the existing common law.12 To
ascertain legislative intent, courts examine the statutory language and
give effect to the statute as written, so long as its common meaning is
explicit and conveys a plain meaning." Specifically, Maryland courts
generally construe remedial statutes liberally.54 On the other hand,
Maryland courts also abide by the principle that remedial statutes in
derogation of the common law should be construed narrowly.5" Thus,
Maryland courts face a judicial tension between effectuating remedial
statutes and altering precedent.56
Nevertheless, even in the case of a potentially ambiguous reme-
dial statute,5 7 statutory construction seeks to ascertain legislative in-
tent.58 For example, in Carolina Freight Carriers Corp. v. Keane, the
court interpreted the words "21 years old or younger" in the Maryland
Wrongful Death Act to encompass everyone in their twenty-first year
of life until the evening of their twenty-second year, in derogation of
the common law.59  The court recognized that the Wrongful Death
Act should be strictly construed.6" However, the court interpreted the
statute in conflict with the common law because such an interpreta-
tion effectuated the legislature's purpose in enacting the statute.6'
51. See, e.g., Garg v. Garg, 163 Md. App. 546, 592, 881 A.2d 1180, 1206 (2005) (describ-
ing the judicial function of statutory interpretation).
52. Stearman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 381 Md. 436, 448 n.8, 849 A.2d 539,
546 n.8 (2004).
53. Id.
54. E.g., State v. Barnes, 273 Md. 195, 208, 328 A.2d 737, 745 (1974).
55. E.g., Bradshaw v. Prince George's County, 284 Md. 294, 302, 396 A.2d 255, 260
(1979).
56. See, e.g., Kaczorowski v. Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 512, 525 A.2d 628, 631 (1987)
(describing a "battle between contending canons of construction").
57. See, e.g., Witte v. Azarian, 369 Md. 518, 525-26, 801 A.2d 160, 165 (2002) (noting
that if legislative intent cannot be easily divined from a statute's language alone, courts can
examine other factors, such as the structure and purpose of the statute; the interaction
between the statute and other laws; the statute's legislative history, including any proposed
or added amendments; and the reasonableness of conflicting constructions).
58. Arundel Corp. v. Marie, 383 Md. 489, 502, 860 A.2d 886, 894 (2004).
59. 311 Md. 335, 344-47, 534 A.2d 1337, 1342-43 (1988).
60. Id. at 338, 534 A.2d at 1339.
61. Id. at 346-47, 534 A.2d at 1343. But see Hardy v. State, 301 Md. 124, 132 & n.3, 482
A.2d 474, 478-79 & n.3 (1984) (refusing to preempt the common-law misdemeanor of
attempted murder by Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article 27, section 12 of the Mary-
land Code, in part because section 644A of the Maryland Code, enacted after section 12,
identifies an alternate construction).
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Through statutory interpretation, the court altered the common law
to eliminate precedent in conflict with the legislature's intent.62
b. The Operation of Judicial Decisions in Maryland.-Maryland
courts generally apply well-established principles of law.63 Occasion-
ally, however, a choice-of-law question arises when a court overrules
precedent or renders a new interpretation of a statutory or constitu-
tional provision.61 Under these circumstances, the parties to a pend-
ing case may have regulated their conduct and the case may otherwise
be decided differently.65 The Supreme Court has identified three pri-
mary means of addressing the choice-of-law problem.66 First, and
"overwhelmingly the norm," a decision may be given full retroactive
effect to the parties before the court and to all others who may pursue
allegations.67 Retroactivity comports with the roles of the courts to
find law and legislatures to create it.68 Second, on rare occasions, a
decision may apply purely prospectively, in which case the decision
applies neither to the parties before the court nor to claims where the
conduct occurred before that decision. 69 Third, under modified or
selective prospectivity, a court applies a new rule to the case before it
but not to cases based on events arising prior to the decision.70 The
Supreme Court largely deserted the latter method because it under-
mines the theory of judicial review and contravenes the notion that
similarly situated parties receive similar treatment.71
In Linkletter v. Walker,72 the Supreme Court set forth factors to
resolve whether a new interpretation of a constitutional or statutory
provision ought to operate retroactively or prospectively. These fac-
62. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 311 Md. at 346, 534 A.2d at 1343.
63. See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Goldstein, 312 Md. 583, 591, 541 A-2d 955, 958
(1988) (noting that most judicial decisions expound the rule of law that existed before and
after the decision).
64. See id. at 591, 541 A.2d at 959 (describing the infrequency of a choice-of-law
problem).
65. Id.
66. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 535-37 (1991) (plurality
opinion).
67. Id. at 535. The Court asserted that a retroactive application of a judicial decision
adheres to "the traditional function of the courts to decide cases before them based upon
their best current understanding of the law." Id.
68. I&
69. Id. at 536. Courts seldom apply pure prospectivity because it tends to undermine
the principle of stare decisis and allow courts to act in a legislative fashion. Id.
70. Id. at 537. The Court has primarily used selective prospectivity in the criminal con-
text when the adoption of new procedural rules has enhanced the protection of criminal
defendants. Id,
71. Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 95 (1993).
72. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
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tors include the purpose of the new interpretation, the parties' reli-
ance on the rule's prior interpretation, and the equitable
considerations of a retrospective application."v The Court of Appeals
of Maryland has adopted the Linkletter factors to decisions regarding
the retrospective or prospective effect of a new interpretation of a stat-
ute or rule."4 If the Linkletter factors give rise to a prospective applica-
tion, the Court of Appeals has held that the new interpretation of the
statute or constitutional provision applies to the parties before the
court, as well as any other cases pending on appellate review where
the parties to the case preserved the matter.7 5
When the Court of Appeals of Maryland delivers a decision that
changes the common law, its application is prospective, except for the
parties before the court.7 6 In Boblitz v. Boblitz, the court prospectively
abrogated the doctrine of interspousal immunity in negligence cases
by applying a revised rule to both the case before it and claims occur-
ring after the decision. 7 Similarly, in Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc.,7"
the court held that a change in the common law regarding the imposi-
tion of strict liability on manufacturers and retailers of "Saturday
Night Special" guns applied to the parties before the court and to all
claims arising after the change, unless the plaintiff could prove that
the first promotion of the Saturday Night Special to the public arose
before the date of the ruling. Thus, Boblitz and Kelley both illustrate
that the Court of Appeals recognizes that a holding that changes the
common law applies retroactively to the parties before the court but
prospectively to future claims.79
c. The Development of a Statute-Based Legal Framework for Lead-
Based Paint Poisoning Claims in Maryland.-
73. Id
74. See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Goldstein, 312 Md. 583, 591, 541 A.2d 955, 959
(1988) (employing the Linkletter factors). The Supreme Court overruled portions of Lin-
kletterin subsequent decisions. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987) (eliminating
selective prospectivity in the criminal context); Harper, 509 U.S. at 97 (expanding Griffith's
ban on selective prospectivity to civil cases). The Court of Appeals of Maryland interprets
the Linkletter factors as a source of good law and continues to apply these factors in ques-
tions regarding the application of judicial decisionmaking. Am. Trucking, 312 Md. at 591,
541 A.2d at 959.
75. Am. Trucking, 312 Md. at 592, 541 A.2d at 959.
76. Id.
77. 296 Md. 242, 275, 462 A.2d 506, 522 (1983).
78. 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985).
79. See, e.g., Gentry v. Ebersole, 378 Md. 612, 612, 837 A.2d 924, 924 (2003) (holding
that Brooks applied retroactively to Gentry because the petition for certiorari was pending
when Brooks was issued).
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(1) Common Law Origins.-A tenant's claim of lead-based
paint poisoning, caused by lead-based paint present in their leased
property, traditionally arose under common-law negligence.8 0 To es-
tablish a prima facie case of lead-based paint poisoning through negli-
gence, the tenant needed to prove that (1) the landlord owed the
tenant a duty of care, (2) the landlord breached that duty, (3) the
plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss, and (4) the tenant's loss or in-
jury proximately resulted from the defendant's breach of duty.81 A
landlord could not be liable for negligence unless she either knew or
had "reason to know"8 2 of the hazardous condition on the leased
premises and had a reasonable opportunity to correct it.8 3 The negli-
gence doctrine also did not impute a duty upon a landlord to inspect
her leased premises to determine whether the property retained de-
fective conditions.8 4
(2) Integration of Statutory Provisions into the Common Law.-
Because tenants found it difficult to establish a common-law claim
that includes a notice requirement, the Maryland General Assembly in
1994 enacted comprehensive lead-based paint poisoning legislation. 5
However, the "Reduction of Lead Risk in Housing" only applies to
tenants diagnosed with an elevated blood lead level of twenty-five pg/
dl or higher on or after February 24, 1996 or twenty pg/dl or higher
on or after February 24, 2001.86 Thus, tenants diagnosed with an ele-
vated blood level prior to the statutory cutoffs still need to seek re-
dress under alternate means.8 7 Frustrated with their inability to
80. See, e.g., Caroline v. Reicher, 269 Md. 125, 304 A.2d 831 (1973) (holding that the
liability resulting from a landlord's negligence of allowing lead-paint chips to remain on
his tenant's property was not impacted by the tenant mother's alleged contributory negli-
gence in the lead-based paint poisoning of her tenant child).
81. RichwindJoint Venture v. Brunson, 335 Md. 661, 670, 645 A.2d 1147, 1151 (1994).
Between 1973 and 1994, virtually no Maryland case law documented landlord-tenant, lead-
paint poisoning negligence claims. As a result, the negligence standard expressed in Caro-
line remained unchanged during this period.
82. See, e.g., Brown v. Dermer, 357 Md. 344, 362, 744 A.2d 47, 57 (2000) (concluding
that a tenant can satisfy the "reason to know" test by showing that there was flaking paint in
the leased premises and that the landlord had notice of the flaking paint).
83. See, e.g., Scroggins v. Dahne, 335 Md. 688, 693, 645 A.2d 1160, 1162-63 (1994) (re-
fusing to grant liability where a landlord neither had notice of flaking lead paint nor a
reasonable opportunity to repair it).
84. Richwind, 335 Md. at 674, 645 A.2d at 1153.
85. See generally MD. CODE ANN., ENVR. §§ 6-801 to -852 (LexisNexis 2005) (establishing
the "Reduction of Lead Risk in Housing" Subtitle, which aims to reduce childhood lead-
based paint poisoning while retaining an ample supply of affordable rental housing).
86. Id. § 6-828(b) (1). This Subtitle ultimately preempts the majority of landlord-tenant
lead-based paint poisoning actions brought under a negligence theory.
87. See infra Part 2.c(3).
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recoup damages for lead-based paint poisoning under negligence,
Baltimore City tenants have utilized the preexisting municipal statu-
tory framework to impute duties owed by Baltimore City landlords to
their tenants.88
Maryland courts have consistently recognized that the legislature
may prescribe a duty owed by a landlord to a tenant.89 Since its 1916
decision in Flaccomio v. Eysink, the Court of Appeals has held that a
violation of a statutory duty is merely evidence of negligence, not neg-
ligence per se.9 ° Accordingly, to establish a prima facie case of negli-
gence, lead-poisoned Maryland tenants must further demonstrate that
an alleged statutory violation is the proximate cause of their injury."'
Proximate cause is established by demonstrating that the plaintiff is
within the class of individuals that the statute intended to protect and
that the injury is of the type that legislators designed the statute to
prevent.92
The legislative history of the Housing Code reveals that its draft-
ers expressly sought to protect Baltimore City children from lead-
based paint poisoning.9" The Baltimore City Council recognized that
the greatest source of childhood lead-based paint poisoning was flak-
ing paint.94 Accordingly, in 1966, the Council codified provisions
such as sections 702 and 703, which required leased properties to be
free of flaking paint. 5 Hence, the Council, through the Housing
Code, wished to place Baltimore City landlords on notice of unsafe
conditions that needed repair.96
88. See BALTIMORE, MD. HOUSING CODE §§ 702(a), 703(b) (3) (2000) (providing Balti-
more City tenants with a basis for a claim against their landlord for injuries sustained from
lead-based paint poisoning on their leased premises).
89. Brown v. Dermer, 357 Md. 344, 358, 744 A.2d 47, 55 (2000). Principally, the
breach of a landlord's duty in a lead-based paint negligence action emanates from a viola-
tion of either an implied warranty of habitability or a statutory provision specifically gov-
erning the use or removal of lead-based paint, such as §§ 702(a) and 703(b)(3) of the
Housing Code. Richwind, 335 Md. at 671-72, 645 A.2d at 1152.
90. 129 Md. 367, 380, 100 A. 510, 515 (1916); accordAbsolon v. Dollahite, 376 Md. 547,
557, 831 A.2d 6, 11 (2003).
91. Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70, 79, 835 A.2d 616, 621 (2003).
92. Id.
93. Brown, 357 Md. at 367-69, 744 A.2d at 60-61 (discussing the historical context and
purpose of the Housing Code).
94. Id. at 367-68, 744 A.2d at 60.
95. Id.; see also BALTIMORE, MD. HOUSING CODE §§ 702(a), 703(b)(3) (2000).
96. Brown, 357 Md. at 368, 744 A.2d at 60. The Brown court noted that if landlords
could raise lack of knowledge that the flaking paint was lead-based as a defense against
liability, the Housing Code's utility would diminish. Id. at 369, 744 A.2d at 61.
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(3) The Effect of the Housing Code on the Common Law.-Be-
cause of statutory provisions designed to protect tenants from lead-
based paint poisoning, the Court of Appeals began to interpret the
effect of the Housing Code on the common law. In Richwind Joint
Venture v. Brunson, a Baltimore City tenant brought a negligence ac-
tion on behalf of her minor children against their landlord and the
landlord's management company for lead-based paint poisoning inju-
ries incurred because of paint on their leased premises.97 The court
recognized that even in the absence of liability under a common-law
negligence action, the Housing Code imposes a statutory obligation
on Baltimore City landlords to abate flaking paint on their leased
premises.98 However, the court noted that neither the common law
nor the Housing Code imposes on Baltimore City landlords an affirm-
ative duty to continually inspect their leased properties because the
owner is not the "insurer" of its tenants.99
In analyzing the impact of the Housing Code on the common
law, the Richwind court reasoned that the drafters of the Code did not
intend for its provisions to alter the common law "absent any clear
indication to the contrary."10 0 Consequently, the court construed the
Housing Code and the common law to both require a landlord to
have notice of a hazard on the property and a reasonable opportunity
to fix it.'0 1 The court asserted that the notice provisions of the Hous-
ing Code"' require the Commissioner of Housing and Community
Development to provide the landlord with notice of a Code viola-
tion.' O3 In contrast, under the common law, a tenant or other person
needed to provide the landlord with notice.10 4 The court held that
the Housing Code did not preempt the common law's notice require-
ment, which holds a landlord liable for Code violations only if he ei-
ther knew or had reason to know of the hazardous condition and had
a reasonable opportunity to ameliorate the hazard. 0 5 The court
found that the landlord and management company received notice
97. 335 Md. 661, 669, 645 A.2d 1147, 1150 (1994).
98. Id. at 670-71, 645 A.2d at 1151.
99. Id at 674-75, 645 A.2d at 1153; Ramsey v. D.P.A. Assocs., 265 Md. 319, 321, 289
A.2d 321, 323 (1972); Elmar Gardens, Inc. v. Odell, 227 Md. 454, 457, 177 A.2d 263, 265
(1962)).
100. 355 Md. at 672, 645 A.2d at 1152.
101. Id at 674, 645 A.2d at 1153.
102. See BALTIMoRE, MD. HOUSING CODE §§ 301-303 (2000) (mandating that the Com-
missioner of Housing and Community Development notify a landlord in violation of the
Housing Code).
103. Richwind, 335 Md. at 675, 645 A.2d at 1153.
104. Id.
105. Id at 676, 645 A.2d at 1154.
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and were negligent because they failed to disclose knowledge about
peeling lead-based paint in the tenant's home. 11 6
Later that same day, the Court of Appeals decided Scroggins v.
Dahne, in which the court affirmed its reasoning in Richwind by con-
cluding that the Housing Code did not supersede the common-law
requirement that a landlord must have knowledge or a reason to
know of a hazardous condition on the leased premises to be liable for
negligence.10 7 Here, because the court found that the landlords had
neither notice of the flaking lead-based paint nor an opportunity to
repair the condition, it held that the landlords were not liable for neg-
ligence to their injured tenants.1 0 8
Six years later, in Brown v. Dermer, the court modified the strin-
gent common-law knowledge requirements set forth in Richwind °9
The court established that a plaintiff merely needs to prove that his
leased premises had flaking, loose, or peeling paint and that the land-
lord had notice of the flaking paint to establish the "reason to know"
element of a negligence analysis.110 The court also stated that
whether the flaking paint was actually lead-based was irrelevant."' Be-
cause the landlords in Brown received notice that their leased property
contained flaking, peeling, or loose paint, the court held that even if
they were unaware of the paint's lead content, the landlords should
have recognized the potentially dangerous condition presented by the
defect and corrected the hazard." 2
In 2003, the Court of Appeals in Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc.
fundamentally altered the nexus between the Housing Code and the
common law of negligence by eliminating the prerequisite of a land-
lord's notice of a hazardous condition prior to establishing his liability
for negligence.' 13 Brooks involved a tenant's negligence action against
her landlord for the tenant's minor son's consumption of flaking lead-
based paint on the rental property. 1 4 The court adhered to the com-
mon-law principle set forth in Brown and numerous other cases that
where a defendant's duty is set forth by a statute or ordinance de-
106. Id. at 678-80, 645 A.2d at 1155-56.
107. 335 Md. 688, 690, 645 A.2d 1160, 1161 (1994).
108. Id. at 693, 645 A.2d at 1162-63.
109. 357 Md. 344, 362, 744 A.2d 47, 57 (2000).
110. Id. The court divined that in enacting the Housing Code, the Baltimore City Coun-
cil intended to put landlords on notice that any flaking paint is deemed a hazard. Id. at
371, 744 A.2d at 62.
111. Id, at 362, 744 A.2d at 57.
112. Id, at 368-69, 744 A.2d at 60-61.
113. 378 Md. 70, 72, 835 A.2d 616, 617 (2003).
114. Id.
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signed to protect a specific class of persons, and the plaintiff is a mem-
ber of that class, violation of that statute constitutes evidence of
negligence. 1 5 The court then acknowledged that to establish a prima
facie case of negligence, an injured plaintiff need only demonstrate
(1) a violation of a statute or ordinance designed to protect a class of
persons, including themselves, and (2) that the violation proximately
caused the injury.' 16 Thus, the court concluded that if the plaintiff
establishes evidence that the statutory violation proximately caused his
injury, then the court should submit this evidence to the jury to deter-
mine whether the defendant acted reasonably under the
circumstances.'1
1 7
By emphasizing that prior precedent did not require the plaintiff
to prove the defendant's knowledge of his statutory violation to estab-
lish negligence, l"' the Brooks court departed from the Court of Ap-
peals's holding in Richwind." 9 Analyzing the Housing Code, the court
referred to legislative history cited in Brown to illustrate that the pur-
pose of the Code is to protect persons like the minor tenant plaintiff
in Brooks from lead-based paint poisoning.12 ° Accordingly, the court
reiterated that if the plaintiff can demonstrate that a Housing Code
violation proximately caused his injuries, then Maryland law does not
require him to prove that his landlord had notice of the violation.121
Interpreting the plain meaning of the Housing Code, the court then
asserted that the Code imputes a continuous duty on Baltimore City
landlords to ensure compliance with its provisions.1 22 The court ex-
plained that the trier of fact examines these efforts to determine
whether the landlord acted reasonably under the circumstances.123
115. Id. at 78, 835 A.2d at 620-21.
116. Id. at 79, 835 A.2d at 621.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 80, 835 A.2d at 622.
119. Id. at 86-87, 835 A.2d at 625-26.
120. Id. at 81, 835 A.2d at 622. The Brooks court also referred to the remedial objective
of the Housing Code and the Mayor and City Council's intention that the Code be "liber-
ally construed to effectuate [its] purposes." Id
121. Id.
122. Id. at 83-84, 835 A.2d at 624. The court noted that the duty under the Housing
Code did not equate compliance at the beginning of the tenant's lease to continued Code
compliance. Id. at 84, 835 A.2d at 624. The Housing Code grants landlords access to their
leased premises "at all reasonable times" for conducting inspections and repairs needed to
comply with the Code. Id. However, in a dissenting opinion joined by Judge WilnerJudge
Raker reasoned that the tenant is in a superior position to detect potential Code violations.
Id. at 97, 835 A.2d at 632 (Raker & Wilner, JJ., dissenting). Thus, Judge Raker opined that
the tenant should notify the landlord of the hazard, rather than the landlord having an
affirmative duty to inspect the property. Id; see also BALTIMORE, MD. HOUSING CODE § 909
(2000) (permitting landlords to conduct periodic inspections in their leased properties).
123. Brooks, 378 Md. at 86, 835 A.2d at 625.
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Lastly, the court addressed the clash between its holding and its
prior opinion in Richwind.124 The court recognized Richwinds ac-
knowledgement that while a violation of a duty or implied warranty
prescribed in the Housing Code can serve as the foundation for a ten-
ant's negligence action against her landlord, a landlord's liability
hinges upon his notice of the violation and a reasonable opportunity
to repair it.125 Furthermore, the court criticized Richwind's proposi-
tion that notice provisions in the Housing Code do not supplant the
common-law notice requirement. 126 The court determined that the
Housing Code requirement is solely an administrative provision 127 un-
related to a liability requirement that tenants must provide their land-
lord with notice of a hazardous condition. 12' Therefore, the court
held that regardless of the landlord's notice of the hazardous condi-
tion, the plaintiff established a prima facie case of negligence by show-
ing that he is a child injured by lead-based paint poisoning because of
flaking, loose, or peeling paint consumed on the landlord's leased
premises. 129
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Polakoff the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that the Brooks criterion for establishing a prima facie
case of negligence based upon a Housing Code violation applied to all
pending cases at the time that Brooks was filed.' The court also held
that (1) it correctly decided Brooks, (2) the Court of Special Appeals
properly applied Brooks to the case before it, and (3) a jury could rea-
sonably conclude based on the evidence that the landlord and the
landlord's management company did not act reasonably under the
circumstances to comply with the Housing Code. 13' Therefore, the
court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and up-
held the retroactive application of Brooks to the case before it.
13 2
124. Id.
125. Id. at 86-87, 835 A.2d at 625-26.
126. Id. at 87, 835 A.2d at 626.
127. The court explains that notice requirements in sections 301 and 303 provide for a
landlord's due process in administrative actions taken by the Commissioner of Housing
and Community Development to order Housing Code compliance. Id. at 88, 835 A.2d at
626-27.
128. Id at 87-89, 835 A.2d at 626-27.
129. Id. at 89, 835 A.2d at 627.
130. 385 Md. at 473, 869 A.2d at 841.
131. Id. at 473, 485, 489, 869 A.2d at 841, 848, 851.
132. Id. at 473, 869 A.2d at 841.
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Writing for the majority, "'Judge Greene first addressed whether
Brooks was properly decided.' 34 The court recognized that Brooks reaf-
firmed the well-established common-law rule that where a statutory
framework intends to protect a class of persons, including the peti-
tioner, a violation of the statute or ordinance is evidence of negli-
gence.' 35 Citing Brooks, the Polakoffcourt also noted that to establish a
prima facie case of negligence, the plaintiff must only demonstrate a
statutory violation, as well as prove that the violation proximately
caused the alleged injury.'3 6 However, the Polakoff court recognized
that Brooks found that once a tenant establishes a prima facie case of
negligence against a landlord, liability hinges upon whether a land-
lord's actions to avoid a statutory violation are considered by a trier of
fact as reasonable under the circumstances. 37 Therefore, through its
citations to Brooks, the Polakoff court aimed to determine that a defen-
dant's knowledge of a statutory violation is no longer essential to
prove liability.
138
The Polakoff court then addressed the nexus between the Hous-
ing Code and the common-law negligence rule set forth in Brooks.'39
It reiterated that a violation of the Housing Code's affirmative duty
upon landlords to continuously keep their properties free of any flak-
ing, loose, or peeling paint equates to evidence of negligence rather
than liability. 4 ' The court in Polakoff noted that a landlord can avoid
liability by proving that she acted reasonably under the circumstances
despite her Housing Code violations.14" ' To illustrate the Housing
Code's effect on the common law, the Polakoff court next discussed
the impact of Brooks on Richwind.42 The court in Polakoff contrasted
its Richwind opinion, where it found that the notice provisions in the
133. ChiefJudge Bell andJudges Cathell, Harrell, Battaglia, and Greene comprised the
majority. Id at 471, 869 A.2d at 840.
134. Id, at 475, 869 A.2d at 842.
135. Id. at 476, 869 A.2d at 842.
136. Id., 869 A.2d at 843.
137. Id. at 476-77, 869 A.2d at 843.
138. Id. at 477, 869 A.2d at 843.
139. Id. at 477-80, 869 A.2d at 843-45.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 480, 869 A.2d at 845. The court offered a list of actions that may evidence to
a trier of fact that a landlord was acting reasonably under the circumstances. Id. at 481,
869 A.2d at 845-46. These include: (1) removing lead paint from the property; (2) alerting
the tenant of the potential incidence of, and health risks associated with, the existence of
lead paint in the property; (3) suggesting that the tenants quickly warn the landlord or
property manager if they notice a potential Housing Code violation; and (4) performing
frequent inspections of the property throughout the tenancy to ensure Code compliance.
Id
142. Id. at 481-82, 869 A.2d at 846.
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Housing Code143 did not preempt the common-law notice require-
ment to establish liability with the notice-free liability standard that it
adopted in Brooks.' Remaining critical of Richwind's reasoning, the
Polakoff court emphasized that the notice provisions in the Housing
Code do not modify the requirements needed to establish a prima
facie case of negligence under Brooks.145 Moreover, the Polakoff court
again endorsed Brooks's analysis regarding the required elements for a
prima facie case of negligence based upon a violation of the Housing
Code.' 46
After reviewing the legal background and subsequent conflict re-
garding the required elements of a prima facie case in a lead-based
paint negligence action, the Polakoff court returned to the facts of the
case before it to justify the jury's determination that Polakoff and
Chase did not act reasonably under the circumstances. 4 7 The court
in Polakoffnoted that Crystal, on behalf of Turner, established a prima
facie case of negligence under the Brooks standard because she (1)
produced testimony of Housing Code violations from flaking, loose,
or peeling paint in the property and (2) demonstrated that the Code
violations proximately caused Turner's lead-based paint poisoning be-
cause she is a member of the class of persons the Code is designed to
protect and her injury is the type of harm that the Code aims to
avert.'48 Because Crystal established a prima facie case of negligence,
the Polakoff court reasoned that the circuit court properly submitted
Turner's negligence action to the jury to resolve whether Polakoff and
Chase acted as reasonable landlords under the circumstances.' 49 Af-
ter considering Polakoff's testimony,1"' the court determined that Po-
lakoff did not act reasonably under the circumstances. 15 1
143. BALTIMORE, MD. HOUSING CODE §§ 301-303 (2000).
144. Polakoff, 385 Md. at 481-82, 869 A.2d at 846.
145. Id. at 482, 869 A.2d at 846. In a footnote, the court refuted Polakoff and Chase's
argument that Brooks's interpretation of the Housing Code is flawed by citing the demise of
City Council Bill 04-1276, a failed amendment to the Code that was introduced after Brooks.
Id. at 482 n.10, 869 A.2d at 846 n.10. The bill, if enacted, would have expressly stated that
the Housing Code did not modify the common-law notice requirement. Id.
146. Id. at 483, 869 A.2d at 847.
147. Id. at 483-85, 869 A.2d 847-48.
148. Id. at 484, 869 A.2d at 847-48.
149. Id,, 869 A.2d at 848.
150. Polakoffs testimony indicated that he was aware of the Housing Code require-
ments and the potential lead-paint hazard existing on the property. Id at 484-85, 869 A.2d
at 848. Nevertheless, he opted to rely on notification by tenants of potential Housing Code
violations in lieu of routine inspections. Id.
151. Id. at 485, 869 A.2d at 848.
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Finally, the Polakoff court addressed whether Brooks applied to the
case before it.152 At the outset, the Polakoff court distinguished be-
tween the three predominant application classifications for judicial
decisions: retroactive, purely prospective, and modified or selectively
prospective. 153 The Polakoff court then adopted the analysis of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Linkletter v. Walker, which introduced factors to
follow in applying a new interpretation of a constitutional provision,
statute, or rule. 154 However, the Polakoff court also noted that even if
a Linkletter analysis yields prospective application, both federal and
Maryland common law dictate that a new interpretation of a constitu-
tional provision, statute, or rule retroactively includes the case before
the court and all other pending cases where the relevant question re-
mains preserved for appellate review.155
Because the Polakoff court already decided that Brooks's modified
standard for establishing a prima facie case of negligence provided a
new interpretation of the Housing Code rather than a change in the
common law, 156 the court determined that the statutory interpreta-
tion provided in Brooks should apply retroactively to all pending cases
where the issue is ripe for appellate review, including the case before
the court.157 To further support this conclusion, the Polakoff court
cited Gentry v. Ebersole, a case pending in the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land when Brooks was filed, in which the Court of Appeals, through a
per curiam opinion, remanded for further proceedings consistent
with Brooks.1 5' Lastly, the Polakoff court noted that even if Brooks did
not apply retroactively to the case before the court, the circuit court
determined that Polakoff and Chase had sufficient knowledge of the
flaking, loose, or peeling paint to establish liability under the preexist-
ing standard.159 Hence, the Polakoff court affirmed the circuit court's
denial of Polakoff and Chase's motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict due to a lack of evidence.1 60
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 487, 869 A.2d at 849.
155. Id. at 487-88, 869 A.2d at 849-50.
156. The Polakoff court noted that Court of Appeals of Maryland decisions that change
the common law warrant what the Supreme Court identifies as selectively prospective ap-
plication. Id. at 488 n.14, 869 A.2d at 850 n.14. Recognizing the confusion regarding
various courts' interpretation of selective prospectivity, the court deferred to its own prior
application of the term, which construed selective prospectivity to mean fully prospective,
excluding the parties before the court. Id.
157. Id. at 489, 869 A.2d at 850-51.
158. Id., 869 A.2d at 851.
159. Id. at 489-90, 869 A.2d at 851.
160. Id. at 490, 869 A.2d at 851.
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Judge Raker dissented' 6 1 to contend that Brooks only applied pro-
spectively because Baltimore City landlords, like Polakoff, had a right
to rely upon the Maryland common law described in Richwind. 6 2 She
argued that a retrospective application of Brooks was unfair to land-
lords who had no reason to anticipate the affirmative duty set forth in
its ruling. 6 ' Finally, Judge Raker referenced her dissenting opinion
in Brooks to reiterate her belief that Brooks was wrongly decided.16"
4. Analysis.-In Polakoff v. Turner, the Court of Appeals reaf-
firmed its decision in Brooks, in which it overturned years of lead-based
paint poisoning precedent by eliminating the common-law require-
ment that a landlord must receive notice of a Housing Code violation
for a tenant to establish a prima facie case of negligence.1 65 In spite of
Brooks's potent impact on the common law, the court retroactively ap-
plied Brooks to Polakoff because it concluded that Brooks provided a
new interpretation of the Housing Code.' 6 6 The Polakoff court cor-
rectly decided that before Brooks, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
failed to recognize the legislature's intent in enacting the Housing
Code.' 6 7 The majority's decision, however, was flawed for two princi-
pal reasons. First, the court misinterpreted its holding in Brooks as a
revised interpretation of the Housing Code instead of as a belated,
justified expansion of the Housing Code's authority, which derogated
the common law.1 68 Second, by misinterpreting Brooks, the majority
erred in retroactively applying Brooks.'69 The court should have pro-
spectively applied Brooks to Polakoff which would have produced the
same result as a retroactive application, without undermining the true
impact of Brooks."7 °
a. A Misinterpretation of Brooks.-The Polakoff court cor-
rectly identified the Court of Appeals's pre-Brooks inability to effectu-
161. Judge Wilner joined in the dissent. Id, at 490-92, 869 A.2d at 851-52 (Raker &
Wilner, JJ., dissenting).
162. Id. Relying upon Judge Chasanow's opinion in Julian, the dissent asserted that con-
tractual leases between landlords and tenants are drafted in accordance with the law that
exists at the time into which they are entered. Id. at 491, 869 A.2d at 851-52. Therefore,
due to the parties' reliance on existing law when contracting, the dissent argued that it is
only fair to interpret such leases based upon then-existing law. Id.
163. Id. at 492, 869 A.2d at 852.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 483, 869 A.2d at 847.
166. Id. at 489, 869 A.2d at 851.
167. See infra Part 4.a(1).
168. See infra Part 4.a(2).
169. See infra Part 4.b.
170. See infra Part 4.c.
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ate the legislature's intent in enacting the Housing Code. But it failed
to properly interpret Brooks as the first Maryland lead-based paint
poisoning negligence case in which the Court of Appeals effectuated
the legislature's intent in enacting the Housing Code.
(1) The Majority's Interpretation of Maryland Lead-Based Paint
Poisoning Jurisprudence Prior to Brooks Acknowledges the Court of Appeals's
Failure to Effectuate the Legislature's Intent in Enacting the Housing Code.-
The Polakoff court appropriately recognized that until its landmark de-
cision in Brooks, the Court of Appeals erroneously refused to interpret
the Housing Code's provisions as an elimination of the common-law
notice requirement needed to establish liability against a landlord in a
lead-based paint poisoning negligence action."' In 1966, the Balti-
more City Council enacted the Housing Code to expressly eliminate
the common-law notice requirement. 172 Yet, as evidenced through
the Polakoff court's description of its 1994 Richwind decision,17 for
more than thirty years following the Housing Code's enactment,
plaintiffs rarely established liability because of the common-law notice
requirement.174
By illuminating the difference between a landlord's duties under
the common law and under a statutory framework, Polakoff validates
the legislature's enactment of the Housing Code.175 The Polakoff
court recited the Brooks court's proposition that a landlord has no
common-law duty to keep its rental properties free of flaking paint or
to inspect them at any point during the lease. 176 Accordingly, the Po-
lakoff court understood that in the absence of a statute, a tenant could
only establish liability by asserting that the landlord breached a duty
of care owed to the tenant, that the tenant suffered actual injuries as a
result of this breach, and that the landlord knew or had reason to
know of a hazardous condition in the leased premises and had a rea-
171. 385 Md. at 481-82, 869 A.2d at 846.
172. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
173. 385 Md. at 481-82, 869 A.2d at 846.
174. See, e.g., Scroggins v. Dahne, 335 Md. 688, 693, 645 A.2d 1160, 1162-63 (1994)
(holding a landlord unaccountable for his tenant's lead-based paint injuries because he
had neither notice of flaking paint nor a reasonable opportunity to repair the hazard);
Caroline v. Reicher, 269 Md. 125, 136, 304 A.2d 831, 837 (1973) (refusing to hold a tenant
mother liable for her alleged contributory negligence in the lead-based paint poisoning of
her tenant child while also demonstrating that the landlord would need to "negligently
permit[ ]" the lead-paint chips to remain on the leased property to be liable for
negligence).
175. 385 Md. at 475-76, 869 A.2d at 842-43.
176. Id.
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sonable opportunity to abate it. 17 7 The Polakoff court again referred
to Brooks to reinforce the well-established Maryland principle that
when a landlord's duty is prescribed by statute, a violation of that stat-
ute is evidence of negligence rather than negligence per se. 171
Hence, the court effectively contrasted the less burdensome elements
needed to establish a prima facie case of negligence when a landlord's
duty is prescribed by statute with the more stringent elements re-
quired when the duty emerges solely from the common law. 179
The Polakoff court also correctly criticized the Maryland Court of
Appeals's holding in Pichwind, which required a landlord's knowledge
of a hazardous condition and a reasonable opportunity to abate it.180
In reviewing Brooks, the majority aptly recognized the Court of Ap-
peals's later disapproval of the Richwind court's mistaken assertion
that the Housing Code did not abrogate the common-law notice re-
quirement."' 1 By realizing that Brooks clashed with Richwinds flawed
construction of the Housing Code, the Polakoff court also acknowl-
edged the precedential value of Richwind, upon which the Court of
Appeals relied heavily in subsequent cases.18 2
(2) The Majority's Flawed Interpretation ofBrooks Fails to Rec-
ognize the First Maryland Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Negligence Case in
Which the Court of Appeals of Maryland Effectuated the Legislature's Intent in
Enacting the Housing Code.-Polakoff undermines the Brooks court's
overruling of Richwind, which acknowledged that Richwind and its
progeny failed to properly construe the Housing Code.'8 3 The major-
ity cited to Brooks's reasoning, which abandoned Richwinds conclusion
that the Housing Code changed the notice requirement needed to
177. Richwind Joint Venture v. Brunson, 335 Md. 661, 670, 673, 645 A.2d 1147, 1151,
1153 (1994).
178. E.g., Polakoff, 385 Md. at 476, 869 A.2d at 842; Absolon v. Dollahite, 376 Md. 547,
557, 831 A.2d 6, 11 (2003); Flaccomio v. Eysink, 129 Md. 367, 380, 100 A. 510, 515 (1916).
179. Polakoff, 385 Md. at 476, 869 A.2d at 843. Compare Brooks, 378 Md. at 78-79, 835
A.2d at 621 (noting that to establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that (1) she is a member of the class that the statute, which the landlord
violated, is designed to protect, and (2) the violation proximately caused her injuries), with
Richwind, 335 Md. at 670, 645 A.2d at 1151 (explaining that to make out a prima facie case
of negligence, the plaintiff must prove that (1) the landlord owed the tenant a duty of
care, (2) the landlord breached that duty, (3) the tenant suffered actual injury or loss, and
(4) the tenant's loss or injury proximately resulted from the defendant's breach of duty).
180. 385 Md. at 481-82, 869 A.2d at 846.
181. Id at 482, 869 A.2d at 486.
182. See supra notes 107-113 and accompanying text.
183. See Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70, 87-88, 835 A.2d 616, 626 (2003)
(recognizing the flaw in Richwinds holding that the Housing Code does not alter the com-
mon-law notice requirement).
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establish a prima facie case of negligence based upon the Code.' 84
Moreover, the majority properly recognized that the Brooks court ad-
hered to principles of statutory construction, 18 5 examined provisions
in the Housing Code, and then effectuated the plain meaning of the
statute to hold that the Code imputes a continuous duty on Baltimore
City landlords to ensure compliance with the Code's provisions. 186 As
no Maryland case law prior to Brooks interpreted the Housing Code in
such a manner,18 7 the Polakoff court clarified that Brooks effectuated
two key principles: (1) it eliminated the common-law notice require-
ment necessary to establish a prima facie case of negligence1 88 and (2)
it expanded the Code's jurisdiction by imposing an affirmative statu-
tory duty upon landlords. 8 ' Nevertheless, the Polakoff court ignored
its own elucidation of Brooks's impact on the common law and, there-
fore, refused to view Brooks as more than a reinterpretation of the
Housing Code. 9 °
Instead, the majority should have deferred to the Brooks court's
incorporation of legislative intent into its decision 1 . by interpreting
Brooks as a change in the common law. While a statute is not intended
to supercede the common law absent any clear indication to the con-
trary,' 9 2 the Brooks court correctly emphasized the Housing Code's ex-
press declaration that due to the statute's remedial nature, the Code
should be liberally construed. 193 Accordingly, adhering to canons of
statutory construction, 19 4 the Brooks court prudently justified its hold-
184. Polakoff 385 Md. at 482, 869 A.2d at 846.
185. See Stearman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 381 Md. 436, 448, 849 A.2d 539,
546-47 (2004) (asserting that the effectuation of legislative intent, the primary purpose of
statutory interpretation, can be achieved by examining the words of a statute and then
construing the statute to convey its plain meaning); see also Garg v. Garg, 163 Md. App. 546,
592, 881 A.2d 1180, 1206 (2005) (noting that it is thejudiciary's function to perform statu-
tory interpretation).
186. Polakoff, 385 Md. at 478, 869 A.2d at 844.
187. See supra notes 97-112.
188. 385 Md. at 483, 869 A.2d at 847.
189. Id. at 478, 869 A.2d at 844.
190. Id. at 489, 869 A.2d at 851.
191. Brooks v. Lewin Realty Ill, Inc., 378 Md. 70, 81, 835 A.2d 616, 622 (2003).
192. E.g., Bradshaw v. Prince George's County, 284 Md. 294, 302, 396 A.2d 255, 260
(1979).
193. 378 Md. at 81, 835 A.2d at 622; see also State v. Barnes, 273 Md. 195, 208, 328 A.2d
737, 745 (1974) (advocating a liberal construction of all remedial statutes, regardless of
whether they include express declarations of their construction, as such statutes are in-
tended to rectify the existing law and avert further exacerbation of flawed common-law
precedent).
194. See Arundel Corp. v. Marie, 383 Md. 489, 502, 860 A.2d 886, 894 (2004) (assessing
the court's need to divine legislative intent in construing remedial statutes); see also Caro-
lina Freight Carriers Corp. v. Keane, 311 Md. 335, 339-44, 534 A.2d 1337, 1339-42 (1988)
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ing by utilizing the legislative history of the Housing Code. 95 In so
doing, the Brooks court clarified that if the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land considers a statute sufficiently ambiguous, then the court should
adopt an alternate construction in accordance with the common
law." 6 Further, the Brooks court directly incorporated into its decision
the Housing Code's purpose of protecting a class of persons, includ-
ing children like the plaintiff, from lead-based paint poisoning.' 97
Thus, the Polakoff court's refusal to acknowledge Brooks's impact on
the common law unconvincingly refutes Brooks's incorporation of the
legislative history of the Housing Code and counterintuitively sup-
ports a strict construction of the statute, contrary to the legislature's
intent.
Further, the Polakoffcourt's conclusion that Brooks did not change
the common law 9 ' directly attacks the Brooks court's well-reasoned
analysis that if a plaintiff can demonstrate that a Housing Code viola-
tion proximately caused her injuries, then Maryland law does not re-
quire her to prove that her landlord had notice of the violation.' 9 9 By
construing the Housing Code to no longer require notice, Brooks's
holding established a new interpretation of the Code as precedent,
thereby changing the liability standard for tenants to prevail against
their landlords in later lead-based paint poisoning actions. 200 Because
the Polakoff court affirmed its holding in Brooks, it reinforced its previ-
ous construction of the Housing Code and created additional prece-
dent for the Court of Appeals of Maryland to bolster the overturning
of Richwind and its progeny by Brooks.2° 1 Hence, the Polakoff court's
contention that its decision in Brooks corrected the Richwind court's
misreading of the Housing Code, instead of changing the common
law,20 2 is incompatible with the Brooks decision's effect on precedent.
(reviewing the Wrongful Death Act's legislative history to generate a statutory construction
that, although in conflict with the common law, effectuates the legislature's intent in enact-
ing the statute); Kaczorowski v. Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 512, 525 A.2d 628, 631 (1987)
(describing the judicial tension between strict and liberal constructions of remedial
statutes).
195. 378 Md. at 81, 835 A.2d at 622.
196. Id.; see also Witte v. Azarian, 369 Md. 518, 525-26, 801 A.2d 160, 165 (2002) (ex-
plaining that for a potentially ambiguous statute, courts can look to other extrinsic sources,
such as the statute's legislative history, to ascertain legislative intent).
197. 378 Md. at 81, 835 A.2d at 622.
198. 385 Md. at 489 n.16, 869 A.2d at 850 n.16.
199. Brooks, 378 Md. at 81, 835 A.2d at 622.
200. Polakoff 385 Md. at 483, 869 A.2d at 847.
201. Id, at 473, 869 A.2d at 841.
202. Id at 489 & n.16, 869 A.2d at 850 & n.16.
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The Polakoff court's reference to the failure of Baltimore City
Council Bill 04-1276 further supports the argument that Brooks
changed the common law and expanded the Housing Code's jurisdic-
tion.20 3 If Brooks did not change the common law, then the City Coun-
cil would likely not have produced such a compelling statement, in
the aftermath of Brooks, rejecting the notion that Brooks altered the
common law of negligence. 214 The bill likely died in committee
2 0 5
because Maryland lawmakers acknowledged that the proposed
amendment ran contrary to the intent of the legislature in enacting
the Housing Code,20 6 as well as the aim of Brooks.
2 0 7
Moreover, the Polakoff court's reference to City Council Bill 04-
1276 is also distinguishable from the Hardy court's refusal to preempt
the common-law misdemeanor of attempted murder by Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article 27, section 12 of the Maryland Code.20 8
In Hardy, an amendment to the statute identified an alternate statu-
tory construction.209 Therefore, the Hardy court effectuated the
amendment's intent by refusing to preempt the common law.2 10 In
contrast to Hardy, no such contrary legislation exists in Polakoff
Hence, a lack of legislative opposition to the Brooks court's construc-
tion of the Housing Code additionally supports the conclusion that
Brooks appropriately construed the Housing Code and changed the
common law.2
11
b. The Majority's Misinterpretation of Brooks Resulted in a Mis-
application of Judicial Precedent.-The Polakoff court erred by retroac-
tively applying Brooks.2 1 2 Although retroactive application is the most
common means of addressing a choice-of-law problem," 3 the Court
of Appeals of Maryland in Polakoff appropriately recognized that pro-
spective applications of judicial decisions are fitting when the court
203. Id. at 482 n.10, 869 A.2d at 846 n.10.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70, 81, 835 A.2d 616, 622 (2003).
207. Id. at 89, 835 A.2d at 627.
208. Hardy v. State, 301 Md. 124, 131-32, 482 A.2d 474, 478 (1984).
209. Id. at 131 n.3, 482 A.2d at 478 n.3.
210. Id.
211. See Polakoff 385 Md. at 482 n.10, 869 A.2d at 846 n.10 (recognizing the legislative
acquiescence doctrine of statutory interpretation); accord Smolin v. First Fidelity Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 238 Md. 386, 392-93, 209 A.2d 546, 549-50 (1965).
212. 385 Md. at 490, 869 A.2d at 851 (Raker & Wilner, JJ., dissenting).
213. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 535 (1991) (plurality
opinion).
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changes the common law.214  Maryland jurisprudence reveals that
once the Court of Appeals selects a prospective application of a judi-
cial decision because of its impact on the common law, it applies the
judicial decision retroactively to the parties before the court.215
Therefore, despite criticism surrounding selective prospectivity, 216 the
Polakoff court conceded that even when the court adopts a purely pro-
spective application of a judicial decision, its application is actually
selectively prospective. 217 Accordingly, because Brooks changed the
common law, the Polakoff court should have prospectively applied the
Brooks decision to the case before it.2 18 In adherence to precedent, a
prospective application would prescribe that Brooks retroactively apply
to Polakoff and any other parties before the court but prospectively to
all other claims.2 9
Instead, in retroactively applying the Brooks decision, the Polakoff
majority unjustifiably relied on the factors set forth in Linkletter and
adopted in American Trucking.22 The guidance provided by these
cases is only appropriate when a court decides whether a new inter-
pretation of a constitutional or statutory provision is to be given retro-
active or prospective effect, not when the court changes the common
law.22 Because the Polakoff court reasoned that Brooks presented a
214. 385 Md. at 488 n.14, 869 A.2d at 850 n.14; see, e.g.,Julian v. Christopher, 320 Md. 1,
10-12, 575 A.2d 735, 73940 (1990) (protecting landlord-tenant reliance on contracts exe-
cuted under prior precedent by applying a change in the common-law interpretation of
.silent consent" clauses prospectively).
215. E.g., Gentry v. Ebersole, 378 Md. 612, 612, 837 A.2d 924, 924 (2003) (applying
retroactively the otherwise prospective Brooks holding because the petition for certiorari
was pending when Brooks was decided); Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 304 Md. 124, 162, 497
A.2d 1143, 1162 (1985) (applying prospectively a modified imposition of strict liability on
manufacturers and retailers of Saturday Night Special guns by subjecting the parties before
the court and all claims arising after the decision to the new rule); Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296
Md. 242, 275, 462 A.2d 506, 522 (1983) (abrogating prospectively the doctrine of inter-
spousal immunity in negligence cases while retroactively applying the modified standard to
the parties before the court and claims occurring after the filing of the decision).
216. Polakoff 385 Md. at 488 & n.15, 869 A.2d at 850 & n.15; see, e.g., Harper v. Va. Dep't
of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1993) (disparaging selective prospectivity in favor of
retroactivity).
217. 385 Md. at 488, 869 A.2d at 850; see also supra note 70 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
220. Polakoff 385 Md. at 487-88, 869 A.2d at 849-50.
221. See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965) (articulating factors to use
when a court issues a new interpretation of a statute, rule, or constitutional provision); Am.
Trucking Ass'ns v. Goldstein, 312 Md. 583, 592, 541 A.2d 955, 959 (1988) (adopting the
Linkletter factors for use in Maryland cases where the question presented is whether a new
interpretation of a statutory or constitutional provision should apply retroactively or
prospectively).
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"different interpretation of a statute,"2 22 only in a short footnote did
the majority distinguish the Linkletter and American Trucking analysis
from the reasoning applicable for those cases in which the Court of
Appeals of Maryland changes the common law.2 23 Ironically, in the
same footnote, the court cited American Trucking, the same case that
the court relied upon to fashion its flawed retroactive decision. 224
Here, American Trucking provides appropriate direction for a selec-
tively prospective application of the Brooks decision to the case at bar
because it sets forth the rule that the Court of Appeals of Maryland
should prospectively apply its ruling when it issues a decision that
changes the common law.225
Finally, the majority in Polakoff inappropriately bolstered its deci-
sion to apply Brooks retroactively to the case before it by citing Brooks's
retroactive application to Genty.2 2 6 Although the court remanded
Gentry for further proceedings consistent with Brooks,22 7 the Polakoff
court failed to recognize that a selectively prospective application of
Brooks yields the same result as a retroactive application. Selective
prospectivity applies a judicial decision retroactively to all pending
cases at the time that the decision was filed.228 Hence, contrary to the
Polakoff court's assertion, the court's decision in Gentry does not
"make [ ] it clear that Brooks applies retroactively. '229 Rather, because
Gentry can be utilized to support the proposition that the court did
not apply Brooks retroactively but instead in a selectively prospective
manner, the Polakoff court's reliance on Gentry undermines the legiti-
macy of its determination to retroactively apply Brooks to the case
before it.23
0
c. By Foraging for the Judicial Reasoning Required for a Retroac-
tive Application of Brooks, the Polakoff Court Diluted the Impact of the
Court of Appeals's Landmark Decision in Brooks.-Polakofffundamentally
weakens Brooks's elimination of defunct precedent in conflict with the
legislature's intent in enacting the Housing Code.231 Although the
Maryland General Assembly enacted the Reduction of Lead Risk in
222. 385 Md. at 489, 869 A.2d at 851.
223. Id. at 488 n.14, 869 A.2d at 850 n.14.
224. Id.
225. 312 Md. at 592, 541 A.2d at 959.
226. 385 Md. at 489, 869 A.2d at 851.
227. Id.
228. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 537 (1991) (plurality
opinion).
229. 385 Md. at 489, 869 A.2d at 851.
230. Id.
231. See supra notes 113-129 and accompanying text.
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Housing Act to reduce childhood lead-based paint poisoning on a
state-wide level,232 tenants diagnosed with an elevated blood lead level
prior to the statutory cutoffs remain at the mercy of the judiciary.2 33
Therefore, precedent set forth by Brooks and its progeny, such as Polak-
off provide Baltimore City tenants with the only legal means for re-
dress.2 4 Because the Polakoff court erroneously refused to interpret
Brooks as a change in the common law, plaintiffs can no longer rely
upon the precedential value of the Brooks standard. The Polakoff
court's construction of Brooks as a new interpretation of the Housing
Code fails to account for the Court of Appeals's elimination of prece-
dent in conflict with the Housing Code through the Brooks decision. 235
By undermining the precedential value of Brooks, the Polakoff court
has dangerously opened the door to a further erosion of Brooks by
subsequent decisions. Such decisions could provide additional inter-
pretations of the Housing Code that mirror the common-law notice
requirement that Brooks specifically eliminated.
Paradoxically, the Polakoff court's decision to retroactively apply
Brooks, through its assertion that Brooks merely reinterpreted the com-
mon law, runs contrary to its justification for the application.236 A
retroactive application of a judicial decision extends precedent to the
furthest reaching segment of the population that the decision may
affect.2 37 Yet the Polakoff court's analysis of Brooks as a mere reinter-
pretation of the Housing Code yields the narrowest construction of
Brooks's influence.
2 38
While the dissent inappropriately contends that the Polakoff court
should have prospectively applied Brooks because Baltimore landlords
like Polakoff relied on prior, inconsistent precedent, the dissent's ar-
gument maintains a subtle strength.239 Even those landlords who ar-
gue that they relied on the prior standard can still be held liable, like
Polakoff and Chase, for unreasonable behavior under Richwind and its
progeny.24 To subject the few pending cases in the Court of Appeals
to a heightened standard of review, the court diluted the impact of
Brooks and reinterpreted the Housing Code.241 The Polakoff court
232. See supra note 85.
233. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
235. 385 Md. at 481-82, 869 A.2d at 846.
236. Id. at 489, 869 A.2d at 850-51.
237. See id. at 485-86, 869 A.2d at 848 (explaining the pervasiveness of retroactivity).
238. Id. at 489, 869 A.2d at 850-51.
239. Id at 491-92, 869 A.2d at 852 (Raker & Wilner, ., dissenting).
240. Id. at 490, 869 A.2d at 851 (majority opinion).
241. Id. at 489, 869 A.2d at 851.
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could have instead elected a change in the common law as its eulogy.
Ultimately, the court lost sight of the true implication of its construc-
tion of Brooks on a potential plethora of plaintiffs by excessively focus-
ing on, inter alia, the already liable Polakoff and Chase.2 4 2 A
selectively prospective application of Brooks to Polakoff would have al-
lowed injured plaintiffs bringing suit to fully profit from tenant-
friendly Maryland lead-based paint negligence jurisprudence.
5. Conclusion.-In Polakoff v. Turner, the Court of Appeals held
that its prior decision in Brooks, which eliminated the notice require-
ment from a tenant's ability to hold her landlord liable for negligence
in a lead-based paint poisoning action, applied retroactively to the
case before it. 243 The court's retroactive application is problematic
because its legal justification undercuts the bearing of the long-over-
due Brooks decision. 244 The court should have applied Brooks prospec-
tively to arrive at the same result,245 highlight Brooks's change in the
common law,24 6 and deter future decisions from overruling its
precedent.24
7
APRIL H. BIRNBAUM
242. Id at 490, 869 A.2d at 851.
243. Polakoff 385 Md. at 489, 869 A.2d at 851.
244. See supra Part 4.c.
245. See supra Part 4.b.
246. See supra Part 4.a(2).
247. See supra Part 4.c.
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B. Maintaining an Unrealistic Standard: Maryland Holds It Is Not
Reasonably Foreseeable for Consumers to Fail to
Follow Product Warnings
In Lightolier v. Hoon,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland consid-
ered whether a manufacturer may be held strictly liable under prod-
ucts liability for a design defect when a consumer fails to follow
warnings. Upholding its prior interpretations of commentj to § 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: Products Liability (1965), the court
held that failure to follow warnings is a type of misuse, which under
Maryland law, negates the element of defect in a products liability
claim.2 Consequently, when a manufacturer provides adequate warn-
ings that a consumer fails to follow, the product is not defective as a
matter of law, the cause of the injury is the failure to follow the warn-
ings, and the manufacturer is not liable for the consumer's injury.'
Although the Lightolier decision was consistent with precedent,
the consequence of its standard is that proof of misuse bars a defective
design claim.4 Under Maryland law, even if a product may be defec-
tively designed, a consumer's misuse precludes judicial examination
of an alleged defect.5 As some jurisdictions have recognized, however,
applying comment j as Maryland does is an improper standard be-
cause such an interpretation unrealistically assumes that consumers
will always understand and follow product warnings.6 The Lightolier
court's construction of commentj permits manufacturers to substitute
warnings for safer designs.' A better approach is the standard advo-
cated by the new Restatement, which recognizes that the law should put
the burden on manufacturers to minimize injuries through safer de-
signs, rather than on consumers to understand and heed warnings.8
In Lightolier, the Court of Appeals missed an opportunity to reevaluate
its application of the comment j assumption and to bring Maryland
law into conformity with the Restatement (Third) of Products Liability
(1998). 9
1. 387 Md. 539, 876 A.2d 100 (2005).
2. Id. at 562, 876 A.2d at 114.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 553-54, 876 A.2d at 109.
5. Id.
6. See infra Part 4.a.
7. See infta Part 4.b.
8. See infra Part 4.c.
9. See infra Part 4.c.
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1. The Case.-In 1998, David and Texie Hoon renovated their
home.10 Westwind Construction Company served as the general con-
tractor and the electrical contractor for the renovation."1 As part of
the renovation, Westwind installed light fixtures designed and manu-
factured by Lightolier.'
2
The Hoons installed Lightolier's Model 1002P1, a non-IC-rated
fixture. 3 "IC," meaning "insulated ceiling," indicates that a fixture
has been approved for use in an insulated ceiling. 4 Because IC-rated
fixtures are approved for use in areas with insulation, they are com-
monly used for recessed lighting in the upper level of a house, where
insulation is heaviest.' On the other hand, according to the National
Electric Code (NEC), 1 6 non-IC-rated light fixtures should not be used
in such a manner because insulation may entrap heat around the fix-
ture. 7 The NEC guidelines further state that insulation should not be
placed within three inches of a non-IC-rated fixture."t On each of the
non-IC-rated fixtures used in the Hoons' home and on the first page
of the instruction booklet that came with each fixture, a warning in
large red print cautioned that insulation should not be installed
within three inches of the fixture."t
The Lightolier model used by the Hoons was equipped with a
self-heating thermal protector (SHTP).2 ° These safety devices moni-
tor the temperature around the fixture so that when the SHTP detects
a temperature above 90'C, it shuts off the light.2 When the tempera-
ture around the fixture cools below 90'C, the SHTP turns the light
10. Lightolier, 837 Md. at 545-46, 876 A.2d at 104.
11. Id. at 546, 876 A.2d at 104. David Hoon is part owner of Westwind. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 545 n.1, 876 A.2d at 104 n.1. The court used the definitions of IC- and non-
IC-rated fixtures as described in the July 2004 Luminaire Marking Guide, written by the Un-
derwriters Laboratories Inc. Id.
15. Id.
16. The NEC is a set of safety guidelines provided by the National Fire Protection Asso-
ciation. Id. at 546 n.2, 876 A.2d at 105 n.2.
17. Id. at 546-47, 876 A.2d at 105.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 546, 876 A.2d at 104. Each Lightolier fixture specified the following:
"WARNING-RISK OF FIRE: DO NOT INSTALL INSULATION WITHIN 3 INCHES OF
FIXTURE SIDES OR WIRING COMPARTMENT NOR ABOVE FIXTURE IN SUCH A
MANNER TO ENTRAP HEAT." Id.
20. Id. at 547, 876 A.2d at 105. The NEC requires thermal-protection devices on all
non-IC-rated fixtures. Id. at 560, 876 A.2d at 113.
21. Id. at 547, 876 A.2d at 105.
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back on.2 2 Lightolier advises consumers and installers that a blinking
non-IC-rated fixture may indicate a problem with insulation.23 Thus,
the SHTPs both monitor the heat around a non-IC-rated fixture and,
with the blinking light, warn of a potential problem. 24 Even with the
SHTP on the model the Hoons used, Lightolier maintained that non-
IC-rated fixtures are not intended for use in ceilings where insulation
is installed.25
Subsequent to Westwind's installation of the Lightolier fixtures, a
subcontractor, Gede Insulation, installed blown-in cellulose insulation
into the ceiling where the fixtures were placed. 26 At some point after
this, two of the Lightolier fixtures began to blink.27 The Hoons no-
ticed the blinking lights, which were in the kitchen, and examined the
area in the ceiling around the two lights. 28 The Hoons found that
Gede had installed the insulation in direct contact with the lights, con-
trary to the warnings on the fixtures. 29 The Hoons removed the insu-
lation around those lights.30 Neither the Hoons nor any one else,
however, checked any of the other non-IC-rated fixtures after they
found insulation around the kitchen lights.31
On November 2, 1998, a fire started in the ceiling of the Hoons'
home near one of the Lightolier non-IC-rated fixtures and caused sub-
stantial damage. 2 The Hoons maintain that the fixture where the fire
started never blinked.33 Investigators determined that direct contact
between the fixture and insulation caused the fire.3 4
The Hoons filed suit on November 15, 1999 in the Circuit Court
for Kent County against Gede and Lightolier, among others.3 5 The
Hoons brought claims against Lightolier alleging negligence, breach
22. Id. Although the SHTP will cycle the electrical current off and on as it monitors
the temperature, the SHTP is not designed to permanently shut down an overheating fix-
ture. Id. at 547 n.5, 876 A.2d 105 n.5.
23. Id. at 547, 876 A.2d at 105. Besides the label warning against installing insulation
within three inches of the fixture, each non-IC Lightolier fixture had another warning
which read: "NOTICE-THERMALLY PROTECTED FIXTURE BLINKING LIGHT MAY
INDICATE INSULATION TOO CLOSE TO FIXTURE, OR IMPROPER LAMP." Id.
24. Id.
25. Brief of Appellants at 4, Lightolier, 387 Md. 539, 876 A.2d 100 (No. 117).
26. Lightolier, 387 Md. at 548, 876 A.2d at 105.
27. Id., 876 A.2d at 106.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 548-49, 876 A.2d at 106.
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of warranty, and product liability/defective design.36 The Hoons' ex-
pert determined that there was more than one cause of the fire, in-
cluding the direct contact of insulation with the non-IC-rated fixture
and the defective design of Lightolier's SHTP.37
On March 15, 2002, Lightolier filed for summary judgment.31
Lightolier argued that it was not liable to the Hoons because, under
Maryland law, if a consumer acts contrary to clear warnings on a prod-
uct, this constitutes misuse of the product, which precludes recov-
ery.39 The Hoons responded that the failure of the SHTP to function
properly was a concurrent cause of the fire.4" On April 15, 2002, the
circuit court granted summary judgment for Lightolier, finding that
the failure to heed the manufacturer's warning was the sole proximate
cause of the fire.41
The Court of Special Appeals reversed the lower court after con-
sidering the grounds on which the circuit court had based its sum-
mary judgment.4 2 First, the court reasoned that a reasonable jury
could find that the Hoons had acted reasonably in not checking the
light where the fire started because: (1) it was undisputed that the
fixture where the fire started never blinked, (2) the instructions indi-
cated that the fixture would blink if there was an over-heating prob-
lem, and (3) it was reasonable for the Hoons to think that the fixture
would blink if there was an insulation problem because of the Hoons'
experience with the other two fixtures in their home that had oper-
ated properly.4 3 Consequently, the court found that there was a jury
issue as to the reasonableness of the Hoons' actions.44 Second, the
court found that the Hoons' installation of the Lightolier fixture too
close to the insulation was reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer
because Lightolier had in fact foreseen such a use when it equipped
the fixtures with SHTPs and warned against contact with insulation.45
36. Id. at 549, 876 A.2d at 106. The Hoons settled with Gede after suit was filed and
before Lightolier moved for summary judgment. Id at 549 n.6, 876 A.2d at 106 n.6.
37. Hoon v. Lightolier, 158 Md. App. 648, 654 n.4, 857 A.2d 1184, 1187 n.4 (2004).
According to the Hoons' expert, Lightolier had defectively designed the fixture by locating
the SHTP too far from the heat source. Id The expert testified that insulation could come
between the SHTP and the fixture and render the SHTP ineffective. Id.
38. Lightolier, 387 Md. at 549, 876 A.2d at 106.
39. Hoon, 158 Md. App. at 655, 857 A.2d at 1187.
40. Id., 857 A.2d at 1188.
41. Lightolier, 387 Md. at 550, 876 A.2d at 107.
42. Hoon, 158 Md. App. at 657-58, 857 A.2d at 1189. The Court of Special Appeals also
considered the issue of contributory negligence, which will not be discussed in this Note.
Id.
43. Id., 857 A.2d at 1188-89.
44. Id., 857 A.2d at 1189.
45. Id. at 668, 857 A.2d at 1195.
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Thus, because there were possibly two concurrent causes of the injury,
namely, Gede's failure to heed the product warning and Lightolier's
defective design of the SHTPs, the Court of Special Appeals found
that the lower court erred in granting summary judgment for
Lightolier.46
On December 17, 2004, the Court of Appeals granted Lightolier's
petition for certiorari to determine whether the failure to heed the
manufacturer's warning not to place the non-IC-rated fixtures within
three inches of insulation was the sole proximate cause of the fire.4 7
2. Legal Background.-Under its products liability r6gime, Mary-
land has adopted the defenses of misuse (comment h) and failure to
follow warnings (commentj), which are enumerated in the comments
to § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: Products Liability.48 As
Maryland interprets commentj, consumers are presumed to read and
heed product warnings; consequently, a product bearing an adequate
warning, which makes it reasonably safe if followed, is not defective as
a matter of law.49 A number of jurisdictions, however, have rejected
this interpretation of comment j.50 Recognizing that consumers fre-
quently either to fail to follow warnings or simply to misunderstand
them, these jurisdictions and the Restatement (Third) reject an inter-
pretation of commentj that would allow a manufacturer to substitute
a warning for a safer design."
a. Strict Products Liability and the Doctrine of Misuse in Mary-
land.-In Phipps v. General Motors Corp.,52 the Court of Appeals of Ma-
ryland adopted strict products liability as defined in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts: Products Liability § 402A. Concurrently, the court ap-
proved the defenses to manufacturer liability discussed in the official
comments to § 402A, including the defenses of misuse and failure to
heed product warnings.53
In Phipps, a husband and his wife sued General Motors, alleging
that the accelerator of an automobile he was test-driving suddenly be-
came stuck, causing him to lose control of the car and veer off the
46. Id at 672, 857 A.2d at 1197.
47. Lightolier, 387 Md. at 544-45, 876 A.2d at 103-04. The court specifically granted
certiorari to address whether a manufacturer may be held liable in strict products liability
when a consumer improperly uses a product and fails to follow warnings. Id.
48. See infra Part 2.a.
49. See infra Part 2.b.
50. See, e.g., Uloth City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188 (Mass. 1978).
51. See infra Part 2.c.
52. 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976).
53. Id. at 346, 363 A.2d at 959-60.
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road.54 Phipps brought his action in the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, asserting a cause of action in strict prod-
ucts liability, citing recent Maryland decisions.55 The district court
certified questions of law to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, asking
whether Maryland had adopted strict products liability.56 The Court
of Appeals replied in the affirmative: Maryland adopted § 402A and
thus no longer required privity of contract for a consumer to bring an
action against the manufacturer. 5' Reasoning that the manufacturer
is better able to prevent injury than the consumer, and acknowledging
the substantial number ofjurisdictions that had already adopted strict
products liability, Maryland adopted § 402A.58 The pertinent part of
§ 402A provides:
402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical
Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property,
if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or con-
sumer without substantial change in the condition in which
it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prep-
aration and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product
from or entered into any contractual relation with the
seller.59
In adopting strict products liability, the Court of Appeals rea-
soned that a manufacturer who places an unreasonably dangerous
product on the market is better positioned to anticipate injuries from
the product, take steps to avoid those injuries, and bear their cost.60
The Phipps court also set out the elements of a products liability claim,
i.e., an injured consumer must prove that: (1) the product is defec-
54. Id. at 339, 363 A.2d at 956.
55. Id at 339-40, 363 A.2d at 956.
56. Id. at 340, 363 A.2d at 956-57.
57. Id. at 349, 352-53, 363 A.2d at 961, 963.
58. Id. at 352-53, 363 A.2d at 963.
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
60. Phipps, 278 Md. at 352-53, 363 A.2d at 963.
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tive, (2) the product is unreasonably dangerous, (3) the defect caused
the injuries, and (4) the manufacturer expected the product to reach
the consumer without significant change in its form and it did in fact
reach the consumer without such a change.61 Notably, a consumer
need not show that the manufacturer was negligent; rather, the focus
is on the defect and whether the product is unreasonably
dangerous.
In Phipps, the court also expressly approved the defenses set forth
in the comments to § 402A.6 3 Among the defenses enumerated in the
comments are abnormal use or handling (comment h) and failure to
heed product warnings (commentj).64 More specifically, comment h,
which describes the basis for the doctrine of misuse, states:
A product is not in a defective condition when it is safe for
normal handling and consumption. If the injury results from
abnormal handling, as where a bottled beverage is knocked
against a radiator to remove the cap, or from abnormal prep-
aration for use, as where too much salt is added to food, or
from abnormal consumption, as where a child eats too much
candy and is made ill, the seller is not liable.65
Along the same lines, language in commentj also provides a defense
for a manufacturer under Maryland law based on the behavior of the
consumer. Commentj provides:
Where warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume
that it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing such a
warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in defec-
tive condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.66
If either of these two defenses is applicable, i.e., if the consumer ei-
ther misuses the product or fails to follow an adequate warning, the
consumer cannot prove the element of defect, and consequently sum-
mary judgment for the manufacturer is proper.6 7
Although jurisdictions differ on the definition of "misuse," Mary-
land adheres to the "reasonable foreseeability" test, defining misuse as
68a use that is not reasonably foreseeable to a manufacturer. In sum,
61. Id. at 344, 363 A.2d at 958.
62. Id., 363 A.2d at 958-59.
63. Id. at 346, 363 A.2d at 959-60.
64. Id.
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILrrY § 402A cmt. h (1965).
66. § 402A cmt. j.
67. Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 591-92, 495 A.2d 348, 353 (1985).
Ellsworth is the principal case defining misuse in strict products liability under Maryland
law. See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
68. Ellsworth, 303 Md. at 595-96, 495 A.2d at 355.
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under Maryland law, a manufacturer must offer a product that is not
unreasonably dangerous when used in a foreseeable manner. If a
product is not unreasonably dangerous for foreseeable uses, it is not
defective as a matter of law.69
In applying the doctrine of misuse, jurisdictions are divided as to
whether lack of misuse is an element of the plaintiffs case or instead
an affirmative defense.7" In Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., the Court
of Appeals of Maryland specifically addressed this issue and held that
because misuse either is applicable to the element of defect or is an
issue of proximate cause, misuse is not an affirmative defense but is
instead part of the plaintiffs case.71 Misuse is, however, the functional
equivalent of a defense because proof of it negates one or more essen-
tial elements of the claim and thus may preclude recovery.7"
b. Application of the Doctrine of Misuse in Maryland.-After the
Court of Appeals adopted § 402A, it applied comments h andj to sev-
eral cases. Under comment h, a consumer misuses a product when he
uses it in a manner that is not reasonably foreseeable to the manufac-
turer, and such misuse precludes manufacturer liability.73 Under Ma-
ryland's construction of commentj, consumers are presumed to read
and heed adequate warnings and failure to do so may be seen by the
court as either negligence by the consumer or as misuse.7 4
The Court of Appeals applied the reasonable foreseeability test in
Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc.75 and held that the consumer's action
did not constitute misuse. In Ellsworth, the consumer was severely
burned when the nightgown she was wearing ignited as she leaned
over a stove. 76 The manufacturer argued that the consumer misused
the product by wearing it inside-out so that the pockets were on the
outside and hung over the burner.77 The court disagreed, reasoning
that it was reasonably foreseeable for a consumer to wear clothes in-
69. Id at 596, 495 A.2d at 355.
70. Id. at 592-93, 495 A.2d at 354. Some jurisdictions treat misuse as an affirmative
defense. E.g., Hammond v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 436 So. 2d 842 (Ala. 1983);
Nelson v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 694 P.2d 867 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984). Other jurisdictions
treat misuse as an issue of proximate causation or defect and consequently part of the
plaintiff's case. E.g., Illinois State Trust Co. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 392 N.E.2d 70 (Ill. App. Ct.
1979); Hughes v. Magic Chef, Inc., 288 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1980); Rogers v. Toro Mfg. Co.,
522 S.W.2d 632 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
71. 303 Md. at 597, 495 A.2d at 356.
72. Id.
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PRODucrs LIABILIrY § 402A cmt. h (1965).
74. See infra notes 79-101 and accompanying text.
75. 303 Md. at 581, 495 A.2d at 348.
76. Id. at 587, 495 A.2d at 350.
77. Id. at 587-88, 590-91, 495 A.2d at 351, 352-53.
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side-out on occasion and that "[m]omentary inattention or careless-
ness on the part of the user" is not a misuse.7"
Subsequent to the landmark Ellsworth decision, the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals applied the doctrine of misuse in several other cases. In
Simpson v. Standard Container Co., a child and his parents sued the
manufacturer of a gasoline container after the child was severely
burned and another child was killed when the children tipped over
and spilled a full gasoline container.7" The father of the deceased
child had stored the gasoline container in his basement.8 " The par-
ents claimed that the container was defectively designed and unrea-
sonably dangerous because it lacked a child-proof cap. l However,
warnings on two of the four sides of the gasoline container cautioned,
"Keep Out of Reach of Children" and "Do Not Store in Vehicle or
Living Space." 2 The court held that failure to follow the warnings
and storage of the full gasoline container within the home were mis-
use as a matter of law, thereby negating the element of defect.8" Con-
sequently, because the parents could not prove the proper elements
for a cause of action in products liability, the Court of Special Appeals
affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the case.8 4 The court further
noted that its decision was also based on commentj of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A. 5 The manufacturer had provided an ade-
quate warning that, when followed, made the product not unreasona-
bly dangerous.8 6 As a result, the product was neither defective nor
unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law.87
Similarly, in Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc.,"8 the Court of
Special Appeals found that the misuse of a product negated any prod-
ucts liability claim. In Halliday, the three-year-old son of Melissa Halli-
day was killed when the child found his father's gun, loaded it, and
shot himself while playing with it.89 The child discovered the gun
78. Id. at 598, 495 A.2d at 357.
79. 72 Md. App. 199, 527 A.2d 1337 (1987).
80. Id at 202, 527 A.2d at 1339.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 207, 527 A.2d at 1341.
83. Id. at 206, 527 A.2d at 1341.
84. Id. at 207, 527 A.2d at 1341.
85. Id. at 206-07, 527 A.2d at 1341.
86. Id at 207, 527 A.2d at 1341.
87. Id
88. 138 Md. App. 136, 770 A.2d 1072 (2001), affd in part, 368 Md. 186, 792 A.2d 1145
(2002). In affirming, the Court of Appeals considered whether Maryland should continue
to use the "consumer expectation" test rather than the "risk-utility" test. 368 Md. at 193-
208, 792 A.2d at 1149-58. The Court of Appeals did not address the lower court's finding
of misuse. I&/ at 193, 792 A.2d at 1149-50.
89. 138 Md. App. at 141, 770 A.2d at 1075.
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under his parents' mattress, found the ammunition that was stored
separately from the gun, and allegedly knew how to load the gun from
watching television." ° Melissa Halliday brought a defective design suit
against the manufacturer, arguing that the gun was unreasonably dan-
gerous and defective because it did not have a child-resistant trigger
lock as a safety device.91 Warnings in the instruction manual specifi-
cally cautioned consumers to store the gun away from the ammuni-
tion and to prevent children from gaining access to it. 9 2 The court
found that the father had misused the gun in affirmatively not follow-
ing the warnings, and that his misuse precluded recovery in products
liability.
93
The Halliday court cited a Fourth Circuit decision applying Mary-
land products liability law, wherein the Fourth Circuit noted that Ma-
ryland does not require a manufacturer to assume that a consumer
will fail to follow clear warnings.94 Finding that the manufacturer
could not have reasonably foreseen that the child's father would ig-
nore the explicit warnings supplied by the gun manufacturer, the
court held that as a matter of law, the father's conduct was not reason-
ably foreseeable and hence was a misuse.95
Finally, the Fourth Circuit has applied Maryland's definition of
misuse in two cases and in each found a misuse of the product as a
matter of law, negating any products liability claim. First, in Higgins v.
E.L DuPont de Nemours & Co.,9 6 parents of children who were stillborn,
prematurely aborted, or who had died shortly after birth brought sur-
vival actions against a paint manufacturer, alleging that the manufac-
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Halliday, 368 Md. at 189, 792 A.2d at 1147. More specifically, in a section of the
manual entitled "WARNING-STORAGE," in red letters was printed "Firearms should al-
ways be stored securely and unloaded, away from children and careless adults." Id. In
another section, in red capital letters, the manual read "FIREARMS SHOULD BE UN-
LOADED WHEN NOT IN USE," and the further warning in that section stated:
Firearms and ammunition should be securely locked in racks or cabinets when
not in use. Ammunition should be safely stored separate from firearms. Store
your firearms out of sight of visitors and children. It is the gun owner's responsi-
bility to be certain that children and persons unfamiliar with firearms cannot gain
access to firearms, ammunition, or components.
Id.
93. Halliday, 138 Md. App. at 174, 770 A.2d at 1094.
94. Id. (citing Hood v. Ryobi Am. Corp., 181 F.3d 608, 612 (4th Cir. 1999)).
95. Id., 770 A.2d at 1094-95. The court noted that besides the doctrine of misuse, com-
mentj (failure to heed warnings) might also be applicable; but because the lower court's
grant of summary judgment was not based on commentj, the court did not consider the
issue. Id. at 172 n.10, 770 A.2d at 1093 n.10.
96. 863 F.2d 1162 (4th Cir. 1988).
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turer had sold paint that was defective and unreasonably dangerous.
Each of the fathers was a city fireman who had used the manufactured
paint at work.97 Labels on the paint cans warned that the paint was
intended for industrial use only by trained professionals using eye pro-
tection, gloves, proper ventilation, and other protective measures.9s
The court held that the parents had misused the paint in failing to
heed the warnings to properly protect themselves and by working with
the paint although they were not professional painters.99
In another Fourth Circuit decision applying Maryland products
liability law, Hood v. Ryobi America Corp.,100 the court held that the con-
sumer had misused a miter saw by failing to heed warnings that cau-
tioned not to use the saw without the accompanying safety guards
properly attached. The court reasoned that, under Maryland law, if
the consumer fails to follow clear and easy-to-understand warnings,
then the consumer causes the injury, and his misconduct prevents
him from asserting a defective design claim.1 °1
c. Developments with Product Warnings: Other Jurisdictions and
the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability.-Comment j of
the Restatement (Second) was intended to relieve consumers of the bur-
den of proving causation in failure-to-warn claims. 102 Maryland is
among the few jurisdictions that construe the comment to mean that
adequate warnings may be substituted for a safer design."0 ' Many ju-
risdictions have specifically rejected commentj on this point because
of the concern that manufacturers could avoid liability by simply pro-
viding an adequate warning. 104 The Restatement (Third) of Torts also
pointedly rejects an interpretation of comment j that would allow a
manufacturer to substitute a warning for a safer design. 10 5
Comment j was intended to be a procedural device to help con-
sumers in failure-to-warn suits.106 In a failure-to-warn claim, the con-
97. Id. at 1164.
98. Id. at 1165.
99. Id. at 1168.
100. 181 F.3d 608 (4th Cir. 1999).
101. Id. at 612-13.
102. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Saenz, 873 S.W.2d 353, 358 (Tex. 1993).
103. Jurisdictions taking the same position as Maryland on the interpretation of com-
mentj include the District of Columbia, Illinois, Ohio, and South Carolina. Ferguson v.
F.R. Winkler GMBH & Co., 79 F.3d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Dugan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
447 N.E.2d 1055 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); Freas v. Prater Constr. Corp., 573 N.E.2d 27 (Ohio
1991); Curcio v. Caterpillar, Inc., 543 S.E.2d 264 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001).
104. E.g., Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188 (Mass. 1978); Uniroyal Goodrich
Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. 1998).
105. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. 1 (1998).
106. Saenz, 873 S.W.2d at 358.
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sumer alleges that the manufacturer failed to provide adequate
warnings.' 07 Recognizing that it would involve speculative evidence
and be difficult to prove, consumers do not have to prove causation,
that they would have read and followed adequate warnings if the man-
ufacturer had included them.'08 Instead, commentj provides the cau-
sation element by presuming that consumers will read and heed
sufficient warnings. 109 Thus, comment j was intended to help plain-
tiffs, not hurt them.110
In Uloth v. City Tank Corp., the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court specifically rejected adopting a rule that would allow manufac-
turers to avoid liability by simply providing an adequate warning.'11
The Uloth court reasoned that warnings may only make the possibility
of injury less likely and only in some situations.1 12 The court held that
the responsibility of making the product safer by design should con-
tinue to be placed on the manufacturer. 3
Likewise, in Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, the Supreme
Court of Texas refused to follow the comment j approach of the Re-
statement (Second) and reasoned that proof of the consumer's failure to
follow clear warnings should not end the suit.'14 In Martinez, al-
though the consumer failed to follow adequate warnings provided by
the manufacturer, he still stated a cause of action in products liabil-
ity." 5 An exploding tire injured the consumer in Martinez when he
attempted to mount a 16-inch tire onto a 16.5-inch rim. 116 Labels on
the tire warned that mounting a 16-inch tire on a 16.5-inch rim could
cause serious injury or death." 7 The warnings also cautioned against
leaning over the assembly while inflating and against inflating the tire
on the floor or a flat surface.'1 " The consumer violated each of these
warnings when he installed and inflated the tire.' Despite his con-
duct, the consumer was not precluded from his products liability
claim under Texas law. 120 The court reasoned that warnings are an
107. Id. at 357-58.
108. Id. at 358.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1192 (Mass. 1978).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 977 S.W.2d 328, 336-37 (Tex. 1998).
115. Id. at 337.
116. Id. at 331-32.
117. Id. at 332.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 337.
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insufficient fix for a design defect because consumers do not always
see, follow, or understand warnings, but they will always encounter the
design. 1
2 1
For similar reasons and specifically referring to URoth, the Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts: Products Liability rejects the interpretation that
commentj of the Restatement (Second) allows manufacturers to substi-
tute warnings for safer designs:
Reasonable designs and instructions or warnings both play
important roles in the production and distribution of reason-
ably safe products. In general, when a safer design can rea-
sonably be implemented and risks can reasonably be
designed out of a product, adoption of the safer design is
required over a warning that leaves a significant residuum of
such risks. For example, instructions and warnings may be
ineffective because users of the product may not be ade-
quately reached, may be likely to be inattentive, or may be
insufficiently motivated to follow the instructions or heed the
warnings. However, when an alternative design to avoid risks
cannot reasonably be implemented, adequate instructions
and warnings will normally be sufficient to render the prod-
uct reasonably safe. Warnings are not, however, a substitute
for the provision of a reasonably safe design. 22
In sum, as many courts are confronting the problem of consum-
ers failing to follow product warnings, these courts, along with the
drafters of the Restatement (Third), consider it reasonably foreseeable
for consumers to fail to follow product warnings. These courts and
the Restatement (Third) agree that products liability law should place
the burden on the manufacturer to design a safer product whenever
possible, and that consumer's failure to follow those warnings should
not preclude judicial evaluation of an allegedly defective design.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Lightolier v. Hoon, the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland reversed the Court of Special Appeals and held that
the installation of insulation within three inches of the recessed light-
ing fixture was the sole proximate cause of the fire and the consum-
ers' misuse of the product prevented them from bringing a defective
121. Id. at 336. Similarly, the District of Columbia explicitly rejected a rule that would
permit a manufacturer to avoid liability by "merely slap[ping]" an adequate warning on the
product. Rogers v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 144 F.3d 841, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1998); accord Delaney
v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 942-43 (Kan. 2000).
122. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. 1 (1998) (citation
omitted). As an illustration of some of the problems with commentj, the drafters of the
new Restatement provided an illustration based on the facts of Uloth. § 2 cmt. 1, illus. 14.
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design claim.' 2 3 Writing for the majority, Judge Cathell t24 found that
by failing to follow the manufacturer's adequate warnings, the Hoons
misused the fixture and therefore were barred from asserting a defec-
tive design claim.
12 5
The court first discussed the doctrine of strict products liability
and misuse.' 26 The court noted that in Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc.,
it had discussed at length § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
which defined the doctrine of strict liability in tort. 12 ' The Ellsworth
court also adopted the defense of misuse as applied to products
liability. 1 2
8
The court then clearly stated that Maryland's standard for misuse
is the reasonable foreseeability test.129 The court noted that the stan-
dard should be cautiously applied because any accident could appear
foreseeable after it has occurred. 13 0
The court then compared the case before it to another recent
products liability case, Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc."' The
court pointed out that in Halliday, the Court of Special Appeals prop-
erly applied Ellsworth when it held that the failure to heed the warn-
ings of the gun manufacturer was a misuse of the product, which
barred a defective design claim. 13 2 The court analogized the Hoons'
case to Halliday; in both cases, adequate warnings provided by the
manufacturer were unheeded and injury resulted.'33 The court noted
that in both Halliday and the case before it, the manufacturer had
foreseen the potential injury and had sought to prevent this by provid-
ing warnings.' 34 According to the court, warnings are meant to
"counteract" reasonably foreseeable injuries, and thus a person mis-
uses a product by failing to follow such a warning. 35
123. 387 Md. at 561-62, 876 A.2d at 113-14.
124. Judge Cathell was joined by Judges Raker, Harrell, and Greene. Id. at 543, 562, 876
A.2d at 103, 114.
125. Id. at 545, 876 A.2d at 104.
126. Id. at 552-55, 876 A.2d at 108-10.
127. Id at 552-53, 876 A.2d at 108-09.
128. Id. at 553-54, 876 A.2d at 109.
129. Id. at 554, 876 A.2d at 109.
130. Id. The court reiterated with approval the Court of Special Appeals's concern that
a manufacturer would become the insurer for any injury resulting from its product if the
reasonably foreseeable test was liberally applied. Id,
131. Id. at 554-55, 876 A.2d at 109-10.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 555, 876 A.2d at 110.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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Although the court found that summary judgment was proper
based solely on the doctrine of misuse, it also addressed a second dis-
tinct, yet closely connected basis for summary judgment-the failure
of the Hoons to heed the manufacturer's warning.1 36 Specifically, the
court stated that the failure to heed product warnings may constitute
negligence." 7 The court noted that misuse and failure to heed warn-
ings may both be applicable to the same case. 13 8 The court then com-
pared the case before it to Simpson v. Standard Oil Co., where the Court
of Special Appeals held that the consumers had failed to state a cause
of action both because they misused the product and failed to heed
the manufacturer's warning.'
39
Finally, the court addressed the Hoons' argument that the failure
of the SHTP safety device to work as designed was a proximate cause
of the fire.14° The court rejected this argument. 4 ' First, the court
noted that the NEC required Lightolier to include some sort of ther-
mal protection device, like the SHTP, on the recessed lighting fix-
ture.142 Next, the court stressed that Lightolier's product was not
defectively designed because it was designed as the NEC recom-
mended with the SHTP detector some distance away from the hottest
point of the fixture so that the SHTP is triggered only by abnormal
increases in temperature. 14 3 As a result, the court rejected the Hoons'
argument that there was more than one proximate cause to the
fire.144
136. Id. at 555-58, 876 A.2d at 110-11.
137. Id. at 556, 876 A.2d at 110. The court explained that where the warnings are ade-
quate, the plaintiff may not recover because a defective product did not cause the injury,
but instead the plaintiffs failure to heed the warnings. Id.
138. Id. at 556-57, 876 A.2d at 110-11.
139. Id. at 556-58, 876 A.2d at 111-12. The court also noted that product warnings must
be sufficiently clear and specific in order to be adequate. Id. at 558-59, 876 A.2d at 111-12.
Furthermore, in considering the adequacy of a warning, courts should consider the stan-
dards and practices of the industry. Id., 876 A.2d at 112. Applying this rule to the case
before it, the court found that because Lightolier's warnings conformed with the require-
ments of both the NEC and the UL marking guide, Lightolier's warnings were adequate.
Id.
140. Id. at 559-62, 876 A.2d at 112-14.
141. Id. at 561, 876 A.2d at 113.
142. Id. at 560, 876 A.2d at 113.
143. Id. at 560-61, 876 A.2d at 113. The court explained that variations in temperature
were not out of the ordinary with recessed lighting fixtures, especially because a recessed
lighting fixture may be suitable for multiple sized lamps. Id. at 560, 876 A.2d at 112. Thus,
the NEC noted that placement of the SHTP away from the heat source is common so that
the SHTP is triggered only by abnormal temperature increases such as those resulting from
the improper installation of insulation. Id., 876 A.2d at 112-13.
144. Id. at 561-62, 876 A.2d at 113-14.
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In his dissent, Judge Wilner found that summary judgment was
improper because there were two jury issues. 14 5 First, Judge Wilner
stated there was a genuine dispute as to whether the recessed light-
ning fixture at issue was intended for use in thermally insulated ar-
eas. 14 6 In particular, Judge Wilner thought the intended use of the
product was unclear because the warnings stated that the fixture
should not be placed within three inches of insulation and because
the manufacturer equipped the fixture with the SHTP safety device.14 7
Judge Wilner argued that such precautions suggested that the fixture
was actually designed for use in insulated ceilings. 48 Next, the dissent
argued that there was a genuine dispute over whether the SHTP de-
vice was defectively designed and whether the failure of the SHTP de-
vice to function was a proximate cause of the fire.' 49 The dissent
therefore did not agree that the consumers' failure to follow the warn-
ings was a misuse that barred a design defect claim."'
4. Analysis.-In Lightolier v. Hoon, the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land missed an opportunity to reevaluate the effect of a consumer's
failure to follow product warnings in a products liability case. In each
of the cases upon which the majority relies, misuse was based on a
failure to follow warnings. 5 Under Maryland products liability law,
the failure to follow warnings is a type of misuse that operates like
contributory negligence in that the misconduct of the consumer pre-
cludes any claim.15 z This rule is based on Maryland's construction of
commentj of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: Products Liability § 402A.
However, Maryland's application of comment j is an inappropriate
standard for two reasons: first, comment j reflects an unrealistic un-
derstanding of a consumer's ability to comprehend and follow warn-
ings;1'5 3 and second, Maryland's construction of comment j allows
manufacturers to use warnings as a shield against liability, rather than
mandate that manufacturers design a safer product whenever possi-
ble.' 5 4 Maryland is misapplying comment j, invoking it in both the
wrong context and in the wrong manner. In Lightolier v. Hoon, the
145. Id. at 563, 876 A.2d at 114 (Wilner, J., dissenting). Judge Wilner was joined by
Chief Judge Bell and Judge Battaglia. Id. at 562, 876 A.2d at 114.
146. Id. at 563, 876 A.2d at 114.
147. I&
148. Id
149. Id. at 563-64, 876 A.2d at 115.
150. Id
151. See supra notes 73-101 and accompanying text.
152. See supra Part 2.b.
153. See infna Part 4.a.
154. See infra Part 4.b.
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Court of Appeals also missed an opportunity to conform Maryland law
with the Restatement (Third), which explicitly rejects Maryland's inter-
pretation of commentj of the Restatement (Second).1 55
a. Failure to Follow Warnings Should Not Be a Complete Bar to a
Products Liability Claim Because It Unrealistically Assumes Consumers Al-
ways Understand and Heed Warnings.-In Lightolier v. Hoon, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland continued to apply the unrealistic assumption
that adequate warnings will always be understood and properly fol-
lowed by consumers.156 The court held that failure to follow warnings
is a type of misuse; the court also continued to define misuse as one
that is "not reasonably foreseeable." '57 Considering these two state-
ments together, it seems that the court held that a consumer's failure
to follow product warnings is not reasonably foreseeable. This conclu-
sion is contrary to practical experience. As a number of courts and
commentators have recognized, there are myriad reasons why an ade-
quate warning may nonetheless not be followed. 158
Because there is substantial evidence that consumers often do not
follow warnings for a variety of reasons, the Maryland rule followed in
Lightolier v. Hoon, which assumes as a matter of law that warnings
should always be understood and followed, is simply unrealistic. 59 As
Howard Latin argues, there are many reasons why consumers may not
follow product warnings, and comment j is an inappropriate judicial
presumption. 60 For instance, a consumer may not follow instructions
because the instructions are difficult to understand or the conse-
155. See infra Part 4.c.
156. 387 Md. at 557-58, 876 A.2d at 111.
157. Id at 554-55, 876 A.2d 109-110.
158. See, e.g., Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 942 (Kan. 2000) (noting that a
warning does not necessarily render a product safe); Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d
1188, 1192 (Mass. 1978) (holding that a consumer's failure to follow warnings should not
preclude judicial evaluation of an alleged design defect because warnings cannot prevent
all injuries and because the manufacturer is in a better position to prevent the injury);
Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 336-37 (Tex. 1998) (reasoning
that "warnings are an imperfect means to remedy a product defect" and rejecting the man-
ufacturer's argument that a manufacturer is not liable for an alleged defective design when
the consumer fails to follow product warnings); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Saenz, 873 S.W.2d
353, 358 (Tex. 1993) ("[I]t is not at all unusual for a person to fail to follow basic warnings
and instructions.").
159. See generally Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations,
41 UCLA L. Rav. 1193 (1994).
160. Latin, supra note 159, at 1206-48. But see Kenneth Ian Weissman, A "CommentJ"
Parry to Howard Latin's "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 70 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 629 (1996).
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quences of not following the instructions are not clear. 61 In some
cases, the consumer may reason that she is less likely to be injured by a
product when she has already used the product contrary to the warn-
ings without any injury. 16 2 Also, as manufacturers place more and
more warnings on products, consumers may be less responsive to
these warnings based on an assumption that manufacturers include
warnings more for the purpose of avoiding liability, rather than to
warn against serious dangers.1 63
In Lightolier, the Court of Appeals of Maryland should have con-
sidered the rationales of other jurisdictions that have rejected com-
mentj because of its unrealistic behavioral assumption. For example,
the Supreme Court of Texas in Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez
explicitly rejected any rule that would assume that warnings are always
understood and heeded as a matter of law. 164 The court noted that
there are many reasons why warnings may not be followed by consum-
ers and the court specifically quoted the rationale of comment 1 of the
Restatement (Third).165 Likewise, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court in Uloth v. City Tank Corp. rejected a rule that would prevent a
defective design claim if the consumer failed to follow product warn-
ings because the court reasoned that a warning will not always prevent
injury. 16' The Uloth court noted that a warning will not prevent an
injury caused by "instinctual reactions, momentary inadvertence, or
forgetfulness." '167
In Lightolier, the court erred in finding that it was unforeseeable
for the Hoons to contract with Gede to install insulation around the
light fixtures without ensuring that the warnings were heeded. On
the contrary, because consumers routinely fail to follow warnings, the
failure of the Hoons to follow the product warnings seems reasonably
foreseeable.' 68 Furthermore, the Hoons' mistake was arguably more
161. Latin, supra note 159, at 1222-26. Latin refers to commentj's assumption that peo-
ple will always understand and follow adequate warnings as an "unrealistic behavioral pre-
sumption." Id at 1196.
162. Id. at 1232.
163. Id. at 1247-48.
164. 977 S.W.2d at 345.
165. Id. at 336-37.
166. 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1192 (Mass. 1978).
167. I.
168. Latin, supra note 159, at 1276. In Lightolier, it is not even clear that the consumers
acted unreasonably in failing to follow the warnings. The consumers were not unreasona-
ble in failing to check the other light fixtures after they discovered a problem with two of
the fixtures. Hoon v. Lightolier, 158 Md. App. 648, 657, 857 A.2d 1184, 1189 (2004).
From the consumers' perspective, they could have reasonably assumed any other fixture
would also blink if it had an insulation problem. Id The Court of Special Appeals found
this argument persuasive. Id.
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foreseeable because of the wording of the warning and the existence
of the SHTP.'6 9 As Judge Wilner notes in his dissent, although Light-
olier insisted the fixture at issue was not intended for use in an insu-
lated ceiling, the fact that the fixture included the SHTP safety device
and the presence of the warning could reasonably lead to the opposite
inference. 7 The warning on the fixture did not prohibit installing the
fixture in an insulated ceiling; instead, the warning only stated not to
install the fixture within three inches of insulation.'7 1 Thus, in Light-
olier, the warnings themselves were not clear and therefore it is all the
more problematic to assume that they will be followed.172
The Court of Appeals did not sufficiently respond to the lower
court's finding that the existence of the SHTP did in fact imply that
Lightolier foresaw that a consumer might not follow the warnings.
173
The Court of Appeals noted that NEC guidelines required the Light-
olier fixture to include a safety device like the SHTP. 174 Thus, the
court reasoned, it was not necessarily because Lightolier foresaw a fail-
ure to follow directions that Lightolier included the SHTP, but be-
cause Lightolier was simply following NEC guidelines. 175  This,
however, does not negate the Court of Special Appeals's point, but
simply moves the foresight from Lightolier to NEC. Consequently, a
consumer's failure to follow the warnings is still reasonably foresee-
able and is even more foreseeable because the agency responsible for
overseeing the safety of this product line specifically foresaw such a
problem. 17
6
The Lightolier court failed to address the logical incongruity of the
application of the doctrine of misuse to a case where the consumer
fails to follow product warnings. The example the court used in its
first and still fundamental explanation of misuse, in Ellsworth v. Sherne
Lingerie, Inc., is inapposite to a case like Lightolier where the consumer
169. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
170. Lightolier, 387 Md. at 563, 876 A.2d at 114-15 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
171. Id., 876 A.2d at 114.
172. The Court of Appeals found the directions were adequate because they were
plainly visible on the fixture itself and in the instruction manual, conformed with industry
standards, and were precise enough to state that insulation should not come within three
inches of the fixture. Id. at 558-59, 876 A.2d at 112 (majority opinion). However, the
dissent argued that the warnings were not clear about the proper usage of the fixture. Id.
at 563, 876 A.2d at 114-15 (Wilner,J., dissenting). Furthermore, the court should also have
considered that the warnings and the purpose of the safety device are likely clearer to the
court when evaluating them after the fire than they would be to a consumer about to use
the product. Latin, supra note 159, at 1223.
173. Hoon, 158 Md. App. at 658-59, 857 A.2d 1184, 1189-90.
174. Lightolier, 387 Md. at 560, 876 A.2d at 113.
175. Id. at 559-60, 876 A.2d at 112-13.
176. Id.
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has failed to follow product warnings. In Ellsworth, the court ex-
plained that misuse may be the sole proximate cause of an injury
where the misuse is the intervening or superseding cause.' 7 7 As an
example, the court offered an electric drill with a design defect that
causes the drill to short circuit and results in an electric shock during
normal usage. 171 If a consumer took that same drill and attached a
toothbrush to the drill and injured himself trying to brush his teeth
with the drill (and the drill did not short circuit), misuse of the drill
would be the sole proximate cause of his injury.'7 9 As the court cor-
rectly states, although anything is reasonably foreseeable after a con-
sumer has done it, attaching a toothbrush to an electric drill to brush
one's teeth is not.8 ° In this example, the design defect and the con-
sumer's use of the drill are separate, such that the design defect was
not a part of the chain of events leading to the injury.18 1
The Lightolier court did not, however, reconcile the Ellsworth ex-
planation of misuse with its finding of misuse in Lightolier. In Light-
olier, the design defect and the consumer's misuse were part of the
same chain leading to the injury. More specifically, the Hoons alleged
that Lightolier had defectively designed the fixture by placing the
SHTP so far from the heat source that it could not properly detect a
fire.18 2 The misuse by the Hoons in failing to follow the directions led
to entrapment around the fixture of heat that the fixture was in-
tended to detect."8 3 Thus, if the SHTP had functioned properly, it
should have detected the excessive heat prior to the fire caused by
insulation placed around the fixture."8 4 In Lightolier, the defect in the
light fixture may have led to the harm.'8 5 Although the Hoons mis-
used the product because they used the fixture contrary to the direc-
tions, the Hoons' misuse was reasonably foreseeable as Lightolier
specifically warned against such use.1 86 The court failed, however, to
address this logical inconsistency in Maryland's misuse doctrine.
Thus, in Lightolier v. Hoon, the Court of Appeals failed to elimi-
nate Maryland's adherence to the unrealistic assumption that consum-
ers consistently comprehend and follow product warnings.
177. 303 Md. 581, 596, 495 A.2d 348, 355 (1985).
178. Id., 495 A.2d at 355-56.
179. Id., 495 A.2d at 356.
180. Id
181. Id.
182. 387 Md. at 559, 876 A.2d at 112.
183. Id. at 561, 876 A.2d at 113.
184. Id. at 563, 876 A.2d at 115 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
185. Id.
186. Hoon v. Lightolier, 158 Md. App. 648, 664, 857 A.2d 1184, 1192 (2004).
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Particularly in this case, where the consumers' actions were foresee-
able and the product did not function as designed, the heeding as-
sumption is an awkward judicial fiction.
b. Comment J, as Construed by the Maryland Court of Appeals, Is
an Improper Standard Because It Allows Manufacturers to Substitute Warn-
ings for Safer Designs.-In Lightolier v. Hoon, even though the manufac-
turer had a safer alternative design, the manufacturer could produce
the more dangerous model with a warning, rather than the safer alter-
native, because the consumers' misuse precluded their products liabil-
ity suit.1 87 Given Maryland's interpretation of comment j of the
Restatement (Second), if the manufacturer provides an adequate warn-
ing that the consumer fails to follow, the consumer is precluded from
bringing a defective design suit, even if the manufacturer knows of a
safer, alternative design.
188
By continuing to follow this interpretation of comment j, the
Court of Appeals in Lightolier v. Hoon inappropriately reduces the bur-
den on manufacturers to design a safer product.1 89 Applying the com-
ment j presumption as Maryland does means that once the
manufacturer shows that the consumer failed to follow adequate warn-
ings, the court's ability to analyze any potential design defect is sum-
marily eliminated.19 °  Maryland is one of a few "misguided"
jurisdictions that continue to apply the comment j presumption in
this way. 91 Furthermore, Maryland's application of the comment j
presumption treats all consumers the same, regardless of why they
failed to follow warnings.1
92
In Lightolier, the Court of Appeals should have taken the chance
to follow those jurisdictions that reject a construction of comment j
that allows warnings to substitute for safer designs. For example, the
Supreme Court of Kansas in Delaney v. Deere & Co., refused to follow
187. David G. Owen, Warnings Don't Trump Design: The Rise and Fall of § 402A CommentJ,
PRODS. LtAB. ADVIsoRY, Nov. 2001, at 1, 1 n.21.
188. Lightolier, 387 Md. at 553-54, 876 A.2d at 109.
189. See Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1192 (Mass. 1978) (arguing that the
manufacturer is in a better position to recognize defects and minimize risks and conse-
quently the burden should be on the manufacturer to cure defects).
190. Latin, supra note 159, at 1196-97; accord James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twer-
ski, The Politics of the Products Liability Restatement, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 667, 689 (1998).
191. Owen, supra note 187, at 1. Other decisions following Maryland's reasoning in-
clude Ferguson v. F. Winkler GMBH & Co., 79 F.3d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1996), Dugan v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 447 N.E.2d 1055 (111. App. Ct. 1983), Freas v. Prater Constr. Corp., 573 N.E.2d
27 (Ohio 1991), and Curcio v. Caterpillar, Inc., 543 S.E.2d 264 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001).
192. See Latin, supra note 159, at 1207-08 (explaining that there are many different rea-
sons why consumers may not read or heed warnings, one of which is illiteracy).
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comment j specifically because it has been construed to allow ade-
quate warnings to substitute for a safer design. 19 3 Likewise in Uloth v.
City Tank Corp. (upon which the Delaney court relied in part), the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court refused to hold that an adequate
warning allows a manufacturer to avoid liability.'94 The Uloth court
reasoned that even a careful user may on occasion fail to follow warn-
ings, and this should not preclude analysis of whether a product is
defective.' 95 Along the same lines, the Supreme Court of Texas rea-
soned that it is appropriate for courts to evaluate an alleged design
defect precisely because warnings will not always solve design
problems or prevent injuries.' 96 Consequently, while consumers may
not understand or heed warnings, they will always "encounter" the
design.' 9 7
The Lightolier court did not properly address the failure of the IC-
rated fixture to function as designed. 9 ' In his dissent, Judge Wilner
rightly criticized the court for minimizing the issue.' 99 None of the
decisions upon which Lightolier relied involved a product that failed to
function as designed.2 °° Consequently, the Lightolier court's finding
that Halliday was controlling was misplaced because Halliday and Light-
olier are factually distinguishable.'O° Although in both Halliday and
Lightolier, the consumers failed to heed product warnings, Halliday is
inapposite because the product there functioned exactly as designed,
while in Lightolier, the light failed to blink to warn of an insulation
problem.20 2 This makes the application in Lightolier of the doctrine of
misuse awkward at best.20 3
193. 999 P.2d 930, 942-43 (Kan. 2000).
194. 384 N.E.2d at 1192.
195. Id.
196. Uniroyal v. Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 336-37 (Tex. 1998).
197. Id. at 336. Even courts that adhere to the commentj presumption admit the pre-
sumption does not reflect reality. E.g., Coffman v. Keene Corp., 628 A.2d 710, 717 (NJ.
1993).
198. SeeHoon v. Lightolier, 158 Md. App. 648, 666, 857 A.2d 1184, 1194 (2004) (stating
that the light fixture did not operate correctly, according to expert testimony). The Court
of Special Appeals looked outside Maryland to an Ohio court for guidance and held that
the failure of the light fixture to properly function meant that the commentj presumption
is inapplicable. Id.
199. Lightolier, 387 Md. at 563-64, 876 A.2d at 115 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
200. Hoon, 158 Md. at 666, 857 A.2d at 1194. More specifically, although each of the
cases cited by Lightolier did involve a consumer's failure to follow warnings, in each case
the product either functioned as intended or did not malfunction. Id. at 659-72, 857 A.2d
at 1190-97.
201. See Lightolier, 387 Md. at 554-555, 876 A.2d at 109-10.
202. Hoon, 158 Md. App. at 666-67, 857 A.2d 1184, 1194.
203. At least one court has held that the commentj presumption does not apply when
the product fails to operate as designed. Moorhead v. Carborundum Co., No. 461, 1983
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c. The Lightolier Court Missed an Opportunity to Bring Mary-
land Law into Conformity with the Third Restatement.-In Lightolier v.
Hoon, the Court of Appeals should have reconsidered its interpreta-
tion of the comment j presumption. Maryland is improperly inter-
preting the commentj presumption by applying it to the detriment of
consumers, rather than for their benefit, as intended.20 4 Although
most courts employ the comment j presumption in failure-to-warn
suits to relieve consumers of the burden of proving causation, Mary-
land is misapplying the comment by using the presumption against
consumers in design defect claims. 20 5
In Lightolier, the Court of Appeals missed an opportunity to ad-
vance Maryland products liability law by bringing it into agreement
with the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability. In the new Re-
statement, commentj is rejected as "unfortunate language" that has led
to extensive criticism and misapplications. °6
In Lightolier, the Court of Appeals failed to reconsider the effects
of its interpretation of comment j. The drafters of the Restatement
(Third) agree with the criticisms of comment j that to assume as a
matter of law that consumers will always understand warnings is un-
realistic. 20 7 The Restatement (Third) rejects Maryland's interpretation
of comment j as "primitive."20 8 According to the Restatement (Third),
the read-and-heed presumption should have no more force than its
original purpose: to relieve consumers of the burden of showing they
would have followed adequate warnings if they had been provided.2 9
The presumption is not intended to allow manufacturers to substitute
warnings for a safer design because an adequate warning cannot al-
ways prevent injury.210 Instead a safer design, when possible, is pre-
ferred over a warning.211
WL 4345 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 27, 1983) (unpublished decision). The Moorhead court did
not explain its reasoning for holding the commentj presumption inapplicable when the
product does not function as designed. It is not clear what the effect of the safety device's
malfunction should be, but if anything, the possibility that the product did not function as
it was supposed to weakens the court's holding that the only proximate cause of the fire
was the Hoons' misuse.
204. See generally Owen, supra note 187.
205. Id. at 1 n.6.
206. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODucrs LIABILITY § 2, cmt. 1 (1998).
207. Id.
208. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 190, at 689.
209. Owen, supra note 187, at 1.
210. Id.
211. § 2, cmt. 1.
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5. Conclusion.-In Lightolier v. Hoon, the Court of Appeals held
that a manufacturer may not be held strictly liable when a consumer
fails to follow warnings.212 This decision was based on Maryland's con-
tinued adherence to its interpretation of commentj of the Restatement
(Second) .213 Comment j's assumption that warnings will always be fol-
lowed by consumers is unrealistic based on everyday experience.214
By maintaining such a standard, the court allows manufacturers to
avoid liability and to avoid designing safer alternatives by simply warn-
ing consumers of potential dangers.2 15 Rather than upholding such
an unrealistic assumption, the court should have taken the opportu-
nity presented in Lightolier to reevaluate its assumption that consumers
always read and heed instructions and should have brought Maryland
law into conformity with the Restatement (Third).216
ERIN O'DA
212. 387 Md. at 545, 876 A.2d at 104.
213. See supra Part 2.b.
214. See supra Part 4.a.
215. See supra Part 4.b.
216. See supra Part 4.c.
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